SENATE.]

On the Panama Mission—(in conclave.)

resistance to lawless encroachments upon our rights; have given us a proud name throughout the nations of the Earth. Happy at home, and respected abroad, why should we change the policy, by which these blessings have been obtained?

We ought not to advise it, except to obtain some lasting an important benefit for the United States; certainly attainable in this mode; probably to be attained in no other never from sympathy for others; from a desire to serve them; or from the desire of gratifying National vanity.

We are then naturally led to inquire into the objects expected to be obtained and the probability of accomplishing them in this mode.

MARCH, 1826.

jects and duties are peaceful. The first subject, then, which will claim the attention of this Congress, is some plan, by which the independence of each State will not only be maintained, but secured.

Á fear has been entertained, that some European Power, now neutral in this war, will be induced to unite with Spain, and lend her assistance to reduce these States to the condition of colonies. They wish to provide against such an event, and in giving these invitations state that they have a pledge from the President, and that there is an accord between them and the cabinet at Washington, that, if any neutral power does take part with Spain, the United States will take part with them; and wish the attendance of our Ministers with a view to discuss this subject, and come to an agreement in relation to it, by which it will be stipulated what contingent each party shall furnish when the casus fœderis shall occur, and say, that in the mean time this agreement or convention may be kept

Here we cannot fail to perceive how difficult it appears to have been for those who gave the invitations to fix upon any subject for discussion, which they believed of sufficient importance to the United States, to induce them to accept those invitations: hence, both the Minister from Colombia and from Mexico introduce the idea of sub-secret. jects "which the Congress may give rise to," &c. (Sce Mr. President, I object to sending Ministers for the purdocuments, pages 6 and 8.) pose of discussing and coming to any agreement or conHow can the Senate advise the President to send Minis-vention upon this subject. It is not true, as far as I am ters to discuss unknown subjects? to accomplish objects which no person can designate? and in relation to which it is impossible to say whether their attainment would comport with the honor and interest of the United States, or not? Suppose those giving these invitations had specified no subject whatever for discussion, but to have asked the attendance of our Ministers, to discuss, and come to an agreement upon, such subjects as the Congress might give rise to; is there any one member of this Senate, that would advise a mission upon such an invitation? Would it not be thought both useless and hazardous?

To these questions it would seem to me there can be but one answer. Fond would he be of the creation of officers, and heedless of the honor and interest of his country, who would advise the appointment of Ministers to a Foreign country, to attend a Congress for the purpose of seeing whether a subject could be produced that might be proper for an agreement with the United States. I will not degrade the Senate by supposing there is any such man among us, and will proceed with this investigation, as if no allusion had been made to any unknown subject, which could neither be designated nor described.

The first subject mentioned is, the resistance or opposition to be made to the interference of any neutral nation in the war of Independence, &c. (See documents, pages 5 and 7.)

