Syllabus. The case has very much the appearance of being gotten up for the benefit of fish inspectors, and with speculative views. Without going into the consideration of the various points made by appellant's counsel, we deem it sufficient to advert to the terms of the ordinance itself. By that, it is very clear the only inspection demanded is of barrels, half barrels, quarter barrels and eighth barrels, the latter of a weight not less than twenty-five pounds. Of such packages an inspection is demanded before the fish can be sold. This demand of the ordinance had been complied with before the fish in question were sold. It would be hard, indeed, upon a retailer of this article, after the law had been observed, and his package branded by the inspector, that he should not be at liberty to break it up into smaller packages for the accommodation of his trade. The inspector was called upon to inspect the packages when arranged into packages of fifteen pounds, which he declined to do, on the ground that they contained less than twenty-five pounds. In this he pursued the ordinance. The defendants violated no law in disposing of the packages. The judgment of the court below must be affirmed. Judgment affirmed. ELIAS RAY v. GEORGE W. HAINES. MINOR-not bound by his contract. Where a minor contracted to work nine months, but worked one month and a half, and quit, it was held, he was not bound by his contract, and could recover from his employer the value of the services rendered. 52 485 30a 210 Syllabus. APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Woodford county; the Hon. SAMUEL L. RICHMOND, Judge, presiding. The opinion sufficiently states the case. Messrs. INGERSOLL & MCCUNE, for the appellant. Mr. W. G. RANDALL and Messrs. BANGS & SHAW, for the appellee. Mr. JUSTICE LAWRENCE delivered the opinion of the Court: In this case a minor had contracted to work for the defendant nine months, but left after working six weeks. Being a minor, his contract was not obligatory upon him, and he was entitled to recover from his employer the value of the services rendered. This value the court inferred from the amount admitted by the defendant to have been due the plaintiff when he left, as wages, and we are not inclined to reverse because the proof was not more positive. Judgment affirmed. WILLIAM PHELAN et al. v. SAMUEL L. ANDREWS et al. 101a 605 1. VARIANCE between declaration and contract in suit for breach of warranty. In a suit for breach of warranty, where the declaration sets out the contract only in substance, and not in hæc verba, a variance, to be fatal, between the contract, as declared on, and the one offered in evidence, must be in some material matter. 2. In a suit to recover damages for an alleged breach of warranty, in the manufacture of two steam boilers, the declaration alleged they were Syllabus. intended for driving a grist mill, at Annawa, in the county of Henry, and State of Illinois," while the contract was silent as to their purpose, or place where they were to be used: Held, there being no averment that the contract stated they were to be so used, and the declaration only purporting to set out the contract in substance, this was not a variance. 3. Nor is there any substantial difference between the averment that the boilers "should be built and manufactured in a first class manner," and that "the work should be done in a first class manner." 4. SAME-implied warranty. So, where the declaration alleged that, "in consideration of the manufacture, sale and warranty of the boilers, plaintiffs agreed to pay $2400," while the contract read, "defendants were to build two steam boilers with a mud-receiver, for $2400:" Held, this was not a variance, as the pleader, in averring the warranty, only stated the substance of the agreement, and a mud-receiver constituted a part and necessary portion of the boilers-it being a well recognized rule of law that when a manufacturer furnishes his wares, he impliedly warrants them to be reasonably suited to the purpose for which such articles are designed, and to be skillfully and properly constructed. 5. Nor is there a variance when the declaration avers that plaintiffs were to pay $2000, on the completion of the boilers, and $400 on June the 1st, 1867, with ten per cent interest; and, by the contract, plaintiffs were to pay $2000 cash at the shop of defendants on completion of the work, "and give a lien note for $400, payable June 1st, 1867, with ten per cent interest, payable at Second National Bank, Peoria"-the terms and conditions of the contract being only stated as inducement to the warranty, upon which the action is based, and mere inducement is not required to be set out with the same degree of particularity as the contract itself. 6. MEASURE OF DAMAGES for breach of warranty. In a suit to recover damages for a breach of warranty, the plaintiff is entitled to recover for all damages which are the natural and proximate result of the failure of the warranty. And where a manufacturer has broken his warranty, in the construction and sale of two steam boilers, the necessary expense of repairing them, the loss of time while so engaged, as well as the increased quantity of fuel necessarily consumed to generate steam, would be considered as both natural and proximate damages. APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Henry county; the Hon. GEORGE W. PLEASANTS, Judge, presiding. The opinion states the case. Mr. D. McCULLOCH, for the appellants. Opinion of the Court. Mr. B. C. Cook, for the appellees. Mr. JUSTICE WALKER delivered the opinion of the Court: This was an action of assumpsit, brought to recover damages for an alleged breach of a contract for manufacturing two steam boilers. The declaration contains two special counts on the contract, and to it the plea of the general issue was filed. On the trial, plaintiff offered the contract in evidence, and it was excluded under the first count, but was admitted under the second. It is urged the court erred in admitting the contract in evidence, as it is claimed there was a material variance between the contract described and the contract read in evidence. The declaration avers the boilers "were intended for driving a grist mill, at Annawan, in the county of Henry, and State of Illinois," while the contract is silent as to the purpose, or place where they were to be used. In this no variance is perceived. There is no averment that the contract states they were to be so used, and hence there can be no variance. There could be no variance unless the contract declared upon varied from that offered in evidence in a material matter, unless it was set out in hæc verba. In this case it is only set out in substance; and, had the averment been that it was a part of the contract, it would be immaterial. Nor do we perceive any substantial difference between the averment that the boilers "should be built and manufactured in a first class manner," and that "the work should be done in a first class manner." The meaning is the same, and the declaration only purports to give the substance, and not the language of the agreement. The same is true of the averment that, in consideration of the manufacture, sale and warranty of the boilers, plaintiff agreed to pay $2400, while the contract says the defendants were to build two steam boilers, with a mud receiver, for Opinion of the Court. $2400. It it a well recognized rule of law that, when a manufacturer furnishes his wares, they shall be reasonably suited to the purpose for which such articles are designed, and shall be skillfully and properly constructed. To this extent the law implies a warranty. In averring a warranty, the pleader only stated the substance of the agreement. As we understand it, a mud receiver is a part and a necessary portion of the boilers. If so, then there was no variance. If, however, it is no part of the boilers, there was a variance, as the contract would then be incorrectly described. It is also objected that there is a variance as to the mode of payment. The declaration avers that plaintiffs were to pay $2000 on the completion of the boilers, and $400 on June the 1st, 1867, with ten per cent interest. By the contract, plaintiffs were to pay $2000 cash, at the shop of defendants, on completion of the work, "and give a lien note for $400, payable June 1st, 1867, with ten per cent interest, payable at Second National Bank, Peoria." The law requires the debtor to seek his creditor for the purpose of making payment, and hence the statement that appellees agreed to pay $2000 on the completion, was the same in substance as an agreement to pay at the shop of appellants, as that was their place of business. But the terms and conditions of the contract are only stated as inducement to the warranty upon which the action is based. Had appellees alleged they had bought and paid for the boilers, without saying when, where, or in what manner, and that appellants had warranted them, and averred the terms of the warranty and the breach, there would be no doubt that it would have been sufficient. And because appellees have failed to set out every particular as to the time and manner payment was to be made, the effect should not be different. The suit is for the breach of the warranty, and the substance of the contract is set out, and an averment that appellees have performed their part of the agreement, and that was sufficient. There is nothing in the description of the contract that is repugnant to the instrument when produced. It is something |