viz., June, 1849? and not for obsolete returns for for four particular ships, the cost of which had been, especially in one case, exaggerated beyond all reasonable bounds. Thus the returns for a 28 gun sloop, the Tweed, had been set down at £292, being greater than the returns for a line of battle ship fitted only a few years subsequently. The shipwright officers, as if conscious of the financial injustice of such returns, enter a minute in red ink in their report to this effect: "This ship was fitted under peculiar circumstances. A vessel of her class would not cost at this time one third the amount." Now as it must be allowed that there is a vast difference between £292 and the one third part of £292, that is, about £97, it is so far demonstrable that the return for this ship, the Tweed, if not thus explained, and that by a mere chance, could only tend to mislead the public mind upon the financial question at issue. Similar minutes accompanied the shipwright officers' returns in 1839 for two other ships, viz., Caledonia, 120, and Revenge, 76, fitted in 1830; the cost of which was set down at £423 and £416*; and in which they say, "This is the cost as nearly as is ascertained; but if fitted up at the present time, the cost would be considerably less," &c. 29. With respect to the cost of the Tweed, sloop, it has already been remarked (26) that the new conductors were applied in that vessel immediately under the Dock Yard administration of the First Naval Lord, a near relative of the noble Lord then at the head of the Admiralty, and who originated the precept now under consideration. Moreover, the professed object in fitting this ship, was a comparison of the cost of the permanent conductors and the temporary conductors of wire rope, then (1840) a question of consideration with the Board of Admiralty. In carrying out this, however, the inventor of the permanent conductors was refused all superintendence or interference with the work, which was left altogether at the mercy of a powerful party, avowedly opposed to the whole system. The consequence was, that the expense of fitting the Tweed, from the little care taken in economising the work, was three times as great as it should have been; and which is clearly proved by the minute of the shipwrights just adverted to (28). 30. It is curious to remark in this question of the cost of the plan to the country, how extravagantly those opposed to it were led to proceed. Taking the aggregate sums £423 and £416 for First and Second Rates, and the heavy sums of £292 and £236, which were placed against a 28 gun sloop, and the Beagle 10 gun brig,-as fair illustrations for the whole Navy,-they added together all the first rates at £423 each, all the second rates at £416 each, and so on, and in this way arrived at a frightful amount. So that representations were made to the Board of Admiralty to the effect that the use of the new conductors in the Royal Navy entailed upon the country an expenditure of no less than £30,000 annually. Whereas that whilst many thousands were being saved every year to the Treasury, the cost Parliamentary Reports, Feb. 1840, p. 83. of the conductors was really so small as to be scarcely worth consideration: the few following facts and considerations will clearly show this. 31. First it is to be observed, that the material of which the conductors consist, will last for an almost indefinate time, and may be transferred from ship to ship, or be converted into new copper sheet at the small cost of four-fifths of a penny per pound*: and since it could be shown that the quantity of copper sheet in the Government service would be just as great whether the fixed lightning conductors were general in the Navy, and constituted a part of it, or not,—the actual cost of these conductors to the Crown would-to make the most of it -be virtually reduced to the labour of the application, and the cost of reconversion of the material. The following official Table, taken from the Parliamentary Report, exhibits the actual cost to the Crown of the fixed system of lightning conductors for H.M. ships, after making deduction for reconvertible material only as old copper, and taking a liberal credit even for interest of money, labour of fitting, &c., &c. Cost to the Crown. £125 £119 £111 £104 £93 £66 £51 £44 Now if it be thus evident that the actual cost to the country for a first rate is only £125, or for a sloop, such as the Tweed, not more than £51, then how great a fallacy and injustice is apparent in leading the public to believe that the cost is £423 and £292 for such ships, and which expenditure is liable to occur yearly. This then, as a question of finance, becomes an important and interesting point in a history of this kind, and is hence worth a little further illustration. 