proceed to state. As we have said, the important question is, Was the officer justified or protected in forcibly taking possession of the coal as against the plaintiff, who was the real owner? The counsel for the plaintiff contends he was not so justitied or protected. He says, notwithstanding the absolute right of the officer to proceed and execute the writ, still, if he takes the property of the plaintiff on a process against Price and Paul, he is none the less a trespasser upon the rights of the plaintiff, and, if a trespasser, he acquired no property in the thing attached as against the real owner. The plaintiff, he says, may have his action, and recover the value of the property taken, from interfering with the coal, and demanded | mitted to the jury. The judgment must be possession of the car. This being refused, reversed for the reason which we will now he forcibly ejected the plaintiff from the same, which is the wrong complained of. These material facts are clearly established by the evidence, and are really not disputed. The possession of the coal, after the seizure on the attachment, must be deemed to have been constructively in the constable, as he had left the car, with its contents, where he found it, though in charge of the railroad company. But he had taken as complete possession of the coal as was practicable, unless he removed it from the car. The constable had such possession and special interest in the coal by virtue of his levy that he could have maintained an action against any. one who interfered with it, had the coal been the property of the defendants in the attach-as was done in this case; or if, after the seizment. It seems to us there can be no doubt ure on the attachment, the plaintiff can as to the correctness of this proposition. But peaceably obtain the possession of the atthe coal belonged to the plaintiff. It had tached property, he may take it, and thus been ordered by him, and was consigned to subject himself to an action at the suit of him, and was afterwards adjudged to be his the officer; but that the officer has no right property in an action brought to recover the in law to dispossess the owner by using force value thereof. But after the seizure, as we for that purpose, and is not protected in dohave said, he acquired peaceable possessioning so. These different positions of counsel of the coal, and held such possession when as to the duty and liability of an officer atthe constable deprived him of it in a forcible taching property, though diametrically op manner. choice to some extent between the rules laid down in opposing decisions. The courts of Vermont, New Hampshire and Ohio support the contention of the defendants, while those in Massachusetts, New York, and Illinois sustain the plaintiff's position. See State v. Downer, 8 Vt. 424; State v. Buchanan, 17 Vt. 573; State v. Fifield, 18 N. H. 34; State v. Richardson, 38 N. H. 208; Faris v. State, 3 Ohio. St. 159. Contra: Com v. Kennard, 8 Pick. 133; Elder v. Morrison, 10 Wend. 128; Wentworth v. People, 5 Ill. 550. posed, are sustained by high authority. The important question in the case is as to There is a serious conflict of judicial opinthe justification of the officer. The other de-ion on the subject, and we have to make a fendants were present at the time, aiding and abetting him in the execution of the writ. The learned counsel for the defendants argues and insists that, as the officer was required by his writ to levy upon the coal the title to which was in dispute or in doubt, and he being indemnified therefor, he was in duty bound to make the levy and hold the property until the question of title was settled, or the property otherwise released; and that an officer, while so acting, may not be lawfully interfered with or resisted by the rightful owner, whether such owner be the defendant in the attachment or not; but that the officer had the right to overcome such resistance, and keep or regain possession by the use of such force as might be necessary for the purpose. The learned