1 United States. He openly and unqualifiedly asserted that he whole transaction was a fraud and imposture-solely calculated to delude the citizens into subscriptions for the pending loan. He denied the offer of mediation altogether: and boldly refer red to M. Daschkoff, and to Dr. Logan, to prove his statements correct. If ever an accusation demanded attention and disproval, this was of that description. It was advanced under his own signature, by a man who had held high official stations, and who possessed very considerable standing with the opposers of the government. But the same fatal and unpardonable neglect prevailed as in so many other instances. The allegation was allowed to produce its full effect without any other attempt at counteraction, than a few anonymous paragraphs of denial. To render this error more palpable, a motion was made in the senate of the United States, on the 2d. of June, 1815, for a disclosure of the correspondence, of which the government ought to have gladly availed itself. But it was rejected. At length, when the affair had in some measure sunk into oblivion, on the 18th. of Jan. 1814, a motion was carried in the house of Representatives of the United States, for the publication of the correspondence on the subject. It then appeared that the whole of the charges were caluminous and unfoundedand that the transaction reflected a high degree of credit as well on the potent monarch, who took so warm an interest in our affairs, as on our government, for its prompt acceptance of the mediation. But the disclosure was too late to counteract any of the pernicious effects that had resulted from the accusation. Many persons to this day believe the whole transaction a de. ception. CHAPTER VIII. Capture of Washington. Causes. Mismanagement. Fort Washington. Trial of Captain Dyson. Extraordinary Sentence. Loans. Injury to Public Credit. Retrospection. THE CAPTURE OF WASHINGTON. On the 24th. of August, the capital of the United States was taken by the enemy. Their force was by no means of such magnitude as would have prevented the disaster from being accompanied by disgrace. Had it been overwhelming, the loss might have excited regret; but we should have been spared mortification and disgrace. But as t stands a sub. ject for historical record, the loss, although very great, is. undeserving of consideration. Placed beside the dishonour, it sinks into insignificance like a molehill beside a mountain. The force of the enemy is variously stated. The highest estimate is 6,000. Dr. Catlett, who had a favourable opportunity of assertaining with precision, states it at 3,540. Every person with whom I have conversed, that saw them, has been of opinion that they were so jaded with their march and so dispirited, that, had suitable preparations been made, they might have been easily defeated, and probably captured. They landed at Benedict, on the 18th. of August, and proceeded in a tolerably regular course towards Washington, which was the only object worthy of their attention. They were six days on their march. And there was hardly any attempt at efficient preparation made for their reception, till three or four days before their arrival at that city. The secretary at war ridiculed the idea of their attacking Washington, till within three days of the battle of Bladensburg. One obvious plan of defence, which would have struck the mind of a mere tyro in military affairs, was to have garrisoned the capitol and the president's house, with as powerful a force as could conveniently opperate there. The strenth of these two buildings would have enabled the garrisons to hold out a long time, until troops could have been collected to encounter the enemy. It is not for me to decide on whom the censure ought to fall-on the president-the secretary at war-on the district general, Winder-or on the whole together. But let that point be determined as it may, it cannot be denied, that nothing but the most culpable neglect could heve led to the results that took place-results which could not fail to prove injurious to the national character in Europe, and which, had not the news of the exploits of the brave and illustrious. Macdonough and Macomb, arrived there at the same time as the account of this disgraceful disaster, would have materially and perniciously affected the negociation at Ghent. When the preceding strictures were written, I had not seen the Report of the Committee appointed to investigate the subject, which I have recently examined with attention. It is clearly established by the documents annexed to this report, that the disaster arose from a series of the most extraordinary and unacountable mismanagement. I shall enumerate a few of the instances in brief. Let me previously observe, that the president stands exculpated from censure in the affair; for a cabinet council was held at Washington, on the 1st. of July, wherein it was resolved to establish a new military district, to comprise the cities of Washington, Baltimore, and the adjacent country. The command of it was given to general Winder, who had explicit directions to make preparations to repel the enemy, should he make any attempt on the seat of government, which the council judged highly probable. Among the errors committed, the following are the most preminent: 1. There was no attempt made to fortify those parts of the country calculated for defence, although General Van Ness, on behalf of the citizens of the District of Columbia, made repeated and earnest applications to the secretary at war on the subject, and although he as repeatedly promised to pay attention to their requests. 