advised, that the United States stand pledged to take part in this war, in any event whatever. Nothing can bind us to go to war with any nation, but a declaration made in the proper form, and by the proper department of this Government. The Executive cannot declare war, but I admit he may pursue a course of policy which will justify other nations in making war upon us. Congress has taken no step, has done no act, has passed no law, by which we are bound to unite with these new States in their war of independence, upon any contingency whatever. The Executive had no power to bind the United States by any pledge he could give. But what has he done? The groundwork of this pretended pledge, it seems, is found in President Monroe's Message of December, 1823. It contains no pledge-it is a general declaration to his own Congress, of the sentiment which would be felt if any neutral should interfere on the side of Spain. Notwithstanding that declaration, the United States were still at liberty, consistent with their honor, to take part with the new States, or omit to do so, as the wisdom of Congress might judge best, when any neutral power did take part with Spain. This declaration had a good effect. Not wishing to give offence to the United States, it may have prevented some of the European States from taking part with Spain. The new States have had the full benefit of this declaration. Thus the matter appears to have rested, till This appears to be a point of primary importance, in the the close of Mr. Monroe's Administration. Since the new estimation of all concerned. Let us calmly and dispas- Administration came into power, it seems that, upon the sionately reflect upon it. Six of the former Spanish Ame- appearance of a French fleet in our seas, some of the new rican Colonies have declared themselves independent of States called upon the Executive to redeem the pledge Spain, and to maintain this independence, have put at which had been given. Upon this application, in place hazard their lives and their fortunes. Spain asserts that of correcting the mistake upon this subject, it would apthey are still parts of her dominions, that she has the right pear from the documents with which we are furnished, to govern them, and that, cost what it may, she will re- the Administration admitted that which I do not see was duce them to subjection. The decision of this issue is the fact, that a pledge had been given, and directed Mr. submitted to the God of battles. These six colonies have Brown, our Minister in France, to ask an explanation, &c. become six States, and are belligerent on one side, and Upon this point, however, I think we are still in the dark; Spain on the other. Heretofore these States have exerted we have no copy of the application from the new States, their strength separately without any regular alliance nor of our answer to them. These documents would have with each other, although they have had a common enemy shown how far our new Administration have gone towards to contend with. The belief, that it would conduce to compelling us to take part in this war. It is very singular, their common interest, and best secure that independence that after all the calls for information which the Senate for which all are contending, has induced five of them to have been compelled to make, upon this important busienter into treaties, by which they are bound to make ness, there is still a want of documents, that would, procommon cause against Spain, and, by their united efforts, bably, be useful. But, if we are at liberty to judge from compel her to acknowledge the independence of each. the correspondence between Mr. Poinsett and the MexiTo produce union in council, and concert in action and can Minister, and from Mr. Secretary's letter to Mr. Poindesign among the new States, they have devised the Con-sett, it does really seem, that the Executive has admitted gress at Panama. It is to be perpetual-Its primary and to Mexico, that we have given a pledge, which we may feading object is belligerent. Its secondary and inferior ob- be called on to redeem, whenever the contingency shall

MARCH, 1826.

On the Panama Mission-(in conclave.)

[SENATE.

in a given quarter? Surely not. And yet this is the very point which gentlemen on the other side must maintain. This part of the subject has been placed by the gentleman from South Carolina on ground which cannot be shaken. His argument has not been answered. It never will be, while there is a distinction between truth and the reverse.

occur. Of this pledge, the People of these States are yet uninformed. I feel persuaded they have no idea we stand pledged upon any contingency, to embark in the war with these new States, whether it may compete with our interest or not. This is an inadvertence which cannot be corrected too soon. If we send Ministers, and an agreement is entered into, then, indeed, will the United States be pledged. We now know the object-we see the pre- Mr. President, I go one step farther, and insist, if you dicament in which we are placed; and with this know-do send Ministers, and they discuss this subject, and enledge, if Congress can be induced to give its sanction to ter into the proposed agreement, so far as you have power this measure, and this pledge of the Executive is refined over the matter, your neutrality is not only broken, but into an agreement, by which the United States shall be you are in a state of war, and that with any and every bound to furnish men, money, ships, &c. in aid of the Power that is now neutral, and may hereafter elect to take new States, whenever any Power, now neutral, may chuse a part with Spain. This is a dilemma from which we canto take part with Spain, then, indeed, shall I think this not escape, without disgrace. Send Ministers, make the nation has given a pledge, one that it may cost us too agreement-and the question of peace, or war, is not with much to redeem, when the casus fœderis shall happen. us; and, at any moment afterwards any European, or even American nation can put you at war, whether it may suit your interest or not.

But, sir, how is it that we are told our neutral character is not to be compromitted? that we are not to enter into any alliance? to engage in nothing importing hostility to. I object to sending Ministers for the discussion of any any other nation? Are we to be led away from the sub- such subject, or for the accomplishment of any such obstance of things by mere names? Are we to have so much ject. Even if we believed that such a state of things faith as to induce us to disregard the plainest evidence that can be furnished? I hope not. What is the substance of this proposition? These new States say, the President has given a pledge to take a part in the war now waged, if any neutral nation shall take part with Spain; and that the Cabinet at Washington has done the like; but, as this is only a general pledge, and they do not know exactly what assistance they are to receive, they wish the United States to send Ministers to Panama, empowered to discuss this subject, and come to a definite agreement upon it, by which it may be distinctly known what contingent the United States are to furnish, when the casus fœderis happens, and that all this matter shall be kept secret.

would probably be produced, as to make it proper for us to take a part in this war, I would still be opposed to any agreement by which we will become bound to do so. It is impossible now to foresee what may best comport with the interest of the United States at any subsequent period; and they ought to be left free to act, unfettered by any agreement whatever, as their interest or honor may require, when some other Power does actually interfere.

