many other circumstances following up the man Wilson, leave no doubt of his identity as Goss, independently of the photograph. The objection to the proof of Goss' habits of intoxication is equally untenable. True the habit is common to many, and alone would have little weight. But habits are a means of identification, though with strength in proportion to their peculiarity. The weight of the habit was a matter for the jury. It is unnecessary to follow the bills of exception in detail. They all relate to facts and circumstances bearing on the question of identity. If the bills of exception are many, they only denote that the circumstances were numerous, and in this multiplication consists the strength of the proof. They are many links in a chain so long it encircles the prisoner in a double fold. The question put to G. P. Moore, A. H. Barintz, and A. R. Carter, were unobjectionable. Whether they really could not identify the dark and swollen face of the corpse it was not for the court to decide; its weight belonged to the jury. there is a variance. The judges have power to sit and act at any time, and at any place, for the transaction of business. It is in the discretion of the court to appoint referees in certain cases to try matters of fact. No judge of the Court of Appeal is to sit on the hearing of an appeal from any judgment or order made by himself, or any divisional court, of which he was a member. All writs at common law, bills, or informations in chancery, causes in admiralty, or citations in the Court of Probate, are to be insti tuted in the High Court by a proceeding called an action. The facts of the case are to be briefly stated, and the nature of the relief asked stated. To such action there is to be an answer. Exceptions and writs of error are abolished. Causes are to be re-heard on motion. There has not been, so far as I can learn, for years any demand for ampler, but only for speedier justice. It is said this act is a lawyer's measure; and I believe it. But I believe the interest of lawyers is identical with the public interest. Except only in very extraordinary cases, no lawyer can ever get rich in the conduct of a case which is very long delayed. It is as much for his interest as for the interest of his client that a case should be disposed of within some reasonable time. This measure was reported upon by comThere was no error in permitting the jury, after their return into missioners some years since. The bill was introduced by Lord Selborne, the court for further instructions, to take out with them, at their the chancellor, who, however, was largely indebted to the chief justice of own request, the letters, check, due-bill, and application for insur- the Queen's Bench for some of the best provisions. The bill was recodance papers which had been proved, read in evidence and com-ified by lawyers, and supported, as it passed, by them; and but for their mented on in the trial. The appearance, contents, and hand-writ-co-operation and support it could not have been passed. It ought to be uning of these documents were no doubt important, and to be in- derstood, if it is not, that the 3,000 attorneys, and 3,900 barristers in Lon spected by the jury, who would not be expected to carry all these don, all of whom are made simply solicitors by this act, are, nevertheless, features in their minds. It is customary in murder cases to permit a power in London-in Parliament and out of it; nor can it be denied, He who says or supposes the jury to take out for their examination the clothing worn by the they are a power productive of great good. deceased, exhibiting its condition, the rents made in it, the instru- they worked only to their own interest and comfort in supporting this measI am sure ment of death, and all things proved and given in evidence bear- ure, knows neither these lawyers nor understands the case. London and the British Empire owe their greatness in very great part to ing on the commission of the offence. their lawyers. PELHAM. We discern no error in this record, and therefore affirm the sentence and judgment of the court below, and order this record to be remitted for execution. Correspondence don JUDGMENT Affirmed. Admissions to the Bar. SELMA, ALA., July 6th, 1874. EDITORS CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL:-I am a constant reader of your An American Lawyer in Lon- live, interesting, and useful journal. I admire its high tone, and the alacThe New Judicature Act rity with which its editors condemn that which is pernicious. Your appro bation of that which tends to establish a higher standard of legal ethics, and to promote the interests of our profession, deserves more than our thanks-you ought to have the earnest co-operation of the lawyers of the land. Permit me to express my thanks for your article in number 27, entitled " Admissions to the Bar." LONDON, May, 1874. EDITORS CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL:-The new judicature act, as you are aware, comes into operation here on the second of November next. Before I came here, or had examined the act, I heard it spoken of in Boston as a revolutionary measure-a very dangerous experiment. The chances are, I think, that they who thus spoke had never read the act at all. The The act consolidates the courts of Chancery, Queen's Bench, Common Pleas, Exchequer, High Court of Admiralty, and the Courts of Probate and of Bankruptcy into one Supreme Court, but with two divisions, a High Court and a Court of Appeal. Nominally it sweeps away all the first above named courts, but, in truth nothing but the name is swept away. The old judges all remain, with some new powers. Apparently appeales to the privy council are abolished, and yet hardly that, because the privy councillors are