of the enemy in the neighbourhood of Suffolk and on the coast of North Carolina. It was a period of indecision and anxiety; Charleston was threatened, and Gen. Lee advised every available man to be sent thither; the enemy was reported at various points of the sea-coast south of James River, and it was not known where his heaviest blow would be delivered; and distracted by so many prospects of attack, the policy of dispersion became, for a time, a necessary one, and Gen. Lee found himself, with not more than two-thirds of the army he had in the battle of Fredericksburg, left to watch the movements of the enemy still remaining north of the Rappahannock.

This serious diminution of his forces affected Gen. Lee with great anxiety, in view of the exigencies of the approaching spring campaign, in which the fate of Virginia, and of the sea-coast, and of the Mississippi Valley, appeared to be cqually involved, and naturally led to a revision of all the Confederate forces in the field. He made it the occasion of one of the plainest letters he ever wrote to the War Department-a letter in which the tone of censure and rebuke was more apparent than in any appeal he ever made to the patriotism of the people and the wisdom of the authorities. He suggested to the government an appeal to the Governors of the States to aid more directly in recruiting the armies. He said the people habitually expected too much from the troops now in the field; that because they had gained many victories, it did not follow that they should always gain them; that the legitimate fruits of victory had hitherto been lost for the want of numbers on our side; and, finally, that all those who failed to go to the field at such a momentous period, were guilty of the blood of the brave soldiers who perished in the effort to achieve independence.

While Lee's force on the Rappahannock was reduced to the extent we have noticed, the enemy had always been able to keep up its army in Northern Virginia to a strength exceeding 100,000 men; and now, for its fifth attempt on Richmond, had a force not less than 150,000, under the command of "Fighting Joe Hooker," the hero of Northern prints. To meet this tremendous force, Gen. Lee had the corps of Jackson, and only two divisions of Longstreet's corps-Anderson's and McLaws'-a total of about 45,000 men. Jackson's corps consisted of four divisions, commanded by A. P. Hill, Rodes, Colston, and Early.

Gen. Hooker's plan of attack was to divide his army into two portions, of which the stronger, having crossed the Rappahannock and Rapidan rivers, should advance against the Confederate left wing; while the Federal left wing, under Sedgwick, equal in numbers to Gen. Lee's whole army, should attack and occupy the heights above Fredericksburg, and seize the railroad to Richmond. On the night of the 28th April, the greater portion of the Federal army crossed the rivers, and headed towards Chancellorsville, the assigned point of concentration.

The situation in which Hooker boasted that the Confederate army must "either ingloriously fly or come out from behind its defences," where "certain destruction awaited it," was no sooner perceived by Gen. Lee, than he determined, leaving Early's division to deal with Sedgwick at Fredericksburg, to "come out" with the remainder of his little army against Hooker's four corps at Chancellorsville. On the 29th April, Jackson's three divisions, and those of McLaws and Anderson (Early's division remaining in the lines of Fredericksburg), were on the road to Chancellorsville. The aspect of affairs was anything but reassuring. The force moved out towards Chancellorsville was outnumbered nearly three to one; from 90,000 to 100,000 men were on what had formerly been its left rear, but which was now its front; while a force equalling in strength the whole army, threatened, by an advance from Fredericksburg, either to crush it or force it to retreat with both flanks exposed, and with a cavalry column of 10,000 sabres already on its communications with Richmond.

But it was the absence of his cavalry which he had sent away in assurance of Lee's retreat, that proved the fatal circumstance for Hooker; for it at once suggested the surprise of a movement on his flank. While, therefore, the divisions of Anderson and McLaws were sufficient to amuse him by feints of attack in front -indeed to such effect that on the 1st May he ordered another of his divisions from across the river, under the impression that the Confederates were in force in his front-Jackson was marching swiftly and silently to find his flank in the Wilderness. In the evening of the 2d May, the battle of the Wilderness was fought; Jackson striking the extreme right of the Federal army, routing Howard's corps, and driving the entire right wing of the enemy down upon the divisions of Anderson and McLaws. The torrent

of Jackson's success was stemmed only by his fall in the midst of a victory, the completion of which had to be reserved for another day.

On the 3d May, Gen. Stuart, having succeeded to Jackson's command, bore down again on the enemy's right wing, while Gen. Lee's remaining divisions attacked the centre and left. By ten o'clock in the morning, Hooker was driven to his second line of intrenchments, Chancellorsville was taken, and the destruction of the enemy now appeared to be the work of but a few hours. But just here that adverse combination of circumstances in which Gen. Lee fought was again apparent; and as he gathered up his forces to attack Hooker's fresh position, news came that Sedgwick, having turned Marye's Heights, was advancing from Fredericksburg, while Early had fallen back to a position at Salem Church, five miles from the town. It became necessary at once to turn attention to this movement; and McLaws' division was rapidly marched to Early's support in time to check Sedgwick's advanced troops, and drive them back on the main body. On the 4th May the battle was renewed, and Sedgwick was overwhelmed and driven back in disgraceful confusion, while Hooker remained idle in his intrenchments, detained in a defensive attitude by a few Confederate divisions, thoroughly cowed, and without spirit even to make the attempt to relieve one of his own corps. On the night of the 5th, his grand army, despite its losses yet larger than that of Lee, but directed by a commander who had evidently lost all stomach for fight, retreated across the river in a drenching storm of wind and rain, leaving behind it 17,000 killed, wounded, and prisoners, 14 pieces of artillery, and 30,000 stand of arms.

