EVIDENCE-Continued.

fendant as a witness before the grand jury was properly ad-
mitted in evidence at the trial for the purpose of impeaching
defendant, where the stenographer who took down the evidence
testified, before reading the same, that it was a true and complete
report thereof, although he testified that he had no recollection of
defendant's testimony independent of the shorthand copy thereof.
Higgins v. State, 57.

9. Habeas Corpus.-Parent and Child.-Guardian and Ward.-
In a habeas corpus proceeding by a father for the possession of his
child, the court properly refused to permit plaintiff to attack the
character of the daughter of the woman in whose care the guardian
intended to place the child.
Berkshire v. Caley, 1.
10. Habeas Corpus.-Parent and Child.-Guardian and Ward.
-In a habeas corpus proceeding by a father to obtain the cus-
tody of his child, it was proper for the court to hear evidence
in respect to the fitness and character of the woman in whose care
the guardian expected to place the child. Berkshire v. Caley, 1.
EXCESSIVE DAMAGES-When verdict will not be set aside be-
cause of, see DAMAGES, 4; Indianapolis St. R. Co. v. Robinson, 414.
EXPERT WITNESS-Knowledge on which opinion is based, see
OPINION EVIDENCE; Isenhour v. State, 517.

EX POST FACTO LAW-Amendment of statute after verdict as to
execution of death sentence, see CRIMINAL LAW, 51, 52; Keith v.
State, $76.

FEES AND SALARIES-Fees of jurors; see JURY, 1, 2; Monroe v.
State, ex rel., 45.

Recovery of illegal allowances made to county treasurer, see
COUNTIES, 13, 14; Sudbury v. Board, etc., 446.

1. Act of 1891.-Salary of County Treasurer.-Publication and
Distribution of Acts. The fee and salary act of 1891 (Acts
1891, p. 424), provided that where a county officer had been
elected before "the taking effect" of the act he should not be
subject to the provisions thereof. As to county treasurers, this act
was unconstitutional until amended by the act of 1893 (Acts 1893,
p. 142). Held, in a construction of the act, that the words “taking
effect" did not mean “become valid and operative” in all its parts,
but referred to the taking effect upon its publication and distribu-
tion with other laws of the legislative session of 1891, and that the
salary of a county treasurer elected after publication and distribu-
tion of the act of 1891, but before the amendment of 1893, was gov-
erned by the act of 1891.
Sudbury v. Board, etc., 446.
2. Act of 1895.-Recorder's Fees.-Notice of Mechanic's Lien.-
Repeal of Statute by Implication.-Section 7258 Burns 1894,
to the extent of fixing the fee of twenty-five cents for record-
ing notice of mechanic's lien is by implication repealed by
$117 of the fee and salary act of 1895 (Acts 1895, p. 349), pro-
viding that the county recorder shall receive certain fees for re-
cording certain designated instruments, and "for entering on entry
book, indexing and recording all other instruments, ten cents per
hundred words, but no charge to be less than fifty cents.
State, ex rel., v. Phillips, 481.

FOOD-Pure food law of 1899 is constitutional, see CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW, 2, 3; Isenhour v. State, 517.

1. Adulteration.-Prosecution Under Act of 1899.-An affidavit
charging one with having for sale adulterated milk, in violation of
$2 of the act of February 28, 1899 (Acts 1899, p. 189), need not dis-
close whether any property was taken from defendant, or how the
evidence against him was procured, and it is therefore immaterial
whether or not the act provides for the taking of property without
just compensation.
Isenhour v. State, 517.
2. Violation of Pure Food Law.-Affidavit.-An affidavit charg-
ing defendant with having in his possession adulterated food, need
not allege that the food was adulterated by defendant.

Isenhour v. State, 517.
3. Violation of Pure Food Law.-Affidavit.-An affidavit charg-
ing defendant with violating the pure food law of 1899 (Acts 1899, p.
189), and reciting that he "had in his possession, with intent to
sell, one pint of milk; adulterated with a certain substance in-
jurious to health, to wit, formaldehyde," is not bad for want of an
allegation that formaldehyde is either poisonous or injurious to
health.
Isenhour v. State, 517.

4. Adulterated Milk.- Affidavit.- Where one is charged with
having in his possession, with intent to sell, milk adulterated with
a substance injurious to health, it is not necessary that the affidavit
charging the offense should allege that the milk in defendant's
pos-
session violated a certain standard fixed by the State Board of
Health.
Isenhour v. State, 517.
5. Adulterated Milk. Affidavit. An affidavit charging one
with having for sale adulterated milk, need not set out the proviso
of $1 of the pure food law, that the law shall not apply to mixtures
or compounds recognized as articles of food, and not injurious to
health.
Isenhour v. State, 517.