circuit court doubtless adopted this view of the law, as it directed a verdict for the defendants. But the rule which commends itself to our judgment as the most salutary and reasonable is to hold that if, after seizure on attachment against a third party, the rightful owner can quietly and peaceably obtain possession of the property, he may retain such possession, and the officer will not be justified in using forcible means to regain possession. If the officer wishes to test the The counsel for the plaintiff insists that right of the owner, he should bring an action the court erred in thus directing the verdict for that purpose. The courts which adopt for the defendants, because, he says, it was the Vermont rule think there are strong a question of fact for the jury to determine grounds of public policy, where the question whether the defendants were acting in good of property is doubtful, that the owner faith in seizing the coal as the property of should resort to his remedy at law to settle Price and Paul, and in taking it from the the question in the courts. There is, doubtpossession of the plaintiff; also whether the less, force in this consideration. Parties defendants used greater force than was neces- should not be permitted to resort to force to sary in ejecting the plaintiff from the car; vindicate their rights where peaceable remeand further, that, under the undisputed tes- dies exist. But the question can be as well timony, the plaintiff was entitled to recover determined in an action brought by the offihis actual damages for the wrongful act of cer as when it is brought by the owner. The the defendants in ejecting him from the car. courts all admit that due regard should be We shall spend no time in considering the had to the rights which the owner has to his first two questions. As it is said by the op- property, and that these rights should be posing counsel, no claim was made on the protected and secured as far as possible. trial that the evidence raised any doubts on Now, why should the owner then, when he these points, and there was no suggestion has possession of that which is his own, be or request made that they should be sub-required to give it up to an officer who comes with a process, not against him, but against | may fail to collect his debt. But, as we a third party, with whom he has no connec- have said, the officer, after a levy, may bring tion, and demands possession? See Gilman an action against anyone who interferes with v. Williams, 7 Wis. 329 (side page). We his possession, and thus settle all rights of can perceive no sufficient reason, founded property. See Merrit v. Miller, 13 Vt. 416. either in law or on public policy, for hold-There is no hardship in this rule. It is surely ing that the owner of personal property may unnecessary to allow the officer to resort to not insist upon his rights, and refuse to sur- force and violence to regain possession of render the same to an officer, because the attached property, where the law affords him latter has attached it on a writ against a an adequate legal remedy to enforce his third party. The creditor or officer is not rights. To allow him to use force under without legal redress to test the question of such circumstances is certainly not essential title to the property. It is admitted that the for the protection of the officer, nor to vindiofficer is a trespasser if he seizes property cate the authority of the law. But the not belonging to the defendant in the attach-question is so fully considered and discussed ment. Why should his unlawful act be re- in the cases to which we have referred that garded with more favor than the rights of no further remarks upon the subject are called the real owner? True, it is said, the owner for. of property seized or attached on a process against another has legal remedies by an action, and therefore he ought not to be allowed to protect his goods with a strong hand, for this power may be abused so as to cover the property of the debtor, and the creditor We think the circuit court erred in directing a verdict for the defendants, and that the judgment af the Circuit Court must be recersed, and a new trial ordered. Rehearing denied. ARKANSAS SUPREME COURT. Biscoe HINDMAN et al., Appts., V. Laura E. B. O'CONNER. (....Ark.....) 1. A judicial sale of minors' property to their step-grandmother will, at their request, be set aside when, after the death NOTE.