ments. Cases in this and Next Number-Acknowledge- less the right to repeal, amend or modify the charter of a railway company is reserved at the time it is created, subsequent state legislatures cannot pass laws which essentially change the rights of the corporators or stockholders. We print in this number a highly important decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, to which we have heretofore alluded, upon the subject of the validity of sales under deeds of trust, made during the war, the grantor residing within the insurrectionary territory. Also, an interesting opinion of Chief Justice NICHOLSON, of Tennessee, on the question under what circumstances a deed takes effect as an escrow. Also, an important opinion of Judge NAPTON, of the supreme court of Missouri, about a matter of much interest to sheriffs, namely: the manner of proceeding under the statutes of Missouri, to levy executions upon homestead property. Also, an opinion by DILLON, J., in a contest between a sheriff and an assignee in bankruptcy for the possession of the pro ceeds of property sold at sheriff's sale under levies made before the commencement of the proceedings in bankruptcy. We gratefully acknowledge the reception of valuable and able opinions, from Judge ROBERT A. HILL of Mississippi, Judge ERSKINE of Georgia, Judge LONGYEAR of Michigan, Judge SAWYER of California, and other judges, attorneys and clerks. These we shall take pleasure in laying before our readers, either in full or in substance, as fast as our space will permit. An able opinion by Judge KRUM, in the general term of the circuit court of Saint Louis county, Missouri, on the subject of the effect of the war on contracts of life insurance, is in type, and will appear in our next. We shall also publish, by request, in our next issue, a recent decision by Judge DILLON, on the subject of elevator receipts, and the nature of the contract for storage of grain in ele vators. The railway companies, by which the internal commerce of the country is now so largely carried on, have been created solely by the various states, and in most cases, the power of full legislative control over them has not been expressly reserved; and in many instances, the power to the corporations to fix their own tolls or fares and freights, has been expressly granted. Accordingly, it is a well known fact, that the companies seek shelter under their charters, and the Dartmouth College case, from the threatened legislative regulation of tariffs; and it is a question now before the United States Supreme Court, under the 25th section of the judiciary act, or on its way there from the judgment of the supreme court of Minnesota, sustaining the validity of the railway tariff law of that state, passed in 1871, whether the doctrine of the Dartmouth College case can be invoked as a shield to protect the companies from legislative control by the states over their charges for carrying freights and passengers. An opposite conclusion, denying the power of the states, was reached by the court of appeals in Delaware, in the case of the Phila. & Balt. R. R. Co. v. Bowers, decided at the January term, 1874, the decision being based by the court upon what it regarded as the doctrine of the Dartmouth College case. Practically, the real question would seem to be, not so much whether the Dartmouth College case is sound law,-for the hope that it will be overruled is scarcely entertained,as whether it really applies to a railroad which is publici juris, and which has been so declared by the Supreme Court of the United States in the recent case of Olcott v. The Supervisors, 16 Wall. 678. In this case, Mr. Justice STRONG, after assertLegislative Regulation of Railway Tariffs. ing the principle that railways are public, says, arguendo: Cheap transportation is the inexorable demand of the peo-"The railroad can, therefore, be controlled by the state. Its ple; and to aid in securing it, attention is turned to railway use can be defined; its tolls and rates for transportation may regulation by legislative enactment. The indications plainly be limited." The case, however, was one in which the right are, that this subject, in all its aspects, is to undergo the most of the state to amend or repeal the charter was expressly rethorough examination by the press, by state legislatures, by tained. congress, and eventually, by the judicial tribunals. In the American Law Review for January, 1874, an extremely Any discussion of it in our JOURNAL must be limited to the acute, and very able writer, has an article of fifty pages on the legal principles involved.. The Dartmouth College case (4 Dartmouth College case, in which he forcibly questions the Wheat. 518), decided by the Supreme Court of the United soundness of every proposition on which it rests. The artiStates at the February term, 1819, asserted, for the first time, cle embodies much research and reflection; and whoever reads the principle that a charter granted by a legislature to a private it, will need to have his faith in the Dartmouth case re-assured (as distinguished from a public corporation) was a contract by reading again the opinion of the great chief justice, which within the meaning of the clause of the national constitution is marked with all his subtle and wonderful powers of reasonwhich prohibits a state from impairing the obligations of con- ing. But the doctrine of that case, even if applicable to tracts. Within the class of private corporations, according to state laws, respecting railway tariffs, does not touch the power this decision, fall all companies whose stock is owned by pri- of the general government, so far as that power exists by virtue vate