v.

WILLIAMS "And after having heard the opinion of the inspector & OTHERS" of marine, we have declared, and do declare, the "American schooner Fortitude to have been well and ARMROYD duly captured by the French privateer, Le Fripon, & OTHERS." and to be forfeited to the owners and crew of the said "privateer; consequently the said schooner Fortitude, "together with her cargo, is awarded to the captors to "be sold in the customary form, if the sale has not al"ready taken place; and the proceeds shall be distri❝buted conformably to the ordinance concerning cap“tures," &c.

On the 19th of April, 1811, the Circuit Court reversed the sentence of the District Court, with costs; from which sentence of reversal, the Libellants appealed to this Court.

LYMAN LAW, for the Appellants.

This condemnation was founded upon the Milan detree, which is admitted, on its face, to be in violation of the law of nations. It does not proceed on the ground of its being the property of an enemy, nor contraband of war, nor for violating a blockade. If it appear from the sentence itself, that the condemnation was not upon any ground recognized by the law of nations, nor upon the violation of any municipal right acknowledged by that law, this Court will not carry it into effect. France may, by her own municipal laws, regulate her own trade, but she has no right to control ours, beyond her territorial jurisdiction, further than to protect her own belligerent rights, acknowledged by the law of nations. If we violate no such right, and if we do not carry our property within her territorial jurisdiction, she has no right to regulate our trade. Her condemnation, grounded upon regulations which she has no right, according to the law of nations, to make, is void. But even if she had a right to condemn, her condemnation can transfer no title, unless the thing itself be in her possession, at the time of condemnation, so that the possession may pass with the title. Here the property never was within the jurisdiction of the Court at Guadalope. It had been sold and delivered by the Dutch governor, before the condemnation. It does not appear that he had any authority either from the captors, or from the Court, to make the sale. The purchaser can

not derive from the governor a better title than the go- WILLIAMS vernor had at the time of sale.

It is acknowledged that a tribunal, professing to be a Court of Admiralty, has condemned the property in question, and that the Appellees possess it by virtue of a capture on the high seas. This is prima facie evidence of the correctness of the title, and throws the onus probandi upon the Appellants.

A Court of Admiralty is a Court whose jurisdiction is co-ordinate with that of every other throughout the world. The Admiralty law is of all times and of all nations," and its decrees, so far as they affect the thing itself, and so long as they remain unreversed, can never be questioned. The end being gained, it is an immaterial question, what were the means, as they are sanctified by the end. Whether the proceedings are erroneous, or not, according to our notions of right and wrong; whether they are predicated upon a mistake of the law, or of the fact, or are founded upon regulations consistent with, or repugnant to, the law of nations, are questions wholly immaterial. The sentence has sealed the proceedings, and those questions can never judicially come before this Court.

In confirmation of these positions, it might be sufficient to refer to the decisions of this Court, where the principles are settled.

In the case of Rose v. Himely, 4 Cr. 292, this Court refused to confirm the property of the alleged purchaser, because the Court, passing sentence, had neither the actual nor constructive jurisdiction, nor power, over the subject in controversy. The point upon which it was decided was, that the vessel and cargo were seized, out of the territorial jurisdiction claimed by the French government of St. Domingo, for a breach of municipal regulations, and were never carried within that jurisdiction, but were sold by the captor at a foreign port.

Two Judges, (the Chief Justice and Judge Washington) thought that, in order to give jurisdiction, the pro

& OTHERS ช.

ARMROYD

& OTHERS.

WILLIAMS perty should have been taken as prize of war, and & OTHERS brought infra præsidia. Three (Judges Cushing, Chase and Livingston) were of opinion, that it would be conARMROYD clusive even under a municipal regulation, provided it & OTHERS. were carried to the country of the captors. Judge John

v.

son considered it conclusive at all events. But even in that case, the Chief Justice says, in p. 276, “If the "Court of St. Domingo had jurisdiction, the sentence "is conclusive." In the case of Hudson and others v. Guestier, and La Font v. Bigelow, Cr. 293, it is decided that, in case of prize of war, a condemnation, while lying in a neutral port, will bind the property; and that the same principle applies to a seizure made within the territory of a state, for a violation of its municipal laws, p. 296. Judges Chase and Livingston dissented, because the vessel was not carried into a French port for trial. Judge Johnson adhered to his former opinion, that it was immaterial whether the capture was made in the exercise of municipal or belligerent rights, or whether within the jurisdictional limits of France, where she is supreme, or upon the high seas, where her authority is concurrent with that of other nations. P. 298.

