then, is in favor of the measure; and, so far as reason and propriety are concerned, and the practice of the Government has gone, the argument is entirely in its favor. When the appropriation is made for two years together, the work continues without interruption during the winter; and the winter is the time to advance with this kind of work, and that both in the North and in the South. In the South, it is the season of doing the work; in the North, it is the season for collecting materials and making contracts. The practice of Congress sanctions this mode of appropriations. The annual appropriation of $200,000 for arming the militia is one instance, and has stood for thirty or forty years. The appropriation of a million a year, for eight years, in 1816, for the gradual increase of the navy, is another instance; and these appropriations, though made for a term of years, are always under the control of Congress, and may be reduced or discontinued when it pleases. Of this, the naval appropriation was a signal instance; for the million per annum voted in 1816, when the Treasury was full, was reduced to half a million in 1821, when it was empty.

Independent of these general and permanent reasons in favor of double appropriations for forts, Mr. B. said there were special and peculiar reasons for them at this time. We were now going on two years without money for this object. The present year might be considered as lost. The length of time which the bill had been delayed, and the time that it might yet be delayed, extinguished the hope of doing much work this year. It was rather for the next year than the present that he was attempting to provide; or, to speak more accurately, it was for the winter of 1836-'37, and for the spring of 1837, that he was attempting to get an appropriation. It was to prevent the stoppage of the works at the end of this year, and a new delay of three or four months next spring, that he was now struggling; for every person knew that the appropriations for the year 1837 will not be made until the third day of March; after which, time would be necessary to advertise for work and materials, to collect hands, and to allow a reasonable period for competition among bidders, which economy required.

Mr. B. could not take leave of this part of the subject without recurring to the opinions of the Secretary of War, notwithstanding the singular fate which seemed to attend that gentleman's reports and recommendations. All Senators praised them. Both sides of the chamber united in applauding them. There seemed to be an emulation of applause in favor of all that he said; but the moment we come to action, the scene shifts. The moment we want a vote, there is a division; one side is off. The opposition gentlemen are against the vote; they array their deeds against their words; and, having given their applause, they withhold their help. This had been witnessed on many occasions besides the pres. ent one; still he would make the experiment again, and try the Secretary's recommendation on the particular point now under consideration. Mr. B. then read from the Secretary's report of April 8th:

"I think that, when the plan of a work has been approved by Congress, and its construction authorized, the whole appropriation should be made at once, to be drawn from the Treasury in annual instalments, to be fixed by the law. This mode of appropriation would remedy much of the inconvenience which has been felt for years in this branch of the public service. The uncertainty respecting the appropriations annually deranges the business; and the delay which biennially takes place in the passage of the necessary law, reduces the alternate season of operations to a comparatively short period. An exact inquiry into the effect which the present system of making the appropriations has had upon

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the expense of the works, would probably exhibit an amount far greater than is generally anticipated." Mr. B. then turned to another part of his subject, and claimed the benefit of an ancient maxim which inculcates the wholesome advice, to wonder at nothing! He was greatly addicted to that maxim, and acted upon it both from habit and from reason. It was good for him that he did so; otherwise, he should be seized with a paroxysm of wonder at the present moment. For what more wonderful than the contradictory exhibitions upon fortifications which this chamber and this session display? Two months ago, it was a question of sharp debate to know who had occasioned the loss of the fortification bill at the last session; and both sides of the chamber, repulsing the blame from themselves, and throwing it on their adversaries, contended for the palm of pre-eminence to devotion to fortifications. Then came certain resolutions of his own, importing that the surplus revenue ought to be set apart as a conservative fund, sacred to the defence of the country, until all defences, military and naval, were on the scale of strength and respectability which the honor and independence of a great people required. On the discussion of these resolutions, he found himself left behind by opposition gentlemen. They darted ahead of him! They went beyond the surplus! They plunged into the integral revenue! Nothing would content their incontinent zeal, but a resolve to pledge all the revenue, and taxes besides, if necessary, to this great object; and so the vote passed, and that unanimously. This was in March, about two months ago; and now, when we come forward with a list of a few forts-twelve small ones at points of acknowledged importance--and want a small part of that mass of money in the Treasury, the magnitude of which is so afflicting to gentlemen, behold there is a decided opposition to the scheme! A systematic opposition is displayed: some objecting to forts altogether; others to those in this bill; others to those not in it; others, again, agreeing to forts in the abstract, but refusing to take them in any form in which they can be presented. This was the singular exhibition which would excite his wonder, if he permitted himself to wonder at any thing. But he did not so permit himself, and less on this occasion than any other; for he saw and knew perfectly well the cause and source of this whole contradiction. It was the division of the money in the Treasury which was at the bottom of all! That division--that fatal scheme of dividing moneywhich was now delaying, obstructing, and defeating so many measures for the good of the country; and this one among others! It was a conflict between distribution and defence; it was a contest between antagonist schemes→→→ between the schemes of taking the public money for the defence of the country, and taking it for spoil and distribution among political partisans.

