COMPLEXITY OF MOTIVES.

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correct view if we suppose a father to command his child Jacti to get a lesson. Here there is, first, between the mind of Cli the child and knowledge a natural congruity, and he may get the lesson from a simple love of the knowledge. It may be just what he would have done without any command. But the parent says further, — If you get the lesson it will aid you in getting a living; you shall have my approbation, and I will express that by a reward. If you do not get it you shall have my disapprobation, and I will express that by punishment.

Now, between the mind of the child and the approbation of the parent there is a congruity. It is right for him to desire that approbation. The reward itself may be one that would appeal to the legitimate desires and which it would be right to seek, and the reverse may be said of the disapprobation and the punishment.

We have, then, as motives, 1st. Love of knowledge for its own sake. 2d. A desire for it as useful in gaining a living. 3d. A desire of the reward. 4th. Fear of punishment. 5th. Regard for the authority of the parent. 6th. A love of his approbation. 7th. Dread of his disapprobation. 8th. The affirmation by conscience of obligation.

Of these each is legitimate,—is appropriate to a rational being, is right. Each may take its turn, or they may conspire together; and if from any one or all of them the lesson should be learned the parent might be satisfied. Still, it must be remembered that the ultimate character of the mind in every movement relative to these motives will be determined by that generic act of choice under which they all take place. The motives may be objectively right, but the man not subjectively right in being governed by them.

If the preceding remarks, or indeed the general doctrine

of these lectures, be correct, they will go far to determine the question whether in order to be virtuous an act must be done from a sense of duty. On this point distinguished thinkers differ. Chalmers says this is essential, and, as is usual with him, reiterates and enforces the point in a variety of ways. "It is not," says he, "volition alone which makes a thing virtuous, but volition under a sense of duty; and that only is a moral performance to which a man is urged by a sense or feeling of moral obligation." Again he says, "Whatever cometh not of a sense of duty hath no moral character of itself, and no moral approbation due to it." This opinion of Chalmers is quoted with approbation by McCosh. On the other hand, Dr. Woods says, "It would be very easy to show that moral affection may exist in one who has at the time no distinct apprehension of its nature, and no present feeling of approbation or disapprobation." "I say, then," he continues, "it is not essential to our moral agency, or to the existence of moral good and evil in us, that we should at the time have a distinct consideration or conception of a moral law, or a sensible approbation or disapprobation of our feelings and actions."

This inquiry runs back to the constitution of the moral nature as involving any other element than that of right and of conscience, and to the question whether there is anything virtuous in the moral affections and the will when they act according to their own law, and directly with reference to their objects.

That there is something thus virtuous, McCosh, in opposition to his direct assertion, seems everywhere to imply. Thus he says, "Much of human wickedness is displayed in the ingenious schemes which are contrived to deceive the moral faculty and avoid its humbling judgments." This implies something having wickedness, and yet acting inde

pendently of the moral faculty. Again, he says, "Moral excellence is truly the whole powers and affections of the soul in healthy exercise, and in order to guard it there is a faculty with a train of corresponding feelings, presiding over all the other faculties and seated in the very heart." This implies excellence before it can be guarded. Again, he says expressly that "the moral quality is not given to the action by the mind contemplating it." "It is not our perception and approbation that renders a benevolent action good, but we perceive its excellence and approve it because it is good."

It is not to be supposed that moral actions are done except under moral law and some generic choice of good or evil. But as a vicious man does not do evil actions because of their viciousness, so neither would it seem necessary that a good man should do good actions because of their virtuousness; at least it cannot be implied, as it seems to be in the statement of Chalmers, that a sense of obligation is the only virtuous motive. It is the law of the affections that they are drawn out in view of their object. An interested love is impossible. Only from an apprehension of some quality in the being loved can love

come.

The love of God may imply virtue. It does so. But the love cannot be in view of its own virtuousness, or with the thought of that, but must be in iew of either the worth or the worthiness of God.

LECTURE X.

RECTITUDE AND VIRTUE. — RELATIONS. — EXPEDIENCY, PRUDENCE, AND VIRTUE.ORIGIN OF MORAL DISTINCTIONS AS RELATED TO THE DIVINE NATURE.COINCIDENCE OF INSTINCT AND REASON OF FAITH AND REASON OF PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION.

It will be remembered that in observing a moral act we went backward to its source. In so doing we found a moral constitution. That constitution we have examined, and have found its end and law. In doing this we considered those voluntary states of mind which are in themselves good or evil, virtuous or vicious.

We know immediately and intuitively that love is good, and malignity evil; and it is inconceivable that their nature should be changed by any will. They are opposites, as are light and darkness, hardness and softness; one may give place to the other, but can never become the other. This, I suppose, is what is meant by the eternal and immutable distinctions of morals.

It was then said that in passing outwards from a moral action we found right and wrong, utility, expediency, general consequences. It will be next in order to examine these, and to inquire how far their claims may be reconciled with those of virtue without confounding the two.

As has been said, right is often used as synonymous with virtuous, and wrong with vicious. The right, also, seems to be used as synonymous with moral goodness; at least if that be not its meaning I am unable to say what it is. But by right is also meant conformity to a rule or law,

NATURAL GOVERNMENT.

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tendency to an end, accordance with fixed relations, and by wrong, the reverse. "Right and wrong," says Dr. Wayland, "depend upon the relations under which beings are created, and are invariable." In this sense actions may be right or wrong without reference to the character or intention of the agent. In the first sense they cannot, and the trouble has been that these terms have been used, now to indicate virtue as originating in will, and now to indicate a quality, sometimes called moral, that has no reference to intention. So far as they are used in the first sense we have already considered them, or rather that which they indicate; it is in the second sense that they now claim our attention.

Plainly the results of human conduct in this life are not determined solely by the dispositions and intentions from which they spring. We live under a natural as well as under a moral government, and the first is the instrument, frame-work, and prophecy of the second. We are sur

rounded by other beings, and by an external nature that is complicated, involving numerous substances, and forces, and laws. These beings, this nature, these substances, and forces, and laws, have a determinate constitution in accordance with which we may act upon them and they upon us, and this action, at least so far as nature is concerned, will not be affected by our state of mind as good or evil, or by any intention that may spring from that. Between us and external nature there are fixed relations, and the result will depend upon our acting or not acting in accordance with those relations.

A being wholly virtuous may act in entire accordance with the nature of the beings and substances around him, and then the whole result will be right and good. Again, with character unchanged, but ignorant of the relations in