still to be employed under the new organization. No judge of the new court can, at the same time, be a member of the House of Commons; but this operates no change, since, I believe, that not | one of the judges of the courts abolished is a member of the House of Commons. They are all or nearly all in the House of Lords; and there they may remain and be the judges of the new court as they now are of the old ones. The High Court is broken into five divisions, and these divisions correspond, very nearly at least, to the five or six courts abolished. The same judges are to be the judges still, not relieved from their old duties, and with few new ones imposed. Appeal to the House of Lords is abolished; but I believe on all questions of law, certainly in, and since, the trial of Mr. Hastings, the lords have taken the advice of the judges, and in most cases decided in conformity to such advice. The division of the legal year into terms is abolished. Choses in action are made assignable. It is said the distinction between equity and law is abolished; but this is not so. Equitable jurisdiction is conferred upon the courts sitting in the trial of common-law cases; and where there is conflict between the rules of equity and the rules of the common law, the equity rule obtains. The rule in the Admiralty Court as to collisions, when both are at fault, is to be the admiralty, and not the common-law rule, wherever I was not aware, before I read it, that this subject was receiving, in so many states from and so many journals, the serious consideration which it deserves. The carelessness with which candidates are admitted even in the supreme court of our state (Alabama), has already worked serious mischief, and can but be regretted by those of the profession who have a proper regard for its welfare. It is true that the ignorant, unskilled and immoral attorney soon loses whatever business he may at first receive, but he has time and opportunities to bring disgrace upon the profession. We have a rule of our supreme court, not only permitting persons to practice, having a license from the highest court of the state whence they come, but also admitting any one who “has a diploma from any respectable (?) law school," etc. Some of these diplomaed gentlemen are too ignorant to draft an ordinary power of attorney, deed of conveyance, or a plea of non assumpsit. Do not understand me as decrying a proper course of training in a law school; my regret is that my struggle in life begun too early to enable me to receive the benefits of a thorough education. If, however, with my experience, I had the choice of a course of study at a law school, or a clerk's place in an office where there was a good library and plenty of work, I should choose the latter. The legal profession of our state are greatly to blame for admitting to the bar persons who have neither a common school education, a knowl. edge of the law, nor "a good moral character." The fault is not in our laws-they are probably stringent enough. Candidates are required to be examined by a committee on seven different branches of the law. So indifferent are the committees to these requirements, however, that a casual private examination of five or ten minutes suffices to get the requisite certificate. Several years ago an applicant for law license in one of our cities in this state was unable to answer the question "what is a bill of exchange?" Yet this man was admitted to practice in "the several courts of this state." The only remedy I can see for the existing evil is a lawyers' state convention. In such a convention this and many kindred irregularities and hindrances might be brought to the attention of the bar, and such steps taken as would redound to its honor. Such a convention was recently advocated by one of our leading daily journals at the suggestion of a prominent member of The Bar Association of Dallas County. I regret to say that there was no general response to this call. We hope, however, that the subject will be again agitated, and that it will eventually lead to such a convention from which great good may result. The medical profession of this and many other states have for years enjoyed the advantages of their state conventions. Are there not many good reasons why our lawyers should have a state convention? Let us then have it, and let the lawyers and judges by their action, so far as in their power lies, take steps to prevent improper" admissions to the bar." If such a convention is ever held, the young and active members of the bar must take the initiatory stepsthe older ones have, we fear, neither the time nor inclination to engage in the work necessary to bring about its proper organization. We hope to have the benefit of their wisdom in its deliberations. JUVENIS. [Communicated.] Section 14 of the Bankrupt Law as Amended. Some doubts having been created by contradictory constructions placed upon the 14th section of the bankrupt law, Congress passed the amendment, which was approved March 3d, 1873. The constitutionality of that amendment has been questioned, and it becomes an interesting subject of investigation to the profession and to the public. susceptible of two constructions, one of which is constitutional and the other not, then the former must be held to be the one intended by the legislature. And hence we say that it was not the intention of congress to fix so variable and varying a standard of exemptions for bankrupts. Another reason for our conclusion is that in the next preceding sentence of section 14, Congress, in adopting the exemptions by the laws of the United States, uses this language: "And such other property as now is, or hereafter shall be, exempted," etc. Did congress, by thus adopting the exemptions of the several