you can confer freely and safely with him. He is commended to your favorable consideration and kind attention. Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

Major General Z. TAYLOR,

W. L. MARCY,

Secretary of War.

Commanding U. S. Army in Mexico.

WAR DEPARTMENT, October 22, 1846.

SIR: It is apprehended here that the recent change in the political affairs of Mexico will have an important bearing upon our military movements, and may render it necessary to modify in some respects the plans of operation.

Santa Anna is at the head of the war party, and appears to have entered with zeal upon his duties as general-in-chief of the Mexican army. It is not improbable that he may succeed in collecting and keeping together a considerable force; but the promise of change in the form of government is probably a more important consideration in regard to the prosecution of the war. The northern departments of Mexico were opposed to the central, and in favor of the federal system. The former was forced upon them and maintained by military power. This undoubtedly produced throughout these provinces considerable disaffection to the central government.

The existence of this disaffection was not overlooked either by yourself or the government here in the plan of the campaign, designed to be principally confined to these provinces, and it was presumed that it would materially affect the extent to which our operations in them could be safely carried.

The views presented in your communications of the 2d of July and 1st of August appeared to be sound, and were fully concurred in by the government. According to these views, the extent to which you could penetrate the enemy's country in the direction of Montery would depend mainly upon the facility of obtaining supplies, and of keeping open your line of communication with the Rio Grande. In both these respects, it was foreseen that much would depend upon the disposition and feelings of the Mexican people. Though there was, when you wrote your letter of the 1st August, as you state, good reason to believe that the country lying between the Rio Grande and the Sierra Madre was disposed to throw off the yoke of the central government, and there was then a hope that it would do so when there should be a strong American force between it and the city of Mexico, the aspect of things in this particular appears to have since changed. The new rulers of Mexico have declared in favor of the federal system, and thus gratified the wishes of the northern provinces. It is, I apprehend, no longer reasonable to expect from them even neutrality, and our measures must be taken on the assumption that they will co-operate with the enemy in carrying on the war, and do all they can to impede our movements.

In your communication of the 1st of August you state that "whether a large force can be subsisted beyond Monterey must be determined by actual experience, and will depend much upon the disposition of the inhabitants towards us." We are led tobelieve, from all the information we have received, that the inhabitants are not only hostile, but will be active in obstructing our march into the interior; and that it will not be safe to proceed beyond Monterey, with a view of taking and holding a permanent position. The risk of extending your line beyond that point, or such positions as you may occupy for its defence and security, would probably counterbalance the advantages of proceeding further into the interior, unless you have an adequate force, and could command ample means to reach. San Luis Potosi, with a view to its secure occupation. It is believed you are not in a condition to do this, if the disposition of the Mexican people is such as has been indicated. Indeed, serious doubts are entertained here whether you ought to extend your line beyond the place you have reached and its necessary dependencies. Should your concur in this view, as it is presumed you will from the tenor of your despatches, you will then turn your attention to securing your position at Monterey, keeping open your line of communication with the Rio Grande. I refer you to what was said on this subject in my letter of the 13th instant. It is not intended, by what is here said, that you should be restrained from making excursions beyond Monterey and the department of New Leon, if you should see occasion to do so. The enemy should be impressed with the belief that you intend to move forward, to the end that they may not withdraw their forces and employ them on ether points. Should the force assembled to resist you be withdrawn, or ascertained not to be in sufficient number to oppose serious obstacles to your further advance, you will exercise your own discretion, under all the circumstances, in regard to any forward movement; but it is not, thought here that this can be done with a view to take a permanent position much beyond that you now occupy, unless you should deem it proper for your own security at Monterey to advance so far as to Occupy the difficult passes between that city and Saltillo. This, however, is left altogether to your own judgment. Monterey may be considered a position in advance of Monclova and Chihuahua, and it is questionable whether, in a military point of view, the occupation of them, with the ascertained change in the circumstances and feelings of the inhabitants, will produce compensating advantages, as a considerable force, which might be usefully employed in other quarters, will be required to take and hold them.

It is not doubted that General Wool will be able to capture Chihuahua; but if the population should be disposed, as it is apprehended they will be, to obstruct his movements and withhold supplies, it is doubtful whether he has a sufficient force to sustain himself long in that position. Should the contemplated military and naval operations on the gulf coast be put in execution, troops to reinforce him, in case his condition required it, cannot well be spared. Under a full view of all the circumstances, it is suggested whether it would not be best to have his forces united with yours

at Monterey, or on the Rio Grande. If he should not have advanced too far on his march to Chihuahua before you can communicate with him, it may be advisable that he should at once form a junction with you. With these suggestions, which are necessarily vague for want of more full and particular information on the subject, this matter is left entirely to your discretion.

In a communication received from General Kearny, written soon after he had taken Santa Fé, he informed the department that he might have more troops than were necessary for his purposes, and in that event should detach a few hundred men and send them to General Wool. Should General Wool be ordered to join you, it will be important that information should be sent to notify this detachment of the change in his position, and to give it instructions for its conduct. Should it proceed to Chihuahua, and General Wool not be there, it will be exposed to be cut off. I am not prepared to say what disposition should be made of this detachment, if it has in fact been sent forward to join the Chihuahua expedition. It is important that it should receive such orders as will lead to its safety. General Wool will be instructed by you to look to this. The mere intimation from General Kearny that he might send off such a detachment, renders it necessary that proper steps should be taken to prevent it from falling into the hands of the enemy.

