was written on the day of the date of Mr. Trist's first note to you, and only the day before your captious reply to it, and in both you assail the War Department. Your withering disappointment seems to have slumbered for ten days, and then to have been aroused by the appearance of Mr. Trist in Mexico, and your quarrel with him. If the order from the War Department had in fact "diverted" the forces with General Cadwalader, still it was fully justified by the threatening aspect of affairs on the Rio Grande; but I am quite sure that it did not divert them. No previous order from the department had designated any other place of rendezvous than the Brazos, for the troops that were to join your column. It was well understood, before you left Washington, that all the troops for both armies were to be sent to that place, and there to fall under your command. This arrangement was not, nor was it expected that it would be, here changed, until you had penetrated so far into the enemy's country as to render your communication with that place of general rendezvous difficult and dilatory.

You also complain that the order was not countermanded. If there had been such an order, and it had been countermanded, what would have been the consequence? The troops would have gone forward from the United States, under the former orders of the department, which would have taken them to the same place.

You allege that "the news of the victory of Buena Vista reached Washington in time to countermand Cadwalader's orders for the Rio Grande, before his departure from New Orleans." I notice this specification of neglect of duty, to show the extent to which you have carried your fault finding, and the industry with which you have searched for occasions to indulge it.

Your assumption is, that the news of the victory of Buena Vista should have satisfied the War Department that Cadwalader's forces were not needed on the Rio Grande, and the omission to countermand, as soon as that news was received, the orders to send them there, was a neglect deserving severe animadversion. How did you act under similar circumstances? With better means of information as to the actual condition of the Rio Grande frontier after the victory of Buena Vista, you did not deem it prudent, after being fortyone days in possession of the news of that victory, to issue positive orders to remove a single man from that frontier; yet, you venture to censure me for not having sent the troops away the moment the news reached Washington.

You received information of that victory on or before the 14th of March, for on that day you proclaimed it in orders to your army. On the 25th of April, more than forty days thereafter, you issued an order to the commanding officer at the Brazos, to embark for Vera Cruz "such detachments of the new regiments as may have been ordered by the War Department to Point Isabel;" but you made it conditional, with reference to the safety of the line of the Rio Grande, and said to that officer that you relied upon his "sound judgment to determine on the spot, whether that line would not be too much exposed by the withdrawal of the troops in question." Thus it appears that you do not hesitate to impute

neglect of duty to me, for not having adopted and acted on the conclusion that the line of the Rio Grande was safe the moment I heard of the victory of Buena Vista; but, when acting on the same subject, you dared not adopt that conclusion, although you had been in possession of the same information forty one days. Your own conduct in this matter completely refutes this charge of yours against the War Department; it does more, it shows how rash and inconsiderate you have been in selecting 'topics for

attack.

But the most serious consequences are attributed to the long delay of these troops at the Brazos. For your sake, I sincerely hope these consequences are much exaggerated, because I am quite confident it will be shown that you alone are responsible for the delay. The War Department did not-and it was proper that it should not-issue any order in regard to the movement of the troops after their arrival in Mexico. The order from the department, of the 30th of April, making a division of the new levies between the two columns, does not contradict this assertion, for these levies were then mostly within the United States; only portions of them had then reached Mexico. Until this order took effect, the troops at the Brazos, and, indeed, on the Rio Grande and with General Taylor, were under your entire and unrestricted command. As to this matter you were under no misapprehension, for, on the 25th of April, and before you were informed what had been done here to secure the Rio Grande line, you issued an order in relation to the troops at the Brazos. This place, you well knew, was the general rendezvous of the new levies from the United States; and before you sailed on your expedition to Vera Cruz, you were notified that the Mexican army were advancing upon General Taylor. To have assumed that you had not left at the Brazos, with a view to meet any probably contingency, orders for the proper disposition of the troops which were or might be sent there, would have implied an opinion that you wanted suitable qualifications for the high station which had been assigned to you. These troops were a part of your command, and subject to your orders; and if they remained one day at the Brazos after it was there known that they were not needed on the Rio Grande line, and would be serviceable with your column, the fault was entirely your own, and in no wise imputable to the War Department. If your opinion be not extravagant, and you say it is not, that, but for the diversion of General Cadwalader's forces from you, and the "much precious time" lost at the Brazos, you "might easily have taken this city (Mexico) in the month of June, and at one-fifth of the loss sustained in August and September," you have, indeed, a most fearful account to settle with your country.

