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Peninsular War very far exceeded, instead of lamentably falling short of, the effective cooperation vowed and promised by their successive commanders in their name.

These few words of warning will not be found superfluous when we come to the disputed battles or events; and even the preliminary chapters setting forth the designs, resources, and preparations of Russia, should be perused with caution; although there is little fear of her succeeding in passing herself off as the most inoffensive and least grasping of the great powers. General Todleben, however, insists that she played the part of lamb to our wolf throughout, and says distinctly that "not to agree at the present time on this fact-that the two antagonistic powers, France and England, ardently desired war-would be to defy evidence." What has been mistaken for ambition in Russia, is simply a double impulse arising from her geographical situation. "With boundaries touching Europe on one side and Asia on the other, she finds herself the natural intermediary between the east and the west. Thence for her the necessity of the double end towards which her policy must be directed. She must pursue the development of her interest in the East by means of European civilization, and seek to consolidate the foundations of the political importance that she has acquired in the great family of European states." As head of the Greek Christians, the czar could not help interfering to protect his co-religionists, and thus afforded a pretext for the quarrel for which Napoleon the Third was eager ly on the look-out; whilst the ever-wakeful jealousy of England was aroused by finding the constantly extending frontier of Russia, though still a few thousand miles off, and separated by a kingdom or two, approaching nearer and nearer the heart of her oriental empire.

Her lurking hostility was first exhibited by what is described as the first manifestation of the progress of English influence in Turkey-the formal refusal of the Ottoman Porte to deliver up to Austria and Russia the Hungarian and Polish insurgents who had taken refuge in the states of the Sultan. Then followed the quarrel of the Greek and Latin churches, in which the dictatorial

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voice of the "Great Eltchee" was raised on the side of the French. The extraordinary mission of Prince Menschikow was a well-intentioned move in a conciliatory direction: he demanded nothing. more than the strict observance of treaty rights; and his abrupt departure, as well as his peremptory demeanor, have been most unfairly represented as derogatory to the independence and dignity of the Porte. The crossing of the Pruth, and the occupation of the Principalities, were equitable and moderate steps towards a reasonable object; and if Austria and Prussia had not played false, that object would have been attained without further complication. Energetic measures on their part would have prevented the war; but, fatally carried along by the current of public opinion, they held aloof, and at the last moment Austria passed from neutrality to threats.

Such, in substance, is General Todleben's explanation of the immediate causes of the war. His sketch of the military and naval events which preceded the invasion of the Crimea, is not less opposed to the popular impression of England and France. Thus, he says that it is altogether a mistake to suppose that the Turks single-handed gained any advantages over the Russians in any quarter; and as for Silistria, that the siege was raised solely because Marshal Prince Paskievitch's lines of communication were commanded by the Austrians, whose intentions were unknown. He says:

listria in special compilations; and in these "A great deal has been written about Sirecitals there is frequent mention of the rare energy of the defence, of assaults repulsed, of audacious sorties of the Turkish garrison, who are said to have got possession of our trenches, of the skilful disposition of countermines, etc., etc. All this is inexact to such a point that it is impossible to recognize in under the ramparts of Silistria in 1854." these recitals the facts which really occurred

He goes on to deny in detail the alleged mining and counter-mining; to describe the Arab Tabia as a formidable fort; to scout the notion of a regular siege; to represent the sorties of the garrison (which he limits to two) as unsuccessful, although he admits that one cost the Russians seven hundred men ;

and to assert that the besiegers never sustained a repulse, although they lost twenty-five hundred men before the place. "The Marshal quitted the army on the 12th June (old style). By the order of Prince Gortschakow, measures were taken for the assault of the advanced forts. They were in such a situation as to make it impossible for them to oppose a powerful resistance. But in the night of the 20th to the 21st June, and when the troops, already at their posts, waited but the signal-gun to rush to the assault, there arrived unexpectedly a courier from the

Marshal, bearing the order to raise the siege,

and retire to the left bank of the Danube,"

So that, if we accept this Russian version, the memorable exploit of Mr. Kinglake's three "English lads," Nasmyth, Butler, and Ballard (although confirmed by the printed journals of two of them in the Times) must henceforth be considered little better than a myth.

