LIMITATIONS. LIMITATION ACT OF 1839.
the required period and then make conveyance to another, to whom all
the rights of the grantor will pass, and a third person may, under a
contract of purchase from such grantee, enter into possession, and thus
the bar of the statute will become complete. Hale v. Gladfelder et al. 91.
25. Of an abandonment of the possession by a purchaser-rights of his
vendor. Where a person acquires color of title to vacant and unoccu-
pied land, and has paid the taxes for the period required by the statute,
and then conveys the premises by deed, neither the grantor nor gran-
tee having yet taken possession, if a third person, under a contract of
purchase from such grantee, enter into possession, such possession of
the purchaser, for the purposes of the statute, will be deemed to be that
of the vendor, and his occupancy subordinate to the title of the vendor,
so that if the purchaser subsequently abandons the premises, with the
intention not to return, but without the knowledge or consent of his
vendor, the rights of the latter, with respect to the bar of the statute,
will not be at all affected by such abandonment, and if any one, even
the holder of the paramount title, subsequently enters into possession,
such vendor, by virtue of the concurrence, in that manner, of all the
elements of the bar of the statute, may, by an action of ejectment,
recover the possession to which he had become entitled. Ibid. 91.
26. Who may pay the taxes, so as to be availing to a subsequent grantee.
A person having acquired color of title to vacant and unoccupied land,
made conveyance thereof the same year, but continued to pay the taxes
even longer than the seven years, and then made another conveyance
to a different person, who had no notice of the former conveyance:
Held, that the second grantee, being an innocent purchaser, would be
protected under the statute, and the payment of taxes by his grantor
would inure to his benefit as the subsequent holder of the color of title.
Ibid. 91.
27. Former decision. This ruling is not in conflict with the case of
Fell v. Cessford, 26 Ill. 522. Ibid. 91.
HOW THE STATUTE MAY BE AVAILED of.
In chancery. See CHANCERY, 1.
PLEADING IN CHANCERY.
To avoid the statute of limitations. See CHANCERY, 2.
SELLING REALTY OF DECEDENT TO PAY DEBTS.
Within what time allowable. See ADMINISTRATION OF ES-
TATES, 10.
LOCUS IN QUO.
IN TRANSITORY ACTIONS.
Need not be set forth. See PLEADING, 5.
WHETHER THE PEREMPTORY WRIT MAY BE REFUSED.
1. Where there is a verdict for the petitioner. The third section of the
chapter of the Revised Statutes, entitled "Mandamus," which requires
the court to award a peremptory writ in cases where a jury have found
a verdict for the petitioner, refers only to cases where the petition
makes a prima facie case, and the issue found by the verdict is material.
The action of the court in denying the peremptory writ, notwithstand-
ing a verdict for the petitioner, is like arresting the judgment in an
ordinary action at law. The People ex rel. Shurtz v. Comrs. of Highways
of Worth township, 498.
MARRIED WOMEN.
WHAT IS "PROPERTY."
1. Within the act of 1861. The right of action accruing by rea-
son of personal injuries received by a married woman from the neg-
ligence of a railroad company, is property, and coming to her from a
source other than her husband, and in good faith, it is her separate pro-
perty, and comes under the operation of the act of 1861. Chicago, Bur-
lington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. Dunn, 260.
WHEN A MARRIED WOMAN MAY SUE Alone.
2. For personal injuries. The right of action accruing by reason of
personal injuries received by a married woman from the negligence of
a railroad company, being the separate property of the wife, she may
sue alone to recover damages therefor. Ibid. 260.
POWER OF THE HUSBAND IN RESPECT TO WIFE'S RIGHTS.
3. To compromise or release. A right of action for personal injuries
to the wife, being her separate property, her husband can not, without
her consent, adjust it or release it. Ibid. 260.
HUSBAND AS AGENT OF THE WIFE.
4. May bind her. But where an action for the same cause had been
commenced in the joint names of the husband and wife, and the for-
mer compromised the suit, and entered into an agreement to dismiss it,
and release the cause of action upon receiving a certain sum from the
defendant, it appearing that in so doing the husband acted as the agent
of the wife, it was held such release operated as a bar to a subsequent
action brought in her own name. Ibid. 260.
CONTRACTS BY THEIR HUSBANDS.
5. Whether bound by contracts made in their names by their husbands.
Even if a married woman can enter into a contract so as to be bound as
a member of an association for business purposes, yet her husband can
not, without authority from her, make a binding contract for her by
signing her name to the articles of association. Boyd v. Merriell, 151.
6. As between husband and wife and creditors of the former. A mar-
ried woman held the legal title to land to place it beyond the reach of
her husband's creditors, it not having been bought with her money,
and she borrowed money in her own name, giving her own notes there-
for, and giving the land as security. It was held, that personal property
purchased by the wife with a portion of the money so borrowed, would
be subject to execution in favor of a creditor of the husband. The
property would be regarded as having been purchased with the hus-
band's money. Hall v. Sroufe, 421.
INSURANCE BY A MARRIED WOMAN.
7. Whether she is "absolute owner" of her own realty. See INSU-
RANCE, 22.
MASTER IN CHANCERY. See CHANCERY, 12, 13.
INJURIES TO SERVANT FROM NEGLIGENCE OF MASTER.
1. Liability of the master. A master is responsible to his servant for
injuries received from defects in the structures or machinery about
which the services were rendered, which defects the master knew, or
ought to have known. Schooner “Norway” v. Jensen, 373.
