REVIEW

OF A

PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY

INTO THE

ORIGIN OF OUR IDEAS

OF THE

SUBLIME AND BEAUTIFUL.

TH

HE title of this book very naturally excites curiofity, as the fubject is in general pleafing to all readers who have any pretenfions to taste, But in treating abstract ideas, there is often great danger that the author will bewilder himself in a maze of chimerical notions; and this the more especially if he attempts to fet himself up for a fystem-maker. Something like this, we are apprehensive, has happened to the author of the performance now before us; who has however the merit of having been very curious in his research, and appears to have employed much close and deep thinking about the subject of his investigation. But the love of novelty feems to have been a very leading principle in his mind, throughout his whole compofition; and we fear that in endeavouring to advance what was never faid before him, he will

find it his lot to have faid what will not be adopted after him. We do not think this gentleman saw his way very clearly through the queftion: and we are of opinion that he has been very ingenious to err, instead of affording us any new lights, whereby we might find out the fources of the Sublime and Beautiful. A review of his book, we think, will fet this matter in a clear light.

In order to come at the bottom of things, he fets out with explaining the first principles of the human mind he obferves that curiofity is one of our earlieft paffions: he then endeavours to prove that pain and pleasure are not connected, and that the removal of pain is not a pofitive pleasure, but for diftinction's fake, he chufes to call it delight. "If "a man," fays he, " in a flate of tranquillity fhould fuddenly hear a concert of mufic, he then enjoys pleasure without previous pain; and on the other hand, if a man in the fame ftate of tranquillity "fhould receive a blow, here is pain without the "removal of pleafure." But furely the removal of a tooth-ach is pleafure to all intents and purposes; it induces a train of pleafing ideas in the mind, fuch as fatisfaction with our prefent ftate, &c. and pleafure is equally pofitive, whether it begins in the mind, or is conveyed thither by agreeable bodily fenfation. In like manner the removal of pleasure is pofitive pain, as the abfence of a fine woman to whom we are attached, &c. The truth is, pain and pleasure may fubfift independently, and also reciprocally induce each other. Our author allows, that the lofs of pleafure occafions three different lenfations, viz. indifference, disappointment, or

grief: but furely disappointment and grief are positive pains." But," fays he, "grief can be no pain, because we fee that many perfons are found "indulging it." They are fo! but it fhould be remembered that grief is a mixed paffion, confifting of forrow for our lofs and fondness for the object: now our fondness for the object makes our imagination dwell on the idea, though we feel very painful fenfations at the fame time. Animum picturá pafcit inani. Our author proceeds to divide our paffions into two general claffes, viz. felf-preservation, and fociety; the felfifh and the focial paffions would have been a better diftinction, because selfish includes all the ideas of felf-preservation, and all our other gratifications. The paffions which concern felf-prefervation he rightly obferves turn moftly on pain and danger; and these, he adds very justly, are the most powerful in our nature. He then endeavours to graft the Sublime on our paffions of felf-prefervation. "Whatever "is fitted," fays he, to excite ideas of pain and "danger, or operates in a manner analogous to

terror, is a fource of the Sublime; that is, ex"cites the strongest emotion which the mind is ca"pable of feeling." But furely this is falfe philofophy: the brodequin of Ravilliac, and the iron bed of Damien, are capable of exciting alarming ideas of terror, but cannot be faid to hold any thing of the Sublime. Befides, why are our other paffions to be excluded? Cannot the Sublime confift with ambition? It is perhaps in confequence of this very paffion, grafted in us for the wifeft purpofes by the Author of our existence, that we are capable of feel

1

ing the Sublime in the degree we do; of delighting 'n every thing that is magnificent, of preferring the fun to a farthing candle, that by proceeding from greater to ftill greater, we might at laft fix our imagination on Him who is the Supreme of all. And this perhaps is the true fource of the Sublime, which is always greatly heightened when any of our paffions are ftrongly agitated, fuch as terror, grief, rage, indignation, admiration, love, &c. By the ftrongest of these the Sublime will be enforced, but it will confift with any of them. As for inftance, when Virgil fays of Jupiter,

Annuit et totum nutu tremefecit Olympum;

Here we have a Sublime image increased by our terror, when we think of his fhaking the poles with a nod. And on the other hand, when the fame defcribes the fame perfonage,

Vultu quo cælum tempeftatefque ferenat;

poet

With that countenance with which he looks ftorms and tempefts into a calm, we ftill have a fublime idea of the power which thus commands all nature, and we feel it with love and admiration.

Our author proceeds to the focial paffions, which he claffes into two forts: firft, the fociety of the fexes; and next, the more general fociety which we hold with mankind and the whole universe. With regard to the first he obferves, that beauty is the object of it; and he endeavours to refute Mr. Addifon's opinion, that animals have a sense of beauty to confine them to their own fpecies: but as he only fuppofes a law of another kind, we think Mr.

Addifon's

Addison's may ftand till he will be pleafed to fubstitute a better. He agrees that beafts have no perception of beauty, because they do not pick and choose but furely it is probable that they may have an immediate perception of fomething beautiful in their own fpecies, without waiting to compare it with others, and felect for themfelves. This would be to enjoy the advantages of deliberate reafoning and reflection; qualities of which they do not appear to be poffeffed.

Our author himself affigns a reason why the brute creation need not choose for themselves. " But "man, who is a creature adapted to a greater va"riety and intricacy of relation, connects with the "general paffion the idea of fome focial qualities, "which direct and heighten the appetite which he "has in common with all other animals: and as he " is not defigned like them to live at large, it is fit "that he should have fomething to create a pre"ference, and fix his choice; and this in general "fhould be fome fenfible quality; as no other can "fo quickly, fo powerfully, or fo furely produce its "effect."

From hence it appears why a beast in the field, according to Mr. Addifon's ingenious notion, may have a sense of beauty in its own fpecies, without waiting to determine its choice by comparison.

In contradiction to his former affertions, he fays, that folitude is as great a pofitive pain as can be conceived and yet the pain of folitude is a privation of pleasure, and is merely a disappointment, and a grieving for the lofs of company. In talking of the focial paffions, he fays, "I am convinced we