of the former. agents of the company selling the tickets, but the latter are to be regarded as the agents another route. It was held that the plaintiff was entitled to hold the first company liable for this failure, upon the ground that this contract was alone with them. MCFARLAND, J., delivered the opinion of the court: Sprayberry purchased from an agent of the Nashville & Chattanooga R. R. Co., at Chattanooga, tickets for himself, wife and two children, from that place to Shreveport, Louisiana. The tickets are what are known as coupon tickets—and indicated the route to be by the Nashville & Chattanooga road to Nashville-and by other eonnecting roads to Memphis, and from that point to Shreveport by steamboat. After passing over the railroads to Memphis, the party took the steamboat called the Nick Wall, to which they were directed, and while on the route on the Mississippi river, an accident occurred, in which the wife of Sprayberry and his two children were drowned. This action was brought by Sprayberry against the Nashville & Chattanooga R. R. Co.; the drowning is averred to have been the result of the misconduct and want of skill of the officers and servants of the boat. A demurrer was filed upon the ground that the plaintiff could not maintain the action in his own name, for wrongs or injuries causing the death of the wife and children. This, we think, was properly overruled. An action of this character is unknown to common law, and is only given by statute, and where such an action is given by statute, and a remedy prescribed, that remedy must be pursued. As the injury occurred in the state of Mississippi, the right of action and the remedy prescribed by the statute of that state, is the one to which the plaintiff was entitled. The statute of this state on the subject has no application. The action, though predicated upon the Mississippi statute, may be brought in this state. In such case, the declaration must aver the statute under which it is brought. This was sufficiently done. That statute gives the remedy to the husband and father-and we enforce that remedy in our courts. The case of Fustenhiem v. The Memphis & Ohio R. R. Co., decided at Jackson, by this court, in April, 1872, was this: The plaintiff purchased a through ticket from New York to Memphis, from the Pennsylvania Central R. R. Co., and received a check for his baggage to be delivered at Memphis. It was held that upon this the plaintiff could not recover from the last company running into Memphis, for an injury to his baggage, which occurred while on the Pennsylvania Central road; for this injury he must look to that company. We are also referred to several cases, and one of them, our own, holding that a carrier receiving freight to be carried beyond the terminus of its own road, is responsible for its delivery at that point, unless a different liability is stipulated for-and there are, as stated, authorities holding that the same rule applies to passengers. On the other hand, there are authorities holding that a different rule applies to passengers from the rule applicable to freight and baggage. That where tickets of this character are sold they are to be regarded as distinct tickets for each road, sold by the first company as agent of the others, so far as passengers are concerned. This is the doctrine maintained by Judge Redfield in his work on carriers. He refers, among others, to the case of Ellsworth v. Tartt, 26 Ala. 733, in which he says the question was a good deal examined, and the rule laid down to be, "if the proprietors of different portions of a public line of travel, by an agreement among themselves, appoint a common agent at each end of the route to receive the fare and give through tickets, this does not of itself constitute them partners ring upon any portion of the line." He refers also to other authori as to passengers, so as to render each one liable for losses occur ties. See Redfield on Carriers, Sec. 444. And the same author maintains the same doctrine in his work on the Law of Railways, Vol. 2, Sec. 201. In this conflict of authority we are left to adopt the rule which seems to us supported by the soundest reasons. As The next question, and one of importance, is as to the liability of the Nashville & Chattanooga Railroad Company for injuries to the passengers caused by the wrongful acts, negligence or want of skill in the officers and servants of the steamboat, after the passengers had passed beyond their line. The declaration avers that the defendant was in partnership with the company or line of carriers The extent and termini of great railway lines, owned and operowning the boat. This was put in issue. The judge, in his charge, ated by companies incorporated by public laws, may be supposed instructed the jury, in substance, that it was not necessary for the to be known, at least in general, to persons of ordinary intelligence, plaintiff to prove this to entitle him to a recovery, but if the plaintiff when they purchase tickets to travel over them, especially when purchased the tickets from an authorized agent of the defendant, this is shown by the tickets themselves. The system of selling the defendant thereby became bound for the transportation of the through tickets is one of great importance and convenience to passengers over the entire line for which the tickets were sold, al- travelers, as it avoids trouble, besides securing in some instance though beyond the terminus of its own road. That the company lower