1. MARRIED WOMEN-what is "property," within the act of 1861. The right of action accruing by reason of personal injuries received by a married woman from the negligence of a railroad company, is property, and coming to her from a source other than her husband, and, in good faith, it is her separate property, and comes under the operation of the act of 1861.

2. SAME whether a married woman may sue alone for such injuries. Such right of action being the separate property of the wife, she may sue alone to recover damages for the injury received.

3. SAME-power of the husband in respect thereto. The right of action in such case being in the wife, the husband cannot, without her consent, adjust it or release it.

4. But where an action for the same cause had been commenced in the joint names of the husband and wife, and the former compromised the suit, and entered into an agreement to dismiss it, and release the cause of action upon receiving a certain sum from the defendant, it appearing that in so doing the husband acted as the agent of the wife, it was held such release operated as a bar to a subsequent action brought in her own name.

5.

CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES. The rule in construing remedial statutes, though it may be in derogation of the common law, is, that every thing is to be done in advancement of the remedy that can be done consistently with any fair construction that can be put upon it.

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Knox county; the Hon. ARTHUR A. SMITH, Judge, presiding.

The opinion states the case.

Messrs. FROST & TUNNICLIFF, Mr. G. C. LANPHERE and Mr. A. M. CRAIG, for the appellants.

Messrs. KITCHELL & ARNOLD, for the appellee.

Mr. CHIEF JUSTICE BREESE delivered the opinion of the Court⚫

Opinion of the Court.

An injury having resulted to the plaintiff in this action, Leannah Dunn, by the locomotive of the defendants, at a street crossing in the town of Galesburg, her husband, Marvin R. Dunn, jointly with herself, brought an action to recover damages therefor, in the circuit court of Knox county, at the June term, 1867. At the same term a similar action was brought against the railroad company, by George E. Dunn, suing by Reuben Hawk, his next friend, for an injury received at the same time, by the same locomotive. Pending these actions, and at the June term, 1867, the following agreement was entered into: "It is agreed that the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company will pay to Marvin R. Dunn, Leannah Dunn and George E. Dunn, the sum of one thousand dollars within three days from this date, or as soon as the said M. R. Dunn can attend to it, and upon payment of the same, the above suits against the said railroad company are to be dismissed, and the said plaintiffs are to give the said company receipts in full of all damages. June 1, 1867."

M. R. Dunn, on the 3d of June, executed to the company a receipt for the amount specified in this agreement.

At the February term, 1868, Leannah Dunn commenced her action in the Knox circuit court, to recover damages for the same injuries which were the subject matter of the suit in which she and her husband were plaintiffs, and compromised by the payment to her husband of one thousand dollars, in pursuance of the above agreement.

To this action the defendants pleaded the above agreement, and claimed that the payment of this money was in full satisfaction and discharge of the grievances in the declaration mentioned, and which M. R. Dunn accepted in full discharge and satisfaction, and dismissed the suit.

To this plea the plaintiff put in six replications, admitting the identity of the cause of action, but denying that she accepted the money in satisfaction of her cause of action. She further replied that the first suit was instituted and carried

Opinion of the Court.

on by her husband, at his own option, without consultation with her and without her authority and consent; that she did not authorize the commencement or settlement of that suit by her husband; that the same was done for his sole benefit, and that she has never received any part of the said money.

The sixth replication alleged that the money paid to M. R. Dunn in satisfaction of the grievances complained of was paid to him upon consideration that she, the plaintiff, should accept the same and acknowledge the receipt thereof by proper receipt executed to the defendants, which she refused to do, and did not accept the money, or any part thereof.

Issues were made up on these allegations, and there was a trial by jury, and a verdict for plaintiff of two thousand nine hundred and thirty-three dollars and thirty-three cents in damages.

A motion for a new trial was overruled, and a judgment rendered on the verdict.

To reverse this judgment, the defendants bring the record here by appeal, and assign various errors.

