HEAD QUARTERS OF THE ARMY, Adjutant General's Office, Washington, June 11, 1846. GENERAL: On completing the duties to which you were specially assigned, in instructions from this office dated the 28th ultimo, I am directed by the major general commanding the army to desire you to repair without delay to San Antonio de Bexar, Texas, and there assume the immediate command of the troops, regulars and volunteers, ordered to that point. Brevet Major General Taylor having been assigned to duty according to his higher brevet, by the President of the United States, and charged with the command of all the land forces of the United States operating, or to operate against the republic of Mexico in that quarter, you will previously, and after your arrival, report yourself, by letter, to him, from whom you will probably soon receive instructions to march, with a part of the troops assembling at San Antonio, against Chihuahua, the capital of the province of that name. In advance of such instructions, you will hold yourself in readiness for that particular expedition. Captain Washington's company of light artillery (full battery) is en route for San Antonio de Bexar; and two companies of the 1st dragoons, and two companies of the 6th infantry, drawn from Forts Smith and Gibson, are under orders for the same point. This regular force will, it is supposed, constitute a part of your command. As soon as you can dispense with the services of Colonel Groghan, the general-in-chief directs that you order him to report in person. to Brevet Major General Taylor for duty as inspector general. In reply to your letter of the 5th instant, on the subject of arms and equipments required for the volunteer regiments, I may refer you to Lieutenant Colonel Talcott's communication of the 5th instant, which apprizes you of the measures adopted by the Ordnance. Department to insure the prompt and adequate supply. I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant, R. JONES, Adjutant General. Brigadier General JoHN E. WOOL, United States Army, Cincinnati, Ohio. [With the approbation of the War Department, I propose to write immediately to General Taylor, as follows:] [No. 4.] HEAD-QUARTERS OF THE ARMY, SIR: For the greater certainty of reception, I send, herewith, a duplicate of my letter to you of the 12th instant. You will please consider this note as a pest scriptum to that letter. Should you be met, as therein supposed, by a proposition to treat for a peace, under circumstances which you may deem suffi ciently formal and sincere, you may, with or without agreeing to an armistice, at your own sound discretion-looking to the intimations of that letter on the subject-grant written passports for the use of any minister or commissioner, and his suite, who may be duly appointed by the Mexican government to treat with that of the United States, to enable such legation to communicate with our blockading squadron on the gulf of Mexico coast, or to enable the legation to pass, by land, our military posts in your rear. In the latter case, a small military escort to (say) Point Isabel, with permission to the legation to take passage in some vessel thence to (say) New Orleans, may be necessary. I remain, sir, with high respect, your most obedient servant, WINFIELD SCOTT. [I think the within should be sent to General T. W. L. M.] [No. 56.] HEAD-QUARTERS, ARMY OF OCCUPATION, SIR: I have only time, before the mail leaves, to acknowledge the receipt, by the steamer "Alabama," of the following communications and orders from the War Department and general headquarters: From the Secretary of War, of May 28, 29, and 30, and June 4 and 8, that of May 30 enclosing an order assigning me to duty as brevet major general, and a copy of a letter from the President, and that of June 4, accompanying several packages of printed proclamations. From your office, of May 30 and June 9, copies of your communications to General Wool of June 1, and Colonel P. F. Smith of June 2, and a copy of memoranda for the chiefs of the staff departments, dated May 18. "General orders" Nos. 14 to 19 inclusive. "Special orders" Nos. 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, and 51. The many points requiring my attention in the above communications will receive it without delay. I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, Z. TAYLOR, Brev. Maj. Gen. U. S. Army, commanding. The ADJUTANT GENERAL of the Army, Washington, D. C. [No. 58.] HEAD-QUARTERS, ARMY OF OCCUPATION, SIR: In reply to the communications of the Secretary of War dated May 28 and June 8, and to that of the general-in-chief dated June 12, I have the honor to submit the following views in regard to the operations against Mexico from this quarter. I will remark that my constant efforts to procure information in relation to the nature of the country, amount of supplies, &c, have not been as satisfactory as I could wish, the various accounts often differing even in important particulars. Either from the ignorance or interested motives of those who profess to give information, it is extremely difficult to obtain any upon which we can implicitly rely. In calling upon the States of Louisiana and Texas for an auxiliary force of about 5,000 meh, it was my expectation with that force to be able to clear the course of the Rio Grande as high as Laredo, and to occupy or control the country to the foot of the mountains, capturing and holding Monterey, if circumstances permitted. With the proper river transportation, this could have been easily done: a depot would now have been established at Camargo, and our operations pushed up the valley of the San Juan. The difficulties and embarrassments that I have experienced for want of such transportation have already been sufficiently made known. These difficulties have been increased by the great excess of volunteers that have been sent out-say 3,000 men beyond my original call. I nevertheless propose, upon the arrival of the steamers now hourly expected, to throw forward this force with the regular troops to Camargo, and establish there a depot and base from which to operate towards the mountains. My reasons for retaining these six-months volunteers in service have been set forth in another communication; and I desire, from motives of health and other considerations, to keep them employed as actively as possible. The twelve-months volunteers can in the mean time form camps at healthy points in my rear, and, while receiving instruction, await the season for more extensive operations. The above dispositions can be made in the rainy seasons perhaps better than at any other time, as the river is then in a good navigable state. For operating with a heavy force, say 6,000 men, from this point towards Monterey and Saltillo, through which passes the only artillery route across the mountains, it is indispensable to employ the river as a channel of supply, and the valley of the San Juan, on