2. There was not the slightest effort to arrest the progress of the enemy, from the time of his debarkation till the day of the battle of Bladensburg, although the country through which he passed was admirably calculated for the purpose. 3. There was no camp formed equidistantly between Baltimore and Washington, so as to be able to cover and protect either or both places. 4. The troops from Baltimore were not ordered out in due season. Had the orders been; as most indubitably they ought to have been, issued at least on the debarkation of the enemy, these troops would have arrived in proper time-been fit for dutyand probably rescued the country from the disgrace. 5. The orders for the Baltimore troops to march, were received in Baltimore on Saturday the 20th. of August. They took up the line of march the next day, Sunday the 21st. On that evening they received an order from General Winder, by express то HALT UNTIL FURTHER ORDERS! Next day, they had renewed orders to march with full speed to Bladensburg.Those to General Stansbury were received at 10 A. M. and those to Colonel Sterrett at 2 P. M. The former reached Bladensburg on the 22d. at night-the latter on the 23d. at night. The fatal delay arising from the orders to halt, was among the principal causes of the disaster. Colonel Sterrett's corps arrived on the ground jaded, and fatigued, and harrassed. They had but little rest the night previous to the battle, owing to some false alarms, and were in every respect unfit for being led into the engagement. 6. Colonel Young's brigade, by order of General Winder, was stationed at a distance from the field of battle, where it remained inactive during the whole time of the engagement, although within hearing of the report of the cannon. : 7. An efficient corps of 600 infantry, and 100 cavalry, under Colonel Minor, arrived at Washington on the evening preceding the battle. The Colonel applied to General Armstrong for arms, and was directed to report himself the next morning!!! to Colonel Carberry, who had the care of the arsenal. This gentleman spent the night at his country seat, and was not to be found in the morning, although inval-. uable hours were spent in the search for him. At length an order for arms was procured from General Winder. Even then delay occurred, from the scrupulosity of Colonel Carberry's deputy in counting the flints-and further delay in giving receipts for them. The consequence was that this corps, which would almost to a certainty, have decided the fate of the day in favour of their country, began their march so late, that they had no share whatever in the action, and met the retreating army after its defeat!!! 8. Had a stand been made in Washington, and the whole force, even discomfited as it was, been collected together, there is no doubt but the loss might have been retrieved. But there was not the slightest effort of the kind made. The retreat was conducted in a disorderly manner, and as much like a flight as could be. Throughout this work, in all important cases, I do not merely refer to my authorities, as is usually done. The rea der must observe that I quote as well as refer to them. I am desirous of silencing incredulity herself. In pursuance of this plan, I submit a few short extracts from the documents published by Congress, on which the preceding views are founded. Extracts from the letter of Gen. Van Ness to the committee of Congress, appointed to enquire into the causes of the Capture of Washington, dated Nov. 23, 1814. "About the opening of the present campaign, I pressed again upon the secretary the subject of our defence; suggesting in addition to the occlusion of the river, the convenience and importance of a central camp, intermediate between Baltimore, Annapolis, Washington, Alexandria, Georgetown, and the neighbouring towns and country. And in frequent interviews, (in number, to be sure, very much increased by the importunate applications and solicitations to me, of both the civil and military branches of the community, whose confidence in the secretary appeared at an early period, at best wavering, if not declining,) sometimes official, at other tiine not so, which I had with him, as the campaign progressed, I did not fail to repeat the suggestion. I still received assurances, generally verbal, favorable, accompani ed by an otherwise apparent indifference, and confidence in our security.