persons, though their objects and operations are public of the clause of the constitution which gives to congress in their nature, such as railway, bank and canal corporations. "power to regulate commerce among the several states." And The doctrine of this case has been repeatedly re-affirmed in it is on this ground, namely, that the states can only prescribe the court by which it was pronounced and by the supreme tariffs for purely internal commerce, that is, from points to court of, perhaps, every state in the Union; and, therefore, points wholly within the state, and have no power over rates if any thing can be settled by judicial decision, it is, that un-on lines beyond their limits, and that the power over inter pared for the occasion, and by an act intentional of death. As was said by the eminent Judge GASTON of North Carolina, state commerce exists, and exists only, in congress-we say it ful legislator, bases his bill for federal regulation of tolls, fares * Our only purpose in this article has been to advise our readers of the current legal discussions on this important topic, rather than to express, at this time, views of our own. We shall refer to the subject hereafter. The Virginia Duel Murder. The trial of W. Page McCarty, for the murder of John B. Mordecai in a duel, in the hustings court, at Richmond, Virginia, before Judge GUIGON, was, on the 24th instant, brought to a farcical termination by the jury returning a verdict of guilty of involuntary manslaughter, and fixing the punishment at a fine of $500. The telegraphic report states that a few minutes after the case had been given to the jury, they returned and asked for instructions as to whether they were required to find a verdict of murder in the first degree or acquit the acThe judge instructed them that they were not so required. He then, at their request, further instructed them as to the various degrees of murder and manslaughter, after which the jury again retired. cused. ling, if death ensue, however fairly the combat may be conducted, is, in the eye of the law, murder. The punctilios of false honor the law regards as furnishing no excuse for homicide. He who deliberately seeketh the blood of another, in compliance with such punctilios, acts in open defiance of the laws of God and of the state, and with that wicked purpose which is termed malice aforethought. While, therefore, because of presumed heat of blood, the law extenuates into manslaughter a killing upon such sudden rencounter, although proceeding upon an insufficient provocation, it withholds this indulgence when, from the circumstances of the case, it can be collected that, not heated blood, but a settled purpose to vindicate offended honor, even unto slaying, in defiance of law, was the actual motive which urged on to the combat." State v. Hill, 3 Dev. & Batt. 497. Therefore, if the proof show a deliberate killing in a duel, to instruct the jury on the law of manslaughter, is to instruct them on a subject utterly foreign to the case; and such an instruction can have no other effect than to confuse and mislead them and break down their consciences. See Harrison v. State, 24 Ala. 67; Shorter v. People, 2 Comst. 193; State v. Shippey, 10 Minn. 223. These instructions seem to have been well calculated to produce the verdict which the jury returned; and this verdict could not have been more complete nonsense, if the jury had found the prisoner guilty of larceny. For if the killing in a duel could, under any circumstances, be manslaughter, it never could be involuntary manslaughter; because such a killing is always intentional of death. If this case has been correctly stated in the public prints, it should seem that the duty of the judge in charging the jury could have been discharged in a single paragraph, by telling them that if they believed from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the prisoner deliberately shot and killed the de ceased in a duel, he was guilty of murder in the first degree. The jury would then have been obliged to return the legal verdict; and if there had been anything in the circumstances of the case, or in the state of society existing in Virginia, making it unjust or impolitic to execute the sentence, it would have been a proper case for the executive clemency. As it is, we are unable to see how the court can proceed to sentence the defendant for a crime which he clearly did not commit; and are not surprised to learn that immediately after the return of this verdict, his counsel moved to set it aside. It is but just to say, however, that the instructions of the court find support in the modern doctrine-or rather, in the modern interpretation of an old doctrine-that in criminal trials the jurors are judges of the law as well as of the facts; and that, therefore, in trials of indictments for homicide, the prisoner has a right to have the whole law of homicide expounded to the jury. We understand that it has been recently decided in two cases in Tennessee, that in every trial for homIf this statement is correct, it is difficult to conceive on icide, the prisoner may require the judge to expound the law what grounds the instructions given can be supported. The of manslaughter to the jury; and that if the judge refuses so deliberate killing in a duel is murder, and nothing but mur- to do, it is error, and ground of reversal. Little's case, deder; and in those states, where murder is divided into statu- cided at Jackson, Tennessee, April term, 1873, and a case tory degrees, it is murder in the first degree; because it is there cited. The doctrine that in criminal trials the jury are, done with deliberation and premeditation, with a weapon pre-in a free and unrestrained sense, judges of the law as well as 1. Sales of land under execution-Title of purchasing Creditor-Title of innocent purchaser.