chief good. 4th. Infidelity when carried to the denial of a hereafter or of human accountability. Not that infidelity has a direct tendency to induce suicide, but that, when men are tempted to it, it removes all obstacles. A thoroughgoing and unflinching infidel would feel himself at perfect liberty to choose nonentity rather than life if he should prefer it. Hence the levity with which this crime. is spoken of by infidels, as Hume, who said that it was but the turning a little blood out of one channel into another. It is only by the removal of the causes now mentioned that we may expect that the frequency of this crime will be diminished.

A fourth mode in which life is wantonly shortened is by - duelling.

In this we have a striking instance of the power of custom after the opinion in which the particular custom originated is entirely changed. Originally regarded as a species of judicial trial in which there was an appeal to God, a refusal to fight came in time to be considered a confession not simply of cowardice, but of cowardice on account of guilt. Then it was that the tyranny of custom and of public opinion commenced; and now, though the idea of an appeal to God, or of any adjudication according to merit, is utterly exploded, though the laws are against it, and it is known to be morally wrong, though the force of public opinion is in some regions entirely removed, and everywhere very much lightened, yet the custom still retains its hold, and the law of God is made void by the "traditions" of men in high places. This, too, is done when all the circumstances which once gave the combat eclat and dignity are entirely reversed. It was once sanctioned by law, and witnessed by multitudes who applauded the knightly bearing of the combatants. Now, those who

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fight shrink away to some place where the law may be evaded, the combat is witnessed only by the seconds and the surgeon, and there is no display of manly vigor, or of any other skill than that of a highwayman. The parties simply take pistols and shoot at each other. It was once an evidence of courage, and compatible with a sense of duty; now, whatever may be said of mere animal courage, it shows a pitiable want of moral courage, and is opposed to all the dictates of morality, of humanity, and of religion. Though founded in mistaken notions, it yet had, at its commencement, something noble about it, but like the Scylla of Virgil, whose head was human, it tapers off, as it comes down to us, into hideous and unmitigated deformity. In its present position, it is difficult to say whether this custom is more wicked or ridiculous.

9*

LECTURE V.

DESIRE OF PROPERTY.-AVARICE. DESIRE OF KNOWLEDGE. - DESIRE OF POWER.INFLUENCE.- - EMULATION.DESIRE OF ESTEEM. DESIRE OF

GLORY.

AFTER the desire of life, which we have already considered, that of property was mentioned.

As life is the condition of all the desires, so also is the possession of that which is necessary to sustain life. In common with the others, this desire has its root in the tendency of all life to appropriate to itself whatever is necessary to its own perfection and manifestation. So it is with the appetites as they are related to the perfection and power of the body. There is a point where they are identical, and whence they branch off in search of different objects necessary for such perfection and power, and so become different specific appetites. So, also, it is with the desires. There is a point where they, too, seem identical in their relation to the perfection and manifestation of mind, and whence they branch off in the directions mentioned as constituting the several specific desires. If, therefore, the ownership of something, possession, property, be essential to such perfection and manifestation, then this general tendency will be in that direction, and will become a specific desire.

But ownership, or property, is thus necessary. It is through this that we have security for ourselves, and a chief means of manifesting our individuality to others.

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What is not our own we have no right to use. We have a right to use the fruit that grows wild only because, when we pluck it, it becomes ours. And, as this sense of property is the condition of our using anything for ourselves, so is it for our giving anything to others.

We may, it is true, conceive of a state in which the whole enjoyment of man, and perhaps an adequate one, should arise from what could not, or need not be appropriated, as the air and the sunlight; but, in his present state, if he had no material thing which he could use as his own, and none which he could give to others, he not only could have no security, but would lack scope for the activity of some of those essential faculties by which he is made in the image of God. If God had no ownership, he would not be God, and if man had none, involving dominion, he would not be in his image.

That the desire of property in the sense and to the extent above indicated is a natural desire, we can scarcely doubt, if, in addition to the considerations just adduced, we notice how early and distinctly it is manifested by children; how it stimulates industry; and how essential property is to the very existence of society. Doubtless, the natural desires often interpenetrate, support, and modify each other, but there seems to be no more reason for referring this desire, as some have done, to that of power, than for referring the desire of knowledge in the same way, since knowledge has often been said to be power. Holding ' such relations as property does, we might expect that God would indicate his will by giving a specific desire, and that he would make that desire, as he has all the others, the basis of a right. If God has given us a desire for property, then, within limits to be fixed by other considerations, we have a right to property, and when we look at

the extent and validity of the right of property, we can hardly suppose it to be founded on anything but a natural desire.

This desire, then, being, in the true and original sense of that word, natural, cannot be wrong. Nor is it too strong in itself, for there is not too much honest industry or selfdenying frugality. The doctrine holds here, that has already been stated in regard to those principles of action which relate to the material interests of the individual and of society, that the stronger they are, provided they be kept properly subordinated, the richer and better substratum of individual character and of society do they form. Those who have done the most for our public institutions, and done it most nobly, have been men with a strong desire of property, who knew the worth of what they gave; generally men who had accumulated it by their own industry, but who gave, nevertheless, cheerfully and gladly, in view of great interests to be promoted, and of the subordinate place which this desire holds as the purveyor of God, and the appointed servant of principles higher than itself. If an alabaster-box of precious ointment is to be opened, the perfume of which is to fill society, the box must first be filled. Only as we recognize the legitimacy of this principle can giving have its true merit and dignity, or indeed any merit or dignity at all. As men now are, it is far better that they should be employed in accumulating property honestly, to be spent reasonably, if not nobly, than that there should be encouraged any sentimentalism about the worthlessness of property, or any tendency to a merely contemplative and quietistic life, which has so often been either the result or the cause of inefficiency and idleness.

But while the legitimacy of this desire is not to be ques