2. Liability of company, when occasioned by dangerous structures. In
an action against a railroad company for injuries sustained by the plain-
tiff, while in the service of the company as a brakeman, the evidence
showed that the injury complained of happened while plaintiff was
engaged in the discharge of his duties, by collision with a projecting
awning from one of the station houses on defendant's line of road,
whereby he was knocked off the car, and so injured as to require
amputation of his left arm; and that the dangerous position of this
awning was well known to the division superintendent and division
engineer, whose attention had been called to it a long time prior to the
accident: Held, that this was negligence of such a character that the
company must be held liable for the damages sustained. Illinois Cen-
tral Railroad Co. v. Welch, 183.
3. As said by this court in the case of the Chicago & N. W. R. R.
Co. v. Swett, 45 Ill. 201, railroad companies are bound to furnish their
servants safe materials and structures, and must, in the first instance,
construct their road with all the necessary appurtenances. Ibid. 183.
4. Must keep in proper repair. And they must be kept in proper
repair; and a person entering the service of a railroad company, has a
right to presume that in these respects it has discharged its obligations.
Ibid. 183.
INJURIES TO SERVANT FROM NEGLIGENCE OF MASTER. Continued.
5. Perils of the service-to what extent assumed. A person engaging
in this service assumes the ordinary perils of railroad life; and also
special dangers arising from the peculiar condition of the road, so far
as he is aware of their existence, and his exposure to them would be
his voluntary act. Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Welch, 183.
6. But in this case, the danger was of such a character as well might
escape the observation of a person who had been in the employ of the
defendant for a long period of time; and there is no reason for suppos-
ing that the plaintiff had acquired knowledge of the unsafe condition
of this awning before his injury, as he had been but two months upon
the road, and, except upon two trips, had always passed this station in
the night. Ibid. 183.
INJURIES TO SERVANT FROM NEGLIGENCE OF FELLOW SERVANT.
7. Liability of the common master. Where a person in the employ-
ment of another, in the performance of a specific line of duty only
ordinarily hazardous, is commanded by a fellow servant, but to whom
he is so subordinate that he is compelled to obey his direction, to do an
act in the same general service, but different from the sphere of employ-
ment in which he had engaged to serve, and extra hazardous in its char-
acter, and in respect to which the servant making the requirement
knew he was unskilled and inexperienced, and in doing the same, the
servant so directed receives injuries, occasioned by the negligence of
another servant employed in the particular line of service in which the
act was being done, the common employer will be liable to the servant
so injured. Lalor, Admx. v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad
Co. 401.
8. In an action against a railroad company, to recover, under the
statute, for the death of a person, occasioned by the alleged negligence
of the company, it was averred that the deceased was employed about
the depot grounds, and freight house of the defendants, as a common
laborer, specially for the purpose of loading and unloading the freight
cars, at monthly wages, and for no other or different purpose; that
while he was engaged in loading a freight car with pig iron, the deceased
was ordered by the superintendent or foreman of the company, employed
to manage, direct and superintend the business and affairs of the com-
pany about the depot, to couple and connect a freight car with other
cars attached to a locomotive, contrary to the special engagement of
the deceased, and to do which he was unversed and inexperienced,
which fact was well known to the superintendent; and while so engaged,
having to go between the cars for the purpose, the engine was so care-
lessly handled as to bring the cars together with great force, and while
he was so between them, by means of which he was crushed to death:
Held, the deceased using due care and caution while coupling the cars,
the company was liable. Ibid. 401.
1. In actions on contracts, actual or compensatory damages only are
recoverable. Hayes v. Moynihan, 423.
2. In a suit to recover damages for a breach of warranty, the plain-
tiff is entitled to recover for all damages which are the natural and
proximate result of the failure of the warranty. And where a manu-
facturer has broken his warranty, in the construction and sale of two
steam boilers, the necessary expense of repairing them, the loss of time
while so engaged, as well as the increased quantity of fuel necessarily
consumed to generate steam, would be considered as both natural and
proximate damages. Phelan et al. v. Andrews et al. 487.
3. Where one partner executes a penal bond, conditioned that he will
pay the firm debts within a given time, on failure to do so the obligee,
his co-partner, not having paid any of the debts himself, can recover
only nominal damages. Dent v. Davison, 109.
IN AN ACTION FOR THE DEATH OF A PERSON.
4. Under the statute. In an action to recover damages for the death
of a person, occasioned by the negligence of another, the damages can
be only for the pecuniary loss to the widow, or next of kin; nothing is
to be allowed by way of solace. Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Wel-
don, Admr. 290.
5. What may be considered as a proper element of damages. In estima-
ting the pecuniary injury, the jury may, in a proper case, where there
is evidence authorizing them to consider the subject, take into consid-
eration the support of the widow of the deceased, and the minor chil-
dren, and the instruction, and physical, moral and intellectual training
of the minor children by the deceased. Ibid. 290.
6. Of the amount of damages-when excessive. In an action of this
character, it appeared the deceased was a common laboring man, who
left a widow and several minor children, but what wages he was receiv-
ing or earning was not shown, yet a verdict of $5000 was regarded too
much, in view of there being no evidence that he earned, annually, as
much even as one half the interest on that sum. Some evidence should
be given of the profits of the labor of the deceased, and what he might
probably earn for the future support of his family, to justify so large a
verdict in such a case. Ibid. 290.
NEGLIGENCE OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
7. Of vindictive damages. In actions against a city to recover damages
for injuries occasioned by neglect of the officers or employees to keep the
streets or sidewalks in proper repair, compensatory damages only should
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