ority of the enemy. The hill of the telegraph, the culminating point of the centre of our position, was occupied by the French, who planted their flag upon it." The whole French army was now advancing, and "thus it came to pass that whilst the right wing of our army was still engaged in a furious conflict, in which the efforts of the English were broken against the firmness and courage of our troops, the combat on the left wing was already terminated. The English have been described as reaching the right bank of the river at half-past one, and without attempting to cross, opening a warm fire of artillery and small arms, from which the Russians, particularly the artillery, suffered much. Here they remained till the whole of Prince Napoleon's division had crossed the river, on hearing which, about two o'clock, Lord Raglan ordered the advance." The order in which the English advance was made is correctly stated in the main, and its steadiness is acknowledged. We learn, also, that our artillery played with effect on the Russian skirmishers. But when the English had reached the bridge, two batteries occupying the heights of the two sides of the main road, received them with a violent fire of grape, and the riflemen of two regiments concentrated their fire on them. Codrington's brigade, assailed by cannon and musketry on its advance to the bridge, suffered considerable losses, its ranks were thrown into confusion, and it retired in great disorder behind Bourliouch.* But the English skirmishers opened their fire behind the inclosures, and began to penetrate into the vineyards of the left bank. The accuracy of their aim caused terrible losses, and especially contributed to check the fire of two light batteries on the left of the road. The situation of these two batteries became still more critical when, after a certain time, two English guns succeeded in crossing the Alma at a ford lower down than Bourliouch, and after having cleared a rise in the hill, got into position and enfiladed them. Whilst this was going on, one of the Russian bat * The Light Division, including Codrington's brigade, crossed the river higher up than the bridge, and sustained no check till they reached the earthwork popularly called the Great Redoubt, which they carried by a rush. teries continued its crushing fire on the retreating troops of Codrington. The troops of General Kiriakow, after their encounter with the French near the telegraph, did not stop again in their retreating movement till they reached the Katcha, and they were followed by the regiment of Borodino. The light battery, number two, was the last to quit the position. It was with great difficulty that it cleared the height in consequence of its loss in horses. At this point the English are again brought upon the stage; and it is both curious and instructive to compare this description of their manœuvres with those hitherto received in England as best authenticated. At length, it is stated, the divisions of the Duke of Cambridge and General Evans, having reached the river, began to cross; whilst Brown's division reached the left bank despite of the fire of the regiment of the Grand Duke Michel, and that of twelve guns placed behind a low earthwork * on the right of the main road. Seeing this, Prince Gortschakow ordered two batteries of the same regiment, who had suffered less than the other, to charge with the bayonet; whereupon the English, drawing back towards the river and letting them approach to within a short distance, opened a deadly fire on them. After losing their colonel and several other officers, they retired towards the earthwork in such a manner as to prevent the batteries from covering their retreat. Close upon their heels followed an English regiment, the Twenty-third, on whose approach the gunners in the earthwork limbered up and hurried off, leaving two guns which they were unable to move; the one from want of horses, and the other from its disabled state. In another moment the English flag was seen floating from the earth work. But the first and second battalions of the Wladimir regiment are at hand to retrieve the disaster. Reckless of the terrible fire of the English, they execute an impetuous bayonet-charge in a compact mass; the English are driven out of the breast work, having hardly time to fire a few shots; and it is occupied anew by the Russians, who, sheltered bebind the parapet, open * Epaulement--the Great Redoubt. a very animated fire against the English, and after occuping the telegraph hill, compelled to retire precipitately towards had directed against the Russian right the river. "Whilst this was passing, flank three French batteries and half an the French had occupied the telegraph English battery. This artillery, comheight, and their reserves were already prising twenty-three guns, opened a massed on the left bank, whilst the troops deadly fire, and at the same moment the of General Kiriakow were in full retreat French troops resumed their onward towards the Katcha." march. Thus taken at disadvantage the Wladimir regiment first halted, then made a fresh charge with the bayonet, then took refuge behind the breastwork, and stood at bay. The brigade Colin Campbell threatened to turn it on its right flank; the division of Prince Napoleon, advancing more to the left, hastened to cut it off from the road to Sebastopol; the French battery thundered on its flank, whilst