-Confidential relations between parties. The rule of the civil law is practiced in our courts of equity, and applied to trustees, agents, and generally to all persons who have been employed in a confidential character in relation to property. Saltmarsh v. Beene, 4 Port. (Ala.) 283, 30 Am. Dec. 526; Parkist v. Alexander, 1 Johns. Ch. 397, 1 L. ed. 186. The rule holds good as to all advantages gained by means of necessary confidence, growing immediately out of the legal relations of the parties as attorney and client, guardian and ward, etc. Marvin v. Bennett, 26 Wend. 183. A fundamental doctrine of equity is that a trustee can gain no advantage to himself, to the detriment of those for whom he holds a trust. The object of the rule is to secure fidelity on the part of the trustee, and to preserve the interest of those whose rights are confided to his care. Wright v. Ross, 36 Cal. 432; Parkist v. Alexander, supra; Holridge v. Gillespie, 2 Johns. Ch. 33, 1 L. ed. 286; Van Horne v. Fonda, 5 Johns. Ch. 409, 1 L. ed. 1125; Slade v. Van Vechten, 11 Paige, 22, 5 L. ed. 42. Personal interests cannot conflict with fiduciary duty No one having duties to discharge of a fiduciary nature shall be allowed to enter into engagements in which he has, or can have, a personal interest, conflicting, or which possibly may conflict, with the interests of those whom he is bound to protect. Gardner v. Ogden, 22 N. Y. 349; Michoud v. Girod, 45 U. S. 4 How. 503, 11 L. ed. 1076; Campbell v. Johnston, 1 Sandf. Ch. 152, 7 L. ed. 276. See note to Manhattan Cloak & S. Co. v. Dodge (Ind.) 6 L. R. A. 369. of their mother and at her request the step-grandmother took charge of them and was virtually constituted their guardian by the probate court and had before the sale at their request taken charge of the property and taken up her residence thereon, although the management of the sale was by law imposed on a stranger, the curator of the estate, and the purchaser acted fairly and in good faith. 2. The five years' Statute of Limitations This principle applies to the relation of trustee or agent. Olcott v. Tioga R. Co. 27 N. Y. 565; Davoue v. Fanning, 2 Johns. Ch. 252, 1 L. ed. 365; Moore v. Moore, 4 Sandf. Ch. 48, 7 L. ed. 1018. See Ward v. Smith, 3 Sandf. Ch. 592, 7 L. ed. 968; Tyler v. Sanborn (Ill.) 4 L. R. A. 218. A purchase by the testamentary guardian of one of the devisees will not be rendered valid by the fact that the ward had another guardian, appointed by the surrogate for the express purpose of representing his interests in that particular transaction (Brasher v. Van Cortlandt, 2 Johns. Ch. 242, 1 L. ed. 362); this rule applied in Bostwick v. Atkins, 3 N.Y. 60. Party cannot purchase property for his own beneft applies to an action to set aside the confirmation of a judicial sale of minors' lands at which their guardian had become the purchaser, notwithstanding the ground upon which the claim to relief is based is fraud. 3. The record must show that the minor resided within the county in which the court was held which attempted to remove his disability under the authority conferred by Act of February 18, 1869, to render the order of removal valid. (July 3, 1891.) De Felice, La Legislation Universelle, Tome 13, pp. 480, 486. 