all other things also; but it rather proves them to be void of reason." It appears evident to us that all the instances of extraordinary sagacity in the brute creation are either the result of human instruction, or arise from the instinctive principles-selfishness chiefly-which influence all animals to a greater or less degree. We do not remember ever hearing of a single instance of extraordinary development of the so-called reason in brutes that had not been brought up under the fostering care and tuition of man, other than what could easily be attributed to the principle of self. They have not the necessary resources within themselves for elevating their state. They cannot rise above a certain level. They may be somewhat elevated, but they cannot elevate themselves. Were a thousand generations to follow each other, the thousandth would not be a whit the wiser or more sagacious than the first; the daily existence of the last would be very similar to the daily existence of the first. We completely fail to discover any progression in brutes. Man, on the contrary, instructs himself and instructs his brother. Even deaf mutes are known to have cultivated their mental faculties to some extent, and to have evinced a desire for knowledge before being taught any kind of language. True, these instances may be few, but none the less confirmatory of their superiority to brutes. For instance, Massieu, in France, who begged to go to school with the other children of the village, and who, in after years, displayed great ability and even originality as a thinker. An intelligent writer, also, in the "Bibliotheca Sacra," p. 566, No. 47, says, "Some cases we have known in which the mental and moral development has reached a point decidedly beyond the average of unlettered speaking men, where yet there is either a very slight knowledge of words, or even none at all." These facts show that, wherever reason is, it will exhibit itself, and is accompanied, to some degree, by action worthy of it; and it also proves that man has resources within himself. All thinkers assert that every man must develop his own resources himself. It is not the mere learning a few words on the tongue like the parrot, performing a few tricks like the horse, the elephant, or the monkey in our menageries; but it is a development of mental and reasoning powers. All man's knowledge and wisdom, exclusive of what has been revealed from God, has been attained by himself. All the resources of mind which he has exhibited have been developed by himself. True, that men instruct each other; but they are fellows, they are not trained by a superior being. This makes the great difference between man and other animals, and demonstrates the superiority of his mental resources to those of the brute. The latter cannot instruct itself further than what relates to its present enjoyment. Selfenjoyment is deeply implanted in the nature of all animals. By this are they, to a great extent, impelled to protect themselves, and to perpetuate their kind. By this do they perform some of their most wondrous achievements, and all this apparently unconsciously. The beaver in the construction of its tenement, the bee in the storing of its honey, and all animals in the propagation of their kinds, evidently have no other stimulus than the enjoyment of self. But most of their more curious and less frequent achievements seem, as already said, to be the result of human instruction; and if they be the result of human instruction, they cannot by any argumentation be employed to prove more than the adaptiveness of their mental instincts or faculties within certain limits. Such instances as the sly look of the dog when spoken of, and the remarkable incident of the wren mentioned by your correspondent" Clement,” may not rigidly come under either of these categories, but we think them by no means inexplicable apart from reason. All animals have the instinct of sagacity wisely endowed them for their self-protection and enjoyment, and this instinct is more highly developed in some instances than in others; but to assert that those higher developments are proofs of the possession of reason, is as absurd as to say that plants have sensational organs, because some of them can adapt themselves, like animals, to the circumstances under which they exist. This is an analogous case, and quite as reasonable as the other. Another fact which militates strongly against the supposition that reason is not confined to man is, that the power of speech is confined to him. "To say," remarks Dr Harris,* fectly, for they can be taught to articulate a few words; but the fact of their not making use of those words, after being taught them, to express thoughts, feelings, or reasoning of their own, makes it extremely probable that they have no thoughts, and cannot reason. The stationary position of the brutes is conceded by all parties. What they were a thousand years since, that are they to-day. No symptoms of progress in the remotest degree can be discovered in any of their movements or actions, other than what they are instructed by man. They have no new mode of enjoying themselves or protecting themselves;-the bird has merely its pretty, but old-fashioned nest; the beaver its house of ancient design; the fox its usual kind of hole; the bee extracts its honey in the same old method, and preserves it in cells of the same style of mathematical construction; and the shell-fish form the same kind of shells; and so on throughout all creation. And why are they thus stationary? Evidently because they are destitute of reason. They needed it not, and the Creator has not endowed his creatures with anything