The prompt and, in my opinion, sufficient measures taken to garrison Tampico the moment that Commodore Perry arrived at the Brazos, were duly reported to the department, and I regret that it should have been considered necessary to give orders from Washington to garrison a place voluntarily abandoned by the enemy and within the theatre of my operations; but above all, that the diversion of a large body of regular troops to that point by the orders of Brigadier General Brooke should be approved, as seems to be the case. Those troops are not required at Tampico, but are much wanted at other points. In regard to the direct correspondence with Major General Patterson, I have nothing to add to what has been said in former letters, except that confusion and embarrassment have resulted from this unusual course; and I must again insist, while invested with the chief command, upon being left perfectly free to employ the officers and the troops under my orders as may, in my own judgment, seem most expedient for the public service. I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, The ADJUTANT GENERAL Z. TAYLOR, Major General U. S. A., commanding. Of the Army, Washington, D. C. [No. 1.] HEAD-QUARTERS, ARMY OF OCCUPATION, Camp near Victoria, Mexico, January 7, 1847. SIR: I have the honor to advise you that on the 29th ultimo Brigadier General Quitman occupied, without resistance, the city of Victoria, capital of the State of Tamaulipas. The enemy had a body of some 1,500 cavalry in the town, with its advanced picket at Santa Engracia, but it fell back as General Quitman approached, and is understood to be now at Jaumave, in the direction of Tula. At Tula there is a strong division of observation under the command of General Valencia. An examination of the mountain pass leading to Tula shows that it is entirely impracticable for artillery or wagons. Such is also believed to be the character of the Santa Barbara pass, which opens in the direction of Tampico. I arrived here with the division of Brigadier General Twiggs on the 4th instant, and was joined on the same day by the force which Major General Patterson conducted from Matamoras. The force now collected here is over 5,000 strong, and, I am happy to add, in excellent health, and in good condition for service. I am unofficially advised that Major General Scott is now in the country, under orders from the government. I propose to remain at this point until I can hear from him and determine what disposition to make of the troops now here. I am constantly expecting despatches from his head-quarters. The reconnoissance of the mountain passes leading to Labradores, alluded to in my communication of December 26, was completely successful, so far as to determine the character of the routes, &c.; but I regret to report that on the return of the party to Linares, the escort was attacked in a difficult pass of the mountain, and the baggage and ten men of the rear guard cut off. It is hoped that the rear guard may have effected their escape, and will yet join us. The officer and non-commissioned officer of the rear guard are in arrest, and the former under charges. I am happy to say that no blame can attach to Lieutenant Colonel May, who commanded the escort, for this unfortunate occurrence. His detailed report will be forwarded hereafter. We have newspapers from the city of Mexico to the 19th of December, at which date the congress had taken no action in regard to the war or the election of president. The country seems to be in a very distracted condition, and the tone of the public press more desponding than heretofore. I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, Major General U. S. A., commanding. The ADJUTANT GENERAL of the Army, Washington, D. C. WAR DEPARTMENT, SIR: Some anxiety is felt here in regard to the position of our troops in Mexico. Everything indicates that it is the policy of the enemy to strike at our detached posts, or cut our lines of communication. We are not fully advised what lines it is proposed to su tain, or what posts are to be held. The line, should it not extend beyond Monterey, is a long one, and a considerable force will be required to keep it open, and to hold that place. If, in addition to retaining possession of Monterey, an attempt should be made to establish posts at Parras, Saltillo, Linares, Victoria, &c., it is feared that an opportunity will be offered to the enemy to gain some advantage over us at one or more of these points, or along the chain of connexion neccessarily to be kept up with them. You are well acquainted with the present plans of operation. While engaged in an expedition on the seacoast, it is not proposed to penetrate the country beyond Monterey, with a view to its permanent occupation, though it is desirable to maintain a threatening attitude at that point. Monterey must be held with a sufficient force. Such a force being provided for that object, the remainder will of course be at your disposal to maintain other proper positions, and to ope- rate on the gulf coast, and especially at Vera Cruz. Your position will enable you to determine, better than can be done here, what should be the best disposition for the safety of our troops, and to disappoint the expectations of the enemy, who is undoubtedly watching for opportunities to fall upon them while in detachments of small bodies, with greatly superior numbers. No positive directions will, therefore, be given touching these matters. It was expected that General Taylor would have deemed it expedient to order the force under General Wool to join him at Monterey, and not to extend his line to Saltillo, with a view to hold permanent possession of it. At the last advices from Gen. Wool he had not received orders to unite his forces with those under the immediate command of General Taylor, but it is hoped that before this time the suggestions in my despatch to General Taylor of the 22d of October have been received, approved, and carried into effect. The detachment which it is proposed to make from the forces at and near Monterey, for the expedition on the coast, will render it proper, if not indispensable, that they should be reinforced by General Wool's command. As a considerable part of the forces under General Taylor may be withdrawn for the expedition you are to conduct against Vera Cruz, it is urged that great caution should be observed in regard to the safety of those which may be left on the present line of operations. If any reliance can be placed on the accounts which have reached us as to the number and condition of the army under the command of the Mexican general, he could have rendered it difficult and hazardous for our troops to advance to Saltillo, and his retiring beyond that place wears the appearance of a ruse to draw us far into the country in that direction, to the end that he may practise, with better hopes of