2 Domat, Civil Law, §§ 2, 3. "Trustee" is also used in a wide and per- APPEAL by complainants from a decree of in the rule forbidding trustees to buy. The facts are stated in the opinion. The rights of the beneficiaries in trust estates have always been carefully guarded by the laws of this State, particularly in regard to transactions involving titles to land. is Imboden v. Hunter, 23 Ark. 622. A trustee "in the strict sense of the word" a person who holds property upon trust." Rapalje & Lawrence, Law Dict. The probate court decreed that O'Conner and his wife should assist in the management of complainants' property. This made them trustees in the strict sense of the term. The guardian cannot purchase the property of his ward, either in his own name or by the intervention of a third person. Buffalo Creek R. Co. 56 N.Y. 491; Downs v. Rickards,, 4 Del. Ch. 433; 2 Pom. Eq. Jur. 483; Moore v. Moore, 4 Sandf. Ch. 37, 7 L. ed. 1014; Burhans v. Van Zandt, 7 N. Y. 523; Ringo v. Binns, 35 U. S. 10 Pet. 269, 9 L. ed. 420; Fisk v. Sarber, 6 Watts & S. 18; Jewett v. Miller, 10 N. Y. 402; Rogers v, Rogers, Hopk. Ch. 515,2 L. ed. 507; Hamilton v. Wright, 9 Clark & F. 111; De Caters v. De Chaumont, 3 Paige, 178, 3 L. ed. 105; Tanner v. Elworthy, 4 Beav. 487; Carter v. Palmer, 1 Dru. & W. 722; York Bldgs. v. Mackenzie, 8 Bro. P. C. 42; Anderson v. Lemon, 8 N.Y. 236; Van Epps v.Van Epps, 9 Paige, 237, 4 L. ed. 682; Terwilliger v. Brown, 44 N. Y. 241, 59 Barb. 13; Olcott v. Tioga R. Co. 27 N. Y. 565; Hawley v. Cramer, 4 Cow. 717; Slade v.Van Vechten, 11 Paige, 21, 5 L. ed. 42; Torrey v. Bank of Orleans, 9 Paige, 649, 4 L. ed. 853; Davoue v. Fanning, 2 Johns. Ch. 252,1 L. ed. 368. This rule was not limited in its application to a particular class of persons, such as trustees, guardians, or solicitors, but went much deeper, and the rule was one of universal application, affecting all persons who came within its principle, which was that no party could be permitted to purchase an interest, where he had a duty to perform which was inconsistent with the character of purchaser. Dickinson v. Codwise, 1 Sandf. Ch. 226, 7 L. ed. 209; Marshall v. Carson, 38 N. J. Eq. 254; Fulton v. Whitney, 66 N.Y. 556. Any person placed in a situation of trust or confidence in reference to the subject of the sale, or who has a duty to perform which is inconsistent with the character of a purchaser, cannot be a purchaser on his own account. Williams v. Townsend, 31 N.Y. 415. If an agent employed to sell becomes himself the purchaser, or the agent of another; or if he be an agent to buy, and he becomes himself the seller, or the agent of another in making the sale, the princi See Jones v. Arkansas Mech. & A. Asso. 38 Ark. 26; West v. Waddill, 33 Ark. 587; Lewin, Tr. p. 484; Underhill, Tr. p. 484; McGaughey v. Brown, 46 Ark. 32; Wright v. Walker, 30 Ark. 44; Livingston v. Cochran, 33 Ark. 301; Black v. Keenan, 5 Dana, 570; Brockett v. Richardson, 61 Miss. 766. The fact that the sale was conducted by the curator can make no difference. Powell v. Powell, 80 Ala. 11. Whether the sale be public or private, the trustee is equally disabled from becoming a purchaser of the trust estate. Davoue v. Fanning, 2 Johns. Ch. 259, 1 L. ed. 371. The court below fell into the error of supposing that the plaintiffs must show some actual fraud in order to sustain their complaint. West v. Waddill, supra; Ex parte James, 8 Ves. Jr. 347; Aberdeen R. Co. v. Blaikie, 1 Macq. H. L. Cas. 461; Gardner v. Ogden, 22 pal may avoid the sale or purchase in equity. New Trustee cannot purchase the objects of the trust. The trustee of property cannot become its purchaser. He has a duty to perform in regard to it which is entirely inconsistent with his assuming that character. Iddings v. Bruen, 4 Sandf. Ch. 263, 7 L. ed. 1098; Dobson v. Racey, 3 Sandf. Ch. 60, 7 L. ed. 770; Moore v. Moore, 4 Sandf. Ch. 37,7 L. ed. 1014; Cram v. Mitchell, 1 Sandf. Ch. 251, 7 L. ed. 318. Trustees are never permitted, without the aid of the court, to buy the property which they hold as such. Carson v. Marshall, 37 N. J. Eq. 215; Staats v. Bergen, 17 N. J. Eq. 297, 554; Fulton v. Whitney, 66 N.Y. 548; Bennett v. Austin, 81 N. Y. 308, 332. A trustee cannot purchase an outstanding title and hold it for his own use, against his cestui que trust, even though he purchases at a judicial sale under a title superior to that conveyed to him as trustee. Roberts v. Moseley, 