superfluous. The right thing is in the right place, and nothing more. They are gifted with what is necessary, and that is sufficient. The objects of their lives are reached without it. The appetites, the passions, the memory, are amply sufficient, without reason, to reach their ends; and we have not sufficient grounds for believing that reason has any part to do in any of their actions. * "that brutes have voices, or inarticulate language, adequate to the indication of certain appetites and passions, only increases the force of the remark. For how unlikely is it that they would be endowed with the means of expressing animal feelings, and be denied the power of imparting ideas, supposing them to have ideas to impart! And besides the inconsistency, perhaps few things would seem to impugn the goodness of the Creator more than to withhold from a creature capable of even very limited reasoning, the faculty of expressing and imparting its reasoning." There is no law in creation more evident than the law of adaptation. Look where we will, we find its consummate perfection. Nothing can be mentioned that would detract therefrom, neither can any part thereof be improved. According to this law, we find that every animal is peculiarly adapted to the sphere wherein it lives, and the objects which it attains. Its physical organs and its general qualities are not only the very things necessary, but, so far as our knowledge goes, they are the only ones that can adequately reach the necessary ends; and, still further, the conditions under which it exists are eminently adapted to develop its characteristics. Improvement in any way is thus impossible. But this could not be said had the brute creation reason, for they are deficient of what is essentially necessary for the full development of that which would be their chief endowment; and this would be utterly inconsistent, not only with God's goodness, but with his method of procedure. Why did God give man an articulated language? "Just because he gave him reason (for what is man's word but his reason coming forth, so that it may behold itself?); that he gave it to him, because he could not be man—that is, a social being without it."+ Had he given the brute creation reason, we feel persuaded that he would also give them the means for developng it; but as they are deficient of that medium, it affords the strongest presumptive proof that they have no reasoning power, otherwise it would be incompatible with the general law of adaptation. Some animals, it is true, have the organs of speech imper-power of mind, which would fain grasp the universe, and render it subservient to his progress and happiness; his mastery over the irrational creation; and his profound and *"Pre-Adamite Earth," p. 261. In looking at the history of man, however, we find him eminently a progressive being. His reasoning powers are continually on the increase. Under favourable circumstances, they develop themselves daily. To what extent they are capable of expanding we know not: they may be, as the heavens, boundless. It is sufficient for our argument that he exhibits his progress on earth. He improves his enjoyments continually. He advances from stage to stage unintermittingly. Week after week do we hear of his inventions and of his schemes, and they are ever a source of wonder to us. His great subtle courses of reasoning, are evidences of his elevated position in creation. He towers infinitely above all earthly existences. Were we mentally to place ourselves in the position of some of the brutes that perish, we should find ourselves necessitated to look up to him as to a god. Creation is at his service in this life; but he requires infinity to act in, and all the extent of God's treasures to revel in. His energy and activity are in this world trammelled. Here, he is as in a cage-the frailties of the body are as so many wires encircling him, and keeping him from that liberty which he demands for the full exercise of his powers. They therefore restrain his action, and, to some extent, deter his progress. Having lost the image of God,* he has lost the chief source of enjoyment. Man cannot, therefore, approach God and enjoy his presence as he did before the fall. But when the slight tissue of life * We may state that we widely differ from our respected friend" Persona" as regards the image ot God with which man was endowed at creation. It could not have consisted of the free will and intellectual faculties, as man, through sin, lost the image of God, and thereby totally incapacitated himself to enjoy God. Now, we have not is broken, and the door of his cage opened, the prisoner of the earthly tenement will then take his flight to the infinity, wherein he will have sufficient scope to develop his powers, and wherein he will exist for endless cycles. Then the development of his mental powers will enable him to partake more largely of the boundless pleasures that are in God, or to receive more and more of his just indignation and wrath. Our existence in the world to come will be a development of our principles in this. We are destined to spend an eternity of progress in corruption or holiness. As man is thus a progressive being, both mentally and morally, and is responsible for all his doings; and as we fail to perceive either the one characteristic or the other in the brute creation, we feel compelled to ascribe to man alone that faculty which places him in so responsible and prominent a position in the scale of creation. ARHONDDU. lost the free will, nor our intellectual faculties. So we believe that the "image" must have consisted of moral perfections-holiness, justice, &c. These qualities certainly were lost. Reason, however, was essential to man as a probationary being. NEGATIVE ARTICLE.