possible form of being. Not that the person is composed of these as elements, but that this person is as a simple form of being, and that these are forms of its manifestation without which personality could not be conceived of. Here we find a being moral and responsible.

In the activity of such a being, naturally knowing his own end, and necessarily affirming obligation to choose it, we have the intuitional side of a true moral system; and in the activity of the discursive and practical powers in coincidence with this we have its inductive side. We thus harmonize intuitional and teleological systems. In this connection, also, we have the characteristic of complete virtue or holiness as manifesting itself in two directions; we have the point of moral responsibility, and the genesis of our chief moral ideas. Here, too, we considered the moral nature in its double function, as both originating moral acts, and judging of them; and here we sought for the proper sphere of conscience, and pointed out the ambiguity of the term.

Of a person thus endowed with reason, moral affections, conscience, and free will, the highest form of activity is rational love; and hence, according to the philosophical formula for the highest good, we found it here. At this point, therefore, we identified the teachings of the human constitution, as drawn from a consideration of ends, with the summary of the revealed law of God as given by our Saviour.

We next investigated the relation between holiness or virtue, and happiness. In doing this we distinguished between moral good, as the natural and necessary result of moral goodness, and natural good; and also considered the good there is from the approbation of goodness. Moral good and that from approbation were shown to be infal

libly connected with moral goodness. Natural good is not necessarily thus connected, but there is a tendency towards it. There is between them no contrariety or opposition, or "antinomy," and they ought to be connected by will in the way of reward. That they are not thus connected in the present state, is an evidence of disorder, and an indication of a state yet future.

In connection with this we affirmed the duty of each one to secure his own good through moral goodness, and found that this was not only compatible with the good of the whole, but necessary to it, thus bringing into harmony a rational self-love and benevolence.

Regarding not only the quantity, but also the quality of enjoyment, we saw that the good and end for man was not to be found either in holiness by itself, or in happiness by itself, but in holy happiness, or blessedness. That these are thus necessarily united, no doubt God intended we should know; also that we should seek them as thus united; and our idea of perfection is the highest possible union of these, together with all natural good following in their train.

In determining, next, more specifically, the sphere of moral science, we took our point of observation at the performance of an outward act, and going backwards to its source, we found an immediate recognition of the moral quality of the act as good or evil; while, in going forwards and outwards to its consequences, we found the ideas of utility, and, in one sense, of right and wrong. In the one case we were wholly concerned with the person and the motive; in the other, with the outward act and its results. Separated from its origin in a person, and its motive, an act can have no moral quality; but it may be outwardly conformed to law, and have consequences

beneficial or injurious, and be, in ordinary language, right or wrong; and an attempt was made to show the confusion that has arisen at this point, and the need of greater precision both of ideas and of terms.

We also considered the province of conscience, its infallibility, the two spheres in which it acts, and its relation to other active principles; and we inquired whether, in order to be virtuous, an act must be done from a sense of duty.

Leaving personality and motives, we next went outward to the consideration of those fixed relations established by God, and which indicate his will. Here we saw that virtue and rectitude are so far coincident that where virtue exists there can fail to be rectitude only from mistake; and also the difference between those calculable consequences from acting in violation of fixed relations or in accordance with them, and those incalculable and illimitable consequences that may flow from guilt or its reverse. We sought the character of a true expediency, and the difference between prudence and virtue. We even ventured to speak of the nature of God, and so far to call in question the common view as to suggest whether it be not his nature to be wholly supernatural; and whether there can be anything more ultimate for the conscience than his character as the standard of moral excellence, and his will as the expression of that character.

At the opening of our discussions it was said that besides pursuing an end as rationally comprehending it, we may also do so from Instinct and from Faith; and we next showed that between the action of these and of reason there might so be a coincidence that a man may be rational in acting both from instinct and from faith. Reason and faith being thus reconciled; reason being at the basis

of moral philosophy, and faith being the distinctive principle of religion, just as it is in the relation between parent and child, it was easy to see what must be the points of coincidence and mutual support between moral philosophy and religion, whether natural or revealed - whether a system of pure revealed law, or of forgiveness and restoration after law had been broken.

We next had before us the subject of rights as connected with our previous speculations. We showed their origin in the will of God-uttered through the several active principles of our nature that man should attain his end. We ascertained their gradations as growing out of previous classifications. We drew the distinction between alienable and inalienable rights, and also between those over persons and over things. We showed the foundation and limits of the rights of parents and of governments. We spoke of liberty in its various kinds as related to rights; also of the rights of different classes of the community; and closed by a reference to the duty of all in a government like ours to secure the rights of all.

In the closing lecture we have passed from the relations of time, and considered the great question of a future life, thus giving to morality weightier sanctions, and a loftier perspective. The details of the argument we need not reproduce.

We have thus, my friends, in accordance with that ancient precept, "know thyself," which is said to have descended from heaven, examined the human constitution in its relation to ends. In doing this it has been my wish to avoid technical terms, and to appeal directly to the consciousness of my hearers. That appeal has been met by an attention that has been all I could desire. Upon such a course probably no independent thinker could enter

without discovering new relations both between the faculties themselves, and between them and the ends for which they were intended. How far such relations have now been presented, or the point been reached towards which the great lines of thought converge, you will judge. That these views will be accepted by all, I do not expect. That they will not be without their value in advancing the science, I cannot but hope. As was said in the first lecture, that advance must be slow; but we are not to be discouraged. The moral sphere is more. intimate to us than any other; it is the highest of all; it is there that we find our true selves; and it cannot be that we should be capable of tracing the harmony of suns and of planets, and be forever incapable of apprehending those higher harmonies which we have now attempted to trace, between man and nature, between man and himself, between man and his fellows, and between man and God.

Rational man, hurrgh!

THE END.