It is vain to say, we are not to take a part in any belligerent question; that our neutrality is not to be violated; that we are not to engage in any thing importing hostility to any other Power; while this proposition is presented to us. One of the Ministers who gave the invitation classes Suppose we do send Ministers, for such a purpose, to a the subjects to be discussed into belligerent and peaceful, Congress composed entirely of belligerents on one side, and states that the United States are not expected to take is it not a violation of our neutrality? What is our situa- any part in the first; but, in the last, they are, and, in this tion? We profess friendship for both the parties to this class, he specifies this very subject. Does this make it war, and that we are not disposed to aid either. Is it no peaceful? Surely not. It is belligerent. I admit it is not an departure from these professions to send our Ministers? absolute stipulation to take part in the war, and, therefore, Can any gentleman doubt upon this point? Recollect that some may feel justified in saying it does not import hosthis Congress is created and assembled avowedly for the tility; yet, it is undoubtedly an agreement to take part purpose of discussing war measures, settling plans, and upon the happening of a certain contingency. It will imdevising means, by which Spain shall be compelled to port hostility upon a certain condition, which contingency acknowledge their independence, and by which that in- or condition is not within the control of the United States. dependence can be best secured. With this knowledge, It may be said there is no danger of any mischief foland for the purpose of entering upon the discussion, and lowing from such an agreement; that the war is, in submaking an agreement, by which we will be bound, upon stance, at an end; and that there is good reason to believe a certain contingency, to aid the party with whom we the independence of the new States will be speedily remake the agreement, we send our Ministers. Can we be cognized by Spain. I admit, that, when the corresponcalled indifferent? Countenancing neither, to the preju-dence between our Government and Russia was commudice of the other? Surely not. What is the answer to this nicated to the Senate, upon a resolution seeking addiargument? The only one as yet attempted is by the gen- tional information, if any could be furnished, an opinion of tleman from Rhode Island, that, if two nations are at war, that kind was intimated by some of our officers. It then it is no breach of neutrality in a third Power to send a struck me as singular; I did not believe those documents Minister to both, or either. This is very true, and yet it warranted any such opinion; but, as our Minister in Russia proves nothing, as it relates to the question now in dis- and the Secretary of State understood the rules by which pute. For peaceful purposes-for any purpose unconected diplomatic conversations were to be interpreted, to wit: with the war, the third Power may send a Minister, may that, when a man says one thing he means another, I was discuss, may treat upon any peaceful subject; but, does inclined to think I was mistaken; but even in that view this prove that you may send a Minister to the Court of of the case, I believed we ought not to enter into any one belligerent to discuss belligerent questions, to advise such agreement, because, if the war of independence was one party what steps he is to take in the war, whether it at an end, the agreement would be useless, as the casus is most prudent to strike his adversary at a given time, or fœderis could never happen; and, if, contrary to these

* Mr. Poinsett's letter to Mr. Clay, 28th September last.

"To these observations I replied, that, against the power of Spain they had given sufficient proof that they required "no assistance, and the United States had pledged themselves not to permit any other Power to interfere with their "independence or form of Government; and that, as in the event of such an attempt being made by the Powers of "Europe, we would be compelled to take the most active and efficient part, and to bear the brunt of the contest, it was "not just that we should be placed on a less favorable footing than the other Republics of America, whose existence we were ready to support ut such hazards."

SENATE.]

On the Panama Mission-(in conclave. }

opinions, the war continued, and the casus fœderis should happen, then such agreement might be very inconvenient, if not ruinous to us.

