tion against leads me to regret that one division of the volunteers had not been encamped, say, at Pass Christian, where it could have been instructed until its services were required in the field.

These embarrassments, however, are now mostly overcome; the regular force is nearly all at Camargo, and all the arrangements are made to throw forward the volunteers to the same point.

The President may be assured that no one laments more than I do the inevitable difficulties and delays that have attended our operations here, and that no exertion of mine has been or will be wanting to press forward the campaign with all possible vigor. But I deem it indispensable to take such amount of force and observe such precautions as not to leave success a matter of doubt. In answer to the inquiry relative to the route from Chihuahua to Guaymas, I have the honor to submit a memorandum derived from

an American gentleman residing in this place, who has lived in Chihuahua, and travelled over the routes. The distances on the mule route are probably overrated, as it is a direct route across the mountains. The wagon road by the city of Arispe is the only one practicable for artillery.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, sir, your obedient servant,

Z. TAYLOR,
Major General U. S. A., commanding.

To His Excellency the Hon. JAMES K. POLK,
President of the United States, Washington, D. C.

Memorandum of two routes from Chihuahua to Guaymas-one a wagon road, the other to be travelled only with mules and packs.

The wagon road from Chihuahua to Guaymas leads at first in a northwest direction to the small village of Carmel, upon a large creek, 110 miles; the next village is Galeuna, also on a large creek, 50 miles; then Casas Grandes, 36 miles; then Presidio de Yanos, 39 miles. This is the most northwest settlement, at a distance of 235 miles from Chihuahua. From this point the road bears to the southward, having made this turn to avoid the high mountains. At 70 miles from Yanos the Sonora line is crossed, and we enter the department or State of that name. It is thence 80 miles to Fronteras, thence 60 to Bacuachi, and 40 thence to Arispe, the capital of the State; making from Yanos to Arispe 250 miles. Arispe contains 5,000 inhabitants, and is on a small river called the Sonora river. From Arispe to Pitic or Hermosillo it is 250 miles, and thence to Guaymas 60 miles; making from Arispe to Guaymas 310 miles, and from Chihuahua to Guaymas, by the wagon route, 795 miles. The mule route from Chihuahua to Guaymas, to be travelled with packs only, leaves Chihuahua in a direction a little south of west, to the mining town of Cosiquiriachi, 70 miles, then 40 miles to Sierra Prieta, then 40 miles to Conception, then over the first

mountain to Jesus Maria, 140 miles; making from Chihuahua to Jesus Maria 260 miles. Jesus Maria being an extensive mining town, numbers 10,000 inhabitants. Thence to Real de Alamos, 240 miles; thence to Pitic or Hermosillo, 250 miles; and thence to Guaymas, as before, 60 miles; making the distance from Chihuahua to Guaymas, by the mule route, 810 miles. This route is over stupendous mountains: it crosses the Hiaqui river, and passes through the tribe of Indians of that name.

SIR: It is intended to make a descent on the gulf coast of Mexico as soon as the season shall have so far advanced as to render it safe in regard to the health of our troops.

Our attention is turned to Tampico, as one of the places for the attack. It may be important to take that place, and hold possession of it and the surrounding country, with reference to your line of operations. Though our information is not so full and accurate as we desire in relation to the interior of the country in the vici

nity of Tampico, yet it is such as induces us to believe that this will be an important position to be occupied to facilitate the future prosecution of the war. The possession of the northern provinces of Mexico, as far south as San Luis de Potosi, is undoubtedly an important object with reference to bringing the war to a successful termination. The difficulties you will encounter in pushing your forces thus far can be much better appreciated by yourself than any other. San Luis de Potosi is stated to be from 150 to 180 miles from Tampico; and if there be a good road between these two places, as some allege to be the case, while it is questioned by others, it will be highly advantageous to have possession of Tampico, and to penetrate the country from that point in the direction of San Luis de Potosi with a considerable force. This matter is under consideration, and will receive the attention it deserves. It is important, in respect to the plan of operations to be adopted for a movement on this point, that you should furnish the government here at the earliest period with your opinion of the progress you will be able to make on your present line of operations. When you shall have arrived at Monterey, you will be enabled to determine as to the practicability of your further progress. It is important that we should know whether you can reach San Luis de Potosi, and your opinion on this point is particularly desired. The administration is, to some extent, aware of the obstacles you will have to encounter, of the difficulties of sustaining so long a line of communication, and of the uncertainty as to the force which will oppose you; but your better information on these several points will enable you to form much more accurate opinions.

Your views, also, as to the effect of taking possession of Tampico, of penetrating the enemy's country from that point, of the amount and kind of force to be assigned to that service, are desired.

It is not intended to weaken the force of your advancing column by any movements on the coast. It is supposed that 1,500 or 2,000 men will be a sufficient number of troops to take and hold possession of Tampico. At least half of this force ought to be of the regular army. These, it is presumed, can be obtained without withdrawing any of that description of force now with you. The amount of the volunteer force required for this purpose can be taken from the Rio Grande, it is presumed, without too much weakening that line.

