determine whether the war shall be prosecuted by directing an active campaign against San Luis and the capital, or whether the country already gained shall be held, and a defensive attitude assumed. In the latter case, the general line of the Sierra Madre might very well be taken; but even then, with the enemy in force. in my front, it might be imprudent to detach to Tampico so large a force as 3,000 or 4,000 men, particularly of the description required for that operation. If the co-operation of the army, therefore, be deemed essential to the success of the expedition against Tampico, I trust that it will be postponed for the present. I have not been unmindful of the importance of taking Tampico, and have at least once addressed the department on the subject. Nothing but the known exposure of the place to the ravages of yellow fever prevented me from organizing an expedition against it last summer. I knew that if taken, it could not, with any certainty, be held, and that the cause would not be removed before the last of November or first of December. It may be expected that I should give my views as to the policy of occupying a defensive line, to which I have above alluded. I am free to confess that, in view of the difficulties and expense attending a movement into the heart of the country, and particularly in view of the unsettled and revolutionary character of the Mexican government, the occupation of such a line seems to me the best. course that can be adopted. The line taken might either be that on which we propose to insist as the boundary between the republics-say the Rio Grande-or the line to which we have advanced, viz: the Sierra Madre, including Chihuahua and Santa Fé. The former line could be held with a much smaller force than the latter; but even the line of the Sierra Madre could be held with a force greatly less than would be required for an active campaign. Monterey controls the great outlet from the interior. A strong garrison at this point, with an advance at Saltillo and small corps at Monclova, Linares, Victoria, and Tampico, would effectually cover the line. I have limited my remarks to the position of the army on this frontier and the requirements for a campaign against San Luis Potosi, the suggestions in the Secretary's letter being confined to this. general theatre of operations. Should the government determine. to strike a decisive blow at Mexico, it is my opinion that the force. should land near Vera Cruz or Alvarado; and, after establishing a secure depot, march thence on the capital. The amount of troops required for this service would not fall short, in my judgment, of 25,000 men, of which at least 10,000 to be regular troops. In conclusion, I feel it my duty to make some remarks which I would gladly have been spared the necessity of submitting. I feel it due to my position and to the service to record my protest against the manner in which the department has sought to make an important detachment from my command, specifically indicating not only the general officers, but to a considerable extent the troops, that were to compose it. While I remain in command of the army against Mexico, and am therefore justly held responsible by the government and the country for the conduct of its operations, I must claim the right of organizing all detachments from it, and regulating the time and manner of their service. Above all do I consider it important that the Department of War should refrain from corresponding directly with my subordinates, and communicating orders and instructions on points which, by all military precept and practice, pertain exclusively to the general in chief command. Confusion and disaster alone can result from such a course. The reason alleged, viz: the loss of time in communicating with General Patterson, has no application, for the Secretary's despatch came from that officer to my head-quarters in sixty hours, and he could not move, at any rate, without drawing largely upon this column for artillery and regular troops. I beg it may be understood that my remarks have no personal application. It is quite probable that in the event of making such a detachment, I would have placed it under Major General Patterson; but I conceive that this mode of regulating details and ordering detachments direct from the Department of War is a violation of the integrity of the chief command in the field, pregnant with the worst evils, and against which I deem it my duty respectfully > but earnestly to protest. I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, Z. TAYLOR, Maj. Gen. U. S. A., commanding. The ADJUTANT GENERAL of the Army, Washington, D. C. No. 100.] HEAD-QUARTERS, ARMY OF OCCUPATION, SIR: In reply to so much of the communication of the Secretary of War, dated September 22, as relates to the mode of supplying the army, I beg leave to submit the follow remarks: It would have been impossible hitherto, and is so now, to sustain the army to any extent by forced contributions of money or supplies. The country between the Rio Grande and Sierra Madre is poor, furnishing only corn and beef. These articles we obtain at moderate rates; but if a different system had been adopted, it is certain that they would not have been procured at all in sufficient quantities. The prompt payment in cash for the few articles of supply we have drawn from the country has neutralized much of the unfriendly feeling with which we were regarded, and has contributed greatly to facilitate our operations. The people have it in their power at any time to destroy their crops, and would undoubtedly do so rather than see them taken forcibly. Add to which, they would have no inducements to plant again. The prices that have been paid are reasonable, being in almost all cases the prices of the country. Should the army in its future operations reach a portion of the country which may be made to supply the troops with advantage, I shall not fail to conform to the wishes and instructions of the department in this particular. am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, Z. TAYLOR, Major Gen. U. S. A., commanding. The ADJUTANT GENERAL of the Army, Washington, D. C. WAR DEPARTMENT, Washington, October 13, 1846. SIR: Your communications of the 22d, 23d, and 25th ultimo, detailing the operations of the army under your immediate command at Monterey, have been received. The skill, courage, and gallant conduct displayed on that occasion by the troops under your command, both regulars and volunteers, have added glory to our arms, and merit from the government and people of the United States the warmest expressions of gratitude and praise. In relation to the terms of the capitulation of Monterey, the President instructs me to say that he regrets it was not deemed advisable to insist upon the terms which you had first proposed. The circumstances which dictated doubtless justified the change. The President, uninformed of these circumstances, does not know in what degree the recent change in the government of Mexico may have contributed to this result. Certain it is, however, that the present rulers of that republic have not yet given any evidence that they are "favorable to the interests of peace." Of this you will have already been informed by my despatch of the 22d