32. We may here observe, that a ship once fitted with the permanent conductors as an integral part of the vessel, (10,) does not necessarily involve any further cost so long as she lasts, which should be from 16 to 20 years; the masts perhaps may require to be replaced within that time; still the same copper plates are available, (31,) so that the whole Navy being completed, there is no longer any new outlay, at least nothing of any moment: the actual cost of the permanent conductors is really little more than the expense of workmanship, and the loss upon the reconversion of material (31). To which we should add perhaps the labour of cutting, drilling, and uniting the plates; the whole expense of workmanship, together with the nails, should not for a first rate greatly exceed from £70 to £80. With respect to the material itself, as we have already observed, (31,) the quantity of copper in the public service would not be materially affected by the application; the only difference would be, that a small portion of it would be doing good service in preserving our ships from lightning, instead of remaining unemployed in the stores of the Dock-yard, If we take the cost to the Crown in round numbers as £75 for placing * Returns to the House of Commons, 6th April, 1835, printed March 19. + Shipwreck by Lightning, page 13. a first rate, worth £150,000 all included, in security from lightning, and that too for 16 or 20 years, that is really as much as should be allowed. Let, however, the cost be taken at £100, still it would not exceed the fifteen hundredth part of the value of the ship. But when we reflect on the vast and important services for which such a ship is destined, that she is a material element of the power of the greatest maritime nation on the page of history, that she is charged with the lives of 800 seamen, will it be said that an expenditure not exceeding the fifteen hundredth part of the value of so noble a structure, is too great a sum for insuring its security against one of the most terrible elements of nature. This question of the cost of the plan, therefore, so unremittingly pursued in the way of objection to its use in the Navy, was evidently based on a narrow, short-sighted, economy, quite unworthy of any one professing to exercise the functions of a British statesman. 33. If we only for a moment turn to the destruction by lightning found to have occurred in the Royal Navy in past times, and to the saving at present affected, this conclusion is irresistable. In April, 1813, the Repulse, of 74 guns, actually engaged in the pursuit of an enemy's squadron in the Mediterranean, was twice struck by lightning in the Bay of Rosas; no less than ten seamen were killed dead on the spot, ten more were so severy injured that the greater part eventually perished. The ship at once lost twenty of her crew: in addition to this, the mainmast was ruined-no sail could be carried on it, the topmast and top-gallant-mast were shivered in pieces, and the vessel effectually placed "hors de combat." She suffered more than would have probably ensued as the result of a general action: thus did Sir S. Hood lose the services of one of his most efficient ships, to say nothing of the cost of the subsequent refit at Minorca. When the question of economy, therefore, is considered, it is essential to recollect such cases as this, so very common in the records of the Navy. 34. Now with respect to the actual state of the Navy as regards its deliverance from such terrible casualties, it is to be observed, that only within the short space of sixteen months, viz, between March, 1846, and July, 1847, at least ten ships, including four large frigates, were completely saved out of the destructive thunderstorms of Tropical Climates; these ships were-America, 50, Constance, 50, Fisguard, 42, Fox, 42, Conway, 26, Rose, 18, Racer, 18, Dido, 18, Albatross, 16, Childers, 12; and by which a sum of certainly not less than £10,000 must have been saved to the Treasury. Let any one acquainted with such details, say, what would have been the loss and inconvenience to the Country, had such a ship as the Constance, a frigate of 2,000 tons, lost one or perhaps two masts, on the coast of Mexico, or the Fisguard of 42 guns, been similarly dealt with on the Oregon. In January, 1850, the Ganges of 80 guns, was preserved from a furious stroke of lightning, at Athens. Then we have had numerous recent instances of the Ranger, 18, Rattler, steam-ship, and others on the coast of See Returns to the House of Peers, 14th June, 1849, No. 154. Africa; Calliope, 26, in New South Wales; Southampton, 50, at Rio; &c., &c. In short, as before observed, (22,) the only instances in which damage has arisen of late years, to ships of H.M. Navy from lightning, are a few cases in which from some peculiar circumstances, the fixed conductors had not been placed. We will however confine ourselves to the first few cases, and stop only to examine the saving effected, as compared with the outlay for the conductors. On a comparison with known cases of damage by lightning in similar ships, a sum of not less than £3,000 must have been saved upon such a ship as the Ganges, and certainly not less than £10,000 upon the ten vessels just named. Here then is at least £13,000 saved to the Treasury upon a few cases only: now, referring to the Table already quoted, (30,) we have the following cost of the conductors by which this saving has been effected. One ship of the line, second rate, £119; two large frigates, or third rates, £222; two frigates, fourth rates, £208; five sloops, £255; one brig, £44:-total, £848. So that £850 would cover the outlay for conductors upon these ships for 16 or 