[MARCH, 1826.

with Spain, in the war. From the documents, we have evidence that they would have strong inducements to interpose immediately. It is their wish that Spain should retain her dominion over those Islands, because then that balance would be kept up in the seas where those Islands are situate, which those powers think ought to be preserved.*

Again: All monarchs, and these in particular, would feel an interest to check this spirit of revolt; if not put down, none of them would feel safe; and, while aiding Spain, they would be rendering more secure their own dominions. To lend assistance would be esteemed by them a principle of self-defence. Lastly, these new States have told us, even now, they suspect that France is secretly furnishing Spain the means of continuing the war. Spain tells you France is her friend that "in six troubles she has stood by her, and that, in the seventh, she will not forsake;" and from the connexion between these powers, at home, it is rendered extremely probable, that the opinions entertained, both by the new States and Spain, as to the policy of France, will turn out to be correct. Suppose, then, you sanction this mission, your Ministers discuss this subject, come to an agreement upon it, stipulate that if any neutral power interferes on the part of Spain, that the United States will take part with the new States, and Russia and France do thus take part with Spain, the casus fœderis will then have happened, and the United States, in connexion with the Spanish American States, will thus become one party in the war, and Spain, Russia, and France, the other, and how, or when, it will terminate, no man can foresee.

But after the report of the committee had been made, the gentleman from New York thought it might be well to know in what spirit Spain had received the mediation of the Emperor of Russia, and he submitted a resolution asking information upon this point, from the President, and this resolution produced the information communicated by Mr. Everett to our Government. And how does it correspond with the complexion previously given to the case? It shows that the opinion entertained, that Spain would recognize the independence of the new States, was destitute of any plausible evidence to support it-that Spain is determined to persevere in the war, until these States are reduced to their former condition-that she expects a struggle in her behalf within these States themselves-that she will procure assistance either from France, or from some other European nation; and, finally, that, as these colonies are hers of right, if all other resources fail, the Supreme Being will miraculously interpose, and put her again in possession of those rights, attempted to be wrested from her improperly. To many, I believe I might say to all, it appeared strange that this correspondence should not have been communicated, when that from Mr. Middleton and Count Nesselrode was furnished, because the Secretary, in answer to the resolution which caused the transmission of that, says, it "opens a wide field, and might be made to embrace all the Foreign relations;" and yet, by some oversight, the information most important was entirely omitted. With this evidence beiore ús, it would seem that he who will insist that there is even a In this state of things, what is to become of our importprobability that the Spanish King will speedily acknow-ant interests, our commerce for example, to secure which ledge the independence of these States, must be as inca- we seem so anxious? Great Britain, ever attentive to her pable of reasoning correctly, as is that King himself. own interest, watching the course of events, and turning them to the advantage of her own subjects, even now, some fear she is at this Congress not as a party, as a listen er, and will gain some advantage by our delay: how would she probably act? Take no part in the war-she would be neutral, the United States belligerent, and what then becomes of your commerce? It will be engrossed by your neighbor, who has been attending to her own interest, while you have been seeking distinction by neglecting your own concerns, and attending to those of other nations.

So far as we have the means of judging, this war is to he continued, and it becomes a very important question to settle in our own minds the direction it will most probably take. It appears to me that, if we consult the documents before us, we can come to a satisfactory conclusion upon this point, so far, at least, as we are concerned. These new States are now struggling for their independence-infatuated Spain will not acknowledge it-they will very naturally recur to such measures as will be most likely to injure her, and thereby compel her to do that which, if reasonable, she would do without compulsion. They will be sure to strike where it can be done with most effect, where she will feel most sensibly. Look at the correspondence between the Secretary of State and Mr. Middleton, between Mr. Middleton and Count Nesselrode, and between Mr. Clay and the Ministers of Colombia and of Mexico, and say if you are not convinced they will strike Spain through her colonies in Cuba and Porto Rico. These colonies are convenient to the new States: they have expelled the enemy from their own territory; they will probably stimulate a portion of the inhabitants of those Islands to rebel, to declare themselves independent of Spain; and, by uniting their forces with those revolted subjects, endeavor to put down the Spanish authorities in those Islands. What consequences are likely to flow from such a measure? Russia, probably, and France almost certainly, would then immediately take part

But, sir, if in this I mistake the course of Great Britain, and she should elect to take a part in the war, it would probably be on the side of Spain, and then we should have our difficulties increased, to the full extent of her means and resources.