I cannot, however, but regard your speculative opinions on this subject as fanciful and wild. You greatly over estimate the forces which landed at the Brazos, and subsequently joined you. From the best calculations which can be made from data in the adjutant general's office, the number was much less than you imagine, and did not probably exceed one thousand. As the refutation of your

charge against the department for diverting these troops is in no wise impaired by their number, be it more or less, it is not important to inquire into that matter; but there is a question of serious import, which I think the country will expect you to answer. If these new levies, which had just entered the service, would have enabled you to capture the city of Mexico in June, with a comparatively small loss, why did you at the very time you discovered that they were so much needed, and would have been so useful, send away from your army three times as many volunteers, who had been many months in service, and were, as you acknowledge, 66 respectable in discipline and efficiency," and who had distinguished themselves at Vera Cruz and Cerro Gordo, and in the hour of peril had fought by the side of your veteran troops, and merited an honorable share in the glory of those memorable conflicts? The period of their engagement had not expired. When thus sent away but one of the seven regiments had less than thirty, and most of them had more than forty-five days to serve. According to your own opinion, concurred in by the department, they could have been legally retained on your line of operations till the last hour of their engagement. If not deemed expedient to take them on towards Mexico with you, their services at that critical period would have been of inestimable value in holding the post at Jalapa, so important and so unexpectedly abandoned, and in keeping open the communication between Vera Cruz and your head-quarters, whereby supplies, munitions, and recruits could be safely and expeditiously forwarded to you. Had this been done you would have been spared the trouble of inditing many items of grievance and complaint against the War Department, for having failed to furnish them. If you had retained the twelve months' volunteers until the end of their agreement-and no sufficient reason has yet been shown for their premature discharge-you might, for a season at least, have received, without much obstruction, supplies from the main depôt on the gulf; the army might have been strengthened by reinforcements at an earlier period, and many of the revolting scenes of barbarity on the road from Vera Cruz to Jalapa, in which so many lives of our fellow citizens have been sacrificed by the ruthless guerrilleros, would not have occurred.

Another and still more lamentable calamity is, I think, fairly to be ascribed to the early obstruction of this important line of communication. The brave and patriotic men who were hurried on to Mexico in small detachments, in order to reinforce your army, were unexpectedly but necessarily detained at Vera Cruz until the numbers there collected were sufficient to force their way through the strong guerrilla bands which held the difficult passes on the Jalapa road. While thus detained on that inhospitable coast in the sickly season, they were exposed to the attacks of a wasting pestilence, more formidable and, as it unfortunately proved, more destructive than the Mexican army.

When the unwelcome news of the premature discharge of this large body of volunteers was received here, unaccompanied by any explanation to show the necessity of the act, it excited very gene

ral surprise and regret; its consequences were at once foreseen, but the step had been taken and could not be retraced. It was loudly condemned. Many did not believe that a measure which appeared to be so unwise and so injurious to the operations of the army could have emanated from yourself, but they were less charitable towards the President and Secretary of War. Both were denounced for what you had done; they were unscrupulously charged with weakness and incapacity; with being actuated by hostility to you, and a desire to secure popularity with the volunteers, nor were these bitter assaults intermitted until it began to be suspected that they were misdirected.

