Baum v. State. The Constitution of 1816 contained a provision substantially like that of §8 of article 2 of the Constitution of 1851; but while that provision was in force, the General Assembly affixed the penalty of disfranchisement to many offenses which were not included in the list of crimes declared to be infamous by the statutes of 1838, or 1843. The revised statutes of 1843 mention, among other offenses for which the punishment of disfranchisement may be inflicted, attempting to restrain the freedom of election by threats, interference, bribery, etc.; voting or attempting to vote more than once; grand larceny; petit larceny; professional gambling, and many others. If it is conceded that the character of the offense, i. e., whether infamous or not, is to be determined by the punishment, it will be found that at common law the deprivation of civil and political privileges was considered an infamous punishment. It is said in Cooley's Constitutional Law, p. 29: "But the punishment of the penitentiary must always be deemed infamous; and so must any punishment that involves the loss of civil or political privileges." So that at the time of the adoption of the present State Constitution, the words infamous crime must have been understood by the framers of that instrument as embracing not only crimes punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary, but also all such offenses as were subject to the penalty of the loss of civil and political privileges. In Rex v. Pitt, and Rex v. Mead, 3 Burr, 1335, Lord Mansfield said: "Bribery at elections for members of parliament must undoubtedly have always been a crime at common law; and consequently punishable by indictment or information." And in 1 Cooley's. Blackstone's Com. 179, the author says: "Thus are the electors of one branch of the legislature secured from any undue influence from either of the other two, and from all external violence and compulsion. Baum v. State. But the greatest danger is that in which themselves coöperate, by the infamous practice of bribery and corruption, to prevent which it is enacted, that no candidate shall, after the date (usually called the teste) of the writs, or after the vacancy, give any money or entertainment to his electors, or promise to give any, either to particular persons, or to the place in general, in order to his being elected; on pain of being incapable to serve for that place in parliament. And if any money, gift, office, employment, or reward be given or promised to be given to any voter, at any time, in order to influence him to give or withhold his vote, as well he that takes as he that offers such bribe, forfeits 500£., and is forever disabled from voting and holding any office in any corporation; unless, before conviction, he will discover some other offender of the same kind, and then he is indemnified for his own offense." In a note upon this passage, it is said: "In like manner the Julian law de ambitu inflicted fines and infamy upon all who were guilty of corruption at elections; but, if the person guilty convicted another offender he was restored to his credit again." From these authorities and enactments, we think it evident that corruption at elections has from the earliest times been regarded as an infamous crime, subject to severe penalties, and frequently punished by depriving the guilty person of his right to vote and to hold office. This offense being so understood and stigmatized, it follows that a statute defining the crime of vote selling, or bribery at elections, and affixing a penalty of disfranchisement, was within the authority expressly granted in the Constitution to the legisla ture. The other constitutional objections to the statute are groundless. It grants immunities to no one, and protects no class of offenders from punishment. And so far from preventing the freedom and equality of elections, it tends in the strongest manner possible to promote them. (2) It is objected, in the next place that the facts stated Baum v. State. in the affidavit and information do not constitute a public offense, because no candidates are named, and the purpose of the election, and the place where it was to be held, are not mentioned. These averments were not necessary. It was sufficient to charge the offense in the language of the statute. If the position of counsel for the appellant is correct, the law might be violated with impunity at any time before candidates were nominated, or the places for holding the election were fixed. Neither are the affidavit and information bad for duplicity. They describe a single offense, which consisted of the sale of the vote of the appellant with the promise that he would vote for the candidates on a certain ticket at the general election to be held on November 6, 1900. (3) For the reasons already given, there was no error in overruling the appellant's motion in arrest of judgment. (4) Under the assignment that the court erred in overruling the appellant's motion for a new trial, it is insisted that there was error in refusing to give certain instructions requested by appellant, and in modifying certain others, and that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the verdict. We have carefully examined the instructions tendered on behalf of the appellant, and the modifications made by the court, and are of the opinion that the instructions numbered six, seven, eight, and ten did not contain a correct statement of the law; and that the modifications made in instructions numbered one, two, and five were proper and necessary. (5) The last ground of the motion for a new trial discussed by counsel is the alleged insufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict. This is not a cause for a new trial in criminal actions. Treating it, however, as an assignment that the verdict of the jury was contrary to the evidence or to law, we have made a thorough examination of the testimony with the result that, in our opinion, the verdict is in harmony both with the law and the facts. We find no error. Judgment affirmed. State v. Cleveland, etc., R. Co. 157 288 1158 706 157 288 THE STATE V. THE CLEVELAND, CINCINNATI, CHICAGO AND ST. LOUIS RAILWAY COMPANY. 159 168 [No. 19,517. Filed October 23, 1901.] RAILROADS.-Reporting Arrival of Trains.—Blackboard Law.—Size J. W. Brissey and L. Nebeker, for State. HADLEY, J.-Action to recover penalties for violation of The single question presented for decision is whether the penalty provided by section two of the statute is recoverable in a case where the defendant has complied with all the provisions of the law, except in the use of a blackboard "not less than three feet long and two feet wide." Or in other words, is the defendant liable solely because of using a blackboard thirty-four inches long and eighteen inches wide? The statute reads: "Sec. 1. That every corporation, com State v. Cleveland, etc., R. Co. pany or person operating a railroad within this State, shall immediately after taking effect of this act, cause to be placed in a conspicuous place in each passenger depot of such company located at any station in this State, at which there is a telegraph office, a blackboard at least three feet long and two feet wide, upon which such corporation, company or person, shall cause to be written, at least thirty minutes before the schedule time for the arrival of each passenger train stopping upon such route at such station, the fact whether such train is on schedule time or not, and if late, how much: Provided however, That any device, indicator or register, painted or printed in large letters and figures giving the required information set forth in this act, in a more legible form than is practicable on a blackboard, may be substituted in place of said blackboard: And, provided further, That the provisions of this act shall not apply to any freight train carrying passengers, or any train carrying both freight and passengers, or to any stations during hours when railroad companies do not regularly have a telegraph operator or operators on duty at any such telegraph office. Sec. 2. That for each violation of the provisions of this act, in failing to report or in making a false report, such corporation, company or person so neglecting or refusing to comply with the provisions of this act shall forfeit and pay the sum of $25, to be recovered in a civil action, to be prosecuted by the prosecuting attorney of the county in which the neglect or refusal occurs, in the name of the State of Indiana, one-half of which shall go to said prosecuting attorney and the remainder shall be paid over to the county in which such proceedings are had, and shall be part of the common school fund." In substance it is alleged in the second paragraph of complaint that at no time between stated dates did the defendant, in or about its said passenger depot, cause to be placed, or cause to be written upon, a blackboard which was at least VOL. 157-19 |