-IV. WE have carefully perused the different articles on this subject in the Controversialist, and have come to the conclusion, with "Clement" (who has, it seems to us, stated the question fairly), that reason, as distinguished between man and the animal world, is rather a question of degree than of kind. None of our opponents attempt to deny the indications of reason shown by the higher class of animals, as developed in the numerous and well attested anecdotes which are continually presented to our notice, and which might be increased by hundreds more if necessary. "Persona" sneers at the bringing forward of these anecdotes in support of our position, and J. F. affects to doubt the accuracy of some of the statements; but we maintain it is a perfectly legitimate mode of supporting the negative argument, for these instances of reason and sagacity may be considered in the light of experiments, and as man has no direct means of communication with the lower animals by speech or otherwise, he can only judge of the extent of their faculties by contemplating their actions. As in the case of those of his own species born deaf and dumb, no one doubts their possession of reason merely because they are deprived of the noble faculty of speech; their actions and behaviour sufficiently prove their intelligence. Of course, none of those who maintain the negative in this argument claim for animals the same degree of reason as belongs to man. We do not pretend they can solve geometrical problems, or even understand them; or that they know the principles of engineering as practised by man; nor do we suppose that the finer shades of thought, the power of mental analysis, or the flights of imagination in which man can indulge, and which he can communicate to his fellows by means of written language, are common to them; but we think it almost demonstrative that the broad distinctive marks of reason, as shown in man, belong in an inferior degree to the lower animals, each according to its peculiar organization, and suitable to the peculiar habits of its life and the requirements of its nature. We are aware that here we may be met by the as sertion that what we claim for them is only instinct under another name. But to this we demur, for we may equally contend that instinct is only another name for a modified degree of reason. In order to come a little nearer the question, we will shortly inquire what are the principal characteristics of the mind of man, and then examine whether the animal world does not possess these characteristics in a modified degree. We are aware that metaphysicians have classified the powers of the mind under many different heads, but on this occasion we will only refer to three, viz., memory, judgment, and foresight. Man is also endowed with passions, the principal of which are love, hatred, fear, and revenge. These are not properly considered as part of the reasoning faculties, though undoubtedly connected with and influenced by them, in a more or less degree. Now it seems to us impossible to deny that the lower animals, such as the dog, cat, horse, elephant, &c., are susceptible of all these. In fact, our opponents, who will only allow what they call "blind instinct" to the possession of animals, are compelled to admit that it is joined with other qualities which, in man, form a part of what is called reason. Hence they are driven to the necessity of claiming for these creatures a power they designate instinct, with occasional and intermittent indications of another power, resembling reason in man, but still distinct from instinct. Addison is so sensible of the difficulty of the position, that he says, "There is not, in my opinion, anything more mysterious in nature than this instinct in animals, which thus rises above reason, and falls infinitely short of it. It cannot be accounted for by any properties in matter, and at the same time works after so odd a manner, that one cannot think it the faculty of an intellectual being. . . . . To me it seems the immediate direction of Providence, and such an operation of the Supreme Being as that which determines all the portions of matter to their proper centre."* The celebrated Dr. Butler, also, in his well-known argument, "The Analogy of Religion," seems to have been so impressed with the indications of reason in the brute world, as to be willing to concede them an immortality hereafter; for, after maintaining that * "C 'Spectator," No. 120, 121. 66 the mysterious principle of perception or mind is not connected with matter, any further than as making use of the body, with its organs of sight, touch, smell, &c., as a medium of communication with the outer world, and that the death or destruction of these organs does not necessarily or logically involve the annihilation of the perceptive faculty, and foreseeing that the same argument is applicable to the perceptive faculties of brutes, and, consequently, if the mind of man be immortal, so may that of brutes, he says, Suppose the invidious thing designed in such a manner of expression were really implied, as it is not in the least, in the natural immortality of brutes; namely, that they must arrive at great attainments, and become rational and moral agents; even this would be no difficulty, since we know not what latent powers and capacities they may be endued with. There was once, prior to experience, as great presumption against human creatures, as there is against the brute creatures, arriving at that degree of understanding which we have in mature age, for we can trace up our