To this view of the case, I beg the attention of the gentleman from Rhode Island, and respectfully ask an application of the rule of " probabilities," and then let him say whether this Congress is so harmless, and whether, in his judgment, we have nothing to apprehend?

There are other views of this subject which render it inexpedient to sanction this measure.

This agreement or treaty is to be kept secret. By the frame of our Government, treaties are to be the supreme law; would it be discreet to have a treaty, by which the United States may be involved, concealed from the People? It is their Government, it is their interests, that are

"She is, however, in the mean while, pleased to hope, that the United States, becoming every day more con"vinced of the evils and dangers that would result to Cuba and Porto Rico from a change of Government, being sa tisfied, as Mr. Clay has said in his despatch, with the commercial legislation of these two Islands, and deriving an "additional motive of security from the honorable resolution of Spain, not to grant to them any longer letters of "marque, will use their influence in defeating, as far as may be in their power, every enterprize against those Islands, "in securing to the rights of his Catholic Majesty, constant and proper respect in maintaining the only state of things "that can preserve a just balance of power in the Sea of the Antilles, prevent shocking examples, and, as the Cabinet at "Washington has remarked, secure to the general peace salutary guarantees."-Count Nesselrode to Mr. Middleton, 60th August last.

MARCH, 1826.]

On the Panama Mission—(in conclave.)

at stake, and nothing material ought to be secreted from

them.

[SENATE.

stroyed; we would be chargeable not only with inconsistency and insincerity, but with national cowardice likewise. To hesitate, or to annul the agreement under such circumstances, would be a sacrifice of those traits, in our nation

Again, such an arrangement would be inconsistent with our character for candor. We owe it to ourselves to do no act, to make no agreement, that we ought to be un-al character, of which every citizen is so justly proud. willing to avow.

The very circumstance of a desire to conceal, is a proof that the project is inconsistent with our professed neutrality, and would be justly offensive to Spain and to other

nations.

We would then be placed in this dilemma; should the Senate ratify the agreement, we would be embarked in a war which might sacrifice our best interests: should they refuse to ratify it, we would be considered both a faithless and dastardly nation, unfit in future to negotiate with any It is, however, suggested, that the very fact of having high-minded honorable nation on the face of the globe. an agreement, which must be concealed, would strength- If we sanction this mission, the very state of things, en the mutual friendship of the United States, and those which I have supposed, is not unlikely to come to pass. new States. How? I suppose, by each proving, how safe-Ought we then to run such a risk? I answer, with great ly the other may repose confidence, where honor is con- respect for the opinions of those who may think differcerned. Our situation is not mutual; the new States could ently, we ought not. not have their character affected should the arrangement be divulged-they are belligerent; that of the United States would be, because we are neutral.

But, sir, the agreement might be disclosed, and if known, would it not furnish an inducement to other nations to take part with Spain?

This is one of the leading objects of this Congress; one which the new States say is of vital importance to them; to discuss and agree upon which, we have been invited to send Ministers. If we do send, we must, in candor to them, discuss and settle it; if we do not, we hazard giving them offence, instead of strengthening our friendship with them.

It has been suggested no danger need be apprehended upon this point, because no agreement would be binding until ratified by the Senate; and if we do not like the arrangement we can refuse to ratify, and thus all danger may be avoided.

Secondly. The next specified subject for discussion is, that some arrangement may be made by which European powers may be prevented from planting any colony upon the American continent. I have felt somewhat at a loss to know what has given rise to wish for an agreement upon this point at this time. I well remember that, when President Monroe stated in his message an unwillingness to see a colony planted by any European power, an idea was taken up, that these sentiments were thrown out in opposition to the pretensions of Russia in the Northwest, and with a view to induce her to abandon those extraordinary pretensions. If that was really the object, and this project owes its origin to these expressions, there can now be no necessity for any agreement upon that subject; be cause, in 1824, we have a convention with Russia, which removes, for the present, all difficulty with that Power, and I am not apprized of any attempt by any other European Power to plant a colony, at any place to which we could have an objection.