-

-

6. Adulteration of Milk.- Evidence. - Defendant was charged
with having in his possession, with intent to sell, milk adulterated
with formaldehyde. He testified that he had used no formaldehyde,
and that the milk contained none, to his knowledge, but that at the
time in question he had put into the milk a substance known as
"Palmer's Preserver," and that the maker of the substance had told
him that it contained no formaldehyde. Defendant was then asked
what representations had been made to him as to the substance used,
but was not permitted to answer, and a circular was offered in evi-
dence and excluded, which accompanied the preservative and which
stated that it was harmless and guaranteed to contain no acid or
injurious ingredient. Held, that the exclusion of the evidence was
reversible error.
Isenhour v. State, 517.
Adulteration of Milk. Evidence. Directing Verdict.
Where, in a prosecution of one charged with "knowingly” having
adulterated milk in his possession, with intent to sell the same, the
evidence showed that in the middle of the forenoon in the hot sea-
son of the year, defendant had the adulterated milk in his exclusive
possession, with intent to sell and deliver it to a customer, it was
proper to refuse to instruct the jury to return a verdict for defend-
ant on the ground that it had not been proved that defendant had
knowledge of the adulteration.
Isenhour v. State, 517.

7.

-

8. Enforcement of Pure Food Law by Others Than Board of
Health. The provision of $2 of the pure food law of 1899, that it
shall be the duty of the State Board of Health to enforce the provis-

FOOD-Continued.

ions of such law, does not exclude individuals from making com-
plaint against one for violation of the statute.

Isenhour v. State, 517.
9. Constitutionality of Pure Food Law of 1899.- Title of Act.—
The following title of the pure food act of 1899: "An act forbid-
ding the manufacture and sale, or offer for sale, any adulterated
foods or drugs, defining foods and drugs, stating wherein the adul-
terations of foods and drugs consist, and defining the duties of the
State Board of Health," etc., is not in violation of the constitutional
requirement that "every act shall embrace but one subject and
matters properly connected therewith, which subject shall be ex-
pressed in the title.'
Isenhour v. State, 517.

FRAUD-Estoppel by reason of, see ESTOPPEL; Shedd v. Webb, 585.
Replevin of goods when sale induced by fraud, see REPLEVIN ;
Adam, etc., Co. v. Stewart, 678.

Withholding mortgage from record, see CHATTEL MORTGAGES 1;
National State Bank v. Sandford Fork, etc., Co., 10.

GAS-Injunction to prevent enforcement of ordinance fixing gas
rates, see INJUNCTION, 2; City of Noblesville v. Noblesville Gas,
etc., Co., 162.

Fixing rates to consumers, see MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 17-20;
City of Noblesville v. Noblesville Gas, etc., Co., 162.

-

Refusal of Company to Furnish Gas. Franchises.-A natural
gas company authorized by the legislature to exercise the right
of eminent domain, and licensed by a city to lay pipe-lines
through its streets and alleys for the distribution of gas to consumers
is not relieved from furnishing gas to an applicant in front of whose
premises the pipes were laid, because it has an insufficient supply of
gas properly to supply its present customers.

State, ex rel., v. Consumers Gas Co., 345.

GRAND JURY—
Examining Witnesses.-The grand jury examining a witness under
oath need not inform such witness of his constitutional privilege
to refuse to testify in matters tending to criminate himself.
State v. Comer, 611.
GUARDIAN AND WARD-Custody of child, see PARENT AND
CHILD; Berkshire v. Caley, 1.

HABEAS CORPUS-By parent to procure possession of child, see
PARENT AND CHILD, and EVIDENCE, 9; Berkshire v. Caley, 1.

1. Refusal of Trial by Jury.-Criminal Law.-Where defendant was
tried and convicted for petit larceny, a writ of habeas corpus for
his release, on the ground that he was refused a trial by jury, was
properly denied, as the action of the court in refusing defendant
a trial by jury, if erroneous, did not deprive the court of juris-
diction of the offense charged, nor of the person of defendant,
and can only be reviewed and corrected on appeal.
Williams v. Hert, 211.

VOL. 157-47

HABEAS CORPUS-Continued.

2. City Ordinance.-Constitutionality.-Collateral Attack.-A judg
ment of the police court of Evansville convicting defendant for
violation of a city ordinance is not void on account of the uncon-
stitutionality of the ordinance, and the action of the circuit court
in refusing to quash a writ of habeas corpus for the release of de-
fendant, on the ground that the ordinance was unconstitutional,
Koepke v. Hill, 172.

was erroneous.

HARMLESS ERROR-See APPEAL AND ERROR, 45-51.

Misjoinder of causes of action, see PLEADING, 6; Coddington v.
Canaday, 243.

HEALTH—Prosecution for violation of pure food law, see FOOD, 1-9;
Isenhour v. State, 517.

