that the power to strike dead or wither implies a certain lively vigour and reality.

Although he seems to be so far in accord with Christian doctrine that he looks upon moral evil as in no way limiting God's goodness, and on sin as the fruit of man's own wilful disobedience and free choice, as a disease of the soul and nothing more,1 still he is very vague and doubtful on this point, and chooses rather to confess the wickedness of the majority of mankind than to include, with Augustine, the whole world in one sweeping condemnation. Indeed, he recognises the possibility of man's attaining to perfection, and that without any assistance from divine grace. The notion of a world lost in

sin and in need of a Redeemer is one that does not suggest itself to him at all.

SECTION VI.-PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CONSOLATION.'

The stoical conception of the soul as a blank tablet which receives external impressions from the material world, finds no place in Boethius's psychology. On the contrary, he dismisses it with contempt and opprobrium, and adopts in its stead the Platonic doctrine of Ideas at rest within the soul, which only

1 "Ad iudicium veluti ægros ad medicum duci [sc. improbos] oportebat, ut culpæ morbos supplicio resecarent."

need the quickening power of sensible perception to arouse them. In developing this portion of his

scheme Boethius adheres to the time-honoured division of science into sense, imagination, reason, and intelligence. Man is a rational and mortal creature, akin to God through his reason and understanding. Although he may become like God in virtue of his powers of reason, he may never hope to attain to hat intelligence which is the peculiar characteristic of the Deity; sense and imagination are both of them subject to reason-nay, they are absolutely dependent on it for their very existence. At this point we seem to catch upon the air the faint premonitory sounds of the great battle of the middleage philosophy, the controversy between the Nominalists and Realists. It will be the business of a later chapter to discuss the nature of the point disputed, and to inquire more particularly into the position our author occupies with regard to the rival camps. I fancy he will be found halting somewhere between them, uncertain with which of the two to cast his lot. The influence of Plato, which it is easy to see was strong upon him as he wrote the Consolation,' inclined him to declare in favour of Realism in that book; but he only touches lightly on the question, and recourse must be had to other writings of his,

notably the two commentaries on the Isagoge' of Porphyry, before a definite opinion can be formed one way or the other.

"The soul is of divine origin, and it is upon

constant communion with the divine elements of knowledge that all its science and knowledge depend.2 By an inborn impulse it is led to seek Good, though in many cases it falls short of its goal through weakness, misconception of its duty (iv. pr. 2), or contact with the material body. Now the highest Good is God, and he who attains to the Good becomes in a measure divine through participation." The road by which this highest Good is to be reached is not very clearly indicated.

3

wrote Juvenal; and although Boethius does not actually cite the Delphic maxim, he implies assent to it by his remarks on the ends which are set before humanity. A man's first duty is to know 1 Cf. "Hic [i.e., Deus] clausit membris animos celsa sede petitos"-iii. m. 6.

2 If iii. m. 9 is founded on the Timæus, v. m. 3 may claim a Platonic origin with equal right. The theory of reminiscence, which is the prominent theme of the Meno, is closely reproduced—e.g.,

"Sed quam retinens meminit summam

Consulit alte visa retractans

Ut servatis queat oblitas

Addere partes."

3 "Obruta mens cæcis membris"-v. m. 3. Cf. iii. m. 6; iv. m. 7, &c.

himself in order that he may shortly become convinced of the utter worthlessness of external goods (ii. pr. 5 and 6). He must conquer Fate; he must free his soul from the fetters of the body and let it soar to heaven on the wings with which Philosophy will fit it, calling the while on God to help him in his effort to rise above the earth (v. pr. 3 and 6).

This, then, is the ethic of Boethius,-to seek the highest Good in God, to lead a pure life, knowing that every movement and every deed takes place in His eternal presence.

The thought is noble, the words are not wanting in inspiration, but no one surely will have the hardihood to maintain that either thought or expression are particularly Christian. A moment's consideration of his doctrine of evil will bring this out into stronger relief. To it, as has been said above (p. 91), he denies all real existence, and so precludes the necessity of redemption for sinful man; for sin brings its own punishment with it, and passion has power to weaken but not to destroy.1 Wickedness is a sickness of the soul which should move our pity rather than our indignation.

1 Contrast "convellere sibique totum [hominem] exstirpare non possunt" (i. pr. 6) with "timete eum qui potest et animam et corpus perdere in gehennam "-Matt. x. 28.

SECTION VII.-FREEWILL AND PREDESTINATION.

This theory of sin, so different from the Christian doctrine of original sin, brings us by a natural transition to freewill, which belongs to all intelligent beings by right of their reason and power of discernment. All, however, do not possess it in an equal degree, for while heavenly substances are endowed with unrestricted freedom of choice and an incorruptible will, human souls hold these gifts in varying proportion, according as they rise above the material to the spiritual. Sometimes they are too weak for the burden, and then, losing all intelligence, they sink and become involved in chains of deepest slavery (v. pr. 2).

Theorising such as this flows straight from the Platonic spring, and one would search long and vainly through the library of Christian philosophy to find its equivalent there.

It has already been seen (p. 71) how Boethius tried to reconcile human freewill with divine prescience by comparing and contrasting God's knowledge of that which is to be with our knowledge of that which is. In support of his argument he takes as examples the fulfilment of some natural law, as the sun rising, or the performance of some obvious