rates. The theory that the company selling the ticket shall selling the tickets incurs a responsibility as though the entire route be held, from this alone to have actually contracted to carry the was its own-unless it stipulate at the time for a less responsibility. passengers over roads besides its own, and that the owners of the This we understand to be the substance of the instructions to the other roads are but the agents of the first to carry out the contract, jury on this question. This doctrine rests upon the theory that the seems to us to be an arbitrary assumption—a sort of legal fiction, contract is alone with the company from whom the tickets were and contrary, in some cases at least, to the truth of the case. purchased for the entire route, and that the connecting lines are suming that in fact the different lines of road are separate and disbut agents of the first in carrying out this contract; and as a conse-tinct, and owned and controlled by different companies, with difquence, the acts or negligence of the servants causing the injury, are the acts of the joint company. This is laid down as the true doctrine in Shearman & Redfield on Negligence, sec. 272, though it is conceded that the American cases do not always support it. The cases referred to in support of the position, we have not had an opportunity to examine. In the case of Carter and Hough v. Peck, 4 Sneed, 202, the language of the judge delivering the opinion of the court, seems to favor this view. In that case, however, it appeared that the plaintiff purchased from the defendants, the proprietors of a stage line, through tickets from Nashville to Memphis. The defendants did not own the entire line, but had an arrangement with another company owning a stage line, to receive the passengers at Waynesboro, on the route, and carry them to La Grange, for their share of the fare, from which point they were to be taken to Memphis by railway, but this arrangement was not known to the plaintiff. The connecting line at Waynesboro failed and refused to carry the plaintiff, and he was compelled to pay his fare upon ferent agents and officers, and that there is no contract or priority between them in regard to carrying passengers, except the arrangement to sell through tickets, and that these facts appear in proof shall the fact that the first company, with the authority of the others, issues and sells the tickets, be held of itself to establish exactly contrary to the truth, that the other companies are but the agents and servants of the first? There is nothing in this record to indicate that the officers and agents of the steamboat, whose wrongful acts or negligence are said to have caused the death of the plaintiff's wife and children, were the servants of this defendant, or in any manner under its control, except the simple fact that the defendant sold the tickets. To allow this of itself to establish this arbitrary conclusion against the truth, would be to attach unjust reponsibility upon the company selling the tickets. We are of opinion that in such cases, the company selling the tickets shall be regarded as the agent of the other lines, when the tickets themselves import this and nothing else appears, and the purchaser may well understand with whom the contract is made, and who is bonds, the whole principal sum mentioned in each and all of the bound for its performance. Of course the company selling the tickets may, by contract, either expressed or to be fairly implied from its acts, bind itself to be responsible for the entire route; but this should not be held conclusively established from the sale of the tickets alone, nor should it be held to throw upon the defendant the onus of proving that it expressly limited its liability. If a partnership in fact appear, the case would be different. For this error the judgment must be reversed and a new trial awarded. JUDGMENT Reversed. NOTE. We are indebted, for the foregoing opinion, and for another which we shall publish next week, to Mr. Attorney-General Heiskell, of Tennessee. Railway Mortgage-Foreclosure-Parties. CHARLES ALEXANDER et al. v. CENTRAL RAILROAD said mortgage bonds then outstanding shall, forthwith, become due United States Circuit Court, District of Iowa, October Term, thereof; and the said trustee, and their successors, shall and may, the benefit of all the bondholders. and hereby is expressly authorized and empowered to sell at public auction, to the highest bidder, the entire property, real and personal, rights, franchises, and privileges herein conveyed; said sale shall be either in the city of Marshalltown, Iowa, or in the city of New York." Platt Smith and J. F. Duncombe, for the plaintiffs; Boardman & Brown, for the railroad company; Grant & Smith, for the trustee. DILLON, Circuit Judge:— 1. The authority in the deed of trust to the trustee, on default of the payment of interest, and upon the written request of a majority of the bondholders to take possession of the road, to operate it and receive its income, and on three months' notice to sell the same, and divide the proceeds of the sale pro rata among the bondholders, is a cumulative remedy for the benefit of the mortgage creditors, and does not exclude their right to resort to the judicial tribunals for a foreclosure. Especially is this so, as the laws of the state of Iowa, forbid sales under powers of this character by proceedings out of court. 