If

I informed you in my last despatch that, in connexion with an invasion of Tamaulipas and attack on Tampico, an expedition. against Vera Cruz was then under advisement. Upon a more full consideration of the subject, it is believed that Vera Cruz may be taken; and, having possession of that city, the castle of San Juan d'Ulloa might probably be reduced or compelled to surrender. the expedition could go forth without the object being known to the enemy, it is supposed that four thousand troops would be a sufficient force for the enterprise, receiving, as they would, the co-operation of our naval force in the gulf; but at least fifteen hundred or two thousand of them should be of the regular army, and under the command of officers best calculated for such an undertaking. In looking at the present disposition of the troops, it appears to be scarcely possible to get the requisite number of regulars without drawing some of those now with you at Monterey, or on the way to that place. Should you decide against holding military possession of any place in Coahuila or Chihuahua, and order the troops under General Wool to join you, it is presumed that the requisite force for the expedition to Vera Cruz could be detached without interfering with your plans of operation. Whilst the government is anxious that nothing should occur to prevent the expedition to Vera Cruz, regarding it of great importance, yet if by withdrawing from your immediate command the force necessary for this purpose the army with you may be placed in danger, this expedition must, for the present, be either deferred or abandoned; a result deeply to be regretted: On the spot, you will know the strength of the force advancing against you, and the number of troops necessary to resist it; you will by no means weaken yourself so as to expose the army under your command to the probable hazard of disaster.

It

is desirable to avoid delay; you will, therefore, unless it materially interferes with your own plan of operations, or weakens you too much in your present position, make the necessary arrangements for having four thousand men (of whom fifteen hundred or two thousand should be regular troops) ready to embark for Vera Cruz, or such other destination as may be given them, at the earliest practicable period. The place of embarkation will probably be the Brazos Santiago, or in that vicinity.

The preparations for such a movement will necessarily attract public attention, and give rise to rumors as to its destination; and knowledge of it may reach the enemy in season for them to take additional measures to defend that place unless great caution is observed. It seems now to be generally understood that an expedition is about to be fitted out against Tampico, or some place in the department of Tamaulipas. It may be well to have such generally considered the point of attack; and should unforeseen difficulties arise in regard to Vera Cruz, the movement may be turned in that direction. If the impression generally prevails that an expedition is fitting out for Tampico, or some place on the coast of Tamaulipas, the enemy will more readily expect a forward movement on your part towards San Luis Potosi as cotemporaneous with such an attack, and, under this view of our operations, would be diverted from any extraordinary preparations for the defence of Vera Cruz. Tampico may be attacked by the squadron alone, before the embarkation of the land foree; but to accomplish the primary object, the military expedition will proceed directly to Vera Cruz, and with the co-operation of the squadron have better assurance of success in the combined attack on that place. Secrecy is, therefore, of the utmost importance. The belief should be encouraged that Tampico is the destination of the expedition, and its real object be made known only to such officers as must be apprised of it, to enable them to perform their duty in the enterprise, and to them under the strictest injunctions of confidence.

Enclosed you will receive a copy of a communication from Mr.——, and it is believed that entire confidence may be placed in the accuracy of his representations, as they are founded on his personal observations. You will also receive herewith a rough sketch of the topography of Vera Cruz and the adjacent localities. These you are desired to place in the hands of the commanding officer of the expedition, with such remarks and suggestions of your own as may be useful to him.

As it was suggested in former communications that Major General Patterson should be placed in command of the expedition against Tamaulipas, it is deemed proper that he should still occupy that position in the expedition fitted out against Vera Cruz. I have no further suggestions to make as to a brigadier general to command the volunteers. In regard to the commanding officer of the regular force, it would meet the views of the government if you should select Brevet Brigadier General Worth. In that event you are directed by the President to assign him to that command by virtue of his brevet rank.

It is proposed that Colonel Totten, the chief engineer, Major Baker, of the ordnance corps, and some officer of rank and experience of the topographical corps, shall accompany the expedition, with others of inferior rank in these respective branches of the public service. Such of these officers as are not now with the army will be ordered to proceed to the Rio Grande, and report to the commander of the expedition.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant, W. L. MARCY,

Secretary of War.

Major General Z. TAYLOR,

Commanding US Army in Mexico.

WAR DEPARTMENT, Washington, October 29, 1846.

SIR: As the views in relation to the expedition on the gulf coast, presented in my last despatch, embraced some matters not set forth in that of the 22d of September, I thought it might be useful to make Major General Patterson acquainted with them sooner than it could be done through you. I have, therefore, transmitted a copy of it to him. I send you herewith a copy of the letter to General Patterson, and a copy of instructions from the Navy Department to the commander of our squadron in the gulf, relating to the contemplated expedition and the co-operation of the naval force. I am, with great respect, your obedient servant, W. L. MARCY, Secretary of War.

Major General Z. TAYLOR,

Commanding U. S. Army in Mexico.

WAR DEPARTMENT, Washington, October 28, 1846.

SIR: I herewith enclose to you a copy of a despatch of the 22d instant to Major General Taylor, and also a copy of one from the Secretary of the Navy to the commander of our squadron in the gulf of Mexico.

By the former you will perceive that, beyond the objects proposed in my communications to you and to General Taylor of the 22d ultimo, for the expedition therein suggested, the attention of the government has been since turned towards an attack upon Vera Cruz.

The fitting out of such an expedition was a suggestion, and depended upon General Taylor's concurrence in its expediency. Should he approve of it, and find himself in a condition to detach the necessary force, it will then become an important question.