QUARTERMASTER GENERAL'S OFFICE, SIR: I have received the extracts from General Scott's letter to you, dated the 24th of February, complaining of the want of means of transportation, of supplies, and of funds, from the quartermaster's department, in consequence of which he informs you he was embarrassed and delayed in his operations, as well in the attack on Vera Cruz as in his movements afterwards; and I have to state in reply, that delays did occur in the movement upon Vera Cruz which were most vexatious, but which were not occasioned by any neglect or omission on my part, or on that of any other officer of the department, as a detail of the facts will show. The memorandum from the War Department for the quartermaster general, alluded to by General Scott, fixed the number of transport ships for his expedition at forty-one, viz: twelve for the volunteers, ordnance, and supplies, from the Atlantic; five for surf boats or lighters; ten to go out in ballast for troops on the gulf of Mexico; and fourteen to be supplied by the officers of the quartermaster's-department at New Orleans and on the gulf. That number, I take it for granted, was determined upon by General Scott himself or by the War Department, with his assent, as I have not understood that he, at any time, objected to the number as insufficient. He complains that the ten in ballast for troops were not sent, and that the embarkation was delayed thereby "in whole, or in part, from the 15th of January to the 9th of March." Colonel Stanton informs me that the order to charter those ten vessels was countermanded in consequence of a letter from me, dated at Brazos Santiago the 27th day of December, which was read by General Scott before it was sealed, and to which he added a postscript. The general, no doubt, relied upon those vessels. I expected them, for I believed they would be chartered and on the way before my letter could be received; but so boisterous was the season that I thought it unsafe to trust to their arrival, and made my arrangements as if they had actually failed, which fact I reported to General Scott, as well as I now remember, either through Captain Wayne or the late Captain Hetzel. It will be seen by reference to the memorandum referred to, that twenty-seven vessels were to be sent from the Atlantic with troops, supplies, and in ballast. Not one was sent in ballast; but there were actually fifty-three ships, barques, brigs, and schooners, sent with troops and supplies. It was expected that I should furnish fourteen ships; the department actually furnished at New Orleans, Brazos, and Tampico, for the army, before it took up the line of march into the interior, one hundred and sixty-three vessels, some of which made several voyages. I submit a copy of a report from the late Captain Hetzel, marked A, dated at the Brazos the 21st of February, 1847, which shows what had been done by the department up to that time. Of the 102 vessels contained in that report, five were from the Atlantic, four only of which had reported there, the other had been wrecked. I also submit paper marked B, which is a list of vessels chartered at Tampico, to transport thence troops, horses, and mules. Under the most favorable circumstances much time would have been required to organize so extensive a transport service; but, owing to the drenching rains throughout the month of January, the ships and other vessels chartered at New Orleans could not be prepared and sent to sea as rapidly as was desirable; and the frightful northers described by General Scott in his letter of the 12th of January, 1847, and mentioned in many of his subsequent letters, delayed their arrival at the Brazos and Tampico, as well as the movement from those points. The time lost from these causes alone may be fairly estimated at from twenty-five to thirty days. But a measure of General Scott, which he seems to have overlooked in summing up his difficulties, produced not only embarrassment and increased expense, but delays more injurious to the service than the want of ten ships promised from the Atlantic, even had others not been substituted in their place. It was the change in the destination of the Mississippi, Louisiana, North Corolina, Massachusetts and Virginia regiments. Had the two former been sent direct to Lobos, and a regiment already at Tampico been left there for the defence of the place, and the regiment replaced by the Mississippi regiment been left with General Taylor, double lighterage would have been avoided at a time when lighters were not abundant, delay would have been prevented, and six ships, that were rendered comparatively useless, would have been available for the campaign, the places of which had to be supplied. Had cutters or pilot-boats been despatched to cruise off cape St. Antonio, with orders for the North Carolina, Massachusetts and Virginia regiments to proceed direct to Sacrificios, double lighterage, as well as the transports for the troops that replaced them, would have been saved. General Scott certainly had the right to change the destination of those regiments, but he, not you or I, is responsible for the embarrassment, increased expense and delay occasioned by that change. As to the complaint of the want of funds, you are aware that the appropriations were nearly exhausted-the small amount available I was obliged to use so as to preserve the credit of the department; and I made the only arrangement in my power for the supply of funds by authorizing the officers of the department to draw on me without limit. The service, I know, was carried on with as little embarrassment as ever attended the service of any army in a foreign war. The complaint of General Scott in regard to clothing, is fully answered in my report of the 18th of February last, which will be found in Executive document No. 56, page 250, to which I respectfully refer. General Scott complains that not more than half of the surf boats he required came at all, and of the siege train and ordnance stores, only about one-half had arrived when the Mexican flags were replaced by those of the United States at Vera Cruz. The science and valor of the army, he says, had to supply all deficiencies. The result shows that he had surf boats and stores enough; and one of his high merits as a commander is, that he never doubted the science and valor of his army, but made the best use of both. He had invaded a country with resources sufficient to support large armies against us; he availed himself with great ability of the resources of the enemy. This, I know, you and the President expected him to do. Had he failed to do so, or had he doubted the science and valor of his army, he would have proved himself unfit for the high trust confided to him; and those who placed him in command would have had a heavy account to settle with the country. But his complaints are entirely groundless, as he, in his cooler moments, I have no doubt will admit. He is one of the best informed military men now living; but it would puzzle him to show a single instance in the military history of the last two centuries in which an army, whose personel and materiel had to be collected from so vast a territory, was as well appointed and supplied as his army has been. The glorious results of his campaign are a sufficient answer to all his complaints-results so astonishing that the faithful chronicler of the events as they occurred will probably be considered rather the compiler of fables than the relator of facts. I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant, Honorable WM. L. MARCY, TH. S. JESUP, Quartermaster General. A. Report of Capt. Hetzel, of vessels for Gen. Scott's expedition. VESSELS EMPLOYED IN TRANSPORTING GEN. SCOTT'S COMMAND FROM THE BRAZOS TO LOBOS. VESSELS SENT TO TAMPICO FROM THE BRAZOS FOR THE TRANSPOR TATION OF TROOPS THENCE TO LOBOS. VESSELS THAT WILL BE SENT TO TAMPICO FOR THE TRANSPORTATION OF TROOPS THENCE TO LOBOS. |