-

1. Boards of Health.-Order for Vaccination of School Children.-
Enforcement of Order. - Mandamus. - Parties. — The school trus-
tees of a city are the proper parties to be called upon to enforce an
order of the board of health requiring all children to be vaccinated
before being permitted to attend the schools of such city during a
threatened epidemic of smallpox.
State, ex rel., v. Beil, 25.
2. Vaccination of School Children.— Complaint.— A complaint by
the State on the relation of the secretary of the county and city
boards of health to compel the school trustees of the city schools
to enforce an order of such boards of health requiring all children
to be vaccinated before being permitted to attend any of the
schools of the county or city respectively is not bad for failure to
set out the rule adopted by the boards of health.

State, ex rel., v. Beil, 25.
3. Boards of Health.-Order for Vaccination of School Children.—
Mandamus.-It is the duty of the board of health to determine
when there has been an exposure to contagious disease, when the
health of the citizens is threatened by an epidemic, and when the
preservation of the health of the people demands that the board
take action to prevent the spread of such disease, and in an action
to compel the school trustees of a city to enforce an order of the
board of health requiring all children to be vaccinated before
being permitted to attend school it is not necessary to set forth the
facts constituting the emergency upon which the order was based.
State, ex rel., v. Beil, 25.
HUSBAND AND WIFE-Action by husband for injury to wife,
see DAMAGES, 1, 2, and NEGLIGENCE, 5, 8, 9; Indianapolis St. R.
Co. v. Robinson, 414.

INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW-Instruction in trial for
larceny need not state the penalty for such offense, see CRIMI-
NAL LAW, 45; Currier v. State, 114.

INDICTMENT-Joint indictment for murder, see CRIMINAL LAW,
12; Musser v. State, 423.

For seduction, see CRIMINAL LAW, 1; Hinkle v. State, 237.

For attempted bribery, see BRIBERY, 1, 2; Banks v. State, 190; Hig-
gins v. State, 57.

For blackmailing, see BLACKMAILING, 1; Green v. State, 101.

INDICTMENT-Continued.

Objections to proceedings in returning indictment, see CRIMINAL
LAW, 11; Rinkard v. State, 534.

Presumptions as to regularity, see CRIMINAL LAW, 10; Rinkard v.
State, 534.

INJUNCTION—Suit to enjoin collection of taxes, see PLEADING, 8;
First Nat. Bank v. Greger, 479.

1. Taxation.-Complaint.-A complaint by a bank to enjoin the
collection of taxes, alleging that the valuation of its capital stock
and property as entered on the tax duplicate was $143,110, but
that on appeal the State Board of Tax Commissioners assessed the
same at $133,110, and that plaintiff paid the taxes on the latter valu.
ation, is sufficient on demurrer. First Nat. Bank v. Greger, 479.
2. Natural Gas Company.-Municipal Corporations.-Complaint.
--In an action by a gas company, having the right to make rea-
sonable charges for gas to its consumers, to enjoin the enforcement
of an ordinance fixing the rate of charges, the complaint was not
bad for failing to allege that the prices charged by plaintiff were
reasonable. City of Noblesville v. Noblesville Gas, etc., Co., 162.

INSOLVENCY-Notice of to creditors, see NOTICE; Reagan v. First
Nat. Bank, 623.

Execution of mortgage on day of general assignment for benefit of
creditors, see MORTGAGES, 1-4; Reagan v. First Nat. Bank, 623.
Mortgage by insolvent corporation securing holders of preferred
stock in violation of statute, see CORPORATIONS, 1, 2, 3; Reagan v.
First Nat. Bank, 623.

Insolvent bank may borrow money, see BANKS AND Banking, 1;
Harris v. Randolph County Bank, 120.

INSTRUCTIONS-See TRIAL.

INTOXICATING LIQUORS—Ordinance prohibiting sales in resi-
dence districts, see MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 21-23; Rowland v.
City of Greencastle, 591.

1. License.-Appeal.-Section 4 of the act of 1875 (Acts 1875, p. 55),
regulating and licensing the sale of intoxicating liquors, being
impressed with such ambiguity and uncertainty as to render it
open to judicial construction, an appeal from a prosecution under
such statute for selling intoxicating liquors without license is
authorized by §8 of the act of 1901 (Acts 1901, p. 565).

State v. Sopher, 360.

2. Appeal from Order Granting License.-Right to Sell Pending
Appeal. The act of 1875 (Acts 1875, p. 55, §5315 R. S. 1881), does not
abrogate the rule that an appeal from the decision of the board of
county commissioners granting a license to sell intoxicating liquors
operates as a suspension of all rights of the applicant thereunder,
but modifies the rule to the extent that his rights thereunder do not
terminate until the close of the next term of court during which
the cause may be lawfully tried.
State v. Sopher, 360.