We know few more striking examples of the extent to which human credulity may be stretched than the theories with which Mr. Urquhart managed to inoculate his disciples touching the irresistible strength of Russia, her project of universal empire, and the complicity of British statesmen in her views. There are persons who believe still that Lord Palmerston was amongst. her emissaries, and that he brought about the Crimean War in the hope of aiding her in some inscrutable way. Calm, calculating politicians were not wanting to contend that the only real danger to the balance of power was to be apprehended from the giant of the north; and these derived small comfort from the reflection that the first aggressive movement on a large scale would dispel the delusion - that the feet of the giant were of clay. It is curious, therefore, to learn, on official authority, what was the actual available strength of the Muscovite empire in 1854, and whether its condition indicated either the capacity or the wish to overrun or overawe Western Europe.

The proposition laid down and partially established in the first chapter of this work is, that at the very time when the Emperor Nicholas was accused of extending his hand to grasp, by anticipation, the inheritance of the "sick man," he had made no preparations on his frontiers either for attack or defence; and these frontiers, vast but vulnerable,

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were each, it is contended, of such a
nature as to require a separate army for
its protection. The coasts of the Baltic,
the Polish and Gallician borders, and the
Russian possessions on the Black Sea,
might be simultaneously assailed; and
the want of good means of communica-
tion made it impossible to rely on the
rapid transfer of forces to a threatened
spot in an emergency. "This," says
the General,
by way of compensation, we had an in-
was our weak side. But,
This superiority consisted in the possi
contestable superiority over our enemies.
bility of recruiting and maintaining an
army such as it was not given to any
other European power to possess. The
entire independence of the government,
and the cheap maintenance of the sol-
dier, compared with his cost in other
countries, made it possible for Russia to
oppose to her enemies an army numer-
ous enough to struggle with success
against their united forces." Her mili-
tary forces are divided into active troops,
regular and irregular; troops of reserve;
troops destined to the interior service of
the empire. The active regulars are com-
puted at 678,201; the active irregulars
at 242,203; the troops destined to the
interior service, composing the Garde
Intérieure, at 144,937; the active troops
of reserve and depot, 212,433; grand
total in January, 1853, 1,365,786. The
active regulars consisted of 544,927 in-
fantry, 81,723 cavalry, 41,551 artillery,
horse and foot. Twenty-four men in
each battalion were armed with rifles,
making rather less than five per cent. of
the infantry.

With regard to the disposition of this force, in the summer of 1854, the number of fighting men which could be employed to carry on the war against the Turks, and defend the frontiers of the empire, was 701,824. The Russian navy, at the same period, consisted of 512 vessels, carrying 7105 guns; including 31 ships-of-the-line, 10 sailing frigates, 10 steam frigates, and 2 corvettes. Of these, 295 vessels, with 4105 guns, composed the Baltic fleet; and 145, with 2855 guns, that of the Black Sea. The only screw men-of-war in the Russian navy, three ships - of-the-line and two frigates, were in the Baltic. The Turkish land forces are estimated at 230,000; those which England could spare for the

service at 35,000; and the French contingent at 63,000; making in all 328,000 to encounter Russia in the East. The naval superiority of the maritime powers was confessedly such as to render exact computation and comparison useless.

We made known in August, 1856, a fact which has since become notorious, namely, that the land defences on the north of Sebastopol were so weak that the Russians had given up all hope of defending them, when the French commander refused to cooperate with Lord Raglan in the attempt to carry them by assault. Besides the fullest confirmation of this statement regarding the north, we find in the work before us accumulated proofs that the town was equally open to a coup-de-main on the south:

"It must be confessed that all the fortifications on the south side of Sebastopol were very weak, and that each of them had its particular imperfections; but since, at the time of their construction, no further use of them was contemplated than to repulse the attack of a weak invading force, the works might then, up to a certain point, appear sufficient. These fortifications were armed with 134 guns; and the total of the guns for the defence of Sebastopol on the land side, amounted to 145. This artillery was spread over all the circuit of the line of defence, on an extent of six and a half versts,* and could not concentrate on almost any point of the space in front of the fortifications the fire of more than three or four of its pieces; there were even spaces not covered by it on the approaches of the land batteries."