states, destroy the uniformity of the law? That the original act was not wanting in uniformity for this reason, seems to be conceded, and it was so decided in the case of In re Beckerford, 4 B. R. 59. In that case Judge KREKEL and Judge MILLER, in the Circuit Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, so decided. Ex parte Appold, 16 Am. L. R. p. 624. The amendatory act, approved 3d of March, 1873, has recently passed under the critioism of Chief Justice WAITE, sitting at Richmond. And it is reported that he declared it unconstitutional because not uniform. If its lack of uniformity is to be attributed to the fact that under its operation different amounts are exempted in the different states, then the same objection would apply with equal force to the corresponding part of the original act adopting the various state exemptions. Hence, if the original act did not lack uniformity, neither does this amendment of it. That uniformity in the original act was not destroyed by the fact that it adopted the various state exemptions, we think the cases of In re Beckerford, 4 B. R. 59, and Ex parte Appold, 16 Am. L. Register, 624, heretofore referred to, sufficiently show. SUBSCRIBER. Revision of the Statute Law and Codification_of the Common Law. The revision and codification of our law are scarcely less important to the profession and the public than the Judicature Act. It is fitting that these great changes should be as nearly contemporaneous as possible. We apprehend that in 1876 every lawyer of eminence or in practice will have in his study a complete edition of the statutes at large, consisting of about twenty volumes in all; a code of the common law, consisting of about five volumes; a code of equity, con isting of about three volumes; and a book of practice. These twenty-eight or thirty volumes will, in all probability, supersede the three or four thousand volumes of statutes, books of reports in law and equity, text-books on practice and miscellaneous sub What was the true meaning of that part of section 14, as passed and approved March 2d, 1867, adopting the exemptions of the several states, in each state respectively? It seems to have been considered that the words "at the time of the commencement of the proceedings in bankruptcy," etc., in the sentence, qualified the expression "as is exempted," and also qualified the words "by the laws of the state;" and, therefore, it was supposed by some that the amount exempted by the laws of a state at the time bankruptcy proceedings begin should be exempted to the bankrupt; while others thought the original act exempted all the state exemptions of 1864. By the former it is held that the intention of congress was to confine and limit the operation of the law to such property as legal process from the state courts could have subjected at the time proceedings in bankruptcy were begun by or against the individual. See Bump on Bankruptcy, p. 129, citing In rejects, which now encumber the shelves of many a law library. The lord Askerr, 3 B. R. 142. But referring to the punctuation of that part of the 14th section, we find that the words "at the time of the commencement of the proceedings in bankruptcy" are disconnected by a comma from that part of the sentence wherein is used the words “as is exempted from levy and sale," and grammatically they only qualify the words "has his domicil." If congress had intended that the words "at the time of commencement of proceedings," should be a clause qualifying either of the expressions "as is exempted from levy and sale," or "by the laws of the state," then it should have been punctuated with a comma after the word "state,” and after the word "domicil” another comma, so as to read "by the laws of the state, in which the bankrupt has his domicil, at the time of commencement of proceedings," etc. It is evident that the use of the present tense in the expression “as is exempted,” etc., refers to the time of the approval of the original act, March 2d, 1867. A little further reflection will tend to satisfy any one of the correctness of this view. chancellor has just passed the bill through its second stage, which contains the revision of the statute law down to 1837. In 1868 a commission was appointed to revise and publish an edition of the statutes down to that year. Of this revised edition five volumes have already been published, and are in the hands of the profession, and contain all the statutes passed down to the year 1824, and which are still in force. These five volumes have superseded forty-three volumes of the octavo, or twenty-six and a half volumes of the quarto edition of the Statutes at Large. Along with them a chronological table and complete index of the statute law down to the year 1872 has been published. The bill proposed by the lord chancellor sanctions a sixth volume, which will contain the acts which were passed between 1824 and 1837, and which are still in force. It is calculated that the revised edition of the statutes, passed between 1837 and 1868, will occupy something like nine or ten volumes more. During this session the lord chancellor does not intend to touch the question of codification of That congress had a constitutional right to prescribe a reasonable exemp- the common law and we highly approve of his abstention. The Jution of property for each bankrupt, we have never seen questioned. And dicature Act will blend the systems of common law and equity to such that, too, without reference to the inhibition of section 10 of article I of an extent as materially to affect the rules laid down by the judges during the federal constitution against impairing the obligation of contracts; for it the period when the two branches were distinct. Many of these rules is aimed only at