64 Mo. 511; Jewett v. Miller, 10 N. Y. 405; Kellogg v. Wood, 4 Paige, 579, 3 L. ed. 569. A trustee acting in his fiduciary character, and without the intervention of the beneticiary, cannot sell the trust property to himself nor buy his own property from himself for the purposes of the trust. Fox v. Mackreth, 2 Bro. Ch. 400, 1 White & T. Lead. Cas. Eq. 4th Am. ed. 188, 212, 237; Lewis v. N. Y. 327; New York Cent. Ins. Co. v. Na-Jones, Id. 371; Everett v. Clements, 9 Ark. 480; tional Prot. Ins. Co. 14 N. Y. 91; Mechem, Butler v. Wilson, 10 Ark. 316; Freem, Judgm. Ag. § 463; 1 Story, Eq. Jur. § 322; 2 Sugd. 123. Vend. p. 687; Michoud v. Girod, 45 U. S. 4 How. 554, 11 L. ed. 1099; Million v. Taylor, 38 Ark. 428; Gillespie v. Holland, 40 Ark. 32. If there were no more in the order of the probate court than the appointment of the appellee as the adviser of the curator in the management of the property, that alone would suffice to prevent her from buying the trust property. Messrs. Stephenson & Trieber, John J. Harnor and E. C. Harnor, for appellees: Appellants by their conduct, before and after the confirmation of the sale, having full knowledge of all the facts, are estopped to deny the title of appellee. No word of dissent or dissatisfaction was expressed by appellants, or either of them, until the filing of the bill in this case, more than six years after the confirmation of the sale, full three years of which existed after the disabilities of each of them were removed. Underhill, Trusts, p. 293; Torrey v. Bank of Orleans, 9 Paige, 661, 4 L. ed. 858; Hawley v. Cramer, 4 Cow. 736; Allen v. DeGroodt, 98 Mo. 159, 14 Am. St. Rep. 626; Moore v. Wood-This bars their right of recovery. all, 40 Ark. 49; Story, Eq. Jur. § 317; McCants v. Bee, 16 Am. Dec. 616, note. The proceeding to remove the minor's disabilities, being unknown to the common law, and unlike any known to the common law, the residence of the minors is jurisdictional, and must be shown by the record in the proceeding, or else the order is void. Pulaski Co. v. Stuart, 28 Gratt. 879; Thatcher v. Powell, 19 U. S. 6 Wheat. 119, 5 L. ed. 221; Harvey v. Tyler, 69 U. S. 2 Wall. 342, 17 L. ed. 873; Galpin v. Page, 85 U. S. 18 Wall. 371, 21 L. ed. 964; Wells, Jurisdiction of Courts, § 162; Gibney v. Crawford, 51 Ark. 35; Denning v. Corwin, 11 Wend. 648; Striker v. Kelly, Hill, 24; Lawson, Presumptive Ev. p. 27; Reeves v. Clarke, 5 Ark. 27; Ex parte | Anthony, Id. 358; Pendleton v. Fowler, 6 Ark. 41; Levy v. Shurman, Id. 182; Latham v. Jones v. Graham, 36 Ark. 390; McGaughey v. Brown, 46 Ark. 25; Woodard v. Jaggers, 48 Ark. 248; Scott v. Freeland, 7 Smedes & M. 409, 45 Am. Dec. 310; 2 Pom. Eq. § 815, 917. 965; Story, Eq. § 385; Hoffert v. Miller, 86 Ky. 572; Goodnow v. Empire Lumber Co. 31 Minn. 468; Wells v. Seixas, 24 Fed. Rep. 82; O'Brien v. Gaslin, 20 Neb. 348; Ward v. Laverty, 19 Neb. 429; Durfee v. Abbott, 61 Mich. 471; Ihley v. Padgett, 27 S. C. 300. Guardian of minors may purchase lands of wards when the sale by a public officer is inevitable, and when he has no funds in his hands belonging to the wards. Chorpenning's App. 32 Pa. 315, 72 Am. Dec. 789; Prevost v. Gratz, Pet. C. C. 378; Buell v. Buckingham, 16 Iowa, 284, 85 Am. Dec. 516. The position occupied by appellee at the time of the application for and sale of the Anderson v. Butler (S. C.), 5 L. R. A. 166; Tyler v. Effect of purchase by trustee. A trustee cannot derive any private advantage from the sale of the trust property committed to his guardianship; and all the advantages which he does thus improperly acquire shall result to the benefit of the cestui que trust. Chapin v. Weed, Clarke, Ch. 466, 7 L. ed. 173. A trustee who buys in the trust property under a prior incumbrance, and at a price below its real value, is always considered as doing so for the use and benefit of his cestui que trust. Colburn v. Morton, 36 How. Pr. 160, 5 Abb. Pr. N. S. 315, 3 Keyes, 305, 1 Trans. App. 149, 1 Abb. App. Dec. 385: Campbell v. Johnston, 1 Sandf. Ch. 148, 7 L. ed. 275. Hillman, 