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readily replaced, and that the sustained discharge at all hours of the day and night along the whole line of the fortifications argued an inexhaustible stock of powder and ball. The number of cannon captured with the place was enormous. But we now learn that a large proportion of the guns laid up in the parks of artillery were old and unserviceable; that the very metal was useless for want of foundries; and that the whole of the powder in Sebastopol, at eight pounds a charge, amounted to 325,000 charges. Very few tools for the engineers and pioneers were to be found in the government stores; not more than enough for 200 men; so that it became necessary to collect all the tools in the town and vicinity for the execution of the works. This is the most remarkable want of all, when it is remembered how much was effected by the spade and pickaxe for the defence. Building utensils (matériaux de construction) also fell short, with the exception of the wood, iron, cordage, and sail - cloth in the naval arsenal. The bread provided for the land forces was sufficient for four months and a half's consumption; that for the fleet, seven months. There were military hospitals for 1125 patients, and infirmaries capable of receiving 1200. The naval hospital was put upon a footing to receive 18,000. The hospital chests were only provided with medicines, lint, and other necessaries for the proper treatment of 1500 sick, and the dressing of 6000 wounded. This explains the frightful condition in which they were found by the Allies at the conclusion of the siege.

The difficulties to be encountered by an invading army were so vividly im-. pressed on the mind of Prince Menschikow that he remained incredulous touching the meditated expedition till it took place. Little had, consequently, been done to strengthen the defences, and the appearance of the armament off the coast of the Crimea was a most disa

The Russian troops in the Crimea on the 13th of September, the day of the disembarkation, did not exceed 51,500 men; and these being dispersed over the peninsula, Prince Menschikow could not concentrate more than 30,000 in and about the place. To these must be added the crews of the vessels of war in the harbor, computed at 18,500. These were about the numbers at which the British government had estimated the defensive forces. But we seem to have very greatly over-estimated (or the Gen-greeable surprise. eral has greatly underestimated) the resources in munitions of war, magazines "On the 13th of September, 1854, about

of provisions, hospital stores, and other necessaries. It was remarked, during the siege, that a disabled piece was

* Rather more than four English miles.

ten in the morning, two ships of war were discovered in the horizon from Sebastopol, and behind them a white cloud of smoke raised by a large number of steamers. afterwards arrived the news that seventy vessels of the enemy had doubled the Cape of

Soon

Tarkhan - koute. About mid-day the tele- | to divert our attention, by false demongraph of Cape Loukul announced to Sebasto- strations, towards any given point of pol that the fleet which had been seen in the the peninsula, to induce us to direct our northwest, was sailing in three columns to- forces on that point, and after having wards the west-northwest. After mid-day effected a disembarkation on a totally the same telegraph announced, at divers intervals, that the number of ships was succesdifferent point, to strengthen themselves sively augmenting, and towards six o'clock in it before our troops had time to connearly a hundred were already counted. A centrate anew." Thus, if Prince Menslittle later appeared some more steamers and chikow, on the first news of the appearmany sailing vessels. At length a Cossack ance of the fleet off Eupatoria, had hurbrought the news that the number of enemy's ried there with the bulk of his forces, vessels was so considerable that it was im- the Allies might have given him the possible to count them. At half-past eight the telegraph signalled that the enemy's fleet slip, and possibly-considering the state

was casting anchor.

"The invasion of the Crimea by the Allies had then become imminent. Let us now see what, at such a moment, the commander of our forces by sea and land could undertake to resist the enemy, at a time when the approach of autumn was day by day confirming the conviction at Sebastopol that the Allies would attempt nothing decisive against the place during the year 1854."

The first question that arose was, whether it was possible or advisable to oppose the landing, and the Russian commander has been severely criticised for missing the opportunity. But General Todleben gives solid reasons for the tactics of his chief. To be able, he says, to oppose the disembarkation of the enemy, it was essential to be informed of the place where it was to be effected. But if it is difficult enough to fix precisely, in the case of a river, the spot where the enemy intends to pass, it is more difficult still to declare beforehand the point the enemy may propose to choose for his landing on a coast more or less accessible to invading troops on all its extent. At the degree of perfec tion to which steam transport has been brought, distances can be cleared with such celerity, that neither infantry nor cavalry disposed along the coast can ever keep pace with the steamers of their foes. Railroads alone can, to a certain extent, give means of remedying this disadvantage in land forces; but it is well known that in the Crimea there was a complete absence of railroads, and that in general all the means of communication existing at the time, with the solitary exception of the chaussée on the south, were little to be depended on and especially difficult to use in the rainy season. In such circumstances, he continues, “it became easy for the enemy

of the fortifications and the weakness of the garrison have got possession of the place without a battle. The General is further of opinion, that the covering fire of the English and French ships would have made it an extremely rash and perilous proceeding to oppose the landing, even had there existed no uncertainty as to the spot. The best course, he contends, was that actually pursued to take up a strong position as far as possible out of reach of the ships, and make a resolute stand there.