In the case of Croudson and others, v. Leonard, Cr. 434, it was decided, that a sentence of condemnation for breach of blockade, was conclusive evidence of a violation of the warranty of neutrality in a policy of in

In the case of Rose & Himely, above mentioned, the incidental questions were decided in favor of our posi tions; for here it was prize of war, seized and condemned within the jurisdiction of the Court; yet it may be said the issue of that case was adverse. If so, it was expressly over-ruled in Hudson & Smith, v. Guestier, 6 Cr. 281. The Court there unanimously decided, that the judge of the French Court must have had a right to dispose of every question made in behalf of the owner of the property, whether it related to the jurisdiction of the Court, or arose out of the law of nations, or out of the French decrees, or in any other way; and even if the reasons of his judgment should not be satisfactory, it would be no ground for a foreign Court to rescind his proceedings, and to refuse to consider his sentence as conclusive on the property'; and that, as the title was changed by the condemnation at Guadalope, the original

owner had no right to pursue it in the hands of a WILLIAMS vendee. & OTHERS

v.

But this is no new principle of law originating with the present state of the world, which would seem rather ARMROYD to forbid it; since the rapacity of Courts of admiralty & OTHERS. on the one side, and their acknowledged subserviency to the governing power on the other, din inish the respect which would otherwise be due to their sentences.

The conclusive effect of a foreign sentence in chang ing the property seems to have been first judicially decided in the case of Hughes v. Cornelius, 2 Shower, 242. Sir T. Raymond, 473. Skin. 59. * Lord Raym. 893.935. Vern. 21. The authority of this case has never been questioned. The only question has been as to the collateral effect between underwriters and the assured in cases of warranty in a policy of insurance. And even there, whenever the condemnation has been upon the ground of its being the property of an enemy, the sen tence has always been holden to be conclusive, without regard to the circumstances by which the Court came to that result. The sentence is conclusive as to whatever it purports to decide. Park. 355, 360, 361-2, Rob. 173, The Christopher. Rob. 35, The Henrick and Maria. 5 Rob. 255, The Comet. Rob. 3, The Helena. s Bos. & Pul. 505, Lothian v. Henderson, 7 T. R. 526, Calvert v. Boville, 7 T. R. 681, Geyer v. Aguilar. East. 473, Oddy v. Boville. 3 Bos. & Pul. 201, Baring . Clagett. 5 East, 99, Baring v. Royal Exch. Ins. Co. 5 East, 155, Bolton v. Gladstone. Such also has been the course of decisions in the different American States. 1 Binney, 295, Calhoun v. Penn. In. Co. 3 Binney, 220, Cheviot v. Faussat. 2 Johnson's N. V. cases, 451, Vanderheuvel v. The United In. Co. S. C. 127.

Such being the acknowledged effect of a foreign condemnation, the only remedy for the injured party is a resort to the Court of the captors for redress. If that government will not afford it, he must apply to his own, which will make it a national concern to be settled either by negotiation or war, if it be deemed a matter of sufficient importance. Doug. 614, Le Caux v. Eden.

The fact that the Milan decree was a violation of the law of nations, and of our neutral rights, can make no difference. For if an unjust condemnation, professing

WILLIAMS to be founded upon a just law, be conclusive, there is & OTHERS no reason why a condemnation, founded upon an unjust x. law, should not be equally conclusive.

ARMROYD & OTHERS.

The question is not, whether this Court will lend its aid to carry into effect the Milan decree, but whether it will reverse the sentence of a foreign Court, and destroy vested rights acquired under such a sentence by a bona fide purchaser.

But it is said the purchase was made before the sentence of condemnation was passed, and was therefore void. This, however, can make no difference. The effect of the condemnation is not to vest the property, but to sanctify a title which was vested by the capture; to confirm all intermediate acts, and to give a judicial sanction to that which was already sufficiently firm in point of fact. 1 Wils. 211. 2 Azuni, 262. 12 Mod. 134, Rex v. Broome. Carth. 398. S. C. The condemnation does not give property, it only establishes the fact that the captor had a lawful title by the capture. These maritime sales in market overt give an indefeasible title. 4 Johnson, 38, 39, Grant v. M.Lachlan. In cases of foreign attachment, if the attached goods are perishable, or from their situation are exposed to peculiar danger, the constant practice is to order a sale, and such sales are valid, although the attaching creditor may fail to support his claim.

It is an established principle, says the Court of errors, (2 Johnson's cases, 458,) that any person purchasing will be secure.

LAW, in reply, cited the cases of Geyer v. Aguilar, Pollard v. Bell, Price v. Bell, Bird v. Appleton, Mayne v. Walter. 1 Rob. 144, and Havelock. Rockwood, 8 T. R. 268, to show that there must be a good cause for condemnation by the law of nations. He cited also, 4 Cr. 221. Doug. 574, and 1 Rob. 139, to the same point, and to show the limitation of the general principle of conclusiveness of a foreign sentence. As to the extent of the power of France over neutral commerce, he cited Marten's Law of Nations, 332; and to show that the Berlin and Milan decrees were in violation of our neutral rights, and were so declared by our government, he referred to the President's message to Congress of the