2. Provisions in an instrument of this character limiting the right of a mortgage-creditor to resort to a court of chancery to foreclose his security, are not to be extended beyond the fair meaning of the language used; and it is our opinion that there is no restric tion in the deed of trust before us, upon the right of the coupon This is a bill in equity to foreclose a mortgage made by the defendant on its railroad and property. The bill is filed by the plaintiffs as bondholders, who allege that they bring it for themselves and all other bondholders who are similarly situated. It charges default in the company to pay interest. It alleges that the plaintiffs have made a demand on the trustee in the mortgage, viz: the Farmers' Loan and Trust Company, of New York, to bring the suit, and its refusal, and the said company is therefore made a defendant. There is no averment in the bill that a majority of the bond-holder to forclose for interest upon default; although a majority holders unite in bringing it, or united in the request to the trustee to bring it. The trustee appears and files an answer, setting up that a majority of the bondholders have never demanded action on the part of the trustee, and that it is willing to submit to the direction of the court as to its duty in the premises, and to become plaintiff if the court so orders. The railroad company demurred to the bill, on the ground that under the provisions of the deed of trust, there could be no foreclosure by bondholders, or by the trustee, unless a majority of the bondholders so desired, and there was no such averment. of the bondholders do not unite in the suit, or request the trustees to bring it. The provision in question gives a majority of the bondholders, on default of the payment of interest, the option or election, after the expiration of a year from the default, to have the whole principal sum become due at once, and the mortgage security enforced accordingly. This is not inconsistent with the unaabridged right of any coupon-holder to foreclose for interest, in the manner sought in the present bill, and it was not necessary that a majority of the coupon-holders should unite in bringing the bill, or in a request to the trustee to bring it. 3. As the bill alleges that the trustee refused to bring suit, the bill was properly brought in the name of the plaintiffs, for themselves and the other coupon-holders, making the trustee a defend ant. 4. If the plaintiffs elect to dismiss the bill as to the trustee, we The following are the provisions in the deed of trust relied on in support of the demurrer : "And the said party of the first part [the Railroad Co.] doth hereby covenant, promise and agree, for itself, its successors or assigns, to and with the said trustee, their successor or successors, that the said company will well and truly pay each and every of said bonds issued by them, and secured by this mortgage, together with the semi-annual interest to become due thereon, at the rate of seven per cent. per annum, at the times, in the manner, and at the places specified therein, in United States gold coin. And that in case said company shall, for the space of six months, make default in the payment of the said semiannual interest to become due upon any, either or the whole of HON. PETER W. GRAY, one of the most eminent lawyers and citizens of of said mortgage bonds, then, after the expiration of twelve Texas, died at Houston, on the 5th instant. He had but recently returned months from the time it became due, and without demand or from Virginia, where he had gone for his health. He was born in Fredericksnotice, at the election or option of a majority of the holders of said | burgh, Va., in 1817, and accompanied his father to Texas in 1837. will allow the trustee to become a party plaintiff, and to file a bill for the benefit of all the bondholders; but it would be anomalous to have the trustee on the record, both as defendant and plaintff in the same proceeding. The demurrer of the railroad company to the bill is overruled. ORDERED ACCORDINGLY. [Correspondence.] James T. Brady. The great men of the nation-those who have given the world a direction towards the good—are endearing and enduring orna ments. To rescue from forgetfulness, to keep fresh and green the memory, and to cherish with just pride the names of those who have elevated and ennobled a beneficent calling, ever tends to raise mankind to a higher level of thought and action. We recur with pleasing recollections—after a lapse of several years since his death-to him who did all that lay in his power, and his bounty was large, to alleviate the condition of the unfortunate, to vindicate the rights of man, and to adorn the profession he so dearly loved. His influence over a jury was very great-probably equal to that of Choate in his palmiest days. While he had a pleasing address, he possessed a remarkable magneticalness which ever wins a jury more than labored logic; these, combined with great felicity of thought and expression, which at times pierced like a Damascus blade to the centre, gave him a powerful lever to distinction. And thus it was, that a gleam of light and beauty shone through whatever he gave his mind to, and made the subject or contested point stand out in radiant characters. But while his diction and eloquence were ever conceded to be remarkable, his powers of analysis, logic and solid argument can but deeply impress the mind of any one who may take occasion to read his forensic speeches, and such of his briefs, legal pleas and arguments as are preserved