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man is endowed with a Sympathetic Feeling, that is, LECT he rejoices with those that rejoice, and grieves with those that grieve. Compassion,-Pity,-is the name given to the latter modification of sympathy; the former is without a definite name. Besides sympathetic sorrow and sympathetic joy, there are a variety of feelings which have reference to our existence in a social relation. Of these there is that connected with Vanity, or the wish to please others from the Vanity. desire of being respected by them; with Shame, or the Shame. fear and sorrow at incurring their disrespect; with Pride, or the overweening sentiment of our own worth. Pride. To the same class we may refer the feelings connected with Indignation, Resentment, Anger, Scorn, &c.

ency to de

In the fourth place, there is in man implanted a 4. Tenddesire of developing his powers,—there is a tendency velopment. towards perfection. In virtue of this, the consciousness of all comparative inability causes pain; the consciousness of all comparative power causes pleasure. To this class belong the feelings which accompany Emulation, the desire of rising superior to others; and Envy, the desire of reducing others beneath ourselves.

Moral Law.

In the fifth place, we are conscious that there is in 5. The man a Moral Law,-a Law of Duty, which unconditionally commands the fulfilment of its behests. This supposes, that we are able to fulfil them, or our nature is a lie; and the liberty of human action is thus, independently of all direct consciousness, involved in the datum of the Law of Duty. Inasmuch also as Moral Intelligence unconditionally commands us to perform what we are conscious to be our duty, there is attributed to man an absolute worth,-an absolute dignity. The feeling which the manifestation of this

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LECT. worth excites, is called Respect. With the consciousness of the lofty nature of our moral tendencies, and our ability to fulfil what the law of duty prescribes, there is connected the feeling of Self-respect; whereas, from a consciousness of the contrast between what we ought to do, and what we actually perform, there arises the feeling of Self-abasement. The sentiment of respect for the law of duty is the Moral Feeling, which has by some been improperly denominated the Moral Sense; for through this feeling we do not take cognisance whether anything be morally good or morally evil, but when, by our intelligence, we recognise aught to be of such a character, there is herewith associated a feeling of pain or pleasure, which is nothing more than our state in reference to the fulfilment or violation of the law.

Man, as conscious of his liberty to act, and of the law by which his actions ought to be regulated, recognises his personal accountability, and calls himself before the internal tribunal which we denominate Conscience. Here he is either acquitted or condemned. The acquittal is connected with a peculiar feeling of pleasurable exultation, as the condemnation with a peculiar feeling of painful humiliation,Remorse.

APPENDIX.

I. PERCEPTION.-FRAGMENTS.-(See Vol. II. p. 29.)

(Written in connection with proposed MEMOIR OF MR STEWART. On Desk, May 1856; written Autumn 1855.—ED.)

THERE are three considerations which seem to have been principally effective in promoting the theory of a Mediate or Representative Perception, and by perception is meant the apprehension, through sense, of external things. These might operate severally or together.

The first is, that such a hypothesis is necessary to render possible the perception of distant objects. It was taken as granted that certain material realities, (as a sun, stars, &c.), not immediately present to sense, were cognised in a perceptive act. These realities could not be known immediately, or in themselves, unless known as they existed, and they existed only as they existed in their place in space. If, therefore, the perceptive mind did not sally out to them, (which, with the exception of one or two theorists, was scouted as an impossible hypothesis), an immediate perception behoved to be abandoned, and the sensitive cognition we have of them must be vicarious; that is, not of the realities themselves, as present to our organs, and presented to apprehension, but of something different from the realities externally existing, through which, however, they are mediately represented. Various theories in regard to the nature of this medium or vicarious object may be entertained; but these may be overpassed. This first consideration alone was principally effectual among materialists: on them the second had no influence.

A second consideration was the opposite and apparently inconsistent nature of the object and subject of cognition; for here the reality to be known is material, whereas the mind knowing is immaterial; while it was long generally believed, that what is

known must be of an analogous essence, (the same or similar), to what knows. In consequence of this persuasion, it was deemed impossible that the immaterial unextended mind could apprehend in itself, as extended, a material reality. To explain the fact of sensitive perception, it was therefore supposed requisite to attenuate, to immaterialise the immediate object of perception, by dividing the object known from the reality existing. Perception thus became a vicarious or mediate cognition, in which the corporeal was said to be represented by the incorporeal.

PERCEPTION-POSITIVE RESULT.

1. We perceive only through the senses.

2. The senses are corporeal instruments,-parts of our bodily organism.

3. We are, therefore, percipient only through, or by means of, the body. In other words, material and external things are to us only not as zero, inasmuch as they are apprehended by the mind in their relation with the material organ which it animates, and with which it is united.

4. An external existence, and an organ of sense, as both material, can stand in relation only according to the laws of matter. According to these laws, things related,-connected, must act and be acted on; but a thing can act only where it is. Therefore the thing perceived, and the percipient organ, must meet in place,must be contiguous. The consequence of this doctrine is a complete simplification of the theory of perception, and a return to the most ancient speculation on the point. All sensible cognition is, in a certain acceptation, reduced to Touch, and this is the very conclusion maintained by the venerable authority of Democritus.

According to this doctrine, it is erroneous, in the first place, to affirm that we are percipient of distant, &c. objects.

It is erroneous, in the second place, to say that we perceive external things in themselves, in the signification that we perceive them as existing in their own nature, and not in relation to the living organ. The real, the total, the only object perceived has, as a relative, two phases. It may be described either as the idiopathic affection of the sense, (i. e. the sense in relation to an external reality), or as the quality of a thing actually determining such or

such an affection of the sentient organ, (i. e. an external reality in correlation to the sense).

A corollary of the same doctrine is, that what have been denominated the Primary Qualities of body, are only perceived through the Secondary; in fact, Perception proper cannot be realised except through Sensation Proper. But synchronous.

The object of perception is an affection, not of the mind as apart from body, not of the body as apart from mind, but of the composite formed by union of the two; that is, of the animated or living organism (Aristotle).

In the process of perception there is required both an act of the conscious mind and a passion of the affected body; the one without the other is null. Galen has, therefore, well said, "Sensitive perception is not a mere passive or affective change, but the discrimination of an effective change."a (Aristotle,-judgment.)

Perception supposes Consciousness, and Consciousness supposes Memory and Judgment; for, abstract Consciousness, and there is no Perception; abstract Memory, or Judgment, and Consciousness is abolished. (Hobbes,-Memory; Aristotle,-Judgment of Sense.) Memory, Recollection; for change is necessary to Consciousness, and change is only to be apprehended through the faculty of Remembrance. Hobbes has, therefore, truly said of Perception,"Sentire semper idem, et non sentire, ad idem recidunt." But there could be no discriminative apprehension, supposing always memory without an act whereby difference was affirmed or sameness denied; that is, without an act of Judgment. Aristotler is, therefore, right in making Perception a Judgment.

II. LAWS OF THOUGHT.-(See Vol. II. p. 368.)

(Written in connection with proposed MEMOIR OF MR STEWART. On Desk, May 1856; written Autumn 1855.-ED.)

The doctrine of Contradiction, or of Contradictories, (ážíwμa îns avripάrews), that Affirmation or Negation is a necessity of thought, whilst Affirmation and Negation are incompatible, is developed into three sides or phases, each of which implies both the others,

a See Reid's Works, p. 878.-ED. B See Ibid.-ED. y See Ibid.-Ed.