There are consequences, sir, still more extensive, which, as they follow clearly from the doctrine combated, must either be admitted, or the doctrine must be given up. If Congress can employ money indefinitely to the general welfare, and are the sole and supreme judges of the general welfare, they may take the care of religion into their own hands; they may appoint teachers in every state, county, and parish, and pay them out of their public treasury; they may take into their own hands the education of children, establishing in like manner schools throughout the Union; they may assume the provision for the poor; they may undertake the regulation of all roads other than post-roads; in short, every thing, from the highest object of state legislation down to the most minute object of police, would be thrown under the power of Congress; for every object I have mentioned would admit of the application of money, and might be called, if Congress pleased, provisions for the general welfare.

The language held in various discussions of this house is a proof that the doctrine in question was never entertained by this body. Arguments, wherever the subject would permit, have constantly been drawn from the peculiar nature of this government, as limited to certain enumerated powers, instead of extending, like other governments, to all cases not particularly excepted. In a very late instance-I mean the debate on the representation bill — it must be remembered that an argument much used, particularly by gentlemen from Massachusetts, against the ratio of 1 for 30,000, was, that this government was unlike the state governments, which had an indefinite variety of objects within their power; that it had a small number of objects only to attend to; and therefore, that a smaller number of representatives would be sufficient to administer it.

Arguments have been advanced to show that because, in the regulation of trade, indirect and eventual encouragement is given to manufactures, therefore Congress have power to give money in direct bounties, or to grant it in any other way that would answer the same purpose. But surely, sir, there is a great and obvious difference, which it cannot be necessary to enlarge upon. A duty laid on imported implements of husbandry would, in its operation, be an indirect tax on exported produce; but will any one say that, by virtue of a mere power to lay duties on imports, Congress might go directly to the produce or implements of agriculture, or to the articles exported? It is true, duties on exports are expressly prohibited; but if there were no article forbidding them, a power directly to tax exports could never be deduced from a power to tax imports, although such a power might indirectly and incidentally affect exports.

In short, sir, without going farther into the subject, which I should not have here touched at all but for the reasons already mentioned, I venture to declare it as my opinion, that, were the power of Congress to be established in the latitude contended for, it would subvert the very foundations, and transmute the very nature of the limited government established by the people of America; and what inferences might be drawn, or what consequences ensue, from such a step, it is incumbent on us all to consider.

On the Proposition introduced by Mr. Fitzsimons, that Provision should be made for the Reduction of the Public Debt. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, November 20, 1792. Mr. MERCER. The Constitution permits the head of the treasury to propose plans. It may be proper, then, that the different secretaries mav

prepare such plans as are within their respective departments, which the chief magistrate may propose to the legislatures, if he sees fit; and when so done, it is constitutional, and the legislature may or may not, at their discretion, take them up; any other exposition is unconstitutional and idle. This is also the exposition of the documents and information that arise in the administration of government, which this house may require of the executive magistrate, and which he will communicate as he sees fit. The house may go too far in asking information. He may constitutionally deny such information of facts there deputed as are unfit to be communicated, and may assist in the legislation I always wish for. But I want no opinions resulting from them. If they are to influence us, they are wrong; if not to influence, they are useless. This mode of procedure, of origina ting laws with the secretary, destroys the responsibility; it throws it on a man not elected by the people, and over whom they have no control.

November 21, 1792.

Mr. AMES. What is the clause of the Constitution, opposed to the receiving a plan of a sinking fund from the secretary? Bills for raising revenue shall originate in this house. I verily believe the members of this house, and the citizens at large, would be very much surprised to hear this clause of the Constitution formally and gravely stated as repugnant to the reference to the treasury department for a plan, if they and we had not been long used to hear it.

To determine the force of this amazing constitutional objection, it will be sufficient to define terms.

What is a bill? It is a term of technical import, and surely it cannot need a definition: it is an act of an inchoate state, having the form but not the authority of the law.

What is originating a bill? Our rules decide it. introduced by a motion for leave, or by a committee.

Every bill shall be

It may be said, the plan of a sinking fund, reported by the secretary, is not, in technical, or even in popular language, a bill nor, by the rules of the house or those of common sense, is this motion the originating a bill. By resorting to the spirit of the Constitution, or by adopting any reasonable construction of the clause, is it possible to make it appear repugnant to the proposition for referring to the secretary? The opposers of this proposition surely will not adopt a construction of the Constitution. They have often told us, we are to be guided by a strict adherence to the letter; that there is no end to the danger of constructions.