to us. It has well been said by one who knew him better, that in this regard, "many of his noblest productions were not unlike the Corinthian pillar, in which the strenghth of the column is lost And a festive gathering, in many of which he figured so delight-sight of in the symmetry of its proportions and the beauty of its fully, was considered incomplete-a play without a star-if he were decoration." absent; for he was James T. Brady was indeed a brilliant ornament-the Curran of the New York bar-while in the social circle he was peculiarly attractive, possessing at the same time, in a liberal degree, the better amenities of our nature. Genial, gentle, and sympathetic, he was always considerate and generous toward his younger brethren of the bar. Companionable and noble, and largely endowed with the spirit of love for his fellow-men, he was ever the delight of his auditory, whether in the court-room, or before a popular audi ence. "From the charmed council to the festive board, Of human feelings the unbounded lord." His boyhood education was under the guidance and direction of his father, Thomas Brady, who was a man of clever legal abilities and varied accomplishments, having kept a school and afterwards practiced law with success, in the city of New York. In that rudimentary school, it was about fifty years ago, that young Brady might have been seen, a large-headed little boy of seven or nine years of age, poring over his books, and laggingly committing his lessons, for he was "slow of study" at that age, as was Webster and many others, who, in manhood, became distinguished; he displayed no marked, distinctive qualities of mind or genius while a youth, which foreshadowed eminence in coming years. "I remember him," says Chief Justice Daly, now of the Common Pleas Court of New York, who was with him while a boy in the school of his father. "I remember him, and such of his schoolmates as survived remember him, as a great, warm-hearted little boy; exceedingly unselfish, most affectionate in his attachments to his young school companions, and exceedingly beloved by them; qualities, which in all his subsequent career, and the distinction that attended him, were never abated or extinguished, as every one will testify that ever knew him, nor came in personal contact with him." Although he was a shy and retiring lad, his father-who knew his nature best-regarded him as a self-reliant and remarkable boy, who was one day to make a figure in the world. While not insensible to his own merits, he was generously ready to accord a word of praise to his associate or antagonist in a cause where he deemed it deserving. The Great Advocate was engaged in most of the important cases in the state of New York, during a period of twenty-five years. It were idle to attempt to collate in order the various cases in which he figured, but some may be mentioned as they occur to us—as we remember the impressions made at the time of their occurrence. In 1862 Mr. Brady was one of the counsel to defend the commander and crew of the privateer Savannah, who were arraigned for piracy. The facts in brief were, that the schooner Savannah, a Confederate vessel, having captured the brig Joseph, laden with sugar, was afterward taken by the United States brig-of-war Perry, and brought into the port of New York, where a true bill" for piracy was found. We may mention in this connection that, as a short time before this, the men of the privateer Jefferson Davis, had been tried in Philadelphia and convicted of piracy, a precedent in such cases had been established. " Mr. Brady handled the cause with marked ability, and as far as we have been able to learn, without pecuniary reward. The closing sentence of his plea to the jury in behalf of the privateermen was about as follows: "I do wish that it were within the power of men, invoking the Great Ruler of the Universe, to bid these doors open and to let the revolutionary sages to whom I have referred, and a Sumter, a Moultric, a Greene, a Putnam and the other distinguished men who fought for our privileges and rights From the impressions of those who remember him in early man-in the days of old, march in here and look on this trial. There is hood, we glean that, his earliest ambition was to be a lawyer; and he ever after had an elevated opinion of the nobleness of the profession; he considered that the beauties and honors of Justitia far out-shone the wealth of " Ormus and of Ind." His natural powers of oratory were great, while an unhesitating command of language and a wonderful felicity of classical illustration, favored and marked him, even from the time he pleaded his first case; these made him engaging and majestic before any audatory. not a man of them who would not say to you that you should remember in regard to each these prisoners, as if you were his father, the history of Abraham, when he went to sacrifice his son Isaac on the Mount-the spirit of liberty, the principles of American jurisprudence and the dictates of humanity constituting themselves another angel of the Lord, and saying to you when the immolation was threatened: Lay not your hand upon him.' He also figured conspicuously in the Forrest divorce case-the accounts of which at the time flooded the newspapers and periodiOf a Celtic origin, he partook largely of the fervid imagination cals of the country. It will be remembered that the cross-firing and flowery style peculiar to that race. In his later efforts he dis- on the part of the litigants, was