ultimo. The government did not contemplate, as you will perceive by the tenor of the despatches from this department, that there would probably happen any contingency, in the prosecution of the war, in which it would be expedient to suspend hostilities before the offer of acceptable terms of peace. In my despatch of the 22d ultimo, which had not reached you when you entered into the arrangement with General Ampudia on the 25th ultimo, there are considerations and facts stated which render the continuance of the armistice extremely embarrassing. As the offer recently made by the United States to open negotiations for a peace was not acceded to by the present rulers of Mexico, but reserved to be submitted to and acted on by a congress to be assembled on the 6th of December next, it was deemed by the government here highly important that the war in the mean time should be prosecuted with the utmost vigor, to the end that they might be made sensible of the evils of its continuance, and thereby become more inclined to bring it to a speedy close. In pursuance of this policy, an expedition was proposed, in my despatch of the 22d ultimo, for the purpose of taking possession of the entire de partment of Tamaulipas; and, under the belief that it would not interfere with your plans and operations, no doubt was entertained that it would receive your concurrence and support. In anticipation thereof, measures have been already taken to carry it out at the earliest practicable period. By the arrangement you have made for a temporary suspension of hostilities within certain limits of the enemy's country, if continued to the end of the time stipulated, a considerable part of Tamaulipas will be exempted from military operations until within a few days of the time fixed for the meeting of the Mexican congress, and the expedition thereby delayed, or if prosecuted by the land or naval forces, might bring into question the good faith of the United States. In the despatch before referred to you will perceive that an attack by our naval force upon some places on the coast of Tamaulipas is also contemplated. Whatever may be the advantage or the necessity of the co-operation of a land force, it must be withheld until near the close of November, if the armistice is continued to the end of the stipulated period. The government is fully persuaded that if you had been aware of the special reasons disclosed in the despatch of the 22d ultimo, and the intentions of the government still entertained, you would not have acceded to the suspension of hostilities for even the limited. period specified in the articles of capitulation; but as its continuance depends upon the orders of your government, you are instructed to give the requisite notice that the armistice is to cease at once, and that each party is at liberty to resume and prosecute hostilities without restriction. The city of Monterey is regarded as an important acquisition. While held by a competent force, the authorities of Mexico may be considered as dispossessed of the department of New Leon. It is therefore proposed that you should make the necessary arrangements for retaining possession of it during the war. For this purpose it is suggested that you should strengthen its defences, and take the proper measures for procuring supplies for the forces. which may be there stationed, not only for holding it securely, but for carrying on military operations in the northern provinces of Mexico. Not only Monterey, but the State of New Leon, may, it is presumed, be regarded as a conquered country; and, as a consequence, the civil authorities of Mexico are in a measure superseded, or at least subject to your control. You will give this subject your consideration, and permit only such civi! functionaries to retain and exercise power as are well disposed towards the United States. It is an object of much interest to the government to be put in possession of your views as to your future operations. The advantages and the difficulties of penetrating further into the interior of Mexico, are now probably satisfactorily ascertained by you. Would it, in your judgment, be advisable, under existing circumstances, to advance beyond Monterey, or the positions necessary to its security? The department has not the requisite information to enable it to answer this question, but must leave it to your de termination and to your discretion to act in accordance with your views upon that point. In your communications of the 2d of July and 1st of August, you express the opinion that your operations should be confined to the northern provinces of Mexico; but whether, in carrying out your views, you proposed to advance beyond the point you have already reached, or Saltillo, is not stated, and probably could not be determined till your arrival at Monterey. It is desirable to do whatever can be done to make an impression upon the enemy; but to determine what it shall be, requires knowledge of the localities of the country; of the means at your command; the force and resources of the enemy; in fine, such knowledge as you possess or have the means of acquiring. The season for carrying on military operations in the enemy's country lying on the gulf has now arrived. It is deemed important that we should have possession of the whole of Tamaulipas before the meeting of the Mexican congress in December. It is hoped that the expedition for that purpose, suggested in my communication of the 22d September, can be organized and sent forward without at all interfering with the contemplated operation of the forces under your immediate command. Among the officers presented to your consideration to be employed in this expedition was Brigadier General Shields. Attention was directed to him by the knowledge that he had become acquainted with some of the principal inhabitants of Tamaulipas, and by that means had acquired information which would have been useful in conducting the enterprise. He has, however, since received orders to join General Wool, and probably cannot be conveniently recalled. If this can be done, and another brigadier sent to General Wool, it might be advantageous to the public service to make the exchange. This is, however, left entirely to yourself. As to the employment of Major General Patterson and Brigadier General Pillow, the wishes of the President and department are unchanged. It is under consideration by the government, though not yet fully determined, to land a considerable force in the vicinnity of Vera Cruz and invest that city. Should this be undertaken, a larger force of regular troops will be required than that assigned to the Tamaulipas expedition. It is desired to know if in your opinion a detachment of two thousand of this description of force can be spared for that purpose from those under your command, without essentially interfering with your plans and operations. It is not desired or intended to weaken the force with you at Monterey, or to embarrass you by diverting troops from the Rio Grande which you may deem necessary as reinforcements to the execution of your own contemplated operations. I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant, W. L. MARCY, Secretary of War. To Major General Z. TAYLOR, Commanding Army of Occupation, Monterey, Mexico. |