*"* "Thus had the campaign progressed, without any visible steps towards works of defence, either permanent or temporary, either on the hand or the water side, (I never having heard of a spade or an axe being struck in any such operation,) or towards forming a rendezvous or camp of regular troops in the neighbourhood, to the great anxiety, inquietude, and alarm, of the district and surrounding country; the secretary generally treating, with in difference at least, if not with levity, the idea of an attack by the enemy.t"** * Report, page 287. † Idem, page 288. "In August last, when the increased and reinforced fleet, with the troops, ascended the Chesapeake, and were known, from authentic information, to have entered the Patuxent, I called on Secretary Armstrong again; and expressed, as usual, my apprehensions, arising from want of means and preparation adding, that from the known naval and reputed land force of the enemy, he probably meant to strike a serious blow. His reply was, "Oh yes! by G-d, they would not come with such a fleet without meaning to strike somewhere: but they certainly will not come here What the d-l will they do here!" &c. After remarking that I difiered very much from him, as to the probable interest they felt in destroying or capturing our seat of government, and that I believed a visit to this place would, for seve ral reasons, be a favourite object with them, he observed, "No, no! Baltimore is the place, sir; that is of so much more consequence*,* I continued to see general Winder occasionally as before, and to be aston ished at the apparent slugishness or procrastination in the preparation for the reception of the enemy, who was on his advance. I recollect well, that even after he had, according to authentic and undoubted information, ascended to the head of the ship navigation of the Patuxent, and had, for about twenty-four hours, been debarking on the hither bank of that river, and marching his troops to their encampment on the heights of Benedict, (about 40 miles from this on the usual route,) general W. in answer to an inquiry of mine, whether he had ordered on any troops from Baltimore, and whether he thought they would be here in time, said, THAT THEY WERE ORDERED ON; AND THAT ALL HIS FEAR WAS, THAT THEY WOULD BE HERE TOO SOON! Expressing to him my astonishment at the apprehension, he said, he thought it very probable that the enemy would suddenly turn about, and make a blow at Baltimore†." Extract from General Stansbury's Report. "The men under my command were worn down and nearly exhausted from long and forced marches, want of food, and watching. They had been, with very little intermission under arms, and marching, from the time of their departure from Baltimore, with but little.sleep, bud provisions, and but little opportunity to cook. They certainly were not in a situation to go into battle; but my orders were positive; and I was determined to obey them. "Before and during the action, I did not see any of the force I was led to expect would support me. I understood since, they were on their way to my assistance, and I presume exertions were made to bring them up." Extract from Colonel Minor's Report. "I took up my line of march, and arrived at the capitol between sunset and dark, [Aug, 23d.] and immediately made my way to the president, and reported my arrival; when he referred me to general Armstrong, to whom I repaired, and informed him as to the strength of the troops, as well as to the want of arms, ammunition, &c. which made it as late as early candle light; when I was informed by that gentleman, the arms, &c. could not be had that night, and directed to report myself next morning to colonel Carberry, who would furnish me with arms, &c. which gentleman, from early next morning, I diligently sought, until a late hour of the forenoon, without being able to find him, and then went in search of general Winder, whom I found near the Eastern Branch; when he gave an order to the armourer for the munitions wanting, with orders to return to the capitol, there to wait further, orders." Extract from the Report of Doctor Catlett. "Respecting the condition of the enemy's troops, I was informed by several of the British officers; that just previous to their reaching Bladensburg, (with excessive fatigue or entire exhaustion) they were dropping off in considerable numbers; that in the action, it was only by the most extraordinary exertions that the main body could be goaded on. Although I observed some of their flankers at times advance on the run a small distance, these were said to be only the most active of their light companies of, and attached to, their 85th. re • Report, page 292. † Idem, page 296. Idem, page 185. Idem, page 231 |