The principal point made on the record is as to the effect of the agreement of June 1, 1867, and of the receipt by M. R. Dunn of June 3d, of one thousand dollars. The question is, do they bind this plaintiff and bar her action?

Another question made is, as to the right of the plaintiff to maintain this action in her own name.

As to this question, it is conceded, by the common law, she could not maintain it.

Appellee's counsel contend that the act of 1861, called "the married woman's act," has so changed the common law, in respect to femes covert, as to authorize the action by the wife

alone.

The act of 1861 was evidently designed to relieve married women from some of the disabilities the common law had, for centuries, imposed upon them. By force of that law, the maxim obtained, that husband and wife are one person, and although property be the wife's, the husband is the keeper of it, being the head of the wife. Co. Lit. 112.

Opinion of the Court.

These maxims were law in this State up to the comparative modern date of February 21, 1861, at which time it was enacted by the Legislature that "all the property, both real and personal, belonging to any married woman as her sole and separate property, or which any woman hereafter married owns at the time of her marriage, or which any married woman, during coverture, acquires, in good faith, from any person other than her husband, by descent, devise, or otherwise, together with all the rents, issues, increase and profits thereof, shall, notwithstanding her marriage, be and remain, during coverture, her sole and separate property, under her sole control, and be held, owned, possessed and enjoyed by her the same as though she was sole and unmarried; and shall not be subject to the disposal, control or interference of her husband, and shall be exempt from execution or attachment for the debts of her husband."

The rule in construing remedial statutes, though it may be in derogation of the common law, is, that everything is to be done in advancement of the remedy that can be done consistently with any fair construction that can be put upon it. Impressed with the force of this canon of interpretation, this court, soon after the enactment of this statute, not in terms giving to the wife the power to sue alone in matters affecting her separate property, held that, to render the act operative and effectual for the purposes intended by it, it was indispensable, she should have this right, and accordingly sustained an action of replevin brought by a married woman to restore to her the possession of personal property, being her own separate property, which had been seized by a constable, on an execution against her husband. Emerson v. Clayton, 32 Ill. 493. It was there said, the right to her property being vested in the wife, by the statute, it must, if the act is to be enforced, so remain until she consents to dispose of it, for this right includes full dominion over it; when these rights are the only rights affected, on the well-established principles of law, she must bring suit for an invasion of them.

Opinion of the Court.

The legislature designed to make, and did make, a radical change in this respect in the condition of a feme covert. Having the sole control of her property, there is no necessity of joining her husband in an action to recover it, or for trespasses upon it. The very object of the statute was to keep. her separate property out of the control of her husband. If this were not so, the act would be futile and of no effect. The husband, for purposes of his own, might refuse to join in an action with his wife. He might connive with others to dispossess her of her property. The right of sole control over the separate property of the wife by her, includes the power to do whatever is necessary to the effectual assertion and maintenance of that right.

If, then, it can be established that the right of action for this injury to the wife, is property, as it came to her from a source other than her husband, and in good faith, then it was her separate property, and comes under the operation of the act of 1861. The statute is very comprehensive-all property.

Chancellor Kent, in his commentaries, says another leading distinction in respect to goods and chattels, is the distribution of them into things in possession and things in action. The latter are personal rights, not reduced to possession, but recoverable by suit at law. Money due on bond or other contract, damages due for breach of covenant, for the detention of chattels or for torts, are included under this general head or title of things in action. Comstock's Ed. 2 Kent's Com. 432, under the head, "of the nature and various kinds of personal property."

A right to sue for an injury, is a right of action—it is a thing in action, and is property, according to this authority. Who is the natural owner of this right? Not the husband, because the injury did not accrue to him; it was wholly personal to the wife. It was her body that was bruised; it was she who suffered the agonizing, mental and physical pain. Indirectly, it is true, the husband was an injured party, also, during her disabilities, in deprivation of his comfort by