Thus three victories-that of the Wilderness, that on. Hooker's front, and that at Salem Church, all compassed in the general name of "the battle of Chancellorsville "-had been achieved by Gen. Lee in so many days. In looking back upon all the circumstances of this struggle, it must be pronounced to have been for Gen. Lee the most brilliant of the war, and to have crowned his reputation for transcendent courage and ability. All the movements of the enemy preceding the battle had been successful and well-timed; he had turned the Confederate line of defence on the right and on the left; and he had apparently placed the little army of Lee in the jaws of destruction. With what consummate

skill the great Confederate commander extricated his army; with what impregnable equanimity he awaited the full development of his adversary's designs; with what admirable readiness he divided his forces, and concentrated his chief strength upon the important point; with what towering courage he at last struck the enemy on his vulnerable side, then engaged him in front, and finally turned to engage a victorious column in his rear, the reader will perceive even from the bare outlines of the battle we have given in the preceding narrative. Those who were near Gen. Lee's person in these eventful three days, say that his self-possession was perfect, and his calm, courteous demeanour the same as on ordinary occasions; he spoke of his success without exultation; and from first to last, his unshaken confidence in his men fortified his resolution and manners, and assured him of victory.

A few days after the battle of Chancellorsville, Gen. Lee issued an address to his army, congratulating them for "the heroic conduct they had displayed under trying vicissitudes of heat and storm, in a tangled wilderness, and again on the hills of Fredericksburg," and inviting them to unite on the following Sunday "in ascribing to the Lord of Hosts the glory due His name." At the same time a letter from President Davis was read, wherein he said to Gen. Lee: "In the name of the people, I offer my cordial thanks to you and the troops under your command, for this addition to the unprecedented series of great victories which your army has achieved. The universal rejoicing produced by this happy result, will be mingled with a general regret for the good and the brave who are numbered among the killed and wounded."

Two great victories, Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, had now been won on the banks of the Rappahannock; but they had no other effect than driving the enemy back to the hills of Stafford. The position was one in which he could not be attacked to advantage. It was on this reflection that Gen. Lee resolved on a new and adventurous campaign. It was to manoeuvre Hooker out of Virginia, to clear the Shenandoah Valley of the troops of the enemy, and to renew the experiment of the transfer of hostilities north of the Potomac. But the events of this campaign we reserve for another chapter.

CHAPTER VIII.

Controversy between Gen. Lee and the War Department.-The Secretary winces.— Gen. Lee's new campaign of invasion.-How it differed from that of 1862.-Reorganization of the Army of Northern Virginia.-Some remarks on its artillery service.-Gen. Lee across the Potomac.-His orders at Chambersburg, Pa.-His errours with respect to the policy of "retaliation."-His conversation with a millowner.-A letter from President Davis.-Gen. Lee misunderstood and disappointed by the Richmond authorities.-Orders to Stuart's cavalry.-The Confederate army blinded in Pennsylvania for want of cavalry.-The battle of Gettysburg has the moral effect of a surprise to Gen. Lee.-The lost opportunity of the 1st July.-Why Gen. Lee fought the next day.-Temper of his army.-He assaults the enemy's centre on the 3d July.-Recoil of the Confederates.-Gen. Lee cheering and comforting his men.-His fearful retreat, and his wonderful success in extricating his army.

In the shifting of forces consequent upon the battle of Chancellorsville, the divisions of Longstreet that had been operating in Southeastern Virginia were recalled to Gen. Lee; and the usual consequence of a great victory in the return of large numbers of "absentees" to the ranks, was fully realized. From these sources Gen. Lee rapidly increased his army to the mark of the necessities of the campaign he now designed.

Since Gen. Lee had been in command, he had been able to effect a much-desired reform in curtailing the authority of the War department, which at one time had presumed to dictate campaigns, and had once driven Gen. Jackson to the extremity of resignation by moving forces under his command by its peremptory orders. That despotic department was now much reduced in its authority, and its favourite idea of a dispersion of forces was brought within limits. After what we have already said of detachments from Gen. Lee's army, and the peril this policy occasioned at Chancellorsville, it will surprise the reader to learn that on the 15th May, 1863, the Secretary of War dispatched him that a portion of his army (Pickett's division) might be sent to Mississippi. To this untimely and vexatious call, Gen. Lee replied that it was a dangerous and doubtful expedient; that it was a question