If you really regarded, on the 6th of May, the augmentation of your forces as being of such vital importance, it is almost as difficult to account for the course taken to re-engage the volunteers, as for their premature discharge. I am misled by information on which I ought to rely, if many of these volunteers would not have continued in service if proper measures had been taken at Jalapa, while they were indulging the hope of participating in further triumphs, and of being among those who would enjoy the enviable distinction of first entering, as victors, the proud capital of the Mexican republic. Though the subject was there presented to their consideration, no vigorous efforts seem to have been made, no attempt to form new companies, or to muster them into service, until this powerful inducement was weakened or withdrawn; until they had been detached from a victorious army, as if no longer deemed worthy to be a part of it; sent sixty miles towards their homes, into a pestilential region, and there brought within the sympathetic influence of the sentiments which, it was natural that many should feel and manifest, at the moment of embarking, to return to their families and friends. Considering the manner in which the Presi dent's order on that subject was attempted to be executed, it is not strange that among more than three thousand patriotic volunteers sent away by your order of the 4th of May, only about "fifty individuals" were found willing to re-engage.

You seem to have suddenly conceived the notion of converting the army, "like Cortez," "into a self-sustaining machine," and to make the resemblance between yourself and the Spanish hero more complete, you indulged a dream of fancy, until you seem to have adopted it as a matter of belief, that you were "doomed at Washington," and you became "like him, always afraid that the next ship or messenger might recall or further cripple" you.

It should not be forgotten that the design of this unaccountable military movement was first communicated to Mr. Trist, before you had given any intimation of it to your government, and while under the perturbation of mind which his unwelcome presence in Mexico had produced. Had you confided this extraordinary plan of a campaign to him, after the "happy change" in your relations; after you had digested his "farrago of insolence, conceit, and arrogance;" and, after he too, mistaking motoriety for fame, had sought to win it by disobeying the orders of his government, defying its authority, and assailing its conduct, this distinguishing mark of your

confidence in him would have caused much less surprise. This novel conception, so suddenly adopted, was as suddenly carried outyour army was indeed converted "into a self-sustaining machine". you discharged the twelve months' volunteers, and broke up your post at Jalapa, and on the way to your main depot; "resolved," as you announced, "no longer to depend on Vera Cruz or home;" you put yourself beyond the reach of the supplies which had been provided by the government, and rendered yourself, in a great measure, inaccessible to the recruits and levies (except in strong parties) which had been raised to augment your command. In this way you rendered unavailing, for a time at least, all that had been or could be done by the assiduous and incessant labors of the War Department in all its branches, and then you recklessly put forth the groundless complaint of "a total want of support and sym-' pathy" from it.

Your letter of the 25th of July, which was not received at Washington until the 30th of December last, abounds with complaints against the department, and refers in strong terms to the wants and sufferings of the army at that time. Before you venture to make its then destitute condition a ground of charge against the War Department, you ought to have recollected that the afflictions fell upon it in the midst of your experiment of making it "a self-sustaining machine," and were the legitimate fruits of that experiment. These sufferings came upon it before your estimated period of isolation from " Vera Cruz and home" had half expired. When you had designedly and unnecessarily abandoned both, and entered upon your self-sustaining position, "cut off from all supplies and reinforcements from home, until perhaps late in November," by what pretence of justice do you complain of the War Department for the distresses you thus voluntarily inflicted upon yourself and the gallant army under your command? Something very different from censure and reproof is due for the extraordinary efforts which were successfully made to reach you with recruits and supplies in your sequestered situation, and to rescue you from the embarrassments in which your ill-judged measure had involved you. I have brought into view this unaccountable movement of yours, with no purpose to make any comment upon it as a military measure, but solely to show that the evils resulting from it are not just grounds of accusation against the War Department, and that the labored attempt to pervert them to such a purpose, discloses the manner and spirit with which you have executed the assumed task of its accuser. As you have indulged in the widest range of speculation in regard to the alleged sinister motives and covert designs of others, I feel less reluctant to present my views as to the main object of your last communication. Throughout the whole of it, and particularly in the concluding part, you manifest the utmost solicitude to place yourself in the position of an injured and persecuted man. With all the aid you can derive from dextrous strategy, you will be likely to fail in your attempt, unless you can have the full benefit of your high coloring of some facts, and your forgetfulness of others, together with all your fanciful conjectures and surmises.