1818. Dugan V. maintained in the name of Tucker for want of interest in him. According to the doctrine on the other side, But all he alone is suable, as well as empowered to sue. Unit. States the authorities show that an agent contracting on the behalf of government is not personally liable:" and the other alternative of the proposition, that he is personally capable of maintaining an action, cannot be supported. A person may become a party to a bill, not only by his own immediate act, but by procuration; by the act of his attorney or agent: and all persons may be agents for this purpose, whether capable of contracting on their own account, so as to bind themselves, or not.b An agent of the government who draws or endorses a bill will not he personally bound, even if he draws or endorses in his own name, without stating that he acts as agent. But here Tucker subscribed the style of his office. It is sufficient to declare on a bill of exchange according to the legal intendment and effect, and an averment that the endorsement was to the party interested is satisfied by showing an endorsement to his agent. The United States, though not natural persons engaged in commerce, may be parties to a bill of exchange. The United States are a body politic and corporate; and it has long since ceased to be necessa a Macbeth v. Haldimand, 1 T. R. 172. Unwin v. Wolseley, Id. 674. Myrtle v. Beaver, 1 East, 135. Rice v. Chute, Id. 579. Hodgson v. Dexter, 1 Cranch, 363. Jones v. Le Tombe, 3 Dall. 384. Brown v. Austin, 1 Mass. Rep. 203. Sheffield v. Watson, 3 Caines' Rep. 69. Freemen v. Otis, 9 Mass. Rep. 272. b Chitty on Bills, 34. Am. ed. of 1817. 'c Id. 40. d Id. 365. 367. App. 528. 539. ry in a declaration on a bill of exchange to state the 1818. V. Unit. States custom of merchants, and that the parties to it were Dugan persons within the customs. Consequently, they have the same right to sue on a bill as any other persons; and that they are not reciprocally liable to be sued, is an attribute of sovereignty. Individuals contracting with them rely on their dignity and justice. But the power of suing on their part is essential to the collection of the public revinue, to the support of government, and to the payment of the public debts. Mr. Justice LIVINGSTON delivered the opinion of the court, and after stating the facts, proceeded as follows: The first question which will be disposed of, although not the first in the order of argument, will be, whether the endorsement. of this hill to Mr. Tucker, under the peculiar circumstances attending the transaction did not pass such an interest to the United States, a's to enable them to sue in their own name. In deciding this point, it will be taken for granted, that no doubt can arise on the special verdict as to the party really interested in this bill. It was purchased with the money of the United States. It was endorsed, to their treasurer; it was registered at their treasury; it was forwarded by their secretary of the treasury, to whom it was returned, after it had been dishonoured, for and on behalf, as the jury expressly find, of the United States. Indeed, without .denying the bill to be the property of the United States it is supposed that the ac Feb. 19th. 1818. V. tion should have been in the name of Mr. Tucker, their treasurer, and not in the name of the cestuy que trust. Dugan If it be admitted, as it must be, that a party may in Unit. States. some cases declare according to the legal intendment of an instrument, it is not easy to conceive a case where such an intendment can be stronger, than in the case before the court. but it is supposed that before any such intendment can be made, it must appear that Mr. Tucker acted under some law, and that his conduct throughout comported with his duties as therein prescribed. It is sufficient for the present purpose that he appears to have acted in his official character, and in conjunction with other officers of the treasury. The court is not bound to presume that he acted otherwise than according to law, or those rules which had been established by the proper departments of government for the transaction of business of this nature. If it Quare, whether when abe generally true, that when a bill is endorsed to the to an agent for agent of another for the use of his principal, an action the use of his cannot be maintained, in the name of such principal (on principal, an action thereon which point no opinion is given,) the government should tained by the form an exception to such rule, and the U. States be perprincipal in his mitted to sue in their own name, whenever it appears, not may be as be only on the face of the instrument, but from all the evitween private dence, that they alone were interested in the subject matparties, the United States ter of the controversy. There is a fitness that the public their own by its own officers should conduct all actions in which name when- it is interested, and in its own name; and the in. bill is endorsed can be main own name? However this may sue in ever it appears alone interest that they are conveniences to which individuals may be exposed ed in the sub- in this way, if any, are light, when weighed against ject matter. 1818. Dugan those which would result from its being always forced to bring an action in the name of an agent. Not only the death or bankruptcy of an agent may cre ate difficulties, but set-offs may be interposed against Unit. States the individual who is plaintiff, unless the court will take notice of the interest of the United States; and if they can do this to prevent a set-off, which courts of law have done, why not at once permit an action to be instituted in the name of the United States? An intimation was thrown out that the United States had no right to sue in any case, without an act of congress for the purpose. On this point the court entertains no doubt. In all cases of contract with the United States, they must have a right to enforce the performance of such contract, or to recover damages for their violation, by actions in their own name, unless a different mode of suit be prescribed by law, which is not pretended to be the case here. It would be strange to deny to them. a right which is secured to every citizen of the United States. It is next said by the plaintiff in error, that if the endorsement to Mr. Tucker, as treasurer of the United States, passed such an interest to the latter, as to enable them to sue in their own name, yet such title was devested by Mr. Tucker's endorsing the bill to the Messrs. Willinks and Van Staphorst, which endorsement appeared on the bill at the trial, and is still on it. The argument on this point is, that the transfer to the last endorsees being in full, a recovery cannot be had in the name of the United States, without produc ing from them a receipt, or a re-indorsement of the bill, 1818. Dugan and that this endorsment not being in blank could not be obliterated at the trial, so that the court and jury were bound to believe, that the title to this bill was Unit. States not in the United States but in the gentleman to whom Mr. Tucker had endorsed it. The endorser The mere returning of this bill, with the protest for non-acceptance and non-payment by the Messrs. Willinks and Van Staphorst to the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States, for their account, is presumptive evidence of the former having acted only as agents or as bankers of the United States. When that is not the case, it is not usual to send a bill back to the last endorser, but to some third person, who may give notice of its being dishonoured and apply for payment to such endorser, as well as to every other party to the bill. In the case of an agency, then so fully established, it would be vain to expect either a receipt or a re-endorsement of the bill. The first could not be giv en consistent with the truth of the fact, and the latter might well be refused by a cautious person who had no interest whatever in the, transaction. In such case, therefore, a court may well say that all the title which the last endorsees ever had in the bill, which was a mere right to collect it for the United States, was devested by the single act of returning it to the party of of a bill, who whom it was received. comes again into the pos- Messrs. Willinks and Van But if this agency in the session thercof is to be regard lished, the opinion of the court would be the same. ed as the bona After an examination of the cases on this subject, fide holder and proprietor, un less the contrary appears, and may recover thereon, notwithstanding there may be one or more endorsements in full, subsequent to the endorsement to him, without producing any receipt or endorsement back to him, from either of such endorsees, and without striking their names from the bill. |