state legislation. But congress could delegate none of its would never have been propounded but for the existence of the two sepconstitutional power over this subject to a state legislature. If congress arate systems in this country. As an example we need only refer to Lord could refer to a state legislature the power to amend or change one of the Hardwicke's observations in Wortley v. Birkhead, 2 Ves. 571. When sections of the bankrupt law, so it could almost any other. If, therefore, speaking of the equitable doctrine of tacking mortgages, he says: “It it is held and construed that the exemptions to a bankrupt in any state could not have happened in any other country but this, because the jushould vary or be changed by any and every expression of the law-making risdiction of law and equity is administered here in different courts, and power of the state, regulating and changing its exemption laws, even while creates different kinds of rights in estates, and, therefore, as courts of congress is not in session, and without any amendment passed by congress, equity break in upon the common law where necessity and conscience reis not that virtually referring to the states the power to fix the amount of ex-quire it, still they allow a superior force and strength to a legal title to esemptions the bankrupt shall retain? We think congress could not do this. If the lord chancellor should proceed with the codification of the No principle of law is better settled than this: When a legislative act is common law during the next session, as he proposes, we will then have the Tiles," three new systems simultaneously established, which will alter the entire administration of the law in all its branches-expediting, simplifying, and contracting its rules, enactments, and procedure, and effecting a revolution which will be unprecedented in its nature and extent.-Irish Law Times. Notes and Queries. KIRKSVILLE, Mo., July 3, 1874. EDITORS CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL:-A. has a judgment against B. B. has a homestead, which is occupied by him as such at the rendition of the judgment. Shortly afterwards he leases his homestead out for two years and goes to another state, but with the intention of returning at the end of the two years and again occupying his homestead as such. Is it liable to sale under execution while thus leased out. ADAIR. refuse to take jurisdiction, and to send the case back to the court from whence it came. That this is the correct view, we think is inferable from the following cases: Sailly v. Hutton, 6 Wend. 508; Legg v. Dorsheim, 19 Wend. 700; Welling v. Sweet, 1 How. Pr. 156; Simmons v. McDougal, 2 How. Pr. 77. See also Mairs v. Remsen, 3 Code R. 138; Job v. Butterfield, 1 Eng. Law & Eq. 417. SPRINGFIELD, Mo., June 22, 1874. EDITORS CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL:-If you have space in your valued paper I would like to ask a few questions. A. sues B., an absentee, by attachment, and gets a special judgment. A. is absent, himself, and his attorney neglects to follow up with execution. So it stands for four years, when A. at last looks the matter up. He finds that after the attachment, during trial, and before judgment, the seven years' presumption as to E.'s life expired, and that no attorney or administrator was appointed to repre Is the judgment good, void, or voidable? Supposing it good, how can it, a special judgment, be revived? STUDENT. ANSWER.Our answers to questions of this character must be understood as conjectures merely. We think the judgment is valid. The law raises presumptions to supply the absence of proof, and out of convenience and necessity. Unless we are greatly mistaken, presumptions of law, such as the presumption of death after seven years' absence, will not be raised to unsettle rights which have been acquired, or to overturn the solemn judgment of a court of record, regular on its face. In such a case the presumption of death would be met and overturned by the stronger presumption which courts always indulge in favor of the regularity of judicial proceedings. After final judgment has been rendered and time has elapsed, rather than presume that the defendant was dead when judgment was rendered, simply on the supposition that he had been absent seven years, a court would presume that the court rendering the judgment had evidence before it that he was alive. Assuming the judgment to be good, we suppose it may be revived by scire facias and publication, if the defendant is still a non-resident, but this may be a matter of more doubt. ANSWER.-There have been within the last ten years numerous decisions in the Western and Southern states upon what constitutes an abandonment of a homestead. If the animus revertendi-the intention of returning-sent B. As the original demand is barred by limitation, what shall he do? can be proved as our correspondent states it, we think it probable that the honestead right was not abandoned. See Mills v. Van Boskirk, 32 Tex. 360; Cross v. Evarts, 28 Tex. 523; Shepherd v. Cassiday, 20 Tex. 29; Gouhenant v. Cockrell, 20 Tex. 96-cases which embody the rule that the abandonment of a homestead can only be established by the most clear, conclusive and undeniable evidence." In Shepherd v. Cassiday, supra, Chief Justice HEMPHILL, a very able judge, whose mind had been enlarged by the study of the maxims of the civil law, and whose learning adorns and elevates the jurisprudence of Texas, declared that “the home stead is not to be regarded as a species of prison bounds which the owner cannot pass over without pains and penalties. His necessities or circum stances may frequently require him to leave his homestead for a greater or less period of time. He may leave on visits of business or