The letter is not repugnant; and will it be seriously affirmed that, according to the spirit and natural meaning of the Constitution, the report of the secretary will be a revenue bill, or any other bill, and that this proposition is originating sucn a bill? If it be, where shall we stop? If the idea of such a measure, which first passes through the mind, be confounded with the measure subsequent to it, what confusion will ensue ! The President, by suggesting the proposition, may as well be pretended to originate a revenue bill; even a newspaper plan would be a breach of the exclusive privilege of this house, and the liberty of the press, so justly dear to us, would be found unconstitutional. Yet if, without any order of the house, the draft of an act were printed, and a copy laid before every member in his seat, no person will venture to say that it is a bill that it is originated, or can be brought under cognizance of the house, unless by a motion I reply upon it, that neither the letter of the Constitution, nor any

meaning that it can be tortured into, will support the objection which has so often been urged with solemn emphasis and persevering zeal.

We may repeat it, what color is there for saying that the secretary legislates? Neither my memory nor my understanding can discern any. I am well aware that no topic is better calculated to make popular impressions; but I cannot persuade myself that they will charge us with neglect or violation of duty, for putting ourselves into a situation to discharge it in the best and most circumspect manner.

Mr. MADISON. I insisted that a reference to the secretary of the treasury on subjects of loans, taxes, and provisions for loans, &c., was in fact a delegation of the authority of the legislature, although it would admit of much sophistical argument on the contrary.

On the Memorial of the Relief Committee of Baltimore, for the Relief of St. Domingo Refugees.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, January 10, 1794. Mr. MADISON remarked, that the government of the United States is a definite government, confined to specified objects. It is not like the state governments, whose powers are more general. Charity is no part of the legislative duty of the government. It would puzzle any gentleman to lay his finger on any part of the Constitution which would authorize the government to interpose in the relief of the St. Domingo sufferers. The report of the committee, he observed, involved this constitutional question

whether the money of our constituents can be appropriated to any other than specific purposes. Though he was of opinion that the relief contemplated could not be granted in the way proposed, yet he supposed a mode might be adopted which would answer the purpose without infringing the Constitution.

Mr. NICHOLAS concurred in the sentiment with Mr. Madison. He considered the Constitution as defining the duty of the legislature so expressly, as that it left them no option in the present case.

Mr. BOUDINOT supported the question on constitutional grounds. He instanced several cases, which had occurred and might occur, in which relief must necessarily be granted, and that without occasioning any doubt of the constitutionality of the business; such as granting pensions, affording relief to the Indians, supporting prisoners, &c. He alluded to the circumstance of the alliance between the United States and France, the connection between the citizens of the United States and that country, &c. Mr. DEXTER stated sundry objections from the Constitution. will not be pretended, he supposed, that the grant of moneys, on this occasion, was for the general welfare; it is merely a private charity. He was in favor of going into a committee on the subject, but wished a short delay, that he might revolve the question more fully in his own mind.

It

Mr. MADISON, in reply to Mr. Boudinot, who had stated several cases as in point, observed, that those cases came within the law of nations, of which this government has express cognizance; the support of prisoners is a case provided for by the laws of nations; but the present question, he remarked, could not be considered in any such point of view. (Motion lost.)

[Note. In May, 1812, "An Act for the relief of the citizens of Venezuela" was passed, authorizing the President to expend $50,000 to purchase provisions for that object. The motion to fill the blank with that amount was moved by Mr. Calhoun, and carried by ayes, 45; noes, 29.]

Commercial Restrictions.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, January 31, 1794. Mr. MADISON insisted that trade ought to be left free to find its proper channels, under the conduct of merchants; that the mercantile opinion was the best guide in the case now depending; and that that opinion was against the resolutions.

In answer to this objection, he said it was obvious to remark that, in the very terms of the proposition, trade ought to be free before it could find its proper channel. It was not free at present: it could not, therefore, find the channels in which it would most advantageously flow. The dikes must be thrown down, before the waters could pursue their natural course. Who would pretend that the trade with the British West Indies, or even with Great Britain herself, was carried on, under the present restrictions, as it would go on of itself, if unfettered from restrictions on her part, as it is on ours? Who would pretend that the supplies to the West Indies, for example, would not flow thither in American bottoms, if they flowed freely? Who would pretend that our wheat, our flour, our fish, &c,, would not find their way to the British market, if the channels to it were open for them?