It is undeniable that the position of the Alma was well chosen for the purpose of enabling an inferior force to bar the passage of one nearly double its numbers; the Russian army consisting of 33,600 men of all arms, and 96 guns; whilst that of the Allied may be roughly computed at 60,000 men and about 150 guns. The Prince's superiority in cavalry prevented the English from attempting a turning movement over the open ground on his right, and he fancied himself, until undeceived by the Zouaves, equally protected by the steepness and ruggedness of the ground on his left.

General Todleben's plans of the field substantially agree with the English and the French; and he tells us little new touching the disposition of the troops. What strikes us most in his account of the battle is its similarity to that of M. de Bazancourt; a similarity extending even to the style. Indeed, it would seem from numerous examples-Thiers and Lamartine among the rest-that no battle could be described in French without the use of inflated terms or phrases which cannot be construed literally without causing confusion and inconsistency. It is difficult to understand how troops can gain a victory, or carry a position, without losing more than five per cent. of

their entire force in killed and wounded, | cimated by a front and flank fire, and after having been culbutées, écrasées, or fearing to be harassed in its retreat, décimées par un feu meurtrier. Unluck- this battalion, after having exchanged ily, moreover, General Todleben's duty as commandant of the engineers, confined him strictly to the town and fortifications of Sebastopol; and he was obliged to depend on the reports of others for the details of the narrative of which we now propose to give an abstract or summary.

According to this history, then, the division of Bosquet was already on the march at six in the morning. At seven, when the French centre also began to move, Marshal St. Arnaud having been informed that the English army was not yet ready, suspended the march of Bosquet's division for a time, and the serious French attack consequently was not commenced till half past eleven. Bosquet reached the right bank of the river about half-past twelve.* At the same time the steamers increased their fire, and threw shells on the Russian left wing, which, distant as they were, suffered considerable loss. Supported by this fire, the brigade D'Autemarre advanced to the ford of Alma-Tamack, which was immediately crossed by the Zouaves, who headed the brigade, and, dispersing as skirmishers, began to scale the heights. The brigade followed, and, with a battery of Bosquet's brigade, formed on the plateau across the road leading from Alma Tamack to Hadjiboulet. About the same time, the brigade Bouet and the Turks were crossing the ford at the mouth of the river.

The battalion which first opened fire on the Russian side was the second battalion of the infantry regiment of Minsk, which, from its position near the village of Aklese, did not become aware of the movement of the brigade D'Autemarre till the head of the French column emerged from the ravine and took up a position on the crest of the heights. The Zouaves had hardly succeeded in clearing the heights of the left bank of the Alma, than already this (the Minsk) battalion found itself very critically placed. De

A glance at a map will show that crossing the river opposite the French position was a very different operation from that which fell to the share of the English, who had to climb a rugged bank and face a hot fire of grape and musketry

at once.

fire with the French skirmishers, and checked their attack as much as possible, commenced its retreat towards the village of Orta-Kissek. General Kiriakow also, who commanded at the extreme left, to avoid the fire of the ships, was withdrawing in the direction of the telegraph, when a battery of light artillery and the regiment of Moskow came up, and the retreat was temporarily suspended. But these reënforcements did not arrive till the French had crossed the river in force, and had extricated Bosquet from the risk to which he had been exposed of being outnumbered and cut off. Canrobert and Prince Napoleon with their divisions advanced to the right bank of the Alma at one o'clock. Their skirmishers engaged the Russian skirmishers in the gardens, whilst five of their batteries opened fire against the Russian centre. One battery was sent to rejoin Bosquet, and two other brigades with a battery were ordered up by St. Arnaud to support the French attack; so that on this part of the field, 6000 Russians had to make head against 7000 French, whose flank was covered by 7000 Turks. Despite their numerical inferiority, the Russians, on the arrival of the regiment of Minsk, made an effort to drive the French from the heights with the bayonet, but were met with such a sustained fire of grape and musketry, that they fell back and resumed the defensive. They had also the worst of it in the artillery combat that ensued, their gunners being rapidly picked off by the French rifles. Despite of what is described as a desperate resistance, Bosquet, Canrobert, and Prince Napoleon, won their way forwards; although it was not until the regiments of Minsk and Moscow had lost 1500 men, and the majority of their officers, including their colonels, were killed or wounded, that they began to retreat towards the telegraph, stopping at intervals and opening a brisk fire. Two batteries of light artillery did the same. "At length"-here we translate literally-" the left wing, stopping at the telegraph, opposed a last resistance to the French; and it was not till after a furious conflict, that it was obliged to yield definitively to the enormous superi

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