pleasure; for the education of his children; or to acquire in some more favorable location means to improve his homestead; or for the subsistence of his family; or he may intend to abandon provided he can sell. But let him leave for what purpose he may, or be his intentions what they may, provided they are not those of total relinquishment or abandonment, his right to the exemption cannot be regarded as forfeited." "It must be undeniably clear," said the same learned judge in Gouhenant v. Cockrell, supra, “and beyond almost the shadow, at least all reasonable ground of dispute, that there has been a total abandonment with an intention not to return and claim the exemption." It has, however, been decided in Illinois that, while in case of the death of a husband, or of both parents, and the children are of tender years possession by a tenant may protect the property from sale on execution (Brinkerhoff v. Everett, 38 Ill. 263), yet, when the husband is living, the family must reside on the homestead. Cabeen v. Mulligan, 37 Ill. 230; Tit. man v. Moore, 43 Ill. 169. And see Walters v. People, 21 Ill. 178; Kitchell v. Burgwin, 21 Ill. 40. The question could be pursued at great length through a list of varying decisions, but we have not space to devote to it. The question will be found in some states settled by the terms of the statute, as in Michigan, where actual occupancy is required in order to preserve the right. That the question of intent to abandon is one of fact for a jury, see Gibson v. Robbins, 10 Watts, 156; Goodman v. Losey, 3 Watts & Serg. 526. CARTHAGE, Mo., July 3, 1874. EDITORS CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL:-Suppose A. sues B., C. and D. jointly. B. files an application for a change of venue in his own behalf, which application is sustained. C and D file no such application, and are anxious to have the case tried in the court where the suit is brought. How will the court proceed in the case, in this state? Please answer through the LAW JOURNAL and oblige a CARTHAGE SUBSCRIBER. ANSWER.-The only possible doubt in the matter is raised by the use of the words "any party" in the Missouri statute, 2 Wagn. Stat. p. 1356, 3. But notwithstanding this, it is manifest that one defendant will not be permitted to drag after him his two co-defendants to another county, if they object to it, and if their rights would be prejudiced by the change. They are parties as well as he, and clearly have as strong a right to stay as he has to go; and if the case is one which does not admit of a severance, the rights of the one must yield to those of the two, rather than permit the rights of two to be subordinated to those of one. Under the facts stated, we should suppose, then, that it would clearly be the duty of the judge to Book Notices. THE FORUM, a Quarterly Law Review, April, 1874. Baltimore. Edited The Bench and Bar Review of Baltimore, conforming to a suggestion made by us at the time, has changed its name to "The Forum," and the It is embellished with a portrait of the vensecond number is before us. erable Reverdy Johnson, and contains a brief sketch of his life. The contents of the number are as follows: Article I. Amendments to the Federal Constitution.-The constitutional convention, its history, powers, and modes of proceeding. By Hon. John Alexander Jameson, Chicago. II. War Claims and Claims of Aliens. By Hon. Wm. Lawrence, Ohio. III. The Forum and its Chances.-The public and private life of Lord Chancellor Eldon, with selections from his correspondence. By Horace Twiss, Esq., one of her majesty's counsel. IV. The Civil Law-Its Origin, Growth and Mutations.-1st. Sources of the Roman Civil Law, by William Grapel; 2d. Compendium of Civil Law, by Ferdinand Mackeldey. By Prof. George Fred. Holmes, University of Virginia. V. Parol Evidence in Explanation of Contracts, from Albany Law Journal. VI. Valid Voluntary Settlement of a Chose in Action. VII. Reverdy Johnson. VIII. Tappan v. Merchants' National Bank of Chicago. IX. Decisions in United States, for February, March and April, 1874. X. Abstract of the English Reports, for February and March, 1874. XI. Red Tape. XII. Book Notices.-1. The Spirit of Laws; 2. The Doctor and Student; 3. A Manuel of Medical Jurisprudence; 4. Civil Liberty and Self-Government; 5. An Exposition of the Constitution of the United States; 6. Trodden Down, and Other Novels; 7 and 8, Our Exchanges. XIII. The Green Bag. LAW OF THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS. By JAMES SCHOULER, author of the Law of Personal Property. Second edition. Boston: Little, Brown & Co. 1874. This is an excellent treatise and deserves the favor it aas met, having reached a second edition in about four years after the appearance of the first, The classification of subjects embraced in the general title of Do mestic Relations, as treated by the author, is the same substantially as that of Kent and Reeve. Accordingly, five leading topics are considered: First, Husband and Wife; Second, Parent and Child; Third, Guardian and Ward; Fourth, Infancy: Fifth, Master and Servant. Although the author has precedent for including in the scope of his work the relation of Master and Servant, yet it is our opinion that logically and properly it does not belong there, at least in modern times. The brief discussion given to this topic shows that the author, in reality, regarded it a foreign graft. The domestic relations sprung from the marriage relation or status, and philosophically Mr. Bingham was right in dividing, in his treatise, the subject into Infancy and Coverture. Confessedly the most important topic is that of Husband and Wife, and accordingly the author has purposely devoted quite one-half of his work to marriage, and the effects of coverture on the powers