THE GROUND OF OBLIGATION.

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If the statements now made be correct, we are prepared to answer the second question mentioned above. The first was, What ought to be done and the general answer was, To ascertain the end for which we were made, and to seek to accomplish that. The second question was, Why ought it to be done? and the answer is, Because of the intrinsic excellency and worth of that end. Man, and all moral beings, are capable, as such, of a high and holy blessedness which can be compared with nothing else, which is the fruit and crown of all virtuous and holy activity, which has no exchangeable value, but has, in itself, an infinite worth.

If it be still asked why a man ought to seek an end which has this intrinsic worth, the reply is that this idea of obligation or oughtness is a simple idea, and therefore that we can only state the occasion on which it arises. Of its presence in connection with our choice of this end we can give no account, except that such is our constitution. This, however, does not compel us to say that we ought to seek a thing simply because we ought. The sense of obligation or oughtness may or may not precede the choice, but could have no place if there were not a ground of action besides itself. It does not come up out of vacancy. A man ought to choose that which is congruous to his nature. It would seem that an act of choice must be from something in the thing chosen thus congruous. He ought to choose his own well-being rather than the contrary; but he ought to choose it not simply because he ought, but because it is well-being. If there were nothing valuable in itself, there would be nothing that ought to be either chosen or done.

For those who adopt the general line of thought we are now pursuing, this question concerning good is funda

mental, because there is involved in it the rule for right action. According to this, any course of action which will secure the whole good for which man was made must be right.

But among those who believe that the rule has its basis in the highest good, there is a difference of opinion as to what that good is. On this subject I cannot enter at large, but will refer briefly to two different views. These make the good consist in that which is conditional for the results, and not in the results themselves.

The first is that of Jouffroy. His view is that good consists in universal order. "When," says he, " reason first perceives that, as there is a good for us, so is there for all creatures whatsoever, and that thus the particular good of each creature is but an element of universal order, of absolute good, then does the idea of good, so disengaged and elevated to the sphere of absolute being, appear to our reason as obligatory." Here two questions may be asked. The first is, whether the reason does necessarily form this idea of universal order. Since the reason has been so much spoken of, nothing has been more common than to mistake the results of abstraction and generalization for its immediate and necessary ideas. That this is not one of those ideas, may be inferred from the fact that men are not agreed in what the order consists. Universal order may be either that form and extent of activity which would secure universal blessedness; or that perfect distribution of good and evil which would constitute moral order, but would involve punishment and suffering.

But if this idea of universal order be an idea of reason, it would not follow that the highest good was in that. It would be only conditional for blessedness. This it doubt

*Introduction to Ethics.

THE HIGHEST GOOD.

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less is; but if no blessedness were at any time or in any degree to result from it, it would be in vain. No position or movement of matter, no activity of mind, however controlled and subordinated, that should have no results beyond itself, would be a good.

These remarks are made on the supposition that the blessedness is not considered a part of the order. If it be, then there is simply a confusion of terms. Order would

be made to include not only, according to its usual acceptation, the constitution and movements of the universe, but its results.

The other view is that of a very able and distinguished cotemporary. This has its basis in the perfection of the individual as a moral being, as the other has in that of the universe as a constituted whole. "The highest good," says Dr. Hickok, "the summum bonum, is worthiness of spiritual approbation." *

From so able a thinker I differ with regret. But what is that in which a man's worthiness of spiritual approbation consists? It is in his choice of an ultimate end. The character is according to that. Does, then, the highest good of man consist in his choosing as an ultimate end his own choice of an ultimate end? This cannot be, and yet would seem to follow from the definition.

Again, if this be the highest good, it consists of something which can enter into the consciousness but a small portion of the time, and then only by special effort. Man can make himself and his state the object of his own thoughts; but introspection was not intended to be the business of his life, nor the form of his activity in which he should be either most useful or most happy. He was made to apprehend God and his works, and his fellow-crea

*Moral Science, p. 43.

ness.

tures, and to love and admire these, and not to look within, except to correct what may be wrong, and to admire there, as elsewhere, indications of the divine wisdom and goodHow, then, can that be the highest good of man which, if he really had it, he would think of only as the man who has healthy lungs thinks of his breathing? No doubt worthiness is conditional, and in a moral being necessarily so, for blessedness. But the word, though it may be used absolutely, naturally carries with it an indication of something beyond itself. A worthiness of what? Of approbation? And why not of the blessedness there is in and through that worthiness and that approbation ?

In this and similar cases the ultimate appeal must be to consciousness. To that I appeal, only wishing the statements to be so made that the consciousness may apprehend distinctly the elements with which it is dealing.

In speaking hitherto of activities and their results, language has been used in its ordinary sense, as applied to outward things. It will be observed, however, that in the region of mind and of consciousness the results are themselves activities. There is, therefore, a sense in which it may be said that the activity is the blessedness. The difference is, that what we call activities here are those which are inaugurated and controlled by the will, while what we call results are those emotions and feelings which follow from the other, by the appointment of God. We do not, therefore, in this connection, regard ends as anything outward, but identify ends and activities.

LECTURE III.

KINDS OF GOOD.-SUSCEPTIBILITIES AND POWERS. GOOD AS HIGHER AND LOWER. FORCES AND FACULTIES-THEIR SUBORDINATION. THE LAW OF LIMITATION.-METHODS OF ADDITION AND OF DEVELOPMENT.NATURAL AND CHRISTIAN LAW OF SELF-DENIAL.

In the last lecture two questions were answered. The first was, What ought man to do? and the second, Why ought he to do it? Man ought to attain the end for which he was made; and he ought to do it because of the intrinsic worth of that end. In answering these questions we considered the nature of an end as related to rational activity, and also the nature of good as necessarily included in an ultimate end.

We now proceed to answer the third question proposed, which is, How ought man to attain the end for which he was made? There is a sense in which this question may be resolved into the first; for, if we know, in the fullest sense, what to do, we also know how to do it. But convenience and the common use of language justify the division now made.

In answering the above question we shall naturally examine the different forms of activity of which man is capable, and their resulting forms of good, that we may thus find for each faculty the law and measure of its activity. But this may be done with more advantage if we first discriminate between different kinds of good; and if we also find a criterion by which we may distinguish that which is higher from that which is lower.