when it was to be employed on a field such as had not for ages been presented to the British army, and to participate in the military operations which commenced in the Spanish peninsula in 1808, and continued till the conclusion of the war in 1814. Within these six years, a career was opened for talent, courage, enterprise, and all the most eminent qualities necessary for a commander and an army as splendid as that in the reign of Queen Anne, when the transcendant genius of the Duke of Marlborough, with the great force entrusted to his command, raised the military character of the British nation to a pre-eminence which it has not since that period been able to uphold, on an equally extended scale of operations. Insulated examples of military talent, and undaunted firmness, were sufficiently numerous to prove that there was no deficiency in any respect, and that those opportunities and that experience were only wanting which are so indispensably necessary in the profession of a soldier.

For many years the strength and energy of the country had been so much directed to the conquest and defence of colonies, that little else had been attempted. The force supposed necessary was generally so strictly calculated, that little was left for contingencies, and frequently, after any successful enterprise had been accomplished, the force was so diminished by warfare, disease, and climate, as to be unequal to the defence of the conquest. The same troops were sometimes compelled to surrender on the spot where they had previously triumphed. This produced an unfavourable impression which their former triumph could not always efface.

Such results bore hard on the officers, to whose want of ability and professional ignorance they were not unfrequently, and often unjustly, ascribed. The preservation and protection of the island of St Lucia, in the year 1796 and 1797, occasioned the death of more than six times the number of men killed in the capture of it by Sir Ralph Abercromby; and there is little doubt that, if the duty had been entrusted to an officer of less unwearied zeal and

persevering exertion than General Moore, it would not have been preserved.

But a new and noble field was now opened, and although, in many cases, there was a scarcity of troops, and a want of some very efficient arms, arising from the difficulty of transporting artillery and cavalry, still there was scope for the display of mental resources; and sometimes a skilful retreat proved as honourable to the talents of the commander as a victory. In colonial warfare, on the contrary, the theatre of action was often so circumscribed, as to afford no room for the display of military talent, and leave no hope of adquate and timely support.

SECTION XIX.

Campaign in Portugal and Spain-Advance and retreat of Sir John Moore-Battle of Corunna-Death of the Commander.

WHEN the usurpation of the crown of Spain by Bonaparte had roused the patriotism of the Spanish people, the British government, anxious to take advantage of this spirit, immediately ordered a large proportion of its disposable force to embark for the Peninsula.

In the month of July 1808, Major-General Sir Arthur Wellesley sailed from Cork with 10,000 men, with the intention of landing at Corunna, but the Spaniards rejecting his offered assistance, he proceeded to the coast of Portugal. But at Oporto, as at Corunna, the offered assistance was declined, although nearly two thirds of the Portuguese peasantry were calling for arms, and ready to rise against the French, who had invaded and taken possession of the country with a force of nearly 40,000 men. In these circumstances, he continued his voyage to Mondego Bay, where, after a farther delay, he landed on the 2d of August. Major-General Spencer, with 6000 men, then on board transports off Cadiz, but not permitted to land, was ordered to join General Wellesley, who was farther to be reinforced with 5000 men, under Brigadier-General Robert Anstruther, from England, and 12,000 under LieutenantGeneral Sir John Moore. To this concentrated force was added the Royal Highland regiment from Gibraltar. * Pre

* It has been already stated, that, in this national corps, the characteristic, so far as regarded the native country of the soldiers, had been well preserved. In 1776 the number embarked for America was 1160 men, all of whom, except 54 Lowlanders, and 2 Englishmen in the

viously to this period was fought, on the 21st of August, the battle of Vimiera, subsequently to which, an extraordinary collision of commands occurred. General Wellesley, who had gained the battle, was on the same day superseded by two senior generals, (Sir Harry Burrard and Sir John Moore,) and these again, on the following morning, by a third general, Sir Hew Dalrymple. The convention of Cintra which followed, causing the recal of Generals Dalrymple and Burrard, the command of the army devolved on Sir John Moore.

An order to resume active operations was received on the 6th of October, accompanied with instructions to march, with all possible expedition, into the heart of Spain, to cooperate with the Spanish army. A body of troops from England, under Lieutenant General Sir David Baird, was directed to land at Corunna, and proceed forthwith to form a junction with General Moore. The want of previous preparations retarded the advance of the army from Lisbon, and the Portuguese government and people affording but little assistance, the whole was left to the resources and talents of the commander, who, incredible as it may appear, could obtain no correct information of the state of the country, or even of the best road for the transport of artillery. Labouring under this deficiency of accurate intelligence, and from the best accounts he could procure, believing it impossible to convey artillery by the road through the mountains, in the defective state of the Commissariat, it was judged necessary to form the army in divisions, and to march by different routes.

band, were Highlanders. In all former periods the proportions were similar. But when the men ordered from the London depôt in 1780 were removed from the regiment, not more than one-half of those received in exchange were native Highlanders, 81 being Lowlanders. At the commencement of the war in 1793 the strength of the regiment was low. The proportions were 480 Highlanders, 152 Lowland Scotch, 4 Irish, and 3 English. At the present period there embarked from Gibraltar, in 1808, 583 Highlanders, 231 Lowlanders, 7 English, and 5 Irish.

The division of the Honourable Lieutenant-General Hope, consisting of the brigade of artillery, and four regiments of infantry, of which the 42d was one, marched upon Madrid and Espinar; General Paget's division moved by Elvas and Alcantara; General Beresford by Coimbra and Almeida; and General Mackenzie Fraser by Abrantes and Almeida. All these divisions were to form a junction at Salamanca, and when united would amount to 18,600 men, including 900 cavalry. This force, it was believed, would revive Spanish patriotism, and enable the natives to oppose an effectual resistance to the powerful force which the enemy was preparing to pour into Spain in support of that already in the country. As the army advanced little enthusiasm was perceived, and nothing was experienced like the reception which might have been expected by men entering the country with the generous and disinterested purpose of aiding the people in throwing off a yoke which, they were taught to believe, the Spanish nation to a man regarded as odious, galling, and disgraceful. General Moore soon found that little dependence was to be placed on the co-operation of the Spanish armies, or on the intelligence furnished by the inhabitants of either Spain or Portugal. Of the incorrectness of the latter he had a striking proof, when he subsequently discovered that the roads were practicable for artillery, that the circuitous route of General Hope was totally unnecessary, and that better information would have enabled him to bring his troops much sooner to the point of rendezvous. He arrived, however, in sufficient time for those allies with whom he was to act in concert, for, from the day he entered Spain, until the 13th of November, when he reached Salamanca, he did not see a Spanish soldier, and so far from having any communication with the Generals commanding the Spanish armies, or any immediate prospect of their concentrating their forces, and acting in concert for the further service of the common cause, it would seem as if he himself had been the only enemy they feared. All va