and rights of the wife as respects herself, her husband and third persons, and growing out of this the right of the wife in equity, to separate estate, and the nature and effect of marriage settlements, both ante-nuptial and post-nuptial, and the general doctrine of separation and divorce. We cannot in the limits of an ordinary notice follow the author into the detail of his treatment of the various topics embraced in his volume. It is written in a clear and succinct style, and the effect of the English and American adjudications is satisfactorily presented. A careful examination of the book justifies us in saying that it deserves a very high rank among recent text-books in the law, and we confidently recommend it as being, in our judgment, for an American lawyer, the best treatise on the subject now before the public. The book is intended to exhibit the marriage status and its effects as viewed in England and in the states of this country, and is strictly a legal treatise on the Domestic Relations. The mode of treatment is well indicated by the author, who, in concluding his introductory chapter, reminds the reader" that the office of the text-writer is to inform rather than invent; to be accurate rather than original; to chronicle the decisions of others not his own desires; to illumine paths already trodden; to criticise if need be, yet always fairly and in furtherence of the ends of justice; to analyze, classify, and arrange; from a mass of discordant material to extract all that is useful, separating the good from the bad, rejecting whatever is obsolete, searching at all times for guiding principles; and, in fine, to emblazon that long list of judicial pre cedents, through which our Anglo-Saxon freedom broadens slowly down.'" judgment, be more safely rested upon the basis of intelligent, equal companionship, than upon the dependent and unequal condition of the wife which the common law imposed as the result of marriage. We have perhaps already said enough on this subject. We close by adding that, although many of the modern "married women's acts" are crude, and, in some instances, unjust to the husband and to creditors, yet the necessity for them has long been seriously felt, and they mark a steady progress in the right direction. The pioneers in this line of advance in the common law countries were the equity judges of England-SOMERS, Cowper, HARDWICKE, and their successors, who, without legislative aid, constructed a system of rules which shielded the wife from the many oppressive conse quences of the common law doctrines, and who in this instance anticipated the more tardy legislative relief. We should have been glad to have seen from so competent a person as the author, more original discussions and practical suggestions; for the law of husband and wife is in a transition period-but others will prefer the work as it is, and it is, indeed, one in which much can be found to praise and little to criticise. DIGEST OF THE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA, from the organization of the court in 1839 to 35th Iowa, 1873. By THOMAS F. WITHROW, late reporter of said court and editor of American Corpor ation Cases, and EDWARD H. STILES, present reporter of the court. Vol. 1. Chicago: E. B. Myers. 1874. 46 The first volume of this long-expected work lies upon our table, and if we are indebted to the delay for its excellent qualities, the profession will overlook the disappointment which its non-appearance at an earlier day has from time to time occasioned. By reason of its comprehensive plan, and extending to date, and giving the text of statutes whenever they have been deemed essential to understand the statement of the decisions, the present work will supersede in practice the digest of Dillon, which comes down only to 1860 (7th Iowa), and Hammond, which comes down to 1866, and Lacy, a supplement which ended with 27th Iowa. The decisions between 27th and 35th Iowa have not before been digested. Lord Macaulay, speaking of Fox and Mackintosh's fitness for the work of writing their histories, says: They had one eminent qualification for writing history—they had spoken history, acted history, lived history." The same may be said of the authors of the present Digest. Mr. Withrow was reporter to the court from 9th to 21st Iowa, inclusive, and Mr. Stiles has been the reporter from that time to the present, and we but record the verdict of all who are familiar It is quite obvious, we think, that the author entertains indulgent, if not with the Iowa Reports when we say that, perhaps, no state in the Union favorable, views of the common-law doctrines concerning the effect of the has had reporters in any respect more capable than these gentlemen. We marriage relation upon the wife. His treatment of these doctrines is con do not hesitate to pronounce the present to be, in our judgment, a model diservative, and, as his book is intended for practicing lawyers rather than gest. Whoever thinks it an easy work to prepare a good digest of judicial legislators, he keeps, it may be said wisely, close in sight of the coast of decisions is greatly mistaken; and the author of such a work as this, while judicial precedents. We need not deny that in the state of society in which certain not to receive full credit for the talent, skill and industry required, the common law originated, its rules in respect to the disabilities of the and to fall short of the deserved pecuniary reward, ought to receive the wife, and the property rights of the husband, may have then been wise, but grateful thanks of the profession whose labors are thus made lighter and they have, at all events, long since ceased to be so. It is our judgment that, easier. When we receive the 2d volume, which will soon appear, we