giment, commanded by lieutenant-colonel Thornton, acting as brigadier; they appeared to me to halt, as if exhausted with fatigue, at or near the place where the firing ceased on our part, about a mile and a half on this side of Bladensburg, about two o'clock, P. Μ."* Extract from the Report of the Committee of Congress on the capture of Wash ington. "Our forces at this time at the Old Fields, are variously estimated, with no material difference, at about 3,000 men, in the following corps: about 400 horse, under the command of the following officers: lieut. col. Lavall, col. Tilman, captains Caldwell, Thornton, Herbert, Williams, &c.: 400 reg ular troops, under the command of lieut. col. Scott, viz. 36th, 38th, and capt. Morgan's company of the 12th, infantry; 600 marines and flotilla-men under com. Barney and capt. Miller, with five pieces of heavy artillerytwo 18 pounders and three twelve pounders: 1,800 militia and volunteers, gen. Smith's brigade of Georgetown and city militia, and Maryland militia under col. Kramer, of which there were two companies of artillery under capt. Burch and major Peter, with six 6 pounders each, making an aggregate of 3,200, with 17 pieces of artillery. The enemy was without cavalry, and had two small field pieces and one howitzer, drawn by men; and the whole country well calculated for defence, skirmishing, and to impede the march of an enemut." * "The march of our army to the city was extremely rapid and precipitate, and orders occasionally given to captains of companies to hurry on the men, who were extremely fatigued and exhausted before the camping ground was reached, near the Eastern Branch bridge, within the district of Colum biat." ** ** "Colonel George Minor, with his regiment of Virginia militia, composed of 600 infantry and 100 cavalry, arrived at the city of Washington in the twilight of the evening of the 23d; he called on the president who referred him to the secretary of war for orders; the secretary informed him that arms onld not be had that night, but gare orders to report himself to colonel Carberry, early in the morning, who would furnish him with arms and ammunition, as he was charged with that duty by gen. Winder. From early in the morning till tate in the forenoon, Col. Minor sought col. Carberry diligently, but he could mt be found. He rode to head-quarters, and obtained an order from gen. Winder upon the arsenal for arms, &c.; marched to the place with his regiment, and its care he found committed to a young man, whose caution in giving out arms, &c. very much delaying the arming and supplying this regi menti." ** * "The distance from Benedict to the city of Washington, by Bladensburg, is upwards of fifty miles. The enemy was without baggage-w.ggons or means of transportation; his troops much exhausted with fatigue; many compelled to quit the ranks, extraordinary exertions used to keep others in motion; and, аз of unable to pursue our forces, remained on the battle ground: the enemy's advance reached the city about eight o'clock in the evening, the battle haring ended about two o'clock, or before."§ ** * "The enemy, on the evening of the 25th, made the greatest exertions to leave the city of Washington. They had about 40 indifferent looking horscs, 10 or 12 carts, and waggons, one ox-cart, one coach, and several gigs. These were sent to Bladensburg to move off the wounded. A drove of 60 or 70 cattle preceded this party. Arriving at Bladensburg the British surgeon was ordered to select the wounded who could walk; the forty horses were mounted by those who could ride; the carts and waggons loaded; and up. wards of 90 wounded left behind About 12 o'clock at night the British army passed through Bladensburg; and parties continued until morning, and stragglers until after mid-day. The retreat of the enemy to his shipping was precipitate aud apparently under an alarm: and it is supposed that it was known to ** him that our forces had marched to Montgomery court-house." "Idem, page 311. †Report, page 21. Idem, page 23. * "On the 19th of July, gen. Winder was authorised, in case of menaced or on actual invasion, to call into service the whole quota of Maryland. On the 17th gen. Winder was authorized to call into actual service not less than 2 nor more than 3,000 of the drafts assigned to his command, to form a permanent force to be stationed in some central position between Baltimore and the city of Washington. On the same day, 17th of July, gen. Winder was authorised to call on the state of Pennsylvania for 5,000 men; on Virginia, 2,000; on the militia of the district of Columbia, in a disposable state, 2,000; together with the 6,000 from Maryland, making an aggregate force of 15,000 drafted militia, 3,000 of which authorised to be called into actual service; the residue in case of actual or menaced invasion, besides the regular troops estimated at 1,000, making 16,000; independent of marines and flotilla men. This was the measure of defence contemplated for the military district No. 10, and the measures taken by the war department up to the 17th of July in execution of it.*" DESTRUCTION OF FORT WASHINGTON. One extraordinary circumstance attended this disastrous affair, which I cannot refrain from stating to the public. Fort Washington was commanded by captain Dyson, when the British took the city of Washington. He had recieved orders from general Winder, in case the enemy came into his rear, to blow up the fort, and retreat with his garrison. The énemy came. His orders were clear and explicit. He obeyed them as it appears he was in duty bound. For this act, he was brought to trial-and sentenced to be dismissed the service. I am no military man. I know little of military affairs. I am therefore liable to error when I pronounce opinions on then. But with due deference to this court martial, whereof "brigadier general Smith, of the militia of the District of Columbia, was president," I cannot but believe captain Dyson's case to be peculiarly severe: and judging on plain principles of reason and common sense, I think the sentence most extravagantly unjust. Were I in his situation, I would appeal to the world against such a condemnation-and "make the welkin ring with my complaints. Extract from the Report of General Winder. "I sent, by major Hite, directions to the commanding officer of fort Washington, to advance a guard up to the main road upon all the roads leading to the fort; and in the event of his being taken in the rear of the fort by the enemy, to blow up the fort, and retire across the river," -Report, page 172. I wish to have it understood that I have no personal knowledge of general Armstrong, general Winder, or Captain Dyson-nor do I believe I have ever seen any of them. *Report, page 38. DEPARTURE OF GEN. IZARD FROM