In re Bjornstad. As the provision is general, applying to all debtors, it is fair to infer in order to carry it out according to its spirit and purpose, that all classes of persons should be recognized, and so far as possible equally provided for, and that in making general provisions for exemptions as the Legislature did, it intended to carry out the constitutional provision in a manner to cause its benefits to be shared in as equal a manner as possible by all classes of debtors. And it would seem, if the statute is fairly capable of such a construction, it should be so construed. I am inclined to think it is. The exemption laws are remedial and beneficent acts of legislation, and are to be liberally interpreted and administered to carry out the constitutional provision.1 Sec. 23, Chap. 134, exempting a homestead, applies to all classes of debtors. Subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6, Sec. 32, exempting the family bible, family pictures and school books, family library, pew in a church, wearing apparel and household goods, apply equally to all classes of debtors. Subdivision 7, exempting two cows, ten swine, one yoke of oxen and one horse, or in lieu thereof a span of horses, ten sheep, and the wool from the same, either in the new material or manufactured into yarn or cloth; the necessary food for all the stock mentioned in this section for one year's support, either provided or growing, or both, as the debtor may choose; also one wagon, cart or dray, one sleigh, one plow, one drag, and other farming utensils, including tackle for teams, not exceeding fifty dollars in value; though in terms applying to all classes of persons, from the nature of the articles exempted, applies to a much larger extent to farmers than any other class, because they are the only per 1 Gilman vs. Williams et al., 7 Wisconsin, 329. 22 Taylor's Statutes of Wisconsin. In re Bjornstad. sons that ever keep or have any use for many of the articles named as exempt. Subdivision 8, exempts provisions for the debtor and his family necessary for one year's support, either provided or growing, or both, and fuel necessary for one year-and applies to all classes. Then follows subdivision 9, first above quoted, which provides for mechanics, miners, etc., and also in a subsequent part of the subdivision exempts the library and implements of any professional man, not exceeding two hundred dollars. And then follow many specific acts scattered through the session laws, making provisions for certain classes of debtors. One exempts all sewing machines kept for use in families, another all printing materials and press or presses used in the business of any printer or publisher, to an amount not exceeding $1,500 in value. Another exempts horses, arms, equipments and uniforms of all officers and privates in the organized militia of the state. Another exempts all books, maps, plats and other papers kept or used by any person for the purpose of making abstracts of title to land. Another exempts the interest owned by any inventor in any invention secured to him by letters patent of the United States. Another the earnings of all married persons and all other persons who have to provide for the entire support of a family for sixty days next preceding the issuing of any process of attachment or execution, etc. This provision was undoubtedly intended mainly for the benefit of laborers. There are still other specific provisions which it is not necessary to enumerate. It will be seen that besides the general provisions which apply to all classes there are specific ones applying to all the leading industrial classes of the community, unless it be the In re Bjornstad. merchant. The farmer, the mechanic, the miner, the profes sional man, the printer, the military man, the laborer, are all snugly and expressly provided for under the various clauses of the exemption law against the stroke of accident and chance of time. Now there would seem to be as much reason for making provision for the merchant as any other class. They are certainly quite as likely to be overtaken by misfortune and to need the exemption. It is insisted that while two hundred dollars of tools and stock in trade would be of some use to enable the mechanic to pursue his trade, that two hundred dollars stock in trade would not be enough to set a merchant up in business or be of much practical use to him. But it is submitted that although it would not go far as stock in trade, even so small an amount protected by the beneficence of the law from the rapacity of creditors in the hour of adversity might do something toward keeping starvation from his family, while he should have a little time in which to look about and either make arrangements to continue in business or turn his hand to some other employment. In the case of Bevitt vs. Crandall, 19 Wisconsin, 581, a farmer claimed as exempt under the same subdivision, a grain drill worth eighty dollars. But the court very justly held that although a literal construction would include the farmer, that it never could have been intended to apply to him, because he was specifically and liberally provided for in subdivision 7, which exempts his team and tackle, sheep, cows, swine, the food for a year's support of the same, wagon, cart, sleigh, plow, drag and other farming utensils not exceeding $50 in value. But, by parity of reasoning, the same provision should apply to the merchant, because he is nowhere else provided for. When we look at the language of the section and compare it with all the other provisions, keeping in view the presumed In re Bjornstad. intention of the Constitution and the Legislature to make equitable provisions for all classes, it would seem that there is strong reason for holding that it was intended in this subdivision to provide for merchants. I am referred to the case of Grimes vs. Bryne, 2 Minnesota, 89, as an authority the other way. I am not clear but that case, as well as Guptil vs. McFee, 9 Kansas, 30, which follows the Minnesota case, is against the construction which has generally obtained in relation to this provision of our statute, and which I am disposed to follow. But there is one consideration which is very noticeable, and that is, the difference in the language of the two statutes. The provision of the Minnesota Statute is: "The tools and implements of any mechanic, miner, or other person, used or kept for the purpose of carrying on his trade or business; and, in addition thereto, stock in trade, not exceeding four hundred dollars in value." The words, "and in addition thereto, stock in trade," would seem to indicate that it was the intention that the exemption of stock in trade should apply only to the same class of persons provided for in the previous part of the section and not merchants to whom tools and instruments are not necessary to their business. And so the court looked upon it, for they say: "In addition to what? Why manifestly in addition to tools and implements above exempted. The Legislature did not intend to leave the tools of the shoemaker or harness-maker in his hands and deprive him of the means of using them. They gave him a stock of material to work upon to render the provisions of exemption of some utility. The two clauses must stand together to bring either in harmony with the spirit of the law. The stock would be worthless without the tools, and the tools idle without the stock." The language of our statute is different, and I am inclined to think the provision different in substance. The use of In re Bjornstad. the disjunctive "or" in the language, "The tools and implements or stock in trade of any mechanic, miner or other person," would seem to indicate a purpose of providing for two classes of persons: that is to say, for mechanics miners and others, to the exercise of whose trade or business, tools or implements are necessary; and to another class of persons like merchants, to whose business, stock in trade is essential, but tools and implements are not. I think, at any rate, the language will fairly bear this construction. It is certainly broad enough if interpreted anyways literally, to include merchants, and considering the beneficent purpose of the law to make reasonable and equal provision for all classes of the community, I am disposed to think that the maxim noscitur à sociis should not in this case prevail over all other principles of construction, so as to deny to so large and useful a class of the community an equal participation and enjoyment of the exemption law. That it should be applied to the extent of excluding farmers and others, who are otherwise specifically provided for as held by DIXON, C. J., in Bevitt vs. Crandall, supra, I have no sort of objection. Still, I do not think it requires a resort to that maxim, to hold that this provision was never intended to apply to farmers. But it is claimed the exemption should not be allowed, because the debts are partnership debts, and that when contracted, the property belonged to the partnership; and there is some show of reason, as well as authority, for this position; but, in the absence of any fraudulent intent, I see no reason why parties may not dissolve the partnership, sever their interest in the property, or one partner sell out his interest to the other, as was done in this case, and the partner continuing the business, and owning the goods, be allowed to claim his exemption, the same as though no partnership had ever existed. This would seem to be in accordance with the prin |