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curing and taking in a part of her return cargo, and DICKEY with a view of returning to the port of Spain, that being the only port in the island of Trinidad at which vessels, arriving from other places, were permitted to enter, or from which those destined on foreign voyages were per- INS. CO. mitted to clear. While on her voyage to fort Hyslop, the Fabius was lost by the danger of the seas; and the question is, whether this loss is within the policy?

Were this a case of the first impression,-were it to be decided for the first time on the intention of the parties to be collected solely from the words of the contract, some contrariety of opinion might undoubtedly be looked for, and it is uncertain what might be the opinion of the Court.

Strictly speaking a vessel is not at an island while sailing from one port to another of the same island; yet it is difficult to resist the persuasion, that something more is meant by an insurance at and from an island, than by an insurance at and from a port. The words, at and from an island, and at and from a port, are not synonimous, and yet in effect the same meaning would often be given to them, if the privilege of sailing from one port to another, for the purpose of completing the cargo, should not be granted by the policy. An insurance to an island may terminate at the first port, and the expression may be adopted from the uncertainty at what port the vessel insured may first arrive; but it seems difficult to put any other construction on an insurance at and from an island, or to assign any other motive for the risk being so described, than that it is a license to use the different ports of the island, for the purpose of obtaining the return cargo. This particular policy furnishes strong reason for this construction. It is difficult to read it without feeling a conviction that the intention of the contract was to ensure the whole voyage from and to New York, and to have the liberty of the islands of Barbadoes and Trinidad. There being but one port in the island of Trinidad, at which a vessel was permitted to enter or clear, takes away every inducement for inserting in the policy the words at and from the island of Trinidad, rather than the words at and from the port of Spain, in the island of Trinidad, unless those words secure the liberty of going to other VOL. VII.

DICKEY ports, for the purpose of completing the cargo, and of returning to the port of Spain, to clear out for New York.

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But the words of this policy are not now to receive their INS. Co. first construction. In Camden v. Cowley, mentioned 1 Marshall, 166, a ship was insured from London to Jamaica generally, and by a subsequent policy she was insured at and from Jamaica to London.

The ship having touched and staid for some days at one port of Jamaica, was lost in coasting the island; but before she had delivered all her outward cargo at the other ports of the island.

In an action on the homeward policy, the claim of the insured on the underwriters was resisted, not on the principle that the words at and from did not imply a permission to use all the ports of the island, not on the principle that sailing from one port to another was a deviation, but on the principle that the risk on the outward policy had not terminated, and that consequently the risk on the homeward policy had not commenced when the loss happened.

A verdict was found against the underwriters, and a new trial was refused.

In Bond v. Nutt, the insurance was made on a ship at and from Jaimaca to London, warranted to sail before the first of August, 1776. The ship sailed from St. Anns in Jamaica, on the 26th of July, for Bluefields, also in Jamaica, in order to join a convoy there. She was detained at Bluefields by an embargo, until the 6th of August, when she sailed with the convoy, but being separated from it, was captured. On this policy a verdict was given in favor of the underwriters, under the direction of Lord Mansfield, and a motion for a new trial was resisted on two grounds.

1st. That a departure from St. Anns, was not a departure from Jamaica.

2d. That going to Bluefields, was a deviation, that being out of the course of the voyage from St. Anns to London.

After great consideration, the Court was unanimously DICKEY of opinion in favor of the motion.

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Lord Mansfield in giving his opinion, said, "as nei❝ther party knew from what part of the island the ship INS. Co. "would sail, they used the words at and from Jamaica, "which protected her in going from port to port, till " she sailed." He also said, "had the insurance been "at and from St. Anns" the going round the island to "Bluefields, would have been a deviation."

In Thelusson v. Furguson, an insurance was made "at and from Gaudaloupe to Havre, warranted to sail on or before the 31st December." The vessel took in her cargo at Point Petre in Gaudaloupe, and for the purpose of obtaining convoy, sailed on the 24th of October, to Basseterre, where there is no port, but only an open road. She was there detained till the 10th of January, when she sailed with convoy, but was captured on the return voyage.