kept up for several years-Mr. played such genius, such astuteness and eloquence as to render Forrest having set the ball in motion by an action for divorce-but him worthy to tread in the footsteps of Thomas Addis Emmet and which finally resulted in Mrs. Forrest recovering judgment for her kindred lights of the bar. support from 1850 to 1860, which, in the aggregate, amounted to a When young Brady was admitted to practice, the profession was large sum—and thus, as was then said, Birnham Wood had come to Dunsinane. Mr. Forrest took an appeal from the final judgment, in his poem just published under that title. In the notorious trial of Gen. Geo. W. Cole, for the murder of Hon. L. Harris Hiscock, at Albany, in December, 1868, James T. Brady won bountiful laurels for the graceful and masterly manner in which he defended the prisoner. Notwithstanding his ill health -he then being under the doctor's care-it is generally conceded that he acquitted himself ably and well, and that his efforts wrought out a vindication of the accused in the minds of the jury. We would not, however, in this commendation, be understood as detracting one jot or tittle from the astuteness, genius and eloquence exhibited by the learned and accomplished gentlemen associated with him on that occasion. The trial of Cole attracted much attention, and was as renowned in pith and moment as that of Sickles for the murder of Barton Key, years ago in Washington. In his plea to the jury, Mr. Brady made touching allusions to the heroic services rendered to the nation by the prisoner; that after being decorated with badges of honor, for patriotism and heroism in the services of his country, he turned his footsteps homeward to share his glories with her, for whom he would have laid down his life: "But," in deepest pathos, exclaimed Mr. Brady, "what found he there? Alas! that hearthstone was desecrated; the spoiler had been there. Where joy and brightness had reigned luxuriantly, sorrow and gloom were. That beautiful fabric of domestic love and tranquility was overwhelmed in ruin, and the ravens of dispair were croaking and gloating over the dark desolation. Gentlemen, what is home without its jewels; what is earth without its flowers; what is heaven without its stars." He then makes an apposite simile in referring to Cæsar being struck down in the senate chamber by his best friend. "He, also, experienced the pangs of knowing that it was his most trusted friend that struck him to the heart For when the noble Cæsar saw him stab, Although the plea had very great weight with the jury, some have expressed a disappointment at this effort. It may be Mr. Brady had, on some former occasion, when in the prime of health, been more pleasing and eloquent, but considering the fact that his constitution was then much shattered, we may justly accord a tribute of praise, believing that his decided influence over that jury was the result of a solemn pathos well fortified with convincing logic. A verdict of not guilty "was rendered. Our generous advocate was ever ready to defend the ignorant, the weak, the worthy "without money and without price,"—and the field for such labor, be it remembered, in any great metropolis is boundless--so that years before, and at his death, full many a poor, unfortunate man and woman whom he had befriended pronounced him blessed, and would fain have laid upon his bier offerings of adoration. Whether prosecuting or defending a case for pay, or for charity's sake, he was always faithful,--faithful to his abilities, to his client, and faithful to himself. "O fortunate, O happy day! Had he ever been able When a new household finds its place he would doubtless have been a happier, if not a better man. Being of a sunny and mercurial nature, he latterly floated on the tide of fawning and flattering society, in which his smiles were ever courted. The honorable John R. Brady, the accomplished judge of the Supreme Court of New York, is a brother of the subject of our sketch, a man of marked ability and highly revered. achievements; At the meeting of the members of the bar of New York, in memory of Daniel S. Dickerson, one great advocate pronounced a sentiment which appositely illustrates his catholic spirit and humane character: "Like you," he observed with a high sense of regard for the opinion of his associates, "I honor greatness, genius, and but I honor more those qualities in a man's nature which show that, while he holds a proper relation to the Deity, he toward them. I would rather have it said of me after death, by has also a just estimate of his fellow-men, and a kindly feeling my brethren of the bar, that they were sorry I had left their com panionship, than to be spoken of in the highest strains of gifted panegyric." That sentence bespeaks the nature of the man. Five winters and summers have rolled their onward course since James T. Brady was called from his beneficient sphere of usefulness,-since a void was occasioned in the Bar of New York, which has scarcely yet been redeemed-and thousands still miss his companionship. New York. " Nor e'er was to the bowers of bliss convey'd Book Notices. JOHN F. BAKER, CRIMINAL LAW REPORTS: Being Reports of Cases Determined in the Federal and State Courts of the United States, and in the Courts of England, Ireland, Canada, Etc. With Notes. By N. ST. JOHN GREEN, formerly Lecturer on Criminal Law at the Dane Law School, and now Lecturer on Criminal Law at the School of Law of Boston University. New York: Published by Hurd & Houghton, Cambridge: The Riverside Press. 