success, his system of guerrilla warfare. If such be his object, I trust proper measures will be taken to disappoint him. It seems now to be generally understood that he is at Tula with a large body of cavalry. The object of this movement is not clearly perceived. The withdrawing of the Mexican force from Tampico would seem to indicate a determination on his part to yield up Tamaulipas to our arms; but the occupation of Tula with a strong force does not appear consistent with such a course of policy, unless he is apprehensive that we may move upon San Luis Potosi through the passes of the mountains in that vicinity. Should we undertake to hold Victoria with a small force, might he not move from his present position at Tula against that place, and surprise it; or fall upon some of our detachments moving by land to Tampico? Though the Sierra Madre is difficult to pass, and with wagons or wheel-carriages impassable, yet may not the enemy's cavalry find a way through the gorges of this mountain? It is not unreasonable to expect that some such movement is contemplated. It is therefore suggested that this matter should be well considered, and great care taken to guard against any surprise in this quarter. We have no news from Mexico on which much reliance can be placed; but from such information as we have, it is doubtful whether a Mexican Congress will have assembled at the time fixed for it the 6th of December; and it is equally doubtful whether, whenever it shall come together, it will be disposed to enter upon negotiations for peace. Mexico is undoubtedly in a wretched con dition, and without the prospect of improvement. A hope was entertained, and not now wholly abandoned, that the northern departments would see that their interest would be promoted by withdrawing from the central government and forming an independent republic. Should any such disposition manifest itself, it ought to be encouraged, and those engaged in the movement should have all the protection and support from our forces that can be properly given to them; without any pledge, however, that its separate existence will be made a condition in the treaty of peace which may be entered into between Mexico and the United States. We have not yet learned that Mexico is making any extraordinary efforts to assemble a large covering army at Vera Cruz, and it is hoped that you will not find a formidable force to oppose your landing. Securely on shore in the vicinity of Vera Cruz, I have but little doubt of your success in getting possession of the city, and hope the surrender of the castle will follow. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, W. L. MARCY. Major General WINFIELD SCOTT. Secretary of War. WAR DEPARTMENT, Washington, January 27, 1847. SIR: I deem it proper to send you a letter (taken from a newspaper) which first appeared in the "New York Morning Express," and has since, as a matter of course, been transferred to many other journals. I learn from General Gaines that the letter is genuine. This information, I am assured, he had previously given to others. As the letter was not marked "confidential," he adjudged that circumstances existed which justified the publication of some part of it, though he expresses an opinion that it was not written with such a view. It will in a short time be in possession of our enemy; and coming, as it does, from the general to whom the conduct of the war on our part was confided, it will convey most valuable information to the Mexican commander, not only in relation to our present line of operations, but as to the new one, which alone, in your opinion, can be taken with a prospect of success, if an attempt is to be made on the city of Mexico. The disclosure of your views as to the future operations of our forces, accompanied, as it is, with your opinion that the fruits of the war, if completely successful, will be of little worth to us, will, it is greatly to be feared, not only embarrass our subsequent movements, but disincline the enemy to enter into negotiations for peace. With particular reference to these effects, the publication is most deeply to be regretted. The 650th paragraph of the General Regulations for the army, published March 1, 1825, declares that "Private letters or reports relative to military marches and operations are frequently mischievous in design, and always disgraceful to the army. They are, therefore, strictly forbidden; and any officer found guilty of making such report for publication, without special permission, or of placing the writing beyond his control, so that it finds its way to the press, within one month after the termination of the campaign to which it relates, shall be dismissed from the service." This paragraph was not included in the compilation of the general regulations published in 1841, but is deemed peculiarly applicable to a state of war; and the President has directed it to be republished, and the observance of it strictly enjoined upon all officers. I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant, Major General Z. TAYLOR, United States Army, in Mexico. W. L. MARCY, Secretary of War. WAR DEPARTMENT, July 11, 1846. SIR: The President and this department feel no little embarrassment on the subject of brevets to the officers who served with distinction in the affairs of the 8th and 9th of May, and in the defence of Fort Brown. With every wish and desire to reward those who distinguished themselves by their gallant conduct on these several occasions, in the presence of the enemy, efforts have been made to form a list of brevet appointments for the favorable action of the Senate; but it has been found impossible to do that justice. to the subject here, which the occasion seems to demand, under the apprehension that, for thé want of full and particular information, so necessary in deciding questions of this nature, some highly meritorious officers might be passed over, whose gallantry and efficiency on the occasions would lose nothing by a comparison with others more favorably noticed. In this doubt and uncertainty, the President naturally looks to you for advice and assistance, which, from your knowledge of the character and conduct. of the officers under your command, and of the services rendered by each on the occasions referred to, he does not question you will be able and willing to give; and he therefore requests that you will furnish a list of such officers as, in your opinion, are entitled to reward for their gallant conduct. You are also requested to state whether there are any non-commissioned officers or privates whose general conduct and gallantry in these affairs are such as to warrant their being favorably noticed by the government, or whose claims would entitle them to promotion. An early answer is requested, as the President is desirous of submitting the list to the Senate before the adjournment of Con |