deas respects property, whenever or however acquired, there should be abso- sign to notice the work more at length. Whoever is gratified in seeing a lute equality between husband and wife. His property before marriage, handsome, and even elegant, law-book, will not fail to thank the enterprisshould remain his, and the wife's should remain her's, and in each case being publisher for the style in which he has produced this work. It is a real beyond the control of the other. On the death of either, their rights in re-pleasure to look upon it. spect of dower, or the equivalent substitute, should be the same. If there are no children, she should have one-half of all property of which the husband died seized, and if children, say one-third in fee. The husband to have the same rights in respect of all property of the wife. The separ ate property of each to be in no event liable for the separate debts of the other, but liable for family expenses. It is our judgment, also, that most of the common law disabilities of cov erture are absurd in themselves and pernicious in their operation. As to all domestic or family matters the legal relation between husband and wife should be that of absolute equality. The husband, simply as husband, should have no more right to the control of the children than the wife. But as respects the relations of the family to the outside world, a few prerogatives or superior rights must, ordinarily, be conceded to the husband. He, in general, represents the family in its legal relations to the world. On him devolves, usually, the duty of making provision for their support. In case of a conflict of views as to domicile, and in general as to matters connected with the husband's business, his will should be the law, and should prevail over the wife's. The marriage relation can, in our MEMOIRS OF WESTMINSTER HALL. With an Historical Introduction by Edward Foss, F. R. S., author of The Lives of the Judges of Eng. land. New York: James Cockcroft & Co. 1874. This enterprising firm is reproducing in an elegant style some of the best quasi legal works which have appeared in Great Britain. The "Adventures of an Attorney in Search of Practice," by Samuel Warren, is followed by the "Memoirs of Westminster Hall," in two volumes. This work gives the history of this famous structure from the date of its erection in the reign of William II to the present time-a period of nearly 800 years, and presents the reader with a plan of the Hall and the Judicial Courts, and with illustrations of its interior and exterior appearance. It also contains plates showing the appearance of the lord chief justice and the lord chancel lor in their robes of office, and portraits of Lord Brougham, Lord Thurlow, Lord Eldon, Lord Erskine, Lord Denman, and the famous Littleton. The rest of the work consists in a collection of historical sketches of the famous judges in law and chancery who have had seats in Westminster Hall, and incidents and anecdotes concerning them. It is very interesting reading, not unprofitable withal, and, judging from our experience, we venture to say that whoever takes it up will not leave it until he finishes it. Summary of Our Exchanges. The American Law Times and Reports for July contains, besides the usual excellent digest of cases from the law journals, the amendatory bankrupt law, with an index. This was also published by us in our issue of July 2. It also contains, Dingee v. Becker, a case decided in the District Court of the city of Philadelphia, by PLAYER, J., holding that the proof of a debt in a bankrupt court does not extinguish it, and discussing the rights of a creditor who has thus proved his debt, in respect of his prior remedies, and also the right of a party who has not been before the bankrupt court, to sue the bankrupt Veigh, to appear in 24 Grattan, which relates to the question of fraud in judicial sales. This was a painful case, in which a defendant, whose property had been libelled under the confiscation act of congress, and who had appeared by an attorney, was refused a hearing on the ground that he was "within the Confederate lines and a rebel," and his property was thereupon condemned and Sold, and bought by the wife of the district judge, the latter not being ashamed In his judicial capacity to confirm the sale and direct the divestiture and investiture of title. A more questionable proceeeing does not occur in our judicial annals, and the only obligation to silence on the part of the public now is. that the grave has lately closed over the earthly remains of the judge who was guilty of it. We shall notice this case more at length hereafter. The Law Times also reports Heaton v. Fryberger (published in the Western Jurist for May), which relates to the effect of mistakes in the deed of a married woman; also Rees v. Watertown (municipal bonds) published in this journal for April 2. It also publishes a charge to the jury by District Judge LONGYEAR, in the United States Circuit Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, upon the construction of the words, "die by his own hand" in a policy of life insurance, and which also discusses the presumptions as to death and sanity of the deceased, and the degree of derangement necessary to avoid a policy of life insurance containing a provision that the insurer shall not be liable in case of suicide. It also publishes the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States in ex parte Robinson (power to disbar attorney for contempt) published in the CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL for June 4. in a state court. It also publishes the important case of Underwood v. Mc it is the mere agent and tool of despotic government. Those who talk about Also the excellent observations of