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afterwards happen, and the plaintiff is authorized at any time afterwards to sue out a writ of inquiry to assess damages for the breach of any covenant contained in the bond, subsequent to the former trial or inqiury.

This being a penal bond, it falls within the provisions of the statute. It is true, the cases which most usually arise are on official bonds, where a breach of duty to different persons, and at various times, at the common law rendered a multiplicity of suits necessary to the attainment of justice, and to avoid litigation, delay and expense, the statute changed the practice so as to enable any party aggrieved, simply by suing out a scire facias against the defendant, and the suggestion of new breaches, have his damages assessed. But the statute is broader and embraces all penal bonds, and that upon which this suit was brought being of that character, it falls within the enactment. Appellee, then, had the right to assign further breaches, under the statute, for any damage sustained after the suit was brought. Had he paid any portion of the debts against the firm before suit was brought, and not recovered the amount as damages, then that portion of his claim would have been barred.

The breach by a failure of Addis to pay only, in contemplation of law, produced a nominal injury. Appellee only sustained substantial damage when he paid the debts. It was then, and only then, that he had a right to recover more than for a technical breach. And on each payment made by appellee on the debts against the firm, a new breach occurred, and a new cause of action arose, and a right of recovery, equal to the amount paid. On the first recovery, appellee had not been damnified, and until he was, he could not recover substantial damages. The first recovery was therefore correct, and under the statute the judgment stood as a security for any sums appellee might subsequently pay on the debts of the firm which Addis had covenanted to pay and discharge.

From the evidence introduced on the assessment, it appears that all of the payments made by appellee were after the suit

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was brought, and hence no portion of the amount found on the assessment of damages, was barred by the first recovery. The suit was brought to the August term, 1867, and the proof shows that the first payment by appellee was made in the following month of November. It follows that the finding in the court below was correct, and the judgment of the circuit court must be affirmed.

The question raised by the cross errors are unimportant, as the only question arising on this record is presented outside of the bill of exceptions, signed by the judge some two years. after the first trial. We are at a loss to see why the judge should have signed it as he did. It, he states, was made simply from memory, without minutes, and, so far as we can see, without any exceptions having been taken at the time. It is for the judge to determine in the first place whether, under the law, he is bound to sign a bill of exceptions; whether the party demanding it has conformed to the law in preserving the exceptions, and has made up and presented his bill as required by the law, and has, in other respects, a legal right to demand his signature to the bill. The signing of the bill is a solemn official act, which should never be performed unless required by law, and is calculated to produce injury to the opposite party, at least to the extent of contesting it in this court,when improperly signed.

Judgment affirmed.

JOHN KARNES

v.

MAHLON B. LLOYD et al.

1. EXECUTION-confession of judgment for the purpose of enabling a creditor to redeem-not fraudulent as against purchaser. The fact that a judg ment debtor confesses judgment in favor of a creditor for the express 8-52ND ILL.

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purpose of enabling such creditor to redeem from a sale under a prior judg ment, in no wise invalidates it, there being no fraud as to the consideration for the judgment. Such confession is not fraudulent as against the purchaser.

2. SAME redemptions-law encourages. It is the policy of the law to encourage redemptions, in order that the property of the debtor may discharge as many of his liabilities as possible.

3. A creditor by note and mortgage may obtain judgment on the note, and subject other property of his debtor to its payment.

4. SAME-redemption—amount paid for—less than sum due. The objection, that the amount of money paid to the sheriff for the purpose of redemption was less than the actual sum due, comes too late when made after the amount so paid has been accepted from the officer. A party, to avail himself of such objection, must urge it at the time the deficient sum is tendered him.

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Henry county; the Hon. GEORGE W. PLEASANTS, Judge, presiding.

The facts in this case are fully stated in the opinion.

Messrs. SHAW & CRAWFORD, for the appellant.

Mr. O. E. PAGE, for the appellees.

Mr. CHIEF JUSTICE BREESE delivered the opinion of the Court;

The rights of the parties to this record were discussed and settled in the case of Lloyd v. Karnes, 45 Ill. 62, and are not now open to further contest.

On a petition for a rehearing, the opinion was so modified, on the suggestion of fraud in the rendition of the judgment under which the redemption was effected, the cause remanded to the circuit court, with leave to appellant here to make such motion as he might deem advisable, on which the circuit court might make the proper order.

Accordingly, on the remand, at the term next ensuing, it being the October term, 1868, the appellant entered his motion

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for leave to file an amended and supplemental bill, which motion was granted at the March term, 1869, following.

In the amended and supplemental bill, fraud was alleged in the confession of the judgment by Davenport, under which the redemption had been made by appellee, and questioning, also, the consideration of the judgment and irregularity in issuing and levying the execution, it appearing to have issued before the court had adjourned the term at which the judg ment was rendered.

To this amended bill, Davenport and Lloyd were made defendants. Davenport answered, alleging the execution was issued on the affidavit of counsel, made for that purpose before the court adjourned; he denied all fraud in confessing the judgment, affirming it was confessed in good faith, and that it was upon a good and valid consideration, setting out in what it consisted.

Lloyd's answer embraced in it all the matters with which he was connected in the original bill, and to which he had filed a cross-bill, alleging that appellant was in possession of the premises, holding them against his rights, and prayed possession thereof. He also amended the cross-bill with a view to restrain the tenants in possession under the appellant from paying rent to him, and made them parties to the suit. In this amended cross-bill, there appears no charge against appellant which was not in the record when before us on Lloyd's appeal. No relief was sought against appellant in that amended cross-bill, nor was any answer demanded from him, the only object appearing to be to get the tenants in possession before the court, so that their rights might be adjudicated.

The tenants made an appearance by answers filed, in which they disclaimed any interest, except as tenants of appellant.

Appellant, also, without being called upon to do so, put in an answer to the cross-bill, reiterating the statements in his own amended and supplemental bill, and setting up as a defense, that the redemption money paid by appellee was less

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than the amount, by a few cents, that was due and should have been paid.

Leave was given appellant to examine as witnesses the defendants Lloyd and Davenport, and also Elizabeth, his wife. The two first named were fully examined the latter was not-and upon the hearing, the court held, there was no fraud in confessing the judgment by Davenport, on which the redemption was made, and entered a decree dismissing the bill, and awarding possession to Lloyd on his cross-bill.

To reverse this decree, the record is brought here by appeal, assigning as errors, in rendering a decree for the defendant in the original and amended bills, in finding the redemption of Lloyd to have been made in good faith, and in finding the same regular and valid.

Appellant insists that the redemption was void, because contrived for dishonest purposes.

The fact is very apparent, that Davenport, the judgment debtor, was largely indebted to Lloyd, on honest transactions, at the time he confessed the judgment in his favor, and enabled Lloyd to redeem the land claimed by appellant as holder of a certificate of purchase of the same land on a prior judgment. All the questions arising upon this branch of the case were fully discussed and decided in the former opinion, and we will consume no time about them. It is sufficient to say, Lloyd was lawfully in a position entitling him to redeem, if there was no fraud on his part, colluding with Davenport, to confess a judgment, no debt being in fact due. The record furnishes no proof of fraud, so far as the consideration for the judgment is concerned, and the fact that the judgment was confessed for the avowed purpose of enabling Lloyd to redeem from appellant's purchase, in no wise invalidates it, as this court has said in Phillips v. Demoss et al. 14 Ill. 412. It is the policy of the law to encourage redemptions, in order that the property of the debtor may discharge as many of his liabilities as possible.