-Where an execution creditor purchases at execution sale, and his judgment is subsequently reversed and restitution awarded, the title reinvests in the execution debtor; but where, before the reversal, the execution creditor conveys to a stranger, who purchases in good faith, he will hold the title unaffected by the reversal. 2. Homestead Laws, how construed. - Homestead laws should be liberally construed with the view of promoting the benevolent purpose of securing to a family a home protected from the creditors of the person who is its head. 3. Levy upon Homestead-Possession of Homestead-Notice to Officer. -The homestead exemption is for the benefit of the family, and a sale of the homestead under execution is void. The exemption need not be claimed, and the possession and use of property, as a homestead, are notice to the officer making a levy that it is held as such. 4. Appraisement. When the homestead exceeds in amount or value the statutory limitation, it is the duty of the officer holding an execution, before making a levy, to proceed under the provisions of the statute to have the homestead appraised and set apart. 5 Abandonment of Homestead-Fraudulent Conveyance of Homestead.The conveyance and repurchase of a homestead without a relinquishment of possession, even though made in fraud of creditors, does not constitute an abandonment of the homestead. 6. Injunction to restrain Sale of Homestead--Cloud upon title.--The sale of a homestead under execution will be restrained in equity on the ground that it will cast a cloud over the title of the owner. A few days previous to ery for the benefit of Shields was made on the 16th of Dec., 1869. The petition in this case sets forth these facts and asks an injunction to prevent Montgomery from selling under his deed of trust. The principal grounds upon which an injunction is asked are: First, that the reversal of the judgment destroyed the title of Nussberger under the execution sales, and, secondly, that Vogler's claim of the property as a homestead, rendered the sale and purchase of Nussberger a nullity; and these are the only questions of importance, whether it be held that it was a case for injunction or not. There is no question that a reversal of a judgment does not invalidate the sales under executions to strangers who purchase at the sale, but as to parties to the judgment the law seems to be settled otherwise; and if they become purchasers, they take a title subject to the ultimate disposition of the case. In this case, the plaintiff in the judgment buys and of course his title is affected by the infirmity, but he conveys to a third person before the judg. ment is reversed, and the question is, whether this infirmity attaches to the purchaser. In Gott v. Powell (41 Mo. 420) the court excepted the case where some third person has acquired a "collateral right before reversal." The purchaser in such cases must be regarded as a purchaser without notice, since he buys from a party who derives title from a judgment and execution valid at the time, and really occupies the same position as if he had himself bought at the sheriff's sale. Whilst therefore the title of the plaintiff in the execution would be annulled by the reversal of the judgment, the sale or conveyance by the plaintiff to a third person before the reversal of the judgment, would be valid, and the purchaser, supposing the purchase to be in good faith, Would be protected from the risks which his vendor would be subject to. In this case, the deed to Montgomery was made four days before the reversal of the judgment under which Nussberger bought, and so far as this point is concerned, he must be regarded as having acquired a good title. But, it is further objected that the sheriff's sale was void because of the property being claimed as a homestead, and therefore protected from execution by our statute on that subject. The construction of our homestead laws, (1 Wagner's Statutes, P. 697,) has never, so far as I have observed, been before this court; so we are left to resort to the general practice of all courts in construing obscure and doubtful provisions of a statute, to carry out as nearly as possible what is believed to be its main scope and design, and in this we may be guided to some extent by adjudications in other states where similar laws have long existed. It seems too well settled in the various courts in the states where the homestead law has been discussed, that such laws, being prompted by benevolent intentions, are to be liberally construed, and in such a way as to promote the design of securing to a family, a home protected from the creditors of the person who is its head. NAPTON, J. delivered the opinion of the court. This was an application for an injunction to restrain Montgomery, a trustee in a deed of trust from Nussberger for the benefit of Shields, from selling the lot conveyed in the deed on the general ground that such sale would cast a cloud on the title of plaintiff. The facts appear to be as follows: Vogler acquired the lot and house in the year 1865. Nussberger obtained a judgment against Vogler, about the 4th of Feb., 1868. this, Vogler conveyed the premises to one Suess, and on Jan. 23, officers, who are to be governed by it, must be greatly embarrassed It is easy to foresee or imagine cases in which the ministerial 1869, Suess conveyed back the same to Vogler. On Nussberger's judgment an execution issued; the lot was sold under it, and Nuss-in regard to their duty in executing some of its provisions, but we berger became the purchaser, and a deed from the sheriff to him do not propose to anticipate difficulties which may not occur or was executed, bearing date August 6, 1868, and recorded Nov. 6, which future legislation may remove. 