Dr. Hammond, Legal News and Notes. A bill to abolish imprisonment for debt in England has been defeated by a vote of 215 to 72. -THE president has appointed General Fagin, of confederate fame, and lately commander-in-chief of the Brooks forces, United States marshal for Ar kansas. -THE appointment of judge for the western district of Arkansas, in place of Judge STORY, resigned, will not be made till next winter. In the meanThe Western Jurist for July contains the tenth installment of an article on time Judge CALDWELL will, under the law, hold court in that district. tax titles in Iowa. We hope these papers will be collected in a book when they are completed, as they will be of much use to those investigating such titles in -G. VAN HOOREBEKE, Esq., who recently brought to a successful terminother states. It also prints an elegant and readable address of Hon. John Wation, in the Supreme Court of Illinois, the great constitutional case known as Campbell to the graduating class of the Albany law school, which has previously the "Grab law case (published in our issue of July 2), has settled in Denver, appeared in the Albany Law Journal. Also the opinion of Mr. Justice NOTT, Colorado. in the case of Mrs. Lockwood in the Court of Claims, with a note from this journal; also two decisions of the Supreme Court of Iowa, which we shall notice in our Notes of Cases, next week. But the feature of the Jurist which renders it most valuable to the practitioner, and indispensible to him if he lives in Iowa, is its very full digest of the current decisions of the Supreme Court of that state; being, in the present number, forty pages in length. We shall take the liberty of selecting from these for our Notes of Cases. The Chicago Legal News for July 4, publishes Kerr v. Smith, Superior Court of the United States, on bankruptcy, articles of separation, subsequent Harris v. Hatfield, Supreme Court of Illinois, action for damages resulting from defendant's owning and having in his possession within the state of Illinois, certain Texas or Cherokee cattle, in violation of the act of April 16, 1869. Also Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific R. R. Co v. Town of Lake, asserting the power of a town corporation to open a street through a block of land purchased and owned by a railroad company, and used for railroad purposes. Also Lull v. Chicago, same court. holding and applying the familiar doctrine that, in the ascertainment of boundaries, fixed monuments will prevail over a printed or written plat. Also Van Namee v. Bradley, same court, a case of replevin by a wife, of property which had been siezed by a sheriff, where one of the defences was that the property belonged to the husband. Also re Scammon, published in our issue of July 2. This case was furnished to the News by Mr. Bissell, the official reporter of the court, and is much fuller than that as given by us. The Legal News also publishes an opinion of the Supreme Court of Illinois in Lewis v. D'Arcy, on the right of a mortgagee of (personal) property to take possession when levied on by a sheriff under an execution against the mortgager. reconciliation, and effect of voluntary conveyance by husband to wife. Also The American Law Record for July prints an exceedingly interesting article on "Trial by Jury, and the Public Prosecutor System in Germany," by Edward Zimmerman, LL. D., solicitor and foreign jurisconsult, from which it appears that trial by jury exists in Germany only in name, and that the jury is systematically and legally packed, and its powers so essentially curtailed that --MISS LAVINIA GOODELL, of Janesville, Wisconsin, has been admitted to the bar. The Chicago Legal News vouches for her as “a young lady of good education, fine appearance, modest bearing," and has no doubt that she will succeed well at the bar and receive, as she deserves, the good will and respect of her brethren in the profession. -JUDGE T. J. MACKEY, of South Carolina, has returned to his home from a visit to Washington, where he had a conversation with the president. He says when he replied that he could not get him into court, the president denounced General Grant asked him sharply, "Why don't you convict Moses?" and the assumption that a president or a governor is above the law as monstrous. -A CANADA barrister has placarded public places in a historic city of the Dominion with notices that he gives special attention to marine protests. Our excellent contemporary, the Canada Law Journal, questions whether he has thereby developed a purity of taste in matters professional at all worthy of imitation. This is not quite so bad as the St. Louis shyster who advertises anonymously “divorces obtained without exposure, and money advanced on lawsuits." -OUR excellent contemporaries, the Albany Law Journal and the Canada Law Journal, are engaged in a discussion about the treatment of Dr. Kenealy, the solution of which seems to hinge on the question whether it is proper to spell judicial with a capital J, according to the latter, or whether it is proper to spell "her majesty, the queen," with small letters, according to the democratic ideas of the former. We suggest that they call in a printer's devil and let him settle it. -THE Khedive of Egypt has, by treaty which has received the sanction of this government, agreed to establish a supreme court, which, as we understand it, shall have jurisdiction of all private controversies and criminal accusations affecting the subjects of the Christian powers assenting to the arrangement. This abolishes in the Khedive's dominions, the jurisdiction of our consuls, who have hitherto exercised jurisdiction over criminal accusations against our own citizens in that country. The court is to be composed in part of subjects of the |