A little reflection will, I think, satisfy us that this suggestion is entitled to no weight. One main object we have If it means that we shall enter into an agreement by in view is to strengthen our friendship with the new which we will stipulate that Spain shall not re-colonize States; they have invited us to agree upon this very ques- these new States, then I urge all the objections against tion; if we send, and enter into the agreement, with what such a stipulation which have been urged against the face could we refuse to ratify? A failure to ratify, under other proposition, and they apply to this with equal, if such circumstances, would betray such an inconsistency not with greater force than they did to the other. If it of character as would destroy all confidence in us. The be intended that we shall stipulate with the new States, fair way to test this matter is to suppose such an agree that we will use all our means to prevent any foreign ment to have been entered into, and now submitted for ra- power from planting a colony within the United States, tification; and if we are prepared to say we would ratify and that they shall stipulate to use all their means to preit, then we ought to advise the Mission, otherwise not. I vent a colony from being planted within their limits, I obthen put the question on that ground, and call upon gen-ject to it for most obvious reasons. The United States tlemen to say whether they would now ratify such an agreement? I call upon the honorable member who is willing to avow to the American People that he is prepared to take such a step.

Again: if this were not so, if our failure to ratify the agreement would not be liable to the objection stated, there is another view of this part of the subject, which, as I think, ought to satisfy us, that the power to refuse our ratification does not furnish an adequate security.

ought never to degrade themselves by any such stipulation, so far as her territory is concerned; they are bath able and willing to defend it against the encroachment of any foreign nation, and ought not to stipulate with any other Power as to the use which we will make, or permit others to make, of any portion of our territory.

Whenever we can feel the necessity for such a stipula tion, to guard our Territory against the encroachments of European nations, then, indeed, shall I think, we are prepared for the vassal condition of colonies. If these new States set so little value upon independence, as to require such an agreement to stimulate them to exert their means to prevent colonies from being planted within their limits, then I shall conclude they are unfit for self-government, and that no agreement with them, upon any subject, can be of much utility to us.

Suppose this Mission to be sanctioned, our Ministers sent to Panama, this subject discussed, and an agreement entered into that the United States shall take a part in the war, if any neutral power interferes on the side of Spain; and immediately after the agreement is thus made, and before the Senate meets, so as to have the agreement submitted to it for ratification, some neutral power does actually determine to aid Spain in the war, and then the I have yet one other objection against an agreement agreement is submitted to us for ratification-do not gen- upon any of the subjects mentioned. We profess, and I tlemen see in what a delicate situation the Senate will be doubt not sincerely, to have a partiality for these new placed? If we refuse the ratification under such circum- States: a question then presents itself, Will we not benestances, we encounter all the risks I have just mentioned, fit them most by abstaining from an agreement upon any and more. In the supposed case, the casus fœderis will of these points? The United States have, deservedly, a have occurred; the time to put forth our strength will ac-high character abroad, and especially, with these States. tually have arrived. Suppose in such a crisis we refuse to If we enter into the agreements proposed, we will induce ratify, what becomes of the character of our country in them to relax their endeavors to maintain and secure their the opinion of the new States, and of the world? It is de-independence, by their own prowess, and with their own

SENATE.]

On the Panama Mission-(in conclave.)

[MARCH, 1826.

means; they will rely and depend upon us, when it is their which they profess a wish to hasten the accomplishment interest to rely and depend upon themselves. In this lat- of. Whenever the States, in which slavery exists, feel it ter course, they will be stimulated to all the exertion they as an evil too intolerable, move towards its removal at are capable of, and this very exertion will produce an en-home, and apply, through their Legislatures, to this Golargement of mind, and elevation of national character, verment for aid to abolish it, then, and not sooner, we may that will be of immense value to them. From the former, discuss it within these walls. a desponding disposition is produced, a state of dependence upon foreigners is made familiar to them, and a degraded national character will be the consequence.

4th. We are invited to attend and settle "the basis of our relations to Hayti, and others, that may be in the like circumstances," &c.