20 years. In return, the country has saved at least £13,000; and what is of still greater importance, the services of the ships and the sailors' lives. This result, although perfectly satisfactory, is not the only consideration: we may imagine, that within the period of a ship's existence, she may suffer many times from lightning. The Racer, Conway, and Albatross, were preserved on more than one occasion; the Cumberland, 74, in former years, viz., 1810 to 1812, was disabled by lightning no less than three times, that is, within two years, and once set on fire; within this period she had no less than three refits and two new mainmasts. We are not now speaking from any casual evidence, but on the faith of official records. Apply this to the whole Navy, and what becomes of the question of the exception taken to the permanent system of conductors employed in H.M. ships on the ground of economy. 35. On comparing the cost with that of the temporary conductors of wire ropes, we find by the returns to the precept of 18th June, 1849*, that the cost and outlay for wire conductors amounted after all to something considerable; being, for a first rate, £80, without sea store now little allowance can be made here for reconvertible material; for it is to be observed, that wire rope, like any other kind of rope, is perishable, likely to be lost overboard, or, what is termed in the Navy, expended, in various ways; then its cost price was at least four times the cost of common copper sheet; and there would be a loss of at least three fourths of its original cost upon every pound sent to the furnaces at Portsmouth. Taking all this into account, it is evident that the economy was, after all, in favour of the permanent system; besides that the latter has been proved secure, whilst the temporary system is insecure, as a few well recorded facts fully show. 36. That small ropes of wire may carry off lightning, and occasionally protect a ship from damage, few will deny. Dr. Franklin * No. 80, Printed 15th March, 1850. found that even bell-wires have transmitted lightning with safety. This, however, was not the point at issue. The great question under consideration was, the adoption of such a system of permanently fixed electrical conductors in ships, as would be independent of the crew, and effectually secure the vessel from lightning at all times and under all circumstances (10). It was also to be further considered, that since a conductor on one mast-suppose the mainmost-does not necessarily defend the other masts, (7,) it is requisite to apply a conductor to each mast; and thus the crew have to provide for the application of three wire conductors in the rigging, and have consequently three temporary conductors to look after instead of one, formerly considered sufficient. 37. Now of the several vessels named in the returns to the precept just named, printed 15th March, 1850, and as having previously to the 6th of June, 1842, been fitted with lightning conductors of wire rope, we find at least two cases in which serious damage arose, incidental to the conditions already laid down (14). Thus in the Bittern, sloop, struck by lightning on the coast of Africa in January, 1844, only a portion of the charge was carried off: the consequence was, that the royal-mast was shivered in pieces; and, by the surgeon's return and ship's report, no less than eight men were struck down on the deck and sent to the hospital. In the Hazard, sloop, struck by the electrical discharge on two occasions at Sumatra, in May, 1846, the wire conductor was partially destroyed, the copper to which it was attached torn off the ship's side, the main-top-gallant-mast and main-topmast shivered in pieces, and much other damage done; thus furnishing a very convincing proof of the soundness of the views entertained by the Commissioners, viz., that such a form of conductor can only be regarded as a "temporary and inadequate expedient," and "liable to lead to serious accidents." Similar results had ensued in other directions: La Junon, a French frigate, having a similar conductor, was struck by lightning, which divided upon the body of the vessel, and damage ensued*. At "L'Hotel des Invalides," at Paris, the electrical discharge shattered a wire rope conductor in pieces, and severely damaged the building. Similar results ensued in a French brig, Bougainville, struck by lightning on the coast of Africa, whilst in company with H.M. brig, Ferret, which, furnished with the fixed system of lightning conductor, did not meet with any damage. In addition to these cases, repeated instances occurred in which these temporary conductors were ill applied, out of place, or damaged by the strain of the spars and chafing of the rigging this occurred in H.M. ships Impregnable and Belleisle; the wire ropes became chafed through, and were sent on shore to the Dockyard at Devonport as defective. The log of the Fair Rosamond, a brigantine, has the following entries :-" 22nd March, 1842, observed lightning conductor carried away; spliced the conductor." "23rd March, 1844, found lightning conductor gone." These results, therefore, all went to confirm the views of this question entertained by the Arago, "Notices sur la Tonnerre." NO. 7.-VOL. XXI. 3 |