not shrink from the expression "to converse with God,"―colloqui cum Deo,--in speaking of the necessity and efficacy of prayer. It must be owned that such personal epithets as præsens and amicus, if not strictly Platonic, are applied to the Deity by both Cicero (Tusc.,' i. 27) and Seneca (De Prov.,' i. 44; ii. 6). Our philosopher, however, returns to Plato when he speaks of God as livore carens (iii. m. 9); and his use of the word "love" in such phrases as cœlo imperitans amor (ii. m. 8) and æternus et cunctis communis amor (iv. pr. 6) is an echo of the pília of Empedocles, conveyed to us through the medium of the Timæus.' It is the concord that keeps the universe together, and has no sort of connection with the ayar of St John's Gospel.

SECTION II.-THE UNIVERSE.

Although neither the xúpa of Plato nor the An of Aristotle bear much resemblance to the dualism of Mani, still both one and the other philosopher were manifestly embarrassed by the existence of matter. It is now necessary to determine what position Boethius assumed with regard to this question; and here if anywhere we have a crucial test by which the Christianity of our author must stand

or fall. The Christian revelation distinctly states that "in the beginning God created the heaven and the earth." Now Boethius quotes with approval the axiom "ex nihilo nihil"; and while he is careful not to include the efficient cause within the limits of this precept, he gives his emphatic assent to it as far as concerns the material substrate, and his thoughts seem to dwell with affectionate regret on the blissful days of philosophy when no one ventured to dispute its truth-"nam nihil ex nihilo existere vera sententia est cui nemo umquam veterum refragatus est" (v. pr. 1). Such an expression of regret would be impossible on the lips of an earnest student of the Bible. He goes on to develop the theory of the world's origin, not in any Christian spirit, but wholly under the influence of Aristotle.1 Thus God is not only the cause but the end of all things (iii. pr. 12). All creatures naturally seek a sovereign Good-seek happiness. This impulse often takes a false direction, making them pursue some part of Good, such as wealth or fame or friendship, and fall short of that Good which is One, and comprises all the rest.

This highest Good or sovereign happiness must exist in reality, and not merely reside in the imag

Lexist

1 Cf. Nic. Ethics, Bk. i., passim.

ination;1 the presence of an incomplete Good or of an imperfect happiness, which we know by experience is always with us, argues a complete Good, a perfect happiness, for it is not possible that the complete should grow out of the incomplete, but vice versa.

We see here that Boethius does not attempt to prove the existence of God, but rather the existence of a perfect Good which must be identical with God. He does not start with the idea of completeness, and work out from it a proof of God's existence; he takes the existing incomplete as his point of departure. In a word, the implicit proof of God's existence is cosmological, and very different from the ontological proof put forward by Augustine. Over and above this proof there is the physicotheological proof, as Nitzsch points out, referring to the passage in iii. pr. 12, where Boethius gives the name of God to that something without which the created world could not hold together, nor be set in motion.

Once again, the attributes of inaccessibility (v. pr. 3), simplicity (v. pr. 6), and purity (iv. pr. 6), which he predicates of his Divinity, are not drawn from the Christian vocabulary. "The eternal God

1 Cf. Nic. Ethics, Bk. i. c. 6.

possesses and embraces in one instant the fulness of eternal life;" "In Him is life immovable;" "He sits enthroned in the citadel of His simplicity; -expressions like these recall to one's mind the mental position of a Proclus rather than that of an Augustine.

Augustine had won his way by the spiritual experience of a lifetime to the clear knowledge of One who is absolutely good, who is absolute Unity, whom he could nevertheless approach and apprehend. Proclus's primary object was to keep God apart from the world of His creation. He is a pure, inaccessible, simple Essence,1—exactly the phraseology of Boethius, be it remarked, and the Creator must be inferior to ev in so far as concerns the predication of energy and working power. To the same origin must be referred the dæmonum varia sollertia which Boethius speaks of as a possible intermediary agency between Providence and Fate, mentioning in the same breath with it angelica virtus, which is as certainly a trace of Christian, as the former is of Neoplatonic, influence. It is clear that Boethius was acutely sensible of the difficulty Proclus felt about confounding the transcendental Essence with the created world; accordingly we find him taking his 1 De Prov., 50-52.

1

ination; the presence of an inco

an imperfect happiness, which w perience is always with us,

ar

Good, a perfect happiness, for it is the complete should grow out

but vice versa. but

We see here that Boethius doos prove the existence of God, but rathe of a perfect Good which must be God. He does not start with the ide ness, and work out from it a proof ence; he takes the existing incompl of departure. In a word, the implic existence is cosmological, and very