Mr. B. wished to fix the attention of the Senate and of the country upon the true nature of this contest; for it was portentous and alarming when a contest of such a nature could be got up, and much more when it could be maintained in the Senate. What was the true nature of this contest for the application of the public money? and what was the relative merit of the two schemes? Defence is an object known to the constitution; and not only known to, but is the first and highest object of the confederacy. To establish the common defence-to enable all to give that defence to each which no one could give to itself-was the first and paramount object of the confederacy. The means of accomplishing that object, are set forth by name in the constitution-navies, armies, forts, arsenals, docks, and all the accessories of military and naval power. Congress is the instrument designated by the constitution to provide these means for the purpose of accomplishing the great object; and for this purpose has power to raise money by loans or

$1,259,792; it is not yet finished, and has cost $1,739,046, and it is estimated to cost $210,000 more. The latter was estimated to cost $904,355; it has already cost $1,388,731, and it is estimated will yet cost $531,188 to finish it. Here are about four millions of dollars for two forts, and these two in the neighborhood of each other; while the sum of three millions for twelve, scattered from Passamaquoddy bay to the mouth of the Mississippi, has been resisted for so many months. Mr. B. reviewed the objections which were made to this appropriation. It was said the money could not be expended if it was voted, and he was sorry to have to admit that this was an objection which gentlemen seemed to have it in their own power to make good. The year was certainly half gone, and, if gentlemen can have their way, it will be weeks or months yet before a dollar for fortifications can be voted, if at all. It will be autumn before the work can begin; but in the South the work will proceed all the winter; and in the North the winter is the time for collecting materials. If the bill was delayed till the year was half gone, it was the fault of the opposition, and gentlemen cannot be permitted to take advantage of their own wrong. They cannot now be allowed to plead the delay to defeat the bill, which delay they have themselves occasioned.

It is said there are not engineers enough to superintend the works; but the answer was ready to that objection. A bill had long since passed the Senate to increase the corps of engineers; that bill was now in the House of Representatives, and it was to be presumed that the House would do what the service of the country required, and not suffer necessary defences to be lost for want of officers to superintend them. The Secretary of War earnestly recommends it, not only with a view to the new works, but because an increase of the corps is necessary for the performance of their current duties. Here is his recommendation.

"That the corps of engineers should be increased. The reasons for this measure have been heretofore submitted, and the proposition has been recommended by you to Congress. I will merely add, upon the present occasion, that the officers of this corps are not sufficiently numerous for the performance of the duties committed to them; and that, if an augmentation does not take place, the public interest will suffer in a degree far beyond the value of any pecuniary consideration connected with this increase."

It is objected that men of science in engineering cannot be created by a bill. That is granted. They cannot be created by a mere act. But, in constructing fortifications, a few skilful engineers are sufficient-a few to locate and plan the works. The superintendence of the execution requires fidelity and attention, with such knowledge as is readily obtained. With respect to locations for forts, they have been nearly all selected; all in this bill were selected fifteen years ago; are detailed in the report of the board of engineers for 1821-the same which the then Secretary of War [Mr. CALHOUN] recommended to Congress.