3 H. L. Cas. 607; Aberdeen R. Co. v., Blaikie, 1 Macq. H. L. Cas. 461; Re Bloye's Trust, 1 Macn. & G. 488; Knight v. Marjoribanks, 2 Macn. & G. 10; Parkinson v. Hanbury, 2 De G. J. & S. 450; Ingle v. Richards, 6 Jur. N. S. 11, 78; Ridley v. Ridley, 34 L. J. Ch. 462; Franks v. Bollans, 37 L. J. Ch. 148, 155; Grover v. Hugell, 3 Russ. 428; Gregory v. Gregory, Coop. Ch. 201; Baker v. Carter, 1 Younge & C. 250; Woodhouse v. Meredith, 1 Jac. & W. 204, 222; Ex parte Lacey, 6 Ves. Jr. 625; Ex parte Bennett, 10 Ves. Jr. 381, 394; Randall v. Errington, 10 Ves. Jr. 423; Atty-Gen. v. Clarendon, 17 Ves. Jr. 491, 500; Tracy v. Colby, 55 Cal. 67; Tracy v. Craig, Id. 91; Scott v. Umbarger, 41 Cal. 410: Union Slate Co. v. Tilton, 69 Me. 244; Connolly v. Hammond, 51 Tex. 635; Paine v. Irwin, 16 Hun, 390; Michoud v. Girod, 45 U. S. 4 How. 503, 11 L. ed. 1076; Stephen v. Beall, 89 U. S. 22 Wall. 329, 22 L. ed. 786; Wormley v. Wormley, 21 U. S. 8 Wheat. 421, 5 L. ed. 651; Cald- Where the purchaser is the attorney for the well v. Taggart, 29 U. S. 4 Pet. 190, 7 L. ed. 828; execution plaintiff, and has controlled a part of the Freeman v. Harwood, 49 Me. 195; Dyer v. Shurtleff, preliminaries to the sale, he will be deemed to hold 112 Mass. 165; Brown v. Cowell, 116 Mass. 461; Smith the property as trustee of the owner. O'Donnell v. Frost, 70 N.Y. 65; Fulton v. Whitney, 66 N. Y. 518; v. Lindsay, 7 Jones & S. 535; Dickinson v. Codwise. Star F. Ins. Co. v. Palmer, 9 Jones & S. 267; Wood-1 Sandf. Ch. 214, 7 L. ed. 304; Dobson v. Racey, 3 ruff v. Boyden, 3 Abb. N. C. 29; Child v. Brace, 4 Paige, 309, 3 L. ed. 449; Campbell v. Johnston, 1 Sandf. Ch. 148, 7 L. ed. 275; Cram v. Mitchell, 1 Sandf. Ch. 251, 7 L. ed. 318; Cumberland Coal & I. Co. v. Sherman, 30 Barb. 553; Johnson v. Bennett, 39 Barb. 237; Romaine v. Hendrickson, 27 N. J. Eq. 162; 2 Pom. Eq. Jur. 482. Property not the subject of the trust, but whose sale at less than its value will diminish the trust fund, cannot be purchased by the trustee for himself. Fulton v. Whitney, 66 N. Y. 555, 5 Hun, 19; Case v. Carroll, 35 N. Y. 385; Hickley v. Hickley, L. R. 2 Ch. Div. 190. Trustee cannot purchase the trust property. See notes to Wilson v. Brookshire (Ind.) 9 L. R. A. 792; Sandf. Ch. 60, 7 L. ed. 770; Alkins v. Delnege, 12 A purchase by a guardian of his ward's land may be enforced against the purchaser's assignee in bankruptcy, and the sureties for the purchase money (Reed v. Jones, 30 Gratt. 133; 2 Tucker's Bl. Com. 459; Moore v. Hilton, 12 Leigh, 1; Daniel v. Leitch, 13 Gratt. 195; Howery v. Helmes, 20 Gratt. 1; Cline v. Catron, 22 Gratt. 378; Phelps v. Seely, Id. 573; Zirkle v. McCue, 26 Gratt. 517; Brock v Rice, 27 Gratt. 812; Talley v. Starke, 6 Gratt. 339); or against an executor who purchases at his own sale. McClure v. Miller, 1 Bail. Eq. 107, 21 Am. Dec. 522. Purchase inures to benefit of cestui que trust. 1891. HINDMAN V. O'CONNER. property imposed no duty upon her as to its conduct or management. West v. Waddill, 33 Ark. 587, and Imboden v. Hunter, 23 Ark. 622, enunciating the duties of trustees, lay down the rule of law applicable to those whose relations to the property impose upon them positive duties to be performed in and about the sale, by and through which the price may be affected. There is a distinction where the trustee deals with the cestui que trust, the latter having his own advisor. Colton v. Stanford, 82 Cal. 351. While as a rule trustees are not permitted to purchase the property of cestuis que trust, yet such purchases are only voidable, and will not be set aside in all cases by courts of equity. See Jones v. Graham, 36 Ark. 383; McGaughey v. Brown, 46 Árk. 25; Woodard v. Jaggers, 48 Ark. 248; Apel v. Kelsey, 47 Ark. 419. In the case at bar the minors were actually present in the probate court by their attorneys, by their next friend in the person of their nearest adult relative, and by their friend who had been, in the lifetime of their mother, the trustee to hold title to their real property, and their failure to