own existence to the same original as theirs." Montaigne, also, after bringing forward many striking proofs of the sagacity and reasoning powers of animals, and attributing to them in degree all the faculties possessed by man, asserts that it is the overweening pride and presumption of man which will not concede to brutes their fair due: ""Tis by the same vanity of imagination that he equals himself to God, attributes to himself divine qualities, withdraws and separates himself from the crowd of other creatures, cuts out the shares of the animals, his fellows and companions, and distributes to them portions of faculties and force as himself thinks fit. How does he know, by the strength of his understanding, the secret and internal motions of animals? From what comparison betwixt them and us does he conclude the stupidity he attributes to them? When I play with my cat, who knows whether I do not make her more sport than she makes me? We mutually divert one another with our play."* We may here notice the affectionate interest shown by the poet Cowper in the lower animals, and his beautiful poem, “The Dog *Montaigne's "Essays." and the Water Lily," which, he adds, is "no fable," and would almost seem to show that the poet attributed reasoning powers to his favourite dog. The anecdote proves that the dog clearly understood his master to be desirous of possessing the lily, and observed his disappointment at not being able to reach it. How beautifully the reflective attitude of the dog is suggested in the verse "Beau marked my unsuccessful pains, " And although his attention was called away for a time from the circumstance, the particulars were imprinted on his memory, and, on their return, affection for his master prompted him to dash into the water, and lay the lily at his feet. But we have no need to fall back upon any authorities to prove the possession by the lower animals of the powers and passions we have described. The experience we have of our own domestic favourites, when they are attentively watched, affords daily proof of a considerable degree of intelligence and reasoning power. How readily they perceive when they have done wrong, and we are offended with them. How the doubts and fears that agitate them are expressed in their eye and gestures. How much, and how soon, they learn from experience what is pleasing or distasteful to their master. How readily they detect when he is in a glad and joyous humour, and when in a depressed and melancholy one; and how skilfully their conduct is regulated accordingly. Most readers of this debate can readily call to mind many instances within their own personal knowledge, of a sagacity displayed by these creatures which cannot be distinguished from what we call reason; and we feel persuaded that the more they are observed the more frequently we shall be struck by them. Several remarkable anecdotes have been already related in the previous papers: we also could add to the number, but for the purpose of our argument do not think it necessary, as no candid person can deny the frequent recurrence of such manifestations. But, farther, there is the physiological and anatomical view of this subject, which merits some consideration, and we think strongly tends to support our view of the argument. We are well aware that, despite the labours of the anatomist, and the multiplied observations and speculations of the phrenologist, from Gall and Spurzheim to the modern professors of that science, the functions of the different parts of the brain, whether in man or animals, are still matter of dispute and question; and, in our humble opinion, must ever be. We believe an accurate knowledge of the mode of action of the brain, and the uses and properties of its different parts, and the mysterious connection between the mental and moral phenomena of the human mind and that organ, never can be traced into all its ramifications. It is, however, unanimously agreed that the brain in man is the organ of the perceptive and reasoning powers. How and in what manner we know not; but all experience shows that it is so, as much as the leg and foot are the organs or instruments specially made and adapted for locomotion, the hand for labour, or the heart for the circulation of the blood. Anatomists tell us, also, that this organ is considerably larger in man in proportion to his size than in any other creature whatever. In quadrupeds and birds its size gradually diminishes, something in the ratio of their reason and instinct, whilst in insects the brain is small and imperfect. Now, unless the brain in animals is formed for the purpose of furnishing them with their perceptive and reasoning powers, it is difficult to suppose it can answer that end in man, or even to conceive any special use for it at all. But "when there is no organiza|tion,” says Mr. Belsham, "as far as our observation extends there is no perception. Wherever such an organic structure as the brain exists, perception exists. Where this organization is imperfect, perception is imperfect. Where the organization is sound, vigorous, and healthy, perception is proportionally vigorous and clear. Where the organization is impaired, perception is enfeebled and obscured. And when the organization ceases, perception appears to cease." 99 Reasoning, therefore, from analogy, we are justified in believing that the same organ subserves the same end in the lower orders of creation to what it does in the higher; though, from the inferior degree of organization in the former, necessarily in a much less perfect manner. And here we may ask, Why should man be unwilling to concede these lower creatures a modicum of reason, and |