1868. There was a mistake in the description of the boundaries of the lot in the deed, as there was in the deed by which it was acquired by Vogler, and a second execution was obtained and levied on the lot, and a sale made under it to Nussberger, who re-inated, to thirty square rods of ground in extent, and in value not ceived a second deed from the sheriff, dated 20th of August, 1869, with a correct description of the boundaries of the lot. At or previous to this second sale, the sheriff was notified that Vogler claimed the lot as his homestead. No claim had been asserted at the first sale under execution. Vogler was married and had four children, and he and his family lived on the premises. The judgment under which these sales were made was reversed on the 24th of December, 1869. The deed from Nussberger to Montgom The points which arise on the present record have been mostly passed on by courts of last resort having similar statutes to ours. Our statute limits the homestead in Sedalia, where this case orig to exceed fifteen hundred dollars. The second section of the act allows the house-keeper, or head of the family, in cases where the limitation is exceeded either as to quantity or value to designate or choose such part as will not exceed the limitation, and provides that where there is such designation or choice, or where there is none made, in either event, the sheriff shall appoint three appraisers to fix the boundaries and location of the homestead, and that the sheriff shall then proceed with the levy of the execution on the residue of the real estate. We infer from this section that in a case where a homestead is claimed, the sheriff cannot proceed with the levy until he has thus appointed appraisers; nor does it seem to be material whether the house-keeper or the head of the family, asserts his claim or not. It may be that he is absent. This law is for the benefit of the family, the wife and children as well as the head of the family. The occupancy of the house as a family residence, is a fact easily ascertained by the officer. He cannot proceed with his levy, until he has ascertained in the mode directed by the act, the extent and the value of the premises, and that it is beyond the limit protected against executions. The question of the title, we suppose, was not to be investigated by the sheriff. If the householder had no title, the execution and levy was of course unavailing, and the law was designed to protect his possession. If, however, there was an incumbrance on the property merely, the third section of the act directs how that is to be considered. made a deed of trust to Seth A. Ranlett, conveying the property thus purchased with authority to sell it in satisfaction of these notes, if they were not paid as they fell due. The notes were assigned by Elliott to the appellant, the Washington University, and the money being unpaid and due, the real estate so conveyed was sold by Ranlett, in accordance with the terms of the trust deed, to the university, on the 9th day of De cember, 18, 2. The trustee made the university, which was a corporate body, a deed for the land, and the university afterwards sold it for value, to one Kimball. cordingly. Daly and Chambers were both citizens of the State of Virginia, residing in the county of Mechlenburg, when they bought the land of Elliott, and have resided there ever since. Chambers and Finch, assignees of Daly, who had been declared a bankrupt, filed the bill, on which the present decree is founded, on the chan cery side of the circuit court of the United States for the district of Missouri, to have the sale decreed void, and to have the proceeds of the sale of the land of the university to Kimball de In this case it appears that Vogler had, prior to the levy, con-clared a trust fund for their use; and the court decreed acveyed his title to the premises to one Suess, and upon this ground it is claimed that he forfeited all the protection which the homestead law gives. If this conveyance was in good faith, and vald, then it is obvious that an execution and a sale under it would convey nothing; but if it was fraudulent, as it doubtless was deemed to be by the execution creditor, then the title was in Vogler, and the homestead law exempted it from execution. It appears to be the received opinion that neither a fraudulent conveyance nor an act of bankruptcy on the part of the head of the family, will produce a forfeiture of the benefits of the homestead exemption. (Cox v. Wilder, 2 Dillon, C. C. 46.) Judge DILLON thinks these laws are chiefly for the benefit of the family, and therefore will not allow the fraudulent acts of the head of the family to subvert the policy of the law, and this opinion was upon our Missouri stat The sole ground of this relief is, that the sale by the trustees took place during the late civil war, and that Daly and Chambers were citizens of the state of Virginia, resident within that part of the state declared by the president to be in a state of insurrection. The argument is, that, inasmuch as all commercial intercourse was forbidden between the people of the loyal states and those residing in the insurrectionary districts, both by virtue of the act of congress and by the principles applicable to nations in a state of war, all processes for the collection of debts were suspended, and that the complainants being forbidden by these principles to pay the debt, there could be no valid sale of the land for such payment. The case before