one of the heads of which Monterey is situated, as a line of operations. The direct land route from this point to Monterey is much longer than the line from Camargo; in wet weather, impassable for artillery or heavy wagons, and in dry scantily supplied with water. Assuming, then, Camargo as the depot, and the valley of the San Juan as the line of operations, the question arises, what amount of supplies. can be obtained, and how can a column be subsisted on this route? It is pretty well determined that we cannot depend upon any considerable supply of breadstuffs short of Monterey, or perhaps Saltillo, seventy five miles further south. Beef in abundance, it is believed, may be procured; and on this, with perhaps occasional issues of mutton, we must mainly depend for the meat part of the ration. From Camargo to Saltillo, then, we must expect to depend upon our depot for bread; and I am of opinion, from all I can learn of the resources of the country in pack mules and means of transportation generally, that a column exceeding 6,000 men cannot be maintained in bread alone as far as Saltillo. Saltillo itself is at no great distance from two or three fertile grain-growing districts; but how far the production in those districts may exceed the supply, I cannot with any certainty determine. The above calculations in regard to subsistence are made on the supposition that we shall find the people of the country, if not friends, at least passive, and willing to part with their produce to the best advantages. I believe we shall find such to be their temper on this side of the mountains; whether this neutrality or indifference extends beyond, may well be questioned. Should they prove hostile, destroy their corps, and drive away their stock, it will be an extremely difficult matter to sustain a column at Saltillo-still more so to pass beyond that city. Supposing a column of the above strength (say 6,000 men) able to maintain itself at Saltillo, it will become a question, depending for its solution upon the elements above indicated, how far that force may be increased, or what amount of the twelve months volunteers may be safely and profitably thrown forward from the rear, with a view to future operations. From Camargo to the city of Mexico is a line little if any short of 1,000 miles in length. The resources of the country are, to say the best, not superabundant, and over long spaces of the route are known to be deficient. Although the road, as we advance south, approaches both seas, yet the topography of the country, and the consequent character of the communications, forbid the taking up a new line of supply either from Tampico or the l'acific coast. Except in the case (deemed improbable) of entire acquiesence, if not support, on the part of the Mexican people, I consider it impracticable to keep open so long a line of communication. It is, therefore, my opinion that our operations from this frontier should not look to the city of Mexi, but should be confined to cutting off the nor hern provinces-an undertaking of comparative facility and assurance of success. With the view of cutting off the northern provinces, the projected expedition from San Antonio to Chihuahua may be of great importance. From the best information, however, which I now possess, I would suggest mounted troops alone for that expedition. I am satisfied that the route from that point to Chihuahua is not practicable for artillery or wagons, and infantry would rather embarras the movement of a mounted expedition. Mounted howitzers, to be packed, with their carriages, on mules, might be advantageously employed on that service, and indeed with the column designed to penetrate to Saltillo. There may be a great difficulty in supplying any considerable force between San Antonio and Chihuahua, although the line is not very long-probably not exceeding 300 miles. I hope to procure better information than any I now possess in regard to this route. It will be perceived that my remarks on the line of operations from the Rio Grande southward have been confined to the question of subsistence, which is certainly the mest important one to be considered. There are military obstacles on the route, particularly in the space between Monterey and Saltillo, where the defile of "La Riconada" is represented to be of great strength. This point, and perhaps others, if fortified, may give us some trouble; but if they can be turned by light troops-and such I believe to be the case they will not long impede our march. In regard to the "description of troops best adapted to operations in the interior of Mexico," I am scarcely prepared at this time to give a definite reply. The facility or difficulty of obtaining forage must necessarily control to some extent the amount of cavalry employed. At the estate of the Conde de Jarral, some 40 leagues from Saltillo, there will, I understand, be no difficulty in obtaining a remount when necessary, and forage for the cavalry. The field artillery under my orders (four batteries, including Washington's) will, particularly if filled up to the complement of guns, be quite sufficient for any operation in this quarter. We may have occasion for heavier guns, and I have directed two 12 pounder field guns to be procured, which, with the 24-pounder howitzers now in depot at Point Isabel, will constitute an efficient battery. We shall have two, perhaps three, regiments of horse from Texas under my original call. They are now organizing, under the governor's directions, at Point Isabel. These are six-months men. Should I find it necessary to increase the cavalry force, I can draw certainly one regiment from San Antonio and still leave quite enough for the expedition to Chihuahua. I have given my views on most of the points connected with the operations from this frontier, purposly abstaining from any reference to movements against Tampico or Vera Cruz. The former place, I am induced to believe, could have been easily taken a month since, and could be so even now; but the yellow fever would not have permitted us to hold it, and I deemed it best to undertake no movement in that direction at this season of the year. Should we advance as far as San Luis Potosi, which has a communication, though not for wheels, with Tampico, the possession of the latter place would be important. I am awaiting with the utmost impatience the arrival of steamboats suited to the navigation of this river to establish a depot at Camargo, and throw the troops gradually forward to that point. The rainy season has commenced, and the river is now in the best possible condition for navigation. Several boats were to leave New Orleans about the 20th of June. If not wrecked in the recent severe gales, they may be hourly expected here. I have the honor to be, very respectfully, general, your obedient servant, Z. TAYLOR, Brevet Major General U. S. A., commanding. The ADJUTANT GENERAL of the Army, |