1874. undertaken by an editor so competent to perform the task, and by publishers We are glad that the preparation of a series of criminal law reports has been who stand foremost in their department of the book-making art. It is an undertaking of which a large portion of the profession have felt the need to some time, and it is matter for congratulation that it has not fallen into bad hands. The practice of the criminal law separates itself so completely from every other field of legal labor, that in the large cities it is rapidly falling into the hands of a separate class of lawyers, some of whom never appear in a civi' case. The establishment of separate criminal courts in many of the large cities has had a further tendency to segregate the criminal lawyers from the rest of the profession. Such of those lawyers who have not access to complete libraries can furnish themselves with the current decisions on criminal law, of states other than their own, in no other way than through a series of this kind. We believe the time is not far distant when each of the leading departments of the law will have its separate series of reports; when, in other words, we shall have Criminal Reports, Bankruptcy Reports, Admiralty Reports, Commercial Reports, Equity Reports, Ecclesiastical and Divorce Cases, Land Cases and the like, in separate and concurrent series, embracing all courts. The law involves too vast an accumulation of knowledge for any one man to excel in all its He possessed abilities of the peculiar kind and description to branches, and the dictates of good sense and self-interest will soon lead each have shone favorably in public life, but he uniformly declined polit-lawyer, at least in large cities, to confine himself to a particular department of ical honors. The position of Attorney-General of the United States was once tendered him, but he did not accept it, although it was believed that he would have filled the office gracefully and his profession. When that time comes-when we shall have specialists in law, as we now have in medicine-every successful practitioner will be able to support a series of reports devoted to his own specialty. The criminal practice has so far become a specialty with a certain class of lawyers that this may be done now. An attempt is made in this series to give, in about one volume per year, all the current decisions on the criminal law in the English and American courts. The editor promises that in future volumes no case which is deemed to be of the slightest importance will be omitted, that doubtful cases will be commented upon in notes, in which an endeavor will be made to treat the subject historic ally as well as theoretically, and that cases which are now established as lead-is pardoned, all Englishmen understand thereby, that the punishment due to ing cases, will, as occasion serves, be added in full in the notes. the offence is the thing remitted.' Unless we greatly deceive ourselves, this undertaking cannot be carried out in one or two, or even three volumes a year. The present volume, although honestly printed, with large pages and without leading or stuffing, comprises. in 814 printed pages, but 98 reported cases. Mr. Green in his preface tells us that the number of volumes of reports published last year was 98. This would make an average of but one criminal case to each volume of reports. We believe from such an examination of the subject as we have been able to make, that the average will come nearer a dozen than one. There is such a diathesis of violent crime in some sections of the country, that we doubt if one volume per annum would do more than comprise the homicide cases alone. We recently had occasion to note ten homicide cases in a single volume of Alabama Reports. We therefore confidently think that Mr. Green must either resort to some principle of selection, or else he and his publishers must conclude to face the task of getting out several volumes per year. But Mr. Green might have done more in the way of notes and comments on his principal cases than he has done. Thus, in Bohannan v. Commonwealth, p. 613, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky criticises two preceding opinions of the same court, Phillips' case, 2 Duval, 328, and Carico's case, 7 Bush, 124. Had Mr. Green turned to these cases, he would have found an extraordinary doctrine announced and enforced by vigorous reasoning. The opinions of the court in these cases (or at least the more striking language contained in them) would have been worthy a place as a foot note to Bohannan's case. The case of Sylvus v. State, p. 679, on the burden and quantum of proof where self defence is urged in justification of homicide, afforded the editor an excellent opportunity to exercise, upon a point as to which the professional mind is unsettled, the fine discrimination which he elsewhere exhibits. The extraordin We have not space to notice the many valuable cases comprised in this vol-ary doctrine laid down in Fields v. State, p. 635, should not have passed unume; but, glancing at the work of the editor, we find many scholarly notes of challenged, unless the editor thought (as we do) that it carries with it its own great value-which will be of equal delight to the student and profit to the prac- refutation. titioner. In these notes the learned editor does not limit his efforts to the collecting of decided points, but, in searching for the