us was not one of a sale by judicial proceeding. No aid of a court was needed or called for. It was purely the case of the execution of power by a person in whom a trust had been reposed in regard to real estate, the land, the trustee and the cestui que trust all being, as they had always been, within a state whose citizens were loyally supporting the nation in its struggle with its enemies. The conveyance by complainants to Ranlett vested in him the legal title of the land, unless there was a statute of the state of Missouri providing otherwise, and, if there was such a statute, it still gave him full control over the title, for the purposes of the trust which he had assumed. No further act on the part of the complainant was necessary to transfer the Validity of Sales under Deeds of Trust not affected title and full ownership of the property to a purchaser under a by the War. THE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY v. GEO. B. FINCH, CHAMBERS. Supreme Court of the United States, January 12, 1874. Sales under Deeds of Trust-War.-A sale of real estate made under a power contained in a deed of trust executed before the late civil war, is valid, notwithstanding the fact that the grantors in the deed, which was made to secure the payment of the promissory notes, were citizens and residents of one of the states declared to be in insurrection at the time of the sale, and that the sale was made while the war was flagrant. Appeal from the circuit court of the United States for the dis tricts of Missouri. John M. Krum, for the plaintiff in error; John J. Jones, for defendant in error. Mr. Justice MILLER delivered the opinion of the court. James J. Daly and Edward R. Chambers purchased of W. G. Elliot, in March, 1860, certain real estate in St. Louis, Mo. For the principal part of their purchase money they gave him their promissory notes, and to secure the payment of these notes, they sale of the trustee. The debt was due and unpaid. The obligation which the trustee had assumed on a condition, had become absolute by the presence of that condition. If the complainants had both been dead, the sale would not have been void for that reason, if made after the nine months during which a statute of Missouri suspends the right to sell in such cases. If they had been in Japan, it would have been no legal reason for delay. The power under which the sale was made was irrevocable. The creditor had both a legal and a moral right to have the power, made for his benefit, executed. The enforced absence of the complainants, if it be conceded that it was enforced, does not, in our judgment, afford a sufficient reason for arresting his agent and the agent of the creditor in performing a duty which both of them imposed upon him before the war began. His power over the subject was per the right of the holder of the note to have him exercise that power was perfect. Its exercise required no intercourse, commercial or otherwise, with the complainants. No military trans: C tion would be interfe ed with by the sale. The enemy, instead of being strengthened, would have been weakened by the process. The interest of complainants in the land might have been liable fect; to confiscation by the government; yet we are told that this right of the creditor could not be enforced, nor the power of the trustee lawfully exercised. No authority in this country, or any other, is shown us for this proposition. It rests upon inference from the general doctrine of absolute non-intercourse between citizens of states, which are in a state of public war with each other, but no case has been cited of this kind, even in such a war. It is said that the power to sell in the deed of trust, required a notice of the sale in a newspaper; that this notice was intended to apprise the complainants of the time and place of sale, and that, inasmuch as it was impossible for such notice to reach complainants, no sale could be made. If this reasoning were sound, the grantors in such a deed need only go to a place where the newspaper could never reach him, to delay the sale indefinitely, or defeat it altogether. But the notice is not for the benefit of the grantor in the sense of notice to him. It is only for his benefit by giving notoriety and publicity of the time, the terms and the place of sale, and the property to be sold, that bidders may be invited, competition encouraged, and a fair price obtained for the property. As to the grantor, he is presumed to know that he is in default, and his property liable to sale at any time, and no notice to him is required. very debts which the citizens of one section may owe to another an inducement to revolution and insurrection, and it rewards the man who lifts his hands against his government by protection to his property, which it would not otherwise possess, if he can raise his efforts to the dignity of a civil war. The case of McVeigh v. The United States, 11 Wallace, 259, holds that an alien enemy may be sued, though he may not have the right to bring suits in our courts, and that when he is sued he has a right to appear and defend himself. "Whatever," says the court, "may be the extent of the disability of an alien enemy to sue in the courts of the hostile country, it is clear that he is liable to be sued, and this carries with it the right to use all the means and appliances of defence." And this proposition is supported by the authorities there cited, as well as by sound reason. If such be the rule in regard to alien enemies in a war between independent states, it should be quite as applicable, if not more so, between citizens of the same government, who are only enemies in a qualified sense in a civil war. See, also, Masterson