not been altered, it would seem that notwithstanding section 97 (3 a) defences founded on the Stamp Acts should not be available against such an action. Yet in the case of Scholfield v. Londesborough, when in the Court of first instance it was pleaded that the stamp was exhausted, this defence was disposed of on the specialty that the bill, being an accommodation bill, was unissued at the date of the alteration. If the view here suggested be unsound, the proviso must be of very limited application, and the holder in due course must generally rely for the whole amount of the bill upon the rule laid down in Burchfield v. Moore, as he must in any case for any sum paid by him for the bill above its original amount. It was said in Leeds Bank v. Walkers that this proviso does not apply to Bank of England notes. But in Scotland such notes do not differ from other bank notes.1 g Whether or not an alteration is material, is a question of law; it does not depend on the actual importance in the circumstances of the alteration in question.5 As to the legal test of materiality, it has been said that the addition to a bill of words which in no respect interfere with its legal operation, will not vitiate it. An alteration of an instrument may be material in the sense of interfering with its legal operation, though it does not affect the contract contained therein." But in the case of Suffell v. Bank of England, Brett, L.J., said:-" Any alteration of any instrument seems to me to be material, which would alter the business effect of the instrument if used for any ordinary business purpose for which such an instrument or any part of it is used." It was held in that case by the Court of Appeal, reversing the judgment of the Lord Chief-Justice, that the alteration of the number of a Bank of England note was a vitiation in essentialibus. This decision applies expressly, not to all bills 1 1894, 2 Q.B. 660. 2 1854, 23 L.J. Q.B. 261, per Campbell, C. J. 3 1883, 11 Q.B.D. 84. 4 See p. 184, infra. 5 Suffell v. Bank of England, infra. per Coleridge, C.J.; Vance Lowther, 1876, 1 Ex. D. V. 176; M'Rostie v. Halley, 1850, 12 D. 816. 6 King v. Creighton, 1841, 4 D. 62, aff. 1843, 2 Bell's App. 81, per L. Campbell. 7 Suffell v. Bank of England, 1881, 7 Q.B.D. 270, rev. 1882, 9 Q.B.D. 555; M'Rostie v. Halley, cit. S. 64. S. 64. and notes, but to notes of the Bank of England, which in the judgments are distinguished as being currency; but, notwithstanding this distinction, there appears to be no substantial reason against applying the decision, if sound, to Bank of England notes in Scotland and to Scotch bank notes, neither of which are currency.1 By including among essentials a number affixed to a species of promissory note by the maker for the purpose of convenient identification, this case goes beyond previous decisions; yet it may be the sound view that the number of a document which is recognised as one of a series, is as much a part of the authentication of the document as its date. But the test of materiality, on which the decision actually proceeds, is extremely wide, and may have to be reconsidered. The following alterations, besides those mentioned in the sub-section, have been held material. The substitution of one drawer for another,2 the deletion of one drawer's name,3 the alteration of the name of an indorsee, an erasure in the name of the acceptor,5 the addition of a new acceptor, the substitution of the words "jointly and severally" for as cautioner," an alteration in the consideration 8 or in the crossing of a cheque9 or in the number of a Bank of England note.10 The following alterations have been held not to be material: The addition or deletion of words which the law supplies, for example, "jointly and severally," 11" or order," 12 'on demand," in a promissory note which bore no time of payment; 13 the addition of the words, " for Mr. P.,” in explanation of the words for value received in trust account"; 14 1 See p. 184, infra. 2 Fleming v. Scott, 1823, 2 S. 446, (n.e. 398); Young's Trs. v. Paisley Bank, 1831, 9 S. 574 3 Callender v. Kilpatrick, Dec. 10, 1812, F.C. 4 Kleinwort, Sons, and Co. v. Comptoir National d'Escompte de Paris [1894], 2 Q.B. 157-fraud; M'Ara v. Watson, 1823, 2 S. 360 (n.e. 318)-to correct a mistake. 5 M'Ewen v. Graham, 1833, 12 S. 110. 6 Home v. Purves, 1836, 14 S. 898. 7 Robertson v. Annan, 1825, 4 S. 40, (n.e. 42). 8 Knill v. Williams, 1809, 10 East 431, 1 Ross' L. C. 700. 9 See s. 78. 10 Suffell v. Bank of England, cit.; Leeds Bank v. Walker, 1883, 11 Q.B.D. 84. 11 Gordon v. Sutherland, 1761, M. 14,677. 12 Decroix v. Meyer, 1890, 25 Q.B.D. 343, aff. [1891], A.C. 520. 13 Aldous v. Cornwell, 1868, L.R. 3, Q.B. 573. 14 Commercial Bank v. Paton, 1837, 15 S. 1202. 1 the substitution of "us" and our for "me" and "my" S. 64. in a firm's bill; the addition of designations to the names of parties; the writing of a special indorsement above the wrong signature; 3 the deletion of a receipt on the back of a bill; an erasure in the name of the place at which a bill bore to be drawn.5 The date is material though the bill is payable on demand. 