Opinion of the Court.

the waters within or bordering upon this State. Session Laws, 1857, pp. 105, 107.

These statutes, the last being amendatory of the first named, must be considered together. They were designed to embrace vessels engaged in domestic navigation only-such vessels or craft as should be employed on our navigable waters. The counsel for appellee are surely mistaken when they say this State has no other waters naturally navigable within its territory, except rivers. By the act of Congress prescribing the boundaries of this State, and by the constitution of the State conformable thereto, it will be perceived no inconsiderable portion of Lake Michigan is within our territorial limits. The maps do not show it, yet the fact is nevertheless so, that so much of the lake as is included by lines, one running north from the point where our eastern boundary strikes the southern bend of the lake to a point in the middle of the lake, in north latitude 42 degrees 30 minutes, and thence west along that parallel, is undeniably within our limits. It is true, no portion of this vast body of water has been assigned to the counties bordering upon it, or received in any manner the attention of the legislature, yet it is, nevertheless, a portion of the navigable waters of this State and of our territory.

The language of the affidavit is, that the vessel, at the time of the injury, was running upon the navigable waters within and bordering upon this State. The objection is, that it should have alleged that the vessel was employed in navigating the rivers within or bordering upon this State.

When the purpose and object of the acts in question are considered, the terms, rivers and navigable waters, must be regarded as synonymous. The object of the statutes being to give a summary remedy against vessels employed in domestic navigation on the navigable waters of this State, the object is attained by applying them to any navigable water, be it lake or river, and there is the same necessity of applying them to vessels navigating the lake, as exists for their application to rivers, a portion of the former and the whole of the latter being

Opinion of the Court.

within our territorial jurisdiction. This, we think, is made quite apparent from the language of the eleventh section which we have quoted. The intent of that act was to afford a remedy and to embrace vessels other than steamboats not included in the original act of 1845, and it is no forced construction of the words used in the act of 1857 to embrace within them vessels and craft engaged in navigating, not only the rivers, but the waters within our jurisdiction.

The affidavit, we think, shows enough to give jurisdiction, and to bring the case within the act of 1857. On the general subject of jurisdiction, we have expressed our opinion fully in Williamson v. Hogan, 46 Ill. 504, and desire to add nothing thereto.

Another point made by appellant's counsel is, conceding the jurisdiction, the act does not cover the injury of which complaint is made; that while the act provides a remedy for injuries done to persons by the vessel or craft, the declaration alleges the injury was caused by the negligence of the owners of the vessel.

This point is not much elaborated. While the statute speaks of injuries done by the vessel or craft, the bearing and spirit of that provision most clearly is, as inanimate things have no will to direct them, but must be controlled by intellect, such vessel or craft assumes the personalty of the owners, who have control over all, vessel, crew and officers. It follows, therefore, that, for an injury done by a vessel, the owners must be responsible. Like a railroad corporation, they are constructively present at all times, in the persons of their agents, and are held liable, in all courts, for their negligence from which an injury results to another. It is well settled a master is responsible to his servant for injuries received by him from defects in the structures or machinery about which the services were rendered, which defects the master knew, or ought to have known. Chicago and Northwestern Railroad Co. v. Swett, Adm. 45 Ill. 197. Other cases to the same effect might be cited, but it is unnecessary.

Syllabus.

The remaining point is, that there was a total failure of evidence to support the action.

We think the proof is ample on this point. That the rigging of the vessel was rotten, and had been so for some time, was known to the owners. The captain, representing them, was told so more than once, and that this particular rope was frayed and in a damaged condition, was also well known. Its condition could be seen, and the safety of the crew demanded attention to it. Catting an anchor requires force, and the mechanical means by which it is obtained should be sound and free from defects. That this pennant was not, is clearly shown. It is no hardship upon owners of a vessel to require them to have all mechanical as well as human agencies employed by them, trustworthy. If they fail in this, they cannot expect a favorable verdict in an action against them, founded upon their negligence.

The instructions, being substantially in accordance with the views herein expressed, were correct. There being no error in the record, the judgment must be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

LEWIS KENYON

v.

PHILIP SHRECK et al.

1. APPEARANCE-as to several defendants, generally. In actions where there are several defendants, an appearance by an attorney for the defendants generally, must be construed as an appearance for all.