appeal was, under the ruling of Jones v. Graham, an election to take the proceeds and discharge the trust. Bramble v. Kingsbury, 39 Ark. 131; Jowers v. Phelps, 33 Ark. 468; Goodman v. Winter, 64 Ala. 410; Schnell v. Chicago, 38 Ill. 382; Penn v. Heisey, 19 Ill. 295; 1 Story, Eq. § 385. Appellants were barred by the Statute of Limitations when the bill was filed. The bill was filed October 13, 1887, six years See note to Wilson v. Brookshire (Ind.) 9 L. R. A. 792. Relief of cestui que trust. A purchase by a trustee is voidable at the election of the cestui que trust, within a reasonable time. Wormley v. Wormley, 21 U. S. 8 Wheat. 421, 5 L. ed. 651. When the delay is far within the Statute of Limitations, and the trustee has not suffered from any act done on the supposition that the cestuis que trust have abandoned their intention to question the sale, the laches will not bar such proceedings. Morse v. Hill, 136 Mass, 66. See note to Cox v. Mackreth, 2 Bro. Ch. 400, 1 White & T. Lead. Cas. Eq. 123; De Bussche v. Alt, L. R. 8 Ch. Div. 286; Hayward v. Eliot Nat. Bank, 96 U. S. 611, 24 L. ed. 855; Michoud v. Girod, 45 U. S. 4 How. 503, 11 L. ed. 1076; Learned v. Foster, 117 Mass. 355; Clark v. Blackington, 110 Mass. 369; Yeackel v. Litchfield, 13 Allen, 417; Litchfield v. Cudworth, 15 Pick. 25; Hayward v. Ellis, 13 Pick. 272. No one but the cestui que trust has a right to call in question or set aside a purchase made by the trustee for his benefit. Wilson v. Troup, 2 Cow. 238; Graves v. Waterman, 63 N. Y. 658; Johnson v. Bennett, 39 Barb. 250. And he can at once have a purchase made by the trustee of the equity of redemption at a sale thereof set aside. Hubbell v. Medbury, 53 N.Y. 1C1. The right of action was held to have expired after ten years from the time at which it had accrued. Ibid. His right to set aside the purchase does not depend upon the question of good faith in the purchase, but on the peril of permitting any conflict between the personal interests of the individual and his duties as trustee, in his fiduciary character. Duncomb v. New York, H. & N. R. R. Co. 84 N. Y. 199. the sale, at which time Biscoe and Blanche As to T. C. Hindman, his disabilities of non- Judgments of superior courts, even of lim- The circuit courts of the United States are He is not bound to prove fraud in the purchase by the trustee. Grubbs v. McGlawn, 39 Ga. 675; Price v. Winter, 15 Fla. 109; Miles v. Wheeler, 43 III. 126. On what terms set aside. The purchase money and expenditures for repairs and permanent improvements must be refunded, and complete equity must be done between the parties, to authorize setting aside such purchase. Yeackel v. Litchfield, 13 Allen, 419; Rotch v. Morgan, 105 Mass. 430; Duncomb v. New York, H. & N. R. R. Co. 22 Hun, 135; People v. Merchants Bank, 35 Hun, 100; Eichelberger v. Hawthorne, 33 Md. 594; Hill, Trustees, 4th Am. ed. 539, and cases cited; Cumberland Coal & I. Co. v. Sherman, 30 Barb. 570; Terwilliger v. Brown, 59 Rarb. 9: Hawley v. Cramer, 4 Cow. 735; Abbot v. American Hard Rubber Co. 33 Barb. 578; Mason v. Martin, 4 Md. 124; Jones v. Jones, 4 Gill, 87; McLaughlin v. Barnum, 31 Md. 425. Setting aside sale. If one acting as trustee for others becomes himself interested in the purchase, the cestuis que trust are entitled to have the sale set aside, unless the of trustee. Stephen v. Beall, 89 U. S. 22 Wall. 340, trustee had fairly devested himself of the character 22 L. ed. 788; Jewett v. Miller, 10 N. Y. 402; Slade v. Van Vechten, 11 Paige, 21, 5 L. ed. 42. Or if the fact is unknown to the buyer and seller. Armstrong v. Campbell, 3 Yerg. 236; Graves v. Waterman, 63 N. Y. 658. Executors and administrators who become buyers at sales made by themselves acquire only an imperfect title, which will be set aside at the option of any of the parties interested in the property. Board of S. B. Bldg. Co. 92 N. Y. 103. Yeackel v. Litchfield, 13 Allen, 419; People v. Open And it has been quite generally held that where an administrator becomes a purchaser of the estate |