The worthy member (Mr. ROBBINS) from Rhode Isl- Will gentlemen tell us whether a Representative from and, seems to have taken up the idea that, if the sovereign-Hayti is invited to attend this Congress? It appears to me ty of the Spanish American States is not transferred to this that it will be very unfair to settle this question, where Congress, no danger, whatever, is to be apprehended from that Government is unrepresented. It is, therefore, most joining in it; and that the whole report is radically wrong, probable, her Minister is to be there likewise. Reflect, in supposing that this sovereignty was vested in the Con- Mr. President, upon the population of that country, and gress, and that the United States would give up their sove- upon that of a portion of our own, as well as upon the reignty also. by establishing this mission; and he has re- peculiar modes of thinking in Spanish America, and then ferred us to page 4 of the Report. let honorable gentlemen say whether they think this will be a fit subject for discussion. It is a question which the American Statesmen must settle for themselves, and by themselves. Our situation, in relation to this subject, is so peculiarly delicate, that I cannot suppose any real friend to the Union would propose that it should be settled at the Congress at Panama. The suggestion of such a project may be readily excused in a Foreigner; but in an American citizen it would be highly inexcusable.

If I have been favored with the attention of the worthy gentleman, to the remarks which I have made, he will have perceived how it may happen that the "destinies" of the United States may be effected by joining in this Congress, even supposing it composed of common diplomatists. That, although they may not be able to make decrees," pass "judgments," or "execute them," yet they may hold consultations, discuss subjects, and come to agreements, upon them, in consequence of which the United States may be involved in war, and thus their "destinies" may be very materially affected.

I cannot but lament that the worthy gentleman does not seem to have read this report, and the documents upon which it is founded, with his usual profit; if he had, we should not have heard that the report said, uniting in this mission would transfer our sovereignty to this Congress. There is not one such idea, either in page 4, or any other part of the document.

The Minister from Central America proposes, that, at this Congress, an American Continental System shall be got up, as Europe has one.

Let us bestow a few thoughts upon this subject, and see to what it tends. In Europe, the object of their system is to make common cause to support Monarchs on their Thrones.

The contrary would be, to make common cause to sccure, in America, a Republican form of government to each Nation. Our fundamental principle is, that every I flatter myself that the gentleman will yet take the Nation ought to be permitted to have just such a form of trouble of re-perusing it, taking with him that impartiality government as the People of that Nation may think best and those faculties for which he is said to be remark-suited to their condition, and best calculated to secure able, and when he does so, I cannot but feel assured, he will himself perceive how strangely he has been heretofore mistaken, as to the statements and reasoning it contains.

their lives, liberty, and property; and that, in settling their forms of government, no other Nation has any right to interfere.

vernment, whether they will it or not? We believe, and I flatter myself truly believe, that ours is the best plan of government which has yet been devised: but if it is the best for the People of these United States, does it thence follow that it would be the best for every other Nation?

Mr. President: I pass to the next subject specified. It We find fault with the European system, and with the is to discuss and agree upon the means to be employed Holy Alliance, because it is their object to fix Monarchy for the entire abolition of the slave trade. Of all subjects upon the People of the respective States, whether the mathat could be thought of, none would be found more un-jorities in those States are pleased with such governments fortunate than this. It was hoped, that, after rejecting or not. Are we then to combine with other States to the convention with Colombia upon this subject, the Se-compel cach one to preserve a Republican form of Gonate would hear no more of it from foreigners. If slavery is an affliction, all the Southern and Western States have it, and with it, their peculiar modes of thinking upon all subjects connected with it. In these new States, some of them have put it down in their fundamental law, "that whoever owns a slave shall cease to be a citizen." Is it then fit that the United States should disturb the quiet of the Southern and Western States, by a discussion and agreement with the new States, upon any subject connected with slavery? I think not. Can it be the desire of any prominent politician in the United States, to divide us into parties upon the subject of slavery? I hope not. Let us then cease to talk of slavery in this House; let us cease to negotiate upon any subject connected with it. The United States have, by their own laws, put an end to the slave trade, so far as their citizens, or their vessels, are concerned in it—more than this, they ought not to attempt. Let other nations discharge their duty as well, and the slave trade, so called, will be abolished.

One word more upon this point, Mr. President, and I will dismiss it. If there be any gentlemen in the United States who seriously wish to see an end of slavery, let them cease talking and writing, to induce the Federal Government to take up the subject, because, by the course now pursued, by some, they are protracting a measure

Ours is the best for an intelligent and virtuous People: but it does not thence follow, that it would be best for an ignorant and vicious People. The People of each country ought to understