v.

BEATTY whom all parties are to appear and defend their interest." By the 40th section, the prerogative Court (which was STATE OF the commissary general's Court) had like authority in MARY'D. enforcing obedience to its process, orders, interlocutory sentences and decrees, as the high Court of Chancery had.

By the act of 1718, c. 5, the person entitled to the residue of an estate may, after 12 months from the date of the letters of administration, sue "for such residuary "part as shali appear to be due by such accounts as "shall then be made up."

This jurisdiction over accounts appears also in the practice of the commissary's Court, as stated in the deputy commissary's guide, p. 45 to 49, which shows also that the settlement of the account by that Court was always holden to be conclusive upon the County Courts. In the appendix p. 198, is the form of a special commission to pass an account. It appears also that all the vouchers are to be surrendered and filed upon passing the account. This shows that it must be conclusive; for nothing could be more unjust than to oblige a man to be always ready to account and to support his account, after taking from him all his vouchers,

DUVALL, J.

The account was only binding upon the representatives of the estate, the distributees; and they might still open it in the general Court. But the creditors are no parties to the settlement of the account, and cannot be bound by it.

There can be no doubt that the judgment against the administratrix, the inventory and two first accounts were conclusive evidence of a devastavit.

MARSHALL, Ch. J. I believe that is the law throughout the United States.

The Court is unanimously of opinion that the settlement of the account by the Orphan's Court is not conclusive evidence for the Defendant upon the issue joined.

Judgment affirmed.

UNITED STATES v. JOHN TYLER.

1812.

THIS case having been submitted without argu- Upon an in

ment

dictment for putting goods on board a car

LIVINGSTON, J. delivered the opinion of the Court as riage, with infollows:

tent to transport them out of the United

ry to the act of

The Defendant was indicted under the act to enforce States contrathe embargo laws passed the 9th January, 1809, for Jan. 9, 1809, loading on carriages, within the district of Vermont, the punishnineteen barrels of pearl-ashes, with intent to transport offence is a fine the same without the United States: to wit, into the of four times province of Canada.

ment of which

the value of the goods, it is

not necessary

On a plea of not guilty, the jury returned the follow- that the jury ing written verdict, which was recorded.

"The jury find that the said John Tyler is guilty of "the charge alleged against him in said indictment, "and that the said pot-ashes were worth two hundred "and eighty dollars."

The Defendant moved in arrest of judgment, because the verdict was not sufficiently certain as to the value of the property charged in the indictment, the same having found the value of pot-ashes, whereas the Defendant was indicted for the intention of exporting pearlashes.

Upon this motion, the judges being opposed in opinion, the same has been certified unto this Court for its direction in the premises.

The law which creates this offence provides that the party shall, upon conviction, be adjudged guilty of a high misdemeanor, and finded a sum by the Court before which the conviction is had, equal to four times the value of the property so intended to be exported. The Court, then, is of opinion that, under this law, no valuation by the jury was necessary to enable the Circuit Court to impose the proper fine; and, therefore,

should find the value of the goods.

v.

U. STATES that that part of the verdict which is objected to, is regarded as surplusage, and cannot deprive the United TYLER. States of the judgment to which they became entitled by the Defendant's conviction of the offence laid in the indictment.

It must, accordingly, be certified to the Court below, that it proceed to render judgment for the United States, on the verdict aforesaid.

(END OF FEBRUARY TERM, 1812.)

A writ of er

THIS was an action of debt brought in the District Court of the United States for the district of Virginia, ror does not upon an embargo-bond, dated the 2d of November, 1808, lie to carry to conditioned to reland the cargo of the Essex, in some Court of the the Supreme port of the United States, the danger of the seas only United States excepted.

a civil cause which has been carried from

Court to the

Semb.: It is a

upon an em

The Defendants, among other things, pleaded the the District following plea, viz.; "And the said Defendants for Circuit Court further plea why the United States ought not to have by writ of erand maintain the said action, say, that the said bond ror. was given and executed for more than double the value good defence of the vessel and cargo, mentioned in the recital and to an action condition of the said bond; to wit, in a sum of eight bargo bond, thousand dollars more than double the said value; and that it was the said last mentioned Defendants aver that the obli- given for more gors were constrained to execute the said bond by the the value of refusal of the collector of the port of Tappahannock to the vessel and clear and permit the said vessel and her cargo to de- the master was part from the port and district of Tappahannock until constrained to the same bond was executed as aforesaid, and this they the refusal of are ready to verify," &c.

To this plea there was a general demurrer, which was overruled by the district judge (TYLER.) The

than double

cargo, and that

execute it by

a clearance.

U. STATES United States carried the cause up to the Circuit Court ་. by writ of error, where the judgment was affirmed by GORDON & MARSHALL, C. J.

OTHERS.

The United States brought another writ of error to the Supreme Court of the United States, which was dismissed for want of jurisdiction; upon the authority of the case of United States v. Goodwin at the last term.

1813.

Feb.

4th.

BARTON v. PETIT AND BAYARD.

If the original

dependent

judgment

Absent....JOHNSON, J. and TODD, J.

ERROR to the Circuit Court for the district of judgment be Virginia on a judgment rendered on a bond (technicalreversed, the reversal of the ly called in Virginia a "forthcoming bond") given to the marshal with condition to have certain goods forthment on coming at the day of sale appointed by the marshal; coming bond" being goods which he had seized under a fi. fu. issued foliows of upon a former judgment recovered by Petit and Bayspecial certio- ard against Barton, which judgment was reversed at rari is necessa- the last term of this Court.

the "forth

course; but a

ry to bring up

the execution

upon which

given so as to

nexion be

tween the two judgments.

P. B. KEY, for the Plaintiff in error, contended, that the bond was the record of the former judgment being referred to in show the con- the condition of the bond, was to be considered as part of this record; and that the Court could judicially take notice that it was the same which was reversed by this Court at the last term, the transcript of which record now remains with the clerk of this Court. But if the Court could not judicially notice that fact, he moved for a certiorari to the clerk below to certify the record of the judgment on which the execution issued upon which the bond was given.

E. I. LEE and I. R. INGERSOLL, contra, contended, that the former record was no part of the present record, and that the Court could not judicially know it to be the same, and cited 4 Hen, and Mun. 293. 1 Wash. 94.