reasons and foundations of the rules under discussion, he carries us back through the old authors and through the most learned and instructive historical enquiries. This will appear from a portion of a note which we select at random, on p. 502, in which the editor traces the origin of the principle that a man's house is his castle. The following brief note, which we find on p. 295, will also show the discrimina-cellent reputation. ting cast of Mr. Green's mind: But the efforts of an editor must end somewhere; and Mr. Green and his publishers are entitled to the thanks of the profession for what they have done in this first volume, and the profession is to be congratulated that the literature of the law is to be enriched by so valuable a series. We ought not to omit to add that, with the exception of the paper, which seems not quite as good as the publishers usually select, the mechanical execution of the book sustains their ex "Many dicta are to be found in the reports to the effect that it is a well THE NEW YORK SUPREME COURT REPORTS. Cases Determined in the We have heretofore taken occasion to express our gratification that the reporting of the decisions of the Supreme Courts of New York has at last fallen into good hands. We have likewise taken occasion to express regret that after Messrs. Thompson and Cook had begun this undertaking and begun it so well, the publication of the former "official" series, which had been suspended simultaneously with the suspension of the series of Barbour, had been resumed by another editor. The present series gave, and still gives, promise of so much usefulness that we thought it a misfortune to have the old anarchy resumed. So far as our means of judging extends, there is no series of reports now published, whose editors achieve what the profession require at their hands, more nearly than do the editors of this series. "This statute has probably not been generally re-enacted in this country. It is undoubtedly true as a matter of fact, that where a statute creates an offence, it is generally sufficient to follow the words of the statute. But this is true, not because there is any rule of law to that effect, but because when the legislature make a new offence they generally specify the facts necessary to constitute the offence." The following note (p. 183) will also show the ready learning with which the editor illustrates interesting questions here and there, and by which he sets his readers to thinking: Coke says (3 Inst. p. 233), a pardon is a work of mercy, whereby the king either before attainder, sentence, or conviction, or after, forgiveth any crime, offence, punishment, execution, right, title, debtor, duty, temporal or ecclesiastical; all that is forfeited to the king by any attainder, etc., he may restore by his charter; but if by the attainder the blood be corrupted, that must be restored by authority of parliament.' "Hobbes, who had a marvellous faculty for stripping words of their ambiguity, says in his dialogue between a philospher and a lawyer, while commenting upon the matter of pardon as treated by Coke : In the first place these reports are prompt, following but two or three months behind the decisions reported. This, if there were no other excel In the second place, the work is well done-both editorial and mechanical. Of course we are not prepared to speak upon this point, as unqualifiedly as a practitioner would be who had for some time used these books; but from such a hasty examination as a reviewer can make, we are convinced that there are no reporters in this country who deserve more credit for careful and judicious work. In the third place, these volumes have a great deal of meat in them, if we may be permitted to use such an expression. Volume 2 contains one hundred and sixty-five reported cases-fifty per cent, more than ordinary volumes of reports; whilst volume 3 contains 273 cases, considerably more than twice as many as will usually be found in a volume of state or federal reports. With reference to the nature of these cases, they are what would be expected in decisions of the courts of a great commercial state. We notice a large-perhaps we may say an unusual number of cases--novel in their character and of general interest, and which do not rest in statutes peculiar to New York. We have selected a number of these, and hope to find space to notice them hereafter. These reports, however, have one vital defect. They are decisions of courts not of final resort, and many of them are re-examined, and some of them reversed by the court of appeals. A "corrigenda" in each volume shows the disposition of the cases of the preceeding volumes which were appealed from, and in which a final judgment has been rendered. We shall not enter again into the propriety of reporting the decisions of courts which are not final. Suffice it to say that we believe that the commercial test is the only one which can be applied. If the profession want such reports, they ought to be published; and those who do not want them, need not buy them. The objection to the publishing of such reports is in our judgment the objection of the case lawyer, and not the objection of the lawyer who thinks. "P. If the king remit the murder, and pardon not the man that did it, THE PYSCHOLOGICAL AND MEDCIO-LEGAL JOURNAL. Conducted by what does the remission serve for?' "L. You know well enough that when we say a murder or anything else WILLIAM A. HAMMOND, M. D., Professor of Diseases of the Mind and |