2. SAME-denial of authority of attorney to enter an appearance. Whatever the true rule may be in regard to the question, to what extent, for what purposes, and under what circumstances, a party for whom an appearance to a suit has been entered, can deny the authority of the attor- ney and ask relief from the court, the claim to do so is viewed with great

Syllabus.

disfavor by courts whenever innocent third parties have acquired rights under the judgment or decree.

3. SAME to let a party in to redeem. In this case, a party became the purchaser of a tract of land under an execution sale, subject to a mortgage. Fourteen months and a half after the purchase, a bill was filed to foreclose the mortgage. The purchaser was made one of the parties defendant to the bill, but was not served with process. The appearance, however, of the defendants, was entered, generally. A decree of foreclosure was pronounced and the property was sold, the mortgagee becoming the purchaser. The purchaser under the execution took no steps to redeem, or set aside the decree, not even procuring a sheriff's deed on his certificate of purchase, though the evidence showed he was aware of the foreclosure, but some six years afterward, sold his certificate of purchase to the complainant, who obtained a sheriff's deed and filed his bill for redemption. The land, in the meantime, was constantly occupied under the foreclosure title, and several times changed hands, and, at the time of the purchase of the certificate by the complainant, was occupied by the defendant: Held, for the purpose of allowing a redemption under such circumstances, evidence could not be received impeaching the authority of the attorneys in entering the appearance of the purchaser under the execution, in the foreclosure suit; that it was the duty of such purchaser, if he wished to redeem, to have come forward within a reasonable time, and asked the decree of foreclosure to be opened as to him, and that the complainant's equities were no stronger than those of the execution purchaser would be if he were complainant, being chargeable with notice of all the facts with which such purchaser would be chargeable.

4. RIGHT OF REDEMPTION—its general character. The right of a mortgagor, or his grantees, to redeem, after condition broken, is a purely equitable right, the creation of courts of chancery. It is a right which can be asserted only in a court of equity, and when its assertion would be plainly inequitable that court will withhold its aid.

5. SAME-effect of foreclosure upon subsequent incumbrancers, not made parties. In this State, when the foreclosure is by scire facias, subsequent incumbrancers are cut off, though not made direct parties to the proceeding.

6. When the foreclosure is by bill in chancery, they are not absolutely barred unless made parties, but they can not be permitted to assert their equity of redemption against an equity still stronger.

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Mercer county; the Hon. ARTHUR A. SMITH, Judge, presiding.

The facts in this case sufficiently appear in the opinion.

Opinion of the Court.

Messrs. J. R. & I. N. BASSETT, for the appellant.

Messrs. FROST & TUNNICLIFF and Mr. J. C. PEPPER, for the appellees.

Mr. JUSTICE LAWRENCE delivered the opinion of the Court:

At the September term, 1859, of the circuit court of Mercer county, six different judgments were rendered against one Smiley S. Keiser, one of which was in favor of Samuel C. Donaldson. Executions were taken out on all the judgments, and several tracts of land were sold thereunder, on the fifth of November, among which was the tract in controversy in this case. It was struck off to Elias Willits, one of Donaldson's attorneys, who does not appear to have paid any money on the purchase, but undoubtedly bid it in as such attorney, and for the benefit of his client. The land was, at the date when these judgments were rendered, subject to a mortgage in favor of William McCartney, who, on the twenty-first of January, 1861, fourteen and a half months after the sale to Willits, filed a bill to foreclose, making Donaldson one of the defendants. There was no service on Donaldson, but the firm of attorneys to which Willits belonged appeared for the defendants generally, and moved to dismiss the bill. On the authority of Kerr v. Swallow, 33 Ill. 380; Flake v. Carson, ib. 518, and Sullivan v. Sullivan, 42 ib. 316, this must be construed as an appearance for all the defendants. A decree of foreclosure was pronounced at the April term, and, on the seventeenth of September, 1861, a sale was had, and the land was bid in by McCartney for the amount of his decree. Before the filing of the present bill, the land was several times sold, and considerable improvements were made thereon. Sometime in the year 1867, Kenyon, the appellant, bought from Donaldson his interest in the certificate of purchase held by his attorney, Willits, and the certificate having been assigned to him, the sheriff, on the thirty-first of October, 1867, made a deed to