GLORY AND REPUTATION.

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And first, we are to separate glory from notoriety. The passions and feelings of one man are common to all, and mankind are always aroused by any vivid and startling exhibitions of their common nature in any of its elements or forms. If this exhibition be of the darker and fiendlike passions, they will utter a cry of execration which is at once notoriety and infamy.

We must also distinguish glory from reputation. This implies something praiseworthy to a certain extent, but may be gained by almost any one who pleases. Mankind, from education, taste, prejudice, are divided into parties, sects, coteries, the members of which are valued, not for their common humanity, but for the elements of difference by which that party or sect may happen to be distinguished. This is their common point of sympathy, and the man who embodies most fully, and expresses most strongly, the peculiarities of the party, will have reputation, will be the great man of the party. But the very cause of his reputation cuts him off from sympathy with the race, and he must pass into oblivion. Such are the party men of the day, who flourish because they are party men, and for that reason, so far as they are party men, must fade. Such are the zealots and sectarians, whether in politics or religion, who are distinguished by anything which is not connected with the great interests of truth and of duty. The possession, in an uncommon degree, of any quality, as wit, humor, memory, will confer reputation. It may be gained by contrivance and trick, by collusion and bargaining.

But with glory it is not so. It has been said already that the elements of humanity are common to all, and that it always recognizes and responds to any vivid portrayal of itself. We are all conscious of indefinite workings of our

minds, of undefined and shapeless feelings, and when these are brought out into perfect expression by the touch of genius we are delighted. We admire, and are grateful to the man who can give us new aspects either of nature or of ourselves. It is the glory of all great poets and philosophers, of those who represent, and of those who analyze nature and man, that in whatever age or country their works may be found by man sufficiently cultivated to understand them, they meet with a recognition and a response. This master minds alone can accomplish. Chance has nothing to do with it. Artifice and pretence are futile here.

In the same way military glory arises from the relation of those who gain it to the permanent interests and universal feelings of man. What gives interest to a battle is not that it is a theatre where brute force contends, but one where different interests and principles are arrayed against each other. It has often seemed to depend upon the fate of a single battle whether liberty or despotism, civilization or barbarism, should be prevalent in the world. When the rights and destinies of men are thus at stake, he who is most perfectly under the control of the master idea that. animates all, and most fully represents it, naturally becomes the leader. It is not in him as an individual that we are interested, it is in the principles of which he is the representative, and of which his acts are the manifestations. If by exertion and sacrifice he cause those principles to prevail, we feel that he is the benefactor of mankind, that he is our benefactor, and the cry of admiration and gratitude which mankind utter towards such a man is glory.

It is, therefore, only by producing some great result that glory can be obtained. To receive glory from mankind

THE DESIRE OF GLORY.

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we must put ourselves in relation to them, must affect their destinies, must make some striking exhibition of talent, or of those emotions and passions that are had in admiration among men. The man who can do this may be a fortunate man, but he must be a great man.

Of this account of glory, in which we find the rationale of modern hero-worship, I remark,- 1st. That as a motive of action it can apply to but few. Few, comparatively, can, by any possible exaggeration of self-esteem, suppose they can produce results that shall put them in relation with the mass of mankind. 2d. That if this glory could be a motive to many, it would be attainable by only a few, and so must lead to disappointment. Mankind are so much engrossed in their own concerns that there can exist but a certain moderate amount of admiration at the same time. The young aspirant for fame, when he has written or done something which he thinks extraordinary, is surprised and vexed on looking around and finding every man minding his own business. 3d. The opportunity for acquiring this glory often depends on causes that are beyond the control of man. At this day Washington could not reproduce himself. 4th. This glory depends on success, which is not proportioned to desert. Mankind judge by success. In the race for fame misfortune is a crime which they never forgive. 5th. The admiration of mankind is often given to qualities that do not deserve it, and withheld from those that do. It is not, therefore, always a safe guide to our conduct, or a certain criterion of goodness, without which there can be no true glory.

Can, then, this be the glory spoken of in the Scriptures ? Or is it all an illusion? Neither. Our constitution does not deceive us. Its tendencies need guidance, but not eradication. This part of it is a striking indication of the

greatness of our nature, and of its capacity of being put into relation with vast numbers, and with great interests. The approbation of God, and of those who judge in accordance with him, is no unsuitable motive for any. It is such an one as an apostle thought worthy of being presented. After enumerating a long list of the worthies of former times, he represents them as resting from their own conflict, and watching the progress of those who have succeeded them. "Seeing, therefore," says he, "we are compassed about by so great a cloud of witnesses, let us run with patience the race set before us." What we need, then, is to illuminate the desire of glory by the revelations of Christianity. Regarding ourselves, not merely as citizens of this world, but of the universe, and knowing that God is over all, and that there is somewhere a vast assembly of the good to whom our conduct either now is or shall be known, we may give to this principle of action free scope.

Such is the theatre on which we are to contend for the true glory and honor, and we are to do it in the only way in which success is possible, "by a patient continuance in well-doing." In this race the success of one does not prevent that of another. All may enter the lists, and all may gain the prize.

LECTURE VI.

THE AFFECTIONS.-NATURAL AND MORAL. BENEVOLENT.-DEFENSIVE AND PUNITIVE.-ORIGIN OF MALEVOLENT AFFECTIONS.-FORGIVENESS. -HOW SUBJECT TO WILL. THE INTELLECT. LOVE OF TRUTH.

IN the last lecture we finished the consideration of what are usually termed the desires. These have no moral character. But desire is not excluded from the sphere of morals. It will go with us not only as an element of the affections, but in its own proper form; for there are really both natural and moral desires, as well as natural and moral affections.

The desires we have considered imply no previous exercise of the moral nature, and have for their object things without us; the moral desires imply a previous exercise of the moral nature, and have for their object our own moral states. A paramount desire for virtue is a virtuous desire, and a similar desire for holiness is a holy desire. The object of the one class of desires is that we may have something, of the other, that we may be something. either case, however, the desires respect not merely the well-being of the individual, but his capacity to minister to others through the affections; and it is to the consideration of these that we now pass.

In

As the appetites have for their end a perfect body, and the desires a perfect mind,— perfect up to that point, and as a condition for something higher, so the affections, though ultimate to the individual, haye, as a further end,