As you are in a situation to obtain more full and accurate information in relation to all the matters touched on in this communication, it is desirable-indeed, quite important-that the administration should have your views upon them. It is unnecessary to assure you that they will have an important influence upon its determinations.

I am, with great respect, your obedient servant,

Major General Z. TAYLOR,

W. L. MARCY,
Secretary of War.

Commanding U. S. army in Mexico, Camargo, Mexico.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, September 22, 1846.

SIR: You will perceive by a copy of a despatch, herewith confidentially communicated, from the Mexican government, in reply to one from our own, proposing to open negotiations for terminating the existing war by a peace, just and honorable to both parties, that the Mexican authorities have declined to treat at this time, and defer definitive action on our offer until the advice of a new Congress, to assemble on the 6th of December next, can be taken.

This determination on the part of our enemy has an important bearing on our military movements, and suggests the propriety of a change of policy in regard to our dealings with the people of the country occupied by our troops.

Public opinion, it is to be presumed, will have some influence upon the decision of that Congress. The progress of our arms, and the positions we may occupy when that body shall come together, cannot fail to have effect upon its action in regard to our proposal to negotiate. Should the campaign be successful, and our troops be in possession of important departments of the enemy's country, the inducements for a speedy peace will be greatly strengthened.

It is far from being certain that our military occupation of the enemy's country is not a blessing to the inhabitants in the vicinity. They are shielded from the burdens and exactions of their own authorities, protected in their persons, and furnished with a most profitable market for most kinds of their property. A state of things so favorable to their interests may induce them to wish the continuance of hostilities.

The instructions heretofore given have required you to treat with great kindness the people, to respect private property, and to abstain from appropriating it to the public use without purchase at a fair price. In some respects this is going far beyond the common requirements of civilized warfare. An invading army has the unquestionable right to draw its supplies from the enemy without paying for them, and to require contributions for its support. It may be proper, and good policy requires, that discriminations should be made in imposing these burdens. Those who are friendly disposed or contribute aid should be treated with liberality, yet the enemy may be made to feel the weight of the war, and thereby become interested to use their best efforts to bring about a state of peace.

It is also but just that a nation which is involved in a war, to ob- · tain justice or to maintain its just rights, should shift the burden of it, as far as practicable, from itself by throwing it upon the

enemy.

Upon the liberal principles of civilized warfare, either of three modes may be pursued in relation to obtaining supplies from the enemy. First, to purchase them on such terms as the inhabitants of the country may choose to exact. Second, to pay a fair price, without regard to the enhanced value resulting from the presence

of a foreign army; and, third, to require them as contributions, without paying or engaging to pay therefor.

This last mode is the ordinary one, and you are instructed to adopt it, if in that way you are satisfied you can get abundant supplies for your forces. But should you apprehend a difficulty in this respect, then you will adopt the policy of paying the ordinary price, without allowing to the owners the advantages of the enhancement of the price resulting from the increased demand. Should you apprehend a deficiency under this last mode of dealing with the inhabitants, you will be obliged to submit to their exactions, provided by this mode you can supply your wants on better terms than by drawing what you may need from the United States. Should you attempt to supply your troops by contributions or the appropriation of private property, you will be careful to exempt the property of all foreigners from any and all exactions whatsoever. The President hopes you will be able to derive from the enemy's country, without expense to the United States, the supplies you may need, or a considerable part of them; but should you fail in this, you will procure them in the most economical,

manner.

It is proposed to take possession of the department of Tamaulipas, or some of the principal places in it, at the earliest practicable period. In this enterprise it is believed that a co-operation of our squadron in the gulf will be important, if not necessary. It is presumed that a force of about three or four thousand men will be sufficient for this purpose, one-third of which should be of the regular army.

We have not now sufficiently accurate knowledge of the country to determine definitively as to the manner of conducting this enterprise. The dangerous navigation of the gulf at this season of the year induces the hope that a column may be advanced by land from the present base of operations-the Rio Grande-and that it may have an occasional communication with our ships in the gulf. Should this land route be adjudged impracticable, or a debarkation be preferred, two points of landing have been suggested; one at the bay of Santander, and the other at Tampico. If a force be landed at the bay of Santander, or in the vicinity of Soto la Marina, it could probably reach, without much difficulty, some of the principal places in the department of Tamaulipas, and march to and take possession of Tampico. While the route is yet open to be settled as a better knowledge of the country may indicate, it is proper to speak more in detail of the force to be employed in this service.

It is not proposed to withdraw any of that now with you in your advance into the interior, nor to divert any of the reinforcements that you may need to carry on your operations in that quarter. It is believed that a sufficient force of the regular army for this expedition-about one regiment-may be drawn from the seaboard, including such companies as may have been left on the lower Rio Grande, and can be spared for that purpose. If a column should advance beyond that river into the interior of Tamaulipas, a part of the troops now on that line might, it is presumed, be safely