whether it shall be directed against Vera Cruz, or confined to operations in the department of Tamaulipas; and this question can only be determined by a full view of all the circumstances as they shall exist when the expedition is prepared to begin operations. If, at the time it is so prepared, the latest information shall warrant the belief that Vera Cruz cannot be attacked with a reasonable prospect of success, it is not expected it will be attempted. Our object is to strike an effective blow at the enemy; and, if Vera Cruz can be taken, and by that means the castle of San Juan d'Ulloa reduced, it would be an important event in the war; but the force which is proposed to be sent against that place, or the largest which could be assembled for that purpose without materially interfering with other operations, may not be sufficient to insure reasonable hopes of success, provided the enemy should anticipate our design upon that place in season to strengthen its defences and greatly increase his forces at that point. Whether Vera Cruz will be found in a condition to be attacked by such means as may be collected for that purpose, must be left to your own determination, and that of the commander of our gulf squadron. As you are to co-operate with the naval force, your movements will necessarily be the result of your joint counsels. If Vera Cruz should, all circumstances considered, be found to be too dangerous an enterprize to be attempted, your attention will then be directed. to the capture of Tampico. It is not doubted that you will have ample means, aided as you will be with the co-operation of the squadron, to take that place, or make a descent on any other place in Tamaulipas, and subdue the whole department. You will not expect from this place directions in regard to the particular movements of the expedition, for they must depend in a great measure upon the condition of things at the moment of action. The objects which it is desirable to accomplish have been indicated, but how far the expedition can go in obtaining these objects, or any of them, you must judge, comparing, as you will, your means with the obstacles to be met and overcome. For the information necessary to guide your movements, you must depend in a great measure upon the navy; and you will perceive, by the orders from the Navy Department, that steps have been already taken for constant communication between you and the commander of the squadron. You will avail yourself of it to confer freely with him, and to indicate such aid and co-operation as you may need from the naval force. The department is anxious for your reply to my communication. of the 22 ultimo. The Quartermaster General is, I presume, at this time on the Rio Grande. He has general instructions to prepare all that may be required for the expedition to be fitted out under your command. Officers in the other branches of the military service will be sent, as stated in the copy of the despatch to General Taylor, to accompany the expedition, and will be with you in season to attend your movements. It is proper that I should remark that the department has not received from General Taylor, and could not have received, on ac any count of the short period since he was addressed on the subject, information as to what are his views in regard to the expedition. In my despatches to him you were presented to his consideration as the commanding officer, and this is addressed to you, as other communications have been, on the supposition that orders will be given by him for the employment of yourself, as well as the other officers therein named, for duty as suggested. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, Major General ROBERT PATTERSON, W. L. MARCY, Secretary of War. U. S. Army, commanding on the Rio Grande. WAR DEPARTMENT, Washington, November 25, 1846. SIR: You will have perceived by my despatch of the 13th ult. that the government apprehended at that time that you would be likely to encounter many and serious difficulties in extending your line of operations as far as San Luis Potosi. These apprehensions are confirmed by your despatch of the 15th ult., which was received on the 20th inst. In the belief that it might not be advisable, unless circumstances favored, to push forward in that direction, it became more important that operations should be undertaken on the gulf coast. In case that it should be decided not to attempt at present to take any place beyond Monterey or Saltillo, with a view of holding permanent possession, it was believed that a sufficient force would be detached from the troops now in the field (with such additions as can be soon made) for a successful attack upon the most important points on the coast, still leaving enough to hold the positions you have gained, and menace the enemy with a forward movement. By intercepting my despatch of the 2d of September, (a copy of which I herewith transmit,) and probably through other means, the enemy has already become aware of our intentions to operate in that quarter, and undoubtedly will be prepared to make a vigorous resistance. It has become quite evident that a larger force than that indicated in my communication of the 13th ult. will be required for that expedition. The President having decided to send Major General Scott to the seat of war, communicated this determination to him on the 18th inst. Since that time the general has been engaged in making preparations here, principally with a view to military operations on the shores of the gulf, and left yesterday for the Rio Grande. The competence of a military tribunal to take cognizance of such a case as you have presented in your communication of the 11th ult., viz: the murder of a Mexican soldier, and other offences not embraced in the express provision of the articles of war, was deemed so questionable that an application was made to Congress at the last session to bring them expressly within the jurisdiction of such a tribunal, but it was not acted on. I am not prepared to say that, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, and particularly by the non-existence of any civil authority to which the offender could be turned over, a military court could not rightfully act thereon; yet very serious doubts are entertained upon that point, and the government do not advise that course. It seriously regrets that such a fiagrant offender cannot be dealt with in the manner he deserves. I see no other course for you to pursue than to release him from confinement, and send him away from the army; and this is recommended. It is intended to invite the attention of Congress again to this subject, in order to have provision made for such cases; but it cannot be so done as to operate ex post facto, and of course will not embrace the case in question. I refer with reluctance to your remarks upon that part of my despatch of the 22d of September which relates to the Tampico expedition. As you have misconceived the views of the government, and made the course pursued here the ground of a formal protest, it seems to be proper that I should notice your animadversions upon it. I think you have erred in regarding what was put forth as suggestions, in the light of peremptory commands. It was intended to leave the whole subject, as well the organizing and sending forth the expedition as the designation of the officers to