It is objected that we have not plans and estimates for all these works; but I answer, that there are plans and detailed estimates for most of them, and conjectural estimates for the remainder, with the statement of the number of guns they would require; which is the only essential part of the estimate, for the number of guns governs every thing else; it governs the size of the fort, the number of the men to garrison it, and conse. quently the whole expense.

Mr. B. said the question of fortifying a port was partly a political question, to be decided by Congress; partly a military one, to be decided by professional men. Congress decides whether the place is sufficiently im portant to merit national defence; military men decide

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whether it can be defended; and, if so, by how many guns; of what calibre, and how to be placed. Each must decide within their sphere; and when the number of guns is given which will defend a place, the cost of the fort is, for all practical purposes, ascertained. Now, in all these cases, the number of guns and their calibre is given; that decides the size of the fort, for each gun, according to its calibre, must have so many feet for its platform and so many men to work it-from five to seven in time of seige; in time of peace, enough only to keep the fort.

Mr. B. said an excessive and overwrought anxiety had been displayed here for plans and estimates, as if they were the most infallible and unerring guides upon earth. Nothing, he said, could be more mistaken. The estimates heretofore furnished, and that by the board of engineers under the administration of Mr. Monroe, when the Senator from South Carolina [Mr. CALHOUN] Was Secretary of War, were generally and exceedingly erroneous. Out of eleven forts constructed upon those estimates, and thirteen more in a course of construction, not one had kept within the estimate; not a fort had been built for what it had been estimated to cost; but generally a quarter more, or in some instances half as much more; and sometimes double as much. Nothing had kept within the estimate but two little works, not forts-a battery at Bienvenu, and a tower at Bayou Dupre, Lou isiana. Mr. B. then turned to Senate Document, No. 203, of this session, pages 12 and 13, to verify this statement; and read the list of forts, and the cost of their construction, which had been finished, or were still under construction. The following is the list: Statement of the forts on the seaboard of the United States under construction.

forts proposed in this bill were but a continuation of a system commenced forty years ago, recommended under every administration, and partly executed. The limita tions proposed by the Secretary of War, and approved by the President, would affect the size of some of the large forts, but would not much diminish their number. Forts in open roadsteads are objected to; forts of large size are objected to, on account of their size. In this, the President and Secretary strike the main objection which was taken to the system of fortifications fifteen years ago by those who were then styled radicals. Fort Monroe covers sixty-four acres of ground; it covers nearly as much ground, and costs nearly as much money, as the twelve forts put together, which are contained in this bill. Fort Calhoun, built near it, is nearly as large; the two together cost nearly four millions of dollars. They were objected to fifteen years ago by those who were then stigmatized as radicals; they are objected to now by the President and Secretary of War, and every- | body applauds the objection. No more such are proposed. No more such will be built on this continent, though a powerful fort will be wanted at Key West, or the Dry Tortugas. The forts proposed in the bill, and those which will be proposed hereafter, are the moderate sized works contended for by the reproached radicals, in 1821, and applauded now by everybody.

Mr. B. read an extract from the message of Governor Everett of Massachusetts to the General Assembly of that State, at its last session, and relied upon it, not only to sustain the propriety of erecting some of the forts enumerated in the bill, but also to show the necessity of early appropriations, and to make it manifest that the public service had already suffered by the delay which had taken place. The following is the extract read:

"In the course of the last winter, resolutions were adopted by the Legislature, instructing our Senators and requesting our Representatives in Congress to use all proper means to obtain the requisite appropriations for the repair of the fortification on Castle island, and the vigorous prosecution of the works commenced on George's island, in Boston harbor. Their exertions were so far successful, that the requisite appropriations introduced into the fortification bill, in the Senate of the United States, by way of amendment, received the sanction of the committees of the other branch of Congress to which they were referred, and passed through all but the last stage of legislation in the House of Representatives. The entire bill was unfortunately lost, in consequence of the introduction of another amendment in the House of Representatives, on which the two Houses disagreed. Notwithstanding the failure of the new appropriations, some progress was made on both the works, particularly on that upon George's island, during the past season, by means of the unexpended balance of the appropriations of the year 1834. I have the satisfaction to inform you, that, for the present year, large appropriations have been recommended for both objects by the Department of War. The rapid progress of these works is of extreme importance; and it is much to be desired that the appropriations should be so early made, as to prevent the loss of some of the best months in the season, which frequently occurs, in this branch of the public service, in consequence of the delay in the passage of the appropriation bills. Among the documents accompanying the report from the War Department, at the commencement of the present session of Congress, is a statement of several new works, proposed by the board of engineers, for the defence of the coast, and arranged in different classes, according to their importance. Among those of the first class, to be commenced as soon as possible,' I notice, with great satisfaction, five or six works, which, when executed, will complete the defences of Boston harbor; a part of the seaboard second VOL. XII.-96

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to no other in importance, and hitherto almost wholly neglected by the general Government."

Mr. B. deprecated the sectional tone which had pervaded a part of this debate. It seemed to be supposed that the North was to be benefited, and the South neglected. Not so the fact. The forts heretofore erected were principally in the South; and of those proposed, the South had-he would not say her share, for this was not a case for dividing out shares, but for extending defence wherever it was needed; and the South was attended to, to the full extent of its need. Besides five forts finished in the delta of the Mississippi, and a superb one in Alabama, costing about a million of dollars, there were others intended at Lake Barrataria, and on the Mississippi, at Mobile bay, Perdido bay, Pensacola bay, St. Rosa's bay, St. Joseph's bay, Apalache bay, Apalachicola bay, Espiritu Sancto bay, Charlotte harbor, Key West, and the Dry Tortugas, making near a dozen works, and costing, by estimate, near six millions of dollars; and all for the security of western commerce; all for the protection of the commerce of the western States, which, passing out of the mouth of the Mississippi, must go through the Gulf of Mexico, and pass between Key West, through a narrow passage, before it could reach the great ocean. Every fort built on the Gulf of Mexico, Mr. B. said, was a western fort; a fort for the benefit of the western States, just as much so as the forts in the Chesapeake bay were for the defence of Maryland and Virginia. Turning on the other side of the peninsula of Florida, it would be seen that the extreme southern coast was not neglected. Georgia was well attended to. Besides the fort now under construction on Cockspur island, estimated by the board of engineers to cost $375,000, and which has cost thus far $290,000, and is expected to cost $240,000 more--besides this fine fort, other works are proposed in the Savannah river, and along the coast, at Ossabaw sound, St. Catharine's sound, Sapelo sound, Dolby inlet, Altamaha sound, St. Simon's sound, St. Andrew's sound, Cumberland sound, to St. Augustine in Florida-mostly small works, estimated to cost nearly two millions of dollars. Continuing the view to Baltimore, and Mr. B. said it would be found that more money had been, and would be, expended on forts to the south, than to the north of that point; but the comparison was absurd, and he would not continue it. Defence was not to be proportioned out, but to be given where it was needed, without regard to lines or latitudes.

Mr. B. deprecated also the extravagant manner of opposing this bill, as a plan to line the whole coast with batteries as a plan to shut out a foreign army from landing at any point-as a plan to raise a great standing army. All this he treated as panical, and intended to frighten weak nerves and weaker heads. The forts proposed were small in extent-confined to the defence of cities were to be manned by a few artillerists in time of peace, and were to look to the militia and volunteers for their main garrisons in time of war. He showed the necessity of forts to prevent cities from being sacked, plundered, and bombarded; and the folly of depending upon men alone, no matter how brave, with muskets and rifles in their hands, to defend a city against thirty-six inch bombs, flying four thousand yards through the air, and bursting with a bushel of fire and shot among the dwellings of the citizens. Forts to keep off fleets and cruisers could alone do this.

But it was not to defend cities only that forts were wanting. They were needed to cover navy yards and dock yards, and to serve as places of refuge to the military and commercial marine of the country. We have a great commerce, he said, and many merchant ships; these ships must have ports of refuge, places where they can be safe from pursuit and attack. We have determined to have a navy; and that determination increases the neces