PLATTSBURG, One of the most extraordinary measures of war-a measure utterly indefensible,-has, as far as I know, almost wholly escaped censure. It affords one among ten thousand instances, to prove how seldom approbation or censure is meted out with due regard to justice. General Izard had an army of about 8000 regulars in the neighbourhood of Plattsburg. General Prevost, at no very great distance, had the command of about 14,000 troops, principally veterans. While the eyes of the nation were directed towards that quarter, and every man interested for the honour, the happiness, the independence of his country, was tremblingly alive to the future, and filled with the most awful forebodings of a ruinous result, from the fearful odds against our little army, amazement and terror filled every breast, to find that 5 or 6000 of our troops, under the general who had directed his utmost energy to train them to service, and to acquire their confidence, were ordered to a remote situation, on an unimportant expedition, in which no laurels were, or probably could be acquired. Thus was a most invaluable frontier exposed to all the horrors of desolation. The annals of warfare present no instance of greater fatuity. It is difficult to conjecture what could have been the object contemplated by this wonderful movement. But whatever it might have been, had the utmost success crowned the undertaking, it could not possibly have compensated for the issue which was to be rationally calculated on at Plattsburg. The result, however, was highly glorious to the nation. Nothing could be more fortunate. But this does not diminish an iota of the censure due to the measure. The character of an action, good or bad, is not affected, except with the canaille,* by its successes, whether prosperous or the reverse. Many of the wisest schemes ever devised have failed of success. Many of the most absurd and ridiculous have prospered. But every man whose approbation is worthy of regard, commends or reprobates a measure according to the wisdom or folly displayed in planning it. Had general Izard's army remained at Plattsburg, and aided in the discomfiture of governor Prevost, the triumph of the United States at the Saranac would not have been so transcendently great. Their removal, therefore, how absurd soever it was, is subject • It may be proper to state, that the true distinction of the Canaille, is not dress, or station. It is mind. There are men worth ten thousand a yeas, who are of the canaille. f the most serious rejoicing. It has added immensely to the laurels the nation acquired in the war. LOANS. The last and perhaps the most grievous and unpardonable error of the democratic party-an error, pregnant with baleful consequences to the finances and credit of the country, was, depending on loans for the support of the war, and deferring the imposition of taxes adequate to erect the superstructure of pub lic credit upon. This arose from the miserable and pernicious dread of forfeiting popularity, and losing the reins of government-a dread often the parent of the most destructive measures. The consequences of this highly reprehensible error was, that the loans were made to very considerable loss, and that the public credit of the nation was most lamentably impaired. I HAVE now gone through a review of the principal errors and follies, the neglects and the mismanagements of the democratic party. I have detailed and canvassed them with the boldness and independence of a freeman. I have followed the sound advice of Othello: "Naught extenuate-nor aught set down in malice." On many of these points I am greatly at variance with men of powerful talents belonging to that party. Some of my facts and opinions have been controverted by a critic of considerable acumen, in one of the daily papers. I have re-examined the various subjects embraced in this volume; and, where I have found cause to change my opinion, I have unhesitatingly done so. My object is truth. I have pursued it steadily-and, as far as I can judge of myself, without undue bias. But I well know how difficult it is for human weakness to divest itself of prejudice and partiality. To the candid reader, I submit the deci sion. This detail of misconduct has been a painful task. Far more agreeable would it have been to have descanted on the merits and talents of the president and other public functionaries. To a man of a liberal mind it is infinitely more agreeable to bestow the meed of praise, than to deal out censure. But a rough truth is preferable to a smooth falsehood. And whatever chance we have of arriving at the haven of peace and happiness, depends upon a fair and candid examination : 1 of ourselves, which must infallibly result in a conviction, that, so great have been the errors, the follies, and the madness on both sides, that mutual forgiveness requires no effort of gene rosity-it is merely an act of simple justice. 1 Before I quit this branch of my subject, it is but proper to ob serve, that it is hardly possible to conceive of a more difficult and arduous situation than Mr. Jefferson and Mr. Madison have been placed in. They have had to struggle with two belligerents, one supremely powerful by land, and on that element holding in awe the chief part of the civilized world-the other equally powerful by seȧ:-and each, in his rage against the other, violating the clearest and most indisputable rights of neutrals, and inflict. ing upon us, in a time of pretended peace, nearly as much injury as if we were ranked among the belligerants. And the divisions and distractions of the country, with the formidable opposition of a powerful party, embracing all the governments of the eastern States and a considerable portion of the citizens of the rest of the union, must have caused the administration infinitely more trouble and difficulty than the two belligerents together. The federalists, as I shall show more fully in the sequel, after goading the government into resistance, and vilifying it for not procuring redress, thwarted, opposed, and rendered nugatory every rational effort made to accomplish the very object they professed to seeka degree of madness and folly never-enough-to-be-deplored. CHAPTER IX. The Federalists. Federal Convention and Constitution. Com plaints of want of energy in the Constitution Disorganizers and Jacobins. Alien and Sedition Laws. Loss of Power. Change of Views. HAVING thus taken what I hope will be allowed to be a candid view of the errors and misconduct of the democratic party, it remains to perform the same office for their opponents. And I feel confident, it will appear that the latter have at least as much need to solicit forgiveness of their injured country, as the former. In the career of madness and folly which the nation has run, they |