the divisions of Brown, Lacy-Evans, and the Duke of Cambridge rained on it a shower of shells and musket bullets. But the regiment moved not; although it had lost its commander, three chiefs of battalion, fourteen captains, thirty officers, and about thirteen hundred soldiers, it stood firm. The cartridges of the Grand Duke's regiment being just now exhausted, the English, after getting beyond the reach of the smooth-bore muskets, had only to sustain the fire of a handful of Wladimir riflemen; so they halted at some paces from the river, and there having begun to re-form, they reopened their fire. Lord Raglan ordered up the divisions of the Duke of Cambridge and Lacy-Evans, who by this time had managed to cross the river, to support the shattered troops of Brown. They advanced again towards the earthwork, and the situation of the Russians became critical; the more especially because they had no longer any artillery at hand to disturb the English in their formation or advance, and the terrible riflemen had picked off a startling proportion of their officers. Nevertheless Prince Gortschakow and General Kvizinsky did not shrink from a fresh sacrifice to keep the position; they both commanded a bayonet charge, and led on in person the remains of the Wladimirs, who, excited by the example of their leaders, rushed forward with hurrahs, some over the breast work, some from its sides, and flung themselves on the foe. "At the sight of the decisive on-abled as we supposed, now figures as a slaught of this regiment, the first line of the English battalions became confused, broke, and began retiring towards the bridge. But in this supreme moment our (the Russian) troops were all of a sudden taken in flank by French artillery, and this unforeseen attack determined the success. of the action in favor of the English."* At length, fearing that the retreat would be cut off, and seeing that all hope was over of restoring the battle in the centre and the left flank, Menschikow, about four in the afternoon, ordered Gortschakow to draw off the troops of the right flank on the chain of heights; and the retreat was effected in good order, with the loss of only two guns, those already mentioned as abandoned in the breast work. Indeed, the Russian artillery, far from being dis decisive check on the pursuit. How this opportune efficiency is to be reconciled with the prior story of its loss in men and horses, and how a single company of the Wladimir regiment, surrounded and out-numbered as it was, ever escaped to tell the tale, we confess ourselves unable to unravel. There is also a good deal of minor inconsistency and tautology in the narrative, mostly suppressed in our abridgment; and the General, if he is to be held responsible for it, is at variance with Russian officers of rank present at the engagement, This statement, that the guns fired into the whose published statements we have flank of the Wladimirs, is evidently copied from read. None of these mention an infanthe Russian account, quoted and accounted for by try fight at the telegraph, although this Kinglake, vol. ii. p. 462, note (fourth edition). The guns in question were either Turner's bat is just the event which they would have tery on the knoll, or the guns of Evans' division. commemorated for the honor of their It is then explained that St. Arnaud, learning the obstinate resistance encountered by the English, had suspended for some instants the advance of his troops, squadrons that so much of them as escaped destruction would not have ventured to attack the powerful batteries of the port; and the allied army, unaided by the fleet, would not have been in a condition to render itself mas countrymen. Kiriakow says expressly that the tide of conflict began to turn against the Russians in the centre and the right wing (where they were opposed to the British), when the first success of the French had been stopped on the left wing; and Anitschoff, after describ-ter of the town. On the arrival of the ing the retreat of the Russian centre and right, speaks of their being "followed by the left wing, which had withstood and repelled the attack of the four French divisions till the moment of the general retreat." Todleben attributes the loss of the battle mainly to the superior discipline and arms of the Allies. The smooth-bore musket, he says, was utterly unable to contend with the rifle, to which the close formation of the Russians gave marked advantages. He also thinks that the omission to fortify the heights was a blunder; and he censures the over-hasty retreat of Kiriakow from the telegraph heights. Prince Menschikow having made good his retreat to Sebastopol, anxious consultations were held as to the best methods of defence. Todleben himself was immediately set to work to strengthen the fortifications; and orders were given to Admiral Kornilow to block up the entry of the roadstead by sinking a certain number of ships, whose crews were to be added to the garrison. Before executing this order, the admiral assembled a council of naval officers, and submitted to them that the enemy, after having occupied the northwest side of the roadstead, might force the Russian fleet to abandon its actual position, take possession of the north side, and burn, by the fire of their batteries, the ships moored in the great bay. Starting from these assumptions, the admiral resolved to attempt a very hazardous enterprise: he proposed to sail out, and attack the allied fleet at anchor off Cape Loukoul. He had calculated that, if his plan succeeded, the fleet of the Black Sea could disperse the invading armada of transports, and thus deprive the allied army of reënforcements and means of subsistence. In case of the failure of the attack, Kornilow proposed to grapple with the enemy's vessels, and blow himself up along with them. This bold stroke, according to the brave admiral, would inevitably have so weakened the allied Russian reënforcements, the Allies, so at least thought Admiral Kornilow, could not have failed of being definitively crushed by superior forces. This project was rejected as too hazardous, first by the council, and secondly by Prince Menschikow; and no alternative was left but to sink the ships, seven in number, with a portion of their armament, which there was not time to disembark. The ceremony is described as solemn and melancholy in the extreme. "The sailors, their hearts swelling with anguish, looked on in silence whilst the waves engulfed these noble vessels, to which, for the fleet of the Black Sea, were attached so many glorious recollections. But the emotion was at its height when the steamer 'Gromonossitz' was ordered to fire into the Tri-Sviatitelia,' to hasten is submersion. Tears restrained till then rolled down the cheeks of our brave sailors." In the meantime, the allied armies had arrived (September 24th) near Belbeck; their bivouacs could be discerned from the North Fort. The insufficient garrison of this fort expected thenceforth from hour to hour to see its feeble intrenchments attacked by a powerful adversary; and its position seemed the more critical, insomuch as Prince Menschikow had quitted Sebastopol in the night to proceed with his army to Bakhtchisarai by the Mackenzie heights. After his departure, there remained in Sebastopol sixteen thousand five hundred and sixty-nine fighting men, including several battalions of sailors. On the 13th, the North Fort had twelve guns in position on the land side; and these were so placed as to be unable to concentrate their fire; whilst ships brought close to the shore could batter it with impunity. Works constructed under the direction of Todleben had materially strengthened it by the 25th, but it still offered a front of a verst and a half (about a mile), armed only with twenty-nine guns, and he gives it as his opinion, "that the insufficient garrison which was to defend "In the North Fort, there was scarcely time to elevate its low parapet, of little thickness, and half crumbled away, to give it the elevation of a field-work, so as to form a protection against the fire of the enemy. To adapt the parapet to musketry, a banquette was added, and the crest of the parapet was supplied with battlements formed of earth-bags. The old walls of the scarp gave way to the pressure of the earth freshly brought to augment the elevation of the parapet. They crumbled down, and filled up the narrow ditch with their ruins. Thus it fell out that in the western bastion a practicable breach, quite fit for use, was formed before ever the enemy had approached the work. And all this happened at the very moment when the enemy's columns were already in view of the North Fort, on the space extending between the Katcha and the Belbeck." Admiral Kornilow, however, resolved to hold the fort to the last extremity, and dispositions were made, at his desire, by Todleben for the reception of the expected assailants. These are minutely described, and their insufficiency against a resolute assault is demonstrated by an elaborate train of reasoning, in which the pros and cons are carefully weighed. It was consequently with a sensation of relief, mingled with astonishment, that, on the morning of the 26th September, the garrison, constant ly on the alert, and in momentary ex pectation of an attack, learned that the allied army was moving towards the On the evening of the 26th the news arrived in town that the Allies had seized a part of the baggage-train of Menschikow's army, and cut off its communications with Sebastopol. With the exception of this intelligence, nothing was heard of or from the army; at this critical period, no one in Sebastopol knew what had become of it or where it was to be found. "Thus the defenders of Sebastopol had no assistance to reckon upon; we have seen that it was impossible to repulse the enemy with the unaided forces of the garrison. There remained to them no other alternative than that of laying down their lives gloriously on the post confided to their bravery. "On the morning of the 27th, the clergy made a procession, with the cross and the holy water, along the whole line of defence. Kornilow, riding round the intrenchments, harangued the troops, and sought to excite their courage. "My children,' he said, 'we must fight every man of us must die on the spot rather against the enemy to the last extremity; than give way. Kill the man who shall dare to talk of falling back. Kill me myself, should I give such an order.'" Si Had the admiral ever heard of Henri de la Rochejaquelin's address to his followers: "Si j'avance, suivez-moi. je tombe, vengez-moi. Si je recule, tuezmoi" Kornilow's address to the regiment of Moscow was in the same exalt ed strain: "Soldiers of the regiment of Moscow, you find yourselves here on the extreme limits of Russia; you east in the direction of