command it, to your approval and final judgment. Such I think the fair import of the language used to manifest this intention. Considering the large number of troops on the Rio Grande, and on the way there, it was presumed here that a part of them could be spared for the Tampico expedition; but you were expressly informed that none would be withdrawn from that line if, in your opinion, it "would interfere with your operations;" and it was not then suggested that any should be taken from your advancing column. So in relation to the general officers proposed for the command of the force: they were not to be taken if "it should interfere with your previous arrangement in regard to these officers." They were presented to your consideration for that service, because they were not employed with the column advancing into the enemy's country, but were with the troops on the Rio Grande, from which most of the force for the expedition, it was presumed, would be detached. Certainly no disrespect was intended towards you as commanding general; nothing was proposed which could deprive you of the means of securing success to your own plans of operation. After a respectful consideration of your remarks, and a re-examination of that part of my despatch which you deem exceptionable, I cannot regard it as an encroachment upon your just rights, or "a violation of the integrity of the chief command in the field." You must be aware that in my official communications I am only the medium of presenting the views of the President; and you will not question his right as commander-in-chief to make suggestions as to the movements of the forces under your command, or as to the officers to be employed in these movements. Having, in this instance, carefully qualified his suggestions so as to prevent them from being regarded as positive directions or commands, and ex pressly disclaimed the intention of employing any part of the troops which, in your opinion, "would interfere with your operations," ," he is entirely unconscious of having given any just cause for protest or complaint. The reason offered for communicating directly with General Patterson, and instructing him "to make preparations for the movement, (the Tampico expedition,) so far as it can be done without disturbing your present arrangements on the Rio Grande," &c., was "to prevent delay." This you declare to be inapplicable. Your language is: "The reason alleged, viz: the loss of time in communicating with General Patterson, has no application, for the Secretary's despatch came from that officer to my head-quarters in 60 hours, and he could not move without drawing largely upon this column for artillery and regular troops." To vindicate the good faith with which this reason was assigned, I deem it proper to apprise you that it was not known here that General Patterson was at Camargo; but as he was in command on the Rio Grande, it was reasonable to conclude that my communication would reach him at Matamoras, or in that vicinity: neither was it known at what place in the enemy's country my despatch would reach you. The casualties of sending communications to and from you after you had penetrated far into it, was not overlooked. The fact that one from this department of the 2d of September, having relation to the Tampico expedition, was intercepted by the enemy, shows that it was not unreasonable to apprehend delay from this cause. There were causes for delay in the contemplated expedition other than that suggested in your remarks, viz: the concentration of troops. By my letter to General Patterson, it will be perceived that it was here considered important that he should be at once engaged in acquiring accurate information as to the routes, whether by land or sea, and in forwarding it, with the least possible delay, to the department. The early receipt of this information was deemed important for the reasonable preparation of transports, and collecting needful supplies, &c. With the disposition which I am sure you possess to judge fairly on the subject, I allow myself to hope that on reflection you will perceive that the reason alleged for a direct communication with General Patterson was not an idle one; and perhaps you may regard it as it was and still is here regarded, as of sufficient importance to justify the course adopted. In conclusion, I assure you that nothing could be further from the views of the department than any intention to interfere with, or derogate from, the authority belonging to you by right or usage as commanding general; and allow me to add, that after full consideration of the part of the despatch deemed by you exceptionable, I am unable to convince myself that either in the manner or matter, all circumstances considered, it furnishes just grounds for your animadversions. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, Major General Z. TAYLOR, &c., &c. WAR DEPARTMENT, Washington, November 23, 1846. SIR: The President several days since communicated in person to you his orders to repair to Mexico, to take command of the forces there assembled, and particularly to organize and set on foot an expedition to operate on the gulf coast, if on arriving at the theatre of action you shall deem it to be practicable. It is not proposed to control your operations by definite and positive instructions, but you are left to prosecute them as your judgment, under a full view of all the circumstances, shall dictate. The work is before you, and the means provided, or to be provided, for accomplishing it, are committed to you, in the full confidence that you will use them to the best advantage. The objects which it is desirable to obtain have been indicated, and it is hoped that you will have the requisite force to accomplish them. Of this you must be the judge when preparations are made, and the time for action has arrived. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, Major General WINFIELD SCOTT, Secretary of War. Commanding the Army, Washington. HEAD QUARTERS OF THE ARMY, West Point, New York, September 12, 1846. SIR: In the letter I had the honor to address to you the 27th of May last, I requested that I might be sent to take the immediate command of the principal army against Mexico-either "to-day or at any better time he (the President) may be pleased to designate.” The horse regiments (twelve months volunteers) destined for that army being, I suppose, now within fifteen or twenty marches of the Rio Grande, and the season for consecutive operations at hand, I respectfully ask to remind the President of that standing request. I do this without any hesitation in respect to Major General Taylor, having reason to believe that my presence at the head of the army in the field, in accordance with my rank, is neither unexpected nor undesired by that gallant and distinguished commander. A slight return of chills and fevers may detain me here with my family long enough to receive your reply to this note. Should the President yield to my wishes, a few hours in New York and Philadelphia would enable me to make certain arrangements and save the necessity of a return to those cities from Washington. I suppose it would be easy for me to reach the Rio Grande by the end of this month. With high respect, I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient servant, WINFIELD SCOTT. Hon. W. L. MARCY, Secretary of War. |