1 For example, the unauthorised specification in a foreign bill of a rate of exchange, or the alteration of a specified rate of interest.8 Acceptance and Payment for Honour. In recent years, owing to the improvement which has taken place in means of communication, acceptance and payment for honour have fallen almost entirely into disuse. 65. (1.) Where a bill of exchange has been pro- S. 65. tested for dishonour by non-acceptance, or protested a с Acceptance for protest. for better security, and is not overdue, any person, honour supra not being a party already liable thereon, may, with the consent of the holder, intervene and accept the bill supra protest, for the honour of any party liable thereon, or for the honour of the person for whose account the bill is drawn.f (2.) A bill may be accepted for honour for part only of the sum for which it is drawn.g (3.) An acceptance for honour supra protest in order to be valid must 1 Spiers and Knox v. Semple, 1901, 9 S.L.T., No. 133; but cf. Knill v. Williams, cit. 2 King v. Creighton, 1841, 4 D. 62. affd. 1843, 2 Bell's App. 81. 3 Mackenzie v. Dott, 1861, 23 D. 1310. 4 Lowe v. Campbell, 1825, 4 S. 299, (n.e. 302). 5 Beattie v. Haliburton, 1823, 2 S. 225 (n.e. 199); Dobie v. Stevenson, 1823, 2 S. 358 (n.e. 314). 6 M'Rostie v. Halley, 1850, 12 D. 816; Vance v. Lowther, 1876, 1 Ex. D. 176. 7 Hirschfeld v. Smith, 1866, L.R. 1 C.P. 340. 8 Sutton v. Toomer, 1827, 7 B. & C. 416, K S. 65. (a.) be written on the bill," and indicate that it is an acceptance for honour: 1 (b.) be signed by the acceptor for honour. (4.) Where an acceptance for honour does not expressly state for whose honour it is made, it is deemed to be an acceptance for the honour of the drawer. (5.) Where a bill payable after sight is accepted for honour, its maturity is calculated from the date of the noting for non-acceptance, and not from the date of the acceptance for honour. a See as to dishonour by non-acceptance, section 43; as to protest, sections 51 and 93; and as to protest for better security, section 51 (5). A person who signs a bill before it has been protested may render himself liable as an indorser under section 56, or, if he is the drawee, as acceptor, but he cannot be an acceptor for honour even, as appears, if he is a referee in case of need.1 b See ss. 14 and 45 (2). c See s. 2. a The drawee, if he has not accepted, or the holder, may accept for honour of some other party.2 It is doubtful if the drawee of a bill drawn payable "as per advice" is entitled to accept or pay for the honour of the drawer.3 It appears to be the better opinion that the holder, if he takes an acceptance for honour, cannot sue the party for whom that acceptance is given, or any subsequent party, until the bill has been dishonoured by the acceptor for honour, but may proceed at any time against prior parties.* In France the holder's right of recourse on non-acceptance is not affected by his taking an acceptance for honour, but he can only demand caution in any case.5 f It has been said that the holder may take several acceptances for the honour of different parties, but it is not 1 See s. 15, n.a 2 Bell Com. 448; Thomson 320-1. 4 Chitty, 244; Story on Bills, s. 258; cf. Thomson, 320. 5 French Commercial Code, 128, 120; see s. 43, n.o. now the practice to do so. Any person may, however, pay a bill for the honour of a party prior to the one for whose honour it has been accepted.1 g An acceptance qualified in any other way, unless authorised by the drawer and indorsers, is equivalent to dishonour.2 h See s. 3, n. No. 3. 1 The usual form is, "Accepted S.P.," or, if it is desired to state for whose honour the acceptance is made-as to which see sub-section (4)—“ Accepted for the honour of A., supra protest, or, S.P." It was formerly necessary, and is still competent, to accept for honour under a form of protest called an act of honour.4 3 1 See s. 3, n.b, No. 5, and s. 91 (1). See ss. 39 (1), 14 (3). S. 65. Liability of 66. (1.) The acceptor for honour of a bill by accept- S. 66. ing it engages that he will, on due presentment,a pay the bill according to the tenor of his acceptance, if it acceptor for is not paid by the drawee," provided it has been duly presented for payment, and protested for non-payment, and that he receives notice of these facts.c (2.) The acceptor for honour is liable to the holder and to all parties to the bill subsequent to the party for whose honour he has accepted.d a See s. 67 (2, 3). b Acceptance for honour "is equivalent to saying to the holder of the bill, Keep this bill, don't return it, and when the time arrives at which it ought to be paid, if it be not paid. by the party on whom it was originally drawn, come to me, and you shall have the money." It is an undertaking to 1 Thomson, 321; Chitty, 242; Byles, 275; Chalmers, 226; s. 68 (2). 2 See ss. 19 and 44. 3 Thomson, 323; Chitty, 244. "5 4 Bell's Prin. 322; Thomson, 322; s. 97 (2). 5 Williams v. Germaine, 1827, 7 B. & C. 468, per Tenterden, C.J., honour. |