v. Howard, of the present term. We are of the opinion, that the sale by the trustee, in the case under consideration, was a lawful and valid sale, and that complainant's bill should have been dismissed. The decree of the circuit court is, therefore, reversed, with directions to dismiss the bill. But the authority of certain cases decided in this court is relied on, in which the effect of the state of the late civil war is considered, in judicial proceedings, between parties residing on different sides of what has been called the line separating the belligerents. The first of these is that of Hanger v. Abbott. That case laid Husband and Wife Witnesses against each other. down the proposition that when a citizen of a state, adhering during that war to the national cause, brought suit afterwards LUCRETIA H. SMITH AND ANNIE GUION, BY NEXT against a citizen residing, during the war, within the limits of an insurrectionary state, the period during which the plaintiff was prevented from suing by the state of hostilities, should be deducted from the time necessary to bar the action under the statute of limitations. It decided nothing more than this. It did not even decide that a similar rule was applicable in a suit brought by the latter against the former; and it decided nothing in the question now before us, even if the sale here had been under a judicial proceeding. [6 Wall. 532.[ Another case is that of Dean v. Nelson, 10 Wallace, 158. If the present had been a sale under judicial order, that case would have some analogy to this, and some expressions more general than was intended may, as this court has already said, tend to mislead. That case was a proceeding within an insurrectionary district, but held by our military forces, in a court established by military orders alone. It was a proceeding to foreclose a mortgage on personal property, and it was instituted against parties who had been expelled by military force from their residence, and who were forbidden absolutely by the order which expelled them, and which was addressed to them by name, from coming back again within the lines of the military authority which organized the court. Inasmuch, as without their consent, and against their will, they were thus driven from their houses, and forbidden to return by the arbitrary, though probably necessary, act of the military power, we held that a judicial decree by which their property was sold during the continuance in force of this order, was void as to them. To that doctrine we adhere, and have repeated it at this term in the case of Lasere v. Rochereau. -Deed Delivered as an Escrow. FRIEND, ETC., v. THOMAS R. TUGGLE, ET AL. Supreme Court of Tennessee, Jackson, Special November Term Competency of Witnesses-Husband and Wife.--A statute making parties competent as witnesses, does not render husband and wife competent to testify for or against each other. 2. Escrow. In order that a deed executed by the vendor and delivered to a third person shall have effect only as an escrow, it s e sential that the conditions upon which it is delivered, should have been agreed upon between the vendor and the vendee. 3. -. The Rule more fully stated.-The rule is said to be, that in every case of escrow, there is a contract of privity between the grantor and grantee. The person parties. He does not hold the deed subject to the grantor; and it is always in the power to whom the deed is delivered is, by mutual agreement, constituted the agent of both of the grantee to entitle himself to the deed, and to the estate, by performing the stipulated conditions. [Acc. Wellborn v. Weaver, 17 Georgia, 275; Carter v. Turner, 5 Sneed, 178.] 4. . The Rule illustrated-Case in Judgment.--Where the vendors delivered a deed to a third person upon the condition that it should not be delivered to the vendees, until payment of the purchase money should be made direct to themselves, but these conditions had not been agreed upon with the vendees, and were unknown to them, it was held that such third person was the agent of the vendors only; and he maintain a bill in equity to have such deed declared void, nor to enforce a vendor's lien having received payment and delivered the deed to the vendees, the vendors cannot for the purchase money. 6. Subsequent Purchaser.--In such a case a subsequent bona fide purchaser has a right to act upon the faith that the deed was delivered as it purported to vendors may have, unless upon unexceptionable evidence. 7. Innocent Purchaser.-A person who advances his money and takes a deed of trust to secure the debt, occupies the status of an innocent purchaser; otherwise, a person who takes a deed of trust to secure a pre-existing debt. But this court has never decided, nor intentionally given expression to the idea that the property of citizens of the rebel be; and he will not be deprived of his property because of any equities which previous states, located in the loyal states, was, by the mere existence of the war, exempted from judicial process for debts due to citizens of the loyal states, contracted before the war. A proposition like this, which gives an immunity to rebels against the government, not accorded to the soldier who is fighting for that government in the very locality where the other resides, must receive the gravest consideration, and be supported by unquestioned weight of authority before it receives our assent. Its tendency is to make the NICHOLSON, CH. J., stated the case and delivered the opinion of the court. The bill in this case was filed by Lucretia H. Smith and Annie Guion against Thomas R. and J. J. Tuggle and H. L. Guion, husband of Annie Guion, to have certain deeds to the lot in contro |