No. 2. QUARTEL GENERAL EN MONTEREY, A 23 de Setiembre de 1846, á las 9 de la noche. SENOR GENERAL: Habiendo hecho yo la defensa de que he creido susceptible á esta ciudad, he llenado obligacion y dejado bien puesto el honor militar, que en cierta manera es comun á todos los ejercitos del mundo civilizado; asi que de proseguir la defensa, sola se lograrán males á la poblacion que bastante ha padecido con las desgrácias consiguientes á la guerra. Y supuesto que el gobierno Americano ha manifestado sentimientos de transaccion, pro pongo á V. S. evacuar la ciudad y su fuerte, llevando me el personal y material de guerra que ha quedado, y bajo la seguridad de que no se siga perjuicio alguno á los paisanos que han tomado parte en la defensa. Sirvase V. S. acepta las protestas de mi mas distinguida consideracion. Al Señor Don Z. TAYLOR, PEDRO DE AMPUDIA. General-in-gefe del Ejercito Americano. [Translation.] HEAD-QUARTERS, MONTEREY, September 23, 1846, at 9 o'clock at night. GENERAL: As I have made all the defence of which I believe this city capable, I have fulfilled my obligation and done all required by that military honor which, to a certain degree, is common to all the armies of the civilized world; and as a continuation of the defence would only bring upon the population distresses to which they have already been sufficiently subjected by the evils consequent upon war, and believing that the American government will appreciate these sentiments, I propose to your excellency to evacuate the city and citadel, taking with me the personnel and materiel of war which is left, and under the assurance that no prosecution shall be undertaken against the citizens who have taken: part in the defence. Be pleased to accept the assurance of my most distinguished consideration. Señor Don Z. TAYLOR, PEDRO DE AMPUDIA. General-in-chief of the American Army. [No. 3.] HEAD-QUARTERS, ARMY OF OCCUPATION, Camp before Monterey, Sept. 24, 1846, 7 o'clock, a. m. SIR: Your communication bearing date at 9 o'clock, p. m., on the 23d, has just been received by the hands of Colonel Moreno. In answer to your proposition to evacuate the city and fort with all the personnel and materiel of war, I have to state that my duty compels me to decline acceding to it. A complete surrender of the town and garrison, the latter as prisoners of war, is now demanded. But such surrender will be upon terms, and the gallant defence of the place, creditable alike to the Mexican troops and nation, will prompt me to make those terms as liberal as possible. The garrison will be allowed, at your option, after laying down its arms, to retire to the interior, on condition of not serving again during the war, or until regularly exchanged. I need hardly say that the rights of non-combatants will be respected. An answer to this commuication is required by 12 o'clock. If you assent to an accommodation, an officer will be despatched at once under instructions to arrange the conditions. I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, Z. TAYLOR, Major General, U. S. A., commanding. .Señor D. PEDRO DE AMPUDIA, General-in-chief, Monterey. Terms of capitulation of the city of Monterey, the capital of Nuevo Leon, agreed upon by the undersigned commissioners, to wit: General Worth, of the United States army, General Henderson, of the Texan volunteers, and Colonel Davis, of the Mississippi riflemen, on the part of Major General Taylor, commanding in chief the United States forces, and General Raquena and General Ortega, of the army of Mexico, and Señor Manuel M. Llana, governor of Nuevo Leon, on the part of Señor General Don Pedro Ampudia, commanding in chief the army of the north, of Mexico. ART. I. As the legitimate result of the operations before this place, and the present position of the contending armies, it is agreed that the city, the fortifications, cannon, the munitions of war, and all other public property, with the under mentioned exceptions, be surrendered to the commanding general of the United States forces now at Monterey. ART. II. That the Mexican forces be allowed to retain the following arms,, to wit: The commissioned officers their side arms, the infantry their arms and accoutrements, the cavalry their arms and accoutrements, the artillery one field battery, not to exceed six pieces, with twenty-one rounds of ammunition. ART. III. That the Mexican armed forces retire, within seven days from this date, beyond the line formed by the pass of the Rinconada, the city of Linares, and San Fernando de Presas. ART. IV. That the citadel of Monterey be evacuated by the Mexican and occupied by the American forces to-morrow morning at ten o'clock. ART. V. To avoid collisions, and for mutual convenience, that the troops of the United States will not occupy the city until the Mexican forces have withdrawn, except for hospital and storage purposes. ART. VI. That the forces of the United States will not advance. beyond the line specified in the 3d article before the expiration of eight weeks, or until the orders or instructions of the respective governments can be received. ART. VII. That the public property to be delivered shall be turned over and received by officers appointed by the commanding generals of the two armies. ART. VIII. That all doubts as to the meaning of any of the preceding articles shall be solved by an equitable construction, and on principles of liberality to the retiring army. ART. IX. That the Mexican flag, when struck at the citadel, may be saluted by its own battery. Done at Monterey, September 24, 1846. W. J. WORTH, Approved: Brigadier General U. S. A. Major General commanding Texan volunteers. Colonel Mississippi riflemen. T. RAQUENA. ORTEGA. [No. 96.] HEAD-QUARTERS, ARMY OF OCCUPATION, SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the communication of the Secretary of War, with enclosures, dated the 22d ultimo; also one from your office of September 21, relative to the resignations of volunteer officers, and "general orders" No. 41; all of which were delivered by Lieutenant Armistead on the 10th instant. It will be seen at once that, under the terms of the capitulation of Monterey, I cannot detach a force south of a line from Linares to San Fernando, and cannot therefore, even were there no other obstacles, comply at present with the instructions of the Secretary. I cannot doubt that, on receiving the intelligence of the capture of Monterey, modified instructions were issued by the department. I shall, with as little delay as possible, reply at length to the Secretary's communication, and present my views in extenso on all topics connected with the campaign. I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, Z. TAYLOR, Major General U. S. A., commanding. The ADJUTANT GENERAL of the Army, Washington, D. C. [No. 98.] HEAD QUARTERS, ARMY OF OCCUPATION, Camp near Monterey, October 15, 1846. SIR: In my acknowledgment, dated the 12th instant, of the-instructions of the Secretary of War, of September 22, I briefly stated that the detachment to Tampico could not be made without contravening the convention of Monterey. Other reasons and more detailed views on this point, and the general question of the campaign, I left to a subsequent communication, which I have now the honor to submit for the information of the general-in-chief and the Secretary of War. Such a point has been reached in the conduct of the war and the progress of our arms, as to make it proper to place my impressions and convictions very fully before the gov ernment. I wish to remark, first of all, that I have considered Brigadier General Wool, though formerly under my orders, yet as charged by the government with a distinct operation, with which I was not at liberty to interfere. Though greatly in doubt as to the practicability of his reaching Chihuahua with artillery, and deeming the importance of the operation at any rate to be not at all commensurate with its difficulty and expense, I have accordingly refrained from controlling his movements in any way. His force; therefore, forms no element in my calculations, particularly as it is now, or soon will be, entirely beyond my reach. The Mexican army under General Ampudia has left Saltillo, and fallen back on San Luis Potosi-the last detachment, as I understand, being under orders to march to-day. Genera! Santa Anna reached San Luis on the 8th instant, and is engaged in concentrating and organizing the army at that point. Whether the withdrawal of the forces to San Luis be intended to draw us into the country, far from supplies and support, or whether it be a political movement, connected with Santa Anna's return to power, it is impossible to say; it is sufficient for my present argument to know that a heavy force is assembling in our front. Saltillo, the capital of Coahuila, is virtually in our possession, and can be occupied, if necessary, the moment the convention is at an end. The occupation of Saltillo will lengthen our line seventy-five miles, but, on the other hand, may enable us to draw at least a portion of our breadstuffs from the country. San Luis is about three hundred miles from Saltillo-perhaps more. San Luis is a city of some sixty thousand inhabitants, in a country abundant in resources, and at no great distance from the heart of the republic, whence munitions of war and reinforcements can readily be drawn. It is at the same time nearly six hundred miles from the Rio Grande, which must continue to be the base of, our operations, at least until we reach San Luis. In view of the above facts, I hazard nothing in saying that a column, to move on San Luis from Saltillo should, to insure success, be at least 20,000 strong, of which 10,000 should be regular troops. After much reflection, I consider the above as the smallest number of effective troops that could be employed on this service, without incurring the hazard of disaster, and perhaps defeat. There would be required, besides, to keep open our long line, protect the depôts, and secure the country already gained, a force of 5,000 men; this, without including the force necessary to send to Tampico, to take or hold that place. The above estimate may seem large when it is remembered that important results have been gained with a much smaller force. But we have hitherto operated near our own base, and the Mexicans at a great distance from theirs. Saltillo may be considered about equi-distant from the Rio Grande and San Luis. Every day's march beyond it lengthens our already long line, and curtails theirs; weakens us, and gives them strength. Hence, the movement should not be undertaken except with a force so large as to render success certain. In the above calculation I have supposed the Mexicans able to concentrate at San Luis a force of 40,000 to 50,000 men. With tolerable stability in the government, I doubt not their ability to do this; and it is not safe to assume any less number as a basis. The force of twelve months' volunteers has suffered greatly from disease. Many have died, and a great number have been discharged for disability. So much has their effective strength been reduced by this cause, and present sickness, that, in the absence of official returns, I am satisfied that 500 men per regiment would be a large average of effectives among the volunteers. This would give, including the cavalry, a force a little short of 9,000 men; or, adding 4,000 regulars, (our present strength is not 3,000,) a total force of 13,000 men. Leaving the very moderate number of 3,000 to secure our rear, I should not be able to march from Saltillo, with present and expected means, at the head of more than 10,000 men; a number which, from considerations above stated, I deem to be entirely inadequate. And I now come to the point presented in the Secretary's letter. A simultaneous movement on San Luis and Tampico is there suggested; but it will readily be seen that, with only half the force which I consider necessary to march on one point, it is quite impossible to march on both; and, that nothing short of an effective force of 25,000 to 30,000 men would, on military principles, justify the double movement. And it is to be remarked that the possession of Tampico is indispensable in case we advance to San Luis, for the line hence to the latter place is entirely too long to be maintained permanently, and must be abandoned for the shorter one from Tampico the moment San Luis is taken. I have spoken only of the number of troops deemed necessary for the prosecution of the campaign beyond Saltillo. It will be understood that largely increased means and materiel of every kind, will be equally necessary to render the army efficient; such as cavalry and artillery horses, means of transport, ordnance stores, &c. The department may be assured that the above views have not been given without mature reflection, and have been the result of experience and careful inquiry. It will be for the government to |