The Plaintiffs obtained a verdict. A motion was made for a new trial, which was refused. Lord Mansfield said, under an insurance" at and from such a place as Gaudaloupe or Jamaica, the word "at" comprises the whole island, and under that word, the ship is protected in going from port to port, round the coast of the island.

The underwriters not being satisfied with this decision, another action was afterwards brought on the same policy against Staples, also an underwriter: But upon that action, the only point insisted on, was that the ves sel had not sailed by the stipulated day.

It appears then to be the settled doctrine of the Courts of England, that an insurance" at and from an island" such as those in the West Indies generally, insures the vessel while coasting from port to port of the island, for the purpose of the voyage insured. It is dangerous to change a settled construction on policies of insurance.

It is the opinion of this Court, that the Circuit Court erred in not giving the instruction prayed for by the

DICKEY Counsel for the Plaintiff, and that the judgment be v. reversed, and the case remanded to that Court with BALTI- directions, to give the instructions prayed for by the Plaintiffs, as stated in the bill of exceptions filed in the

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INS. CO.

cause.

Upon an action

misrepresen

Present....All the Judges except TODD, J.

THIS was an appeal from the decree of the Ciron a valued cuit Court for the district of Columbia, sitting at Alexpolicy, if a andria, in a suit in equity, brought by the Marine Intation of the surance Company of Alexandria against Hodgson, to age & tonnage enjoin so much of a judgment at law obtained by the of the vessel, latter against the former, as exceeded the value of the underwriters brig Hope as found by the jury in a special verdict upon a valued policy.

whereby the

were induced

to agree to a high valuation, be a defence, it is at law and not in equity.

It was contended in the bill that the age and tonnage of the vessel was misrepresented, and that such misrepresentation induced the Complainants to value the ship at 10,000 dollars, when in fact she was worth only 3,500 dollars, as specially found by the jury on the trial at law. She was represented to be about 250 tons burthen, when she was only 161 tons, and to be from six to seven years old when she was between nine and ten years old.

The bill also alleged as a ground for relief, the refusal of the Court below to receive two pleas offered by the Complainants on the trial at law, the rejection of which pleas had been assigned for error in this Court when the cause was here last; (see Ante. vol. 6. p. 206 ) but this Court thought the rejection of a plea no ground for a writ of error, and therefore gave no opinion as to the propriety of admitting them.

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The first of those pleas stated the above misrepre- MARINE sentation as to the age, tonnage and value of the vessel, INS. Co. and averred it to be material in regard to the risk of the voyage. The other plea stated in general terms HODGSON. that the policy was obtained by fraud with intent to defraud the Complainants of the difference between the true and the represented value of the vessel, which difference it averred to be more than 4,000 dollars.

Upon the answer of Hodgson and the other evidence in the cause the Court below dissolved the injunction and dismissed the bill.

E. I. LEE, for the Appellants, relied principally upon the evidence of the over-valuation, which he said was so excessive as to amount to proof of fraud. But even if it were only a mutual mistake it is sufficient to avoid the policy. Park. 12, 196, 225. Miller, 39, 43, 97.

As to the equity of the case, he contended that the pleas rejected by the Court of law, and which charge fraud, being made part of this bill, are to be considered as a charge of fraud, which is a ground of equitable jurisdiction. The rejection of the pleas, is of itself a ground for a Court of equity to relieve, for the Complainants have not yet had an opportunity to show the fraud.

A Court of equity will relieve against mistakes upon which contracts are founded.

All that the Defendant is entitled to upon a policy is indemnity. He ought in equity to recover only the value and interest.

To show that equity will relieve against error at law, he cited 2 Wash. 36, Ambler v. Wyld. Prec. in ch. 233, Kent v. Bridgman. 2 Vern. 146, Graham v. Stamper. id. Robertson v. Bell. Finch, 472. 2 Str. 733, Burrow v. Jemino. 2 P. Wms. 425. 1 Vez. Jr. 417. 2- Vez. 155. 5 Cranch, 110, Hodgson v. Marine In. Co.

SWANN and JONES, contra.

The bill contains no charge of fraud. Straas and Leeds, who were the persons insured, are not made