the Mackenzie farm. The fears felt for the north were now transferred to the south, which had been comparatively neglected, under an impression that it was not likely to be the first object of the besiegers. Its garrison consisted only of five thousand men, including sailors, and Admiral Nakhmikow, the local commander, despairing of an effectual resistance, made the necessary arrangements for sinking However, adds Todleben, neither the all the ships of his squadron, to prevent exaltation of the troops, nor their resothem from being captured, and (Septem-lution to fight to the last, would have ber 26th) issued the following order of been able to save Sebastopol, if the enethe day: my had attacked immediately after his "The enemy is advancing towards the city passage of the Tschernaia. The strategic reasons which at first induced Prince Menschikow to leave the garrison to their fate are examined in detail; the principal being the supposed impossibility of making head behind incomplete fortifications against an enemy flushed with recent victory, and the fear of losing his whole army with the town. His plan, it seems, was to hang upon the rear of the Allies, harass their communications, and save at least the rest of the peninsula. Why he abandoned this plan is not explained; all we are permitted to know of the change of intention is the fact, that, on the 30th of September, about midday, to the great joy of the whole garrison, his troops appeared on the heights of Belbeck, and at two in the afternoon the prince arrived in person at the North Fort. As soon as the allied armies appeared on the south, all the workmen that could be got together were employed to strengthen the defences on that side, and a good deal was done within four days in the execution of new batteries connected by earthworks; but it is stated over and over again, with wearisome iteration, that all must have proved unavailing against a combined and resolute assault. The only hope of the besieged lay in the (to them) unaccountably cautious and dilatory proceedings of the besiegers, who were all along acting on an impression that the place was too strong to be attacked before the fire of its artillery had been at least partially subdued. They therefore resolved to construct siege batteries, and on the night of the 27th the first trench was opened by the French. แ success, and the hope that the town would. be saved." Dating from this period, the contest. was turned into one of engineering skill, in which the Allies were certainly worsted; for the strength of the defences increased faster than the means of dstroying or overcoming them. This reflects the more honor on Todleben and his branch of the service, because not only (as already mentioned) was there an extraordinary scarcity of tools, but the rocky nature of the ground, almost entirely denuded of turf, caused great difficulty in getting proper materials. for the earthworks, which, being more than half composed of stones and gravel, were liable to sink or crumble under fire. The first decisive trial began at half-past six on the morning of the 17th of October, when all the besieging batteries simultaneously opened fire. In full expectation that an assault would ensue, the Russian troops were drawn up behind their intrenchments and suffered greatly. The works, also, were damaged in parts, and some guns were dismounted. But the garrison replied with such effect, that in rather more than four hours the French batteries were completely silenced. "The cannonade had lasted more than three hours with equal vivacity on all points, when, all of a sudden, about half-past nine, one of our shells blew up a powder-magazine in one of the French batteries on the Rodolph hill. This explosion was hailed on our side by a loud and triumphant hurrah. The French battery was completely overthrown, which permitted us to concentrate all our energies on the other French batteries on the hill. Half an hour after the first explosion there was a second. These two explosions were not without results, for the fire of the "This," says Todleben, was done with-French artillery began gradually to slacken, out our suspecting it, favored as it was by aand was soon entirely extinguished. Tostrong wind which blew off the town during wards half-past ten its fire ceased definitively the whole night in the direction of the along the whole line. enemy's works, so that we only became aware of it at dawn. Those who know anything of siege warfare may imagine what a joyful impression we must have felt at the sight. It became then evident for us that the Allies had not decided on an immedi- suffered especially from the English batteries, ate assault, and that they intended first to es-exposed as it was to the concentrated fire tablish batteries in the hope of disabling our of the Montagne Vert and the Mont Woronartillery; so that we might yet gain time, at zow." least during some days. Everybody in Sebastopol was gladdened by this happy event; they addressed mutual congratulations to each other; for all saw in it a guarantee of "Such was not the result of our contest with the English batteries, which were not long in manifesting a great relative superiority over our artillery, arising principally from the difference of calibre. The Third Bastion At this point the account of the land attack is interrupted to describe the simultaneous attack of the allied fleets |