It seemed to have been forgotten that the principle of this objection struck at every regulation in favor of manufactures, as much, or even more, than at regulations on the subject of commerce. It required that every species of business ought to be left to the sagacity and interest of those carrying it on, without any interference whatever of the public authority.

The interest of the mercantile class may happen to differ from that of the whole community. For example; it is, generally speaking, the interest of the merchant to import and export every thing; the interest of manufacturers to lessen imports in order to raise the price of domestic fabrics, and to check exports, where they may enhance the price of raw materials. In this case, it would be as improper to allow the one for the other as to allow either to judge for the whole.

It may be the interest of the merchant, under particular circumstances, to confine the trade to its established channels, when the national interest would require those channels to be enlarged or changed. The best wri

ters on political economy have observed, that the regulations most unfriendly to the national wealth of Great Britain have owed their birth to mercantile counsels. It is well known that, in France, the greatest opposition to that liberal policy which was as favorable to the true interest of that country as of this, proceeded from the interests which merchants had in keeping the trade in its former course.

If, in any country, the mercantile opinion ought not to be implicitly followed, there were the strongest reasons why it ought not in this. The body of merchants who carry on the American commerce is well known to be composed of so great a proportion of individuals who are either British subjects, or trading on British capital, or enjoying the profits of British consignments, that the mercantile opinion here might not be an American opinion; nay, it might be the opinion of the very country of which, in the present instance at least, we ought not to take counsel. What the genuine mercantile American opinion would be, if it could be collected apart from the general one, Mr. M. said he did not undertake positively to decide. His belief was, that it would be in favor of the resolutions.

Direct Taxes.

May 6, 1794.

Mr. SEDGWICK said, that, in forming a constitution for a national government, to which was intrusted the preservation of that government, and of the existence of society itself, it was reasonable to suppose that every mean necessary to those important ends should be granted. This was in fact the case in the Constitution of the United States. To Congress it was expressly granted to impose "taxes, duties, imposts, and excises." It had been universally concluded, and never, to his knowledge, denied, but that the legislature, by those comprehensive words, had authority to impose taxes on every subject of revenue. If this position was just, a construction which limited their operation of this power (in its nature and by the Constitution illimitable) could not be the just construction.

He observed that, to obviate certain mischief, the Constitution had provided that capitation and other direct taxes should be proportioned according to the ratio prescribed in it. If, then, the legislature was authorized to impose a tax on every subject of revenue, (and surely pleasure carriages, as an object of luxury, and in general owned by those to whom contributions would not be inconvenient, were fair and proper subjects of taxation,) and a tax on them could not be proportioned by the constitutional ratio, it would follow, irresistibly, that such a tax, in this sense of the Constitution, was not "direct." On this idea he enlarged his reasoning, and showed that such a tax was incapable of apportionment.

He said that, so far as he had been able to form an opinion, there had been a general concurrence in a belief that the ultimate sources of public contributions were labor, and the subjects and effects of labor; that taxes, being permanent, had a tendency to equalize, and to diffuse themselves through a community. According to these opinions, a capitation tax, and taxes on land, and on property and income generally, were a direct charge, as well in the immediate as ultimate sources of contribution. He had considered those, and those only, as direct taxes in their operation and effects. On the other hand, a tax imposed on a specific article of personal property, and particularly of objects of luxury, as in the case under consideration, he had never supposed had been considered a direct tax within the meaning of the Constitution. The exaction was indeed directly of the owner; but by the equalizing operation, of which all taxes more or less partook, it created an indirect charge on others besides the owners.

The Bill for authorizing the President to lay, regulate, and revoke Embargoes.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, May 29, 1794. Mr. MADISON did not accede to the principle of the bill. He did not see any such immediate prospect of a war as could induce the house to violate the Constitution. He thought that it was a wise principle in the Constitution to make one branch of the government raise an army, and another conduct it. If the legislature had the power to conduct an army, they might imbody it for that end. On the other hand, if the President was empowered to raise an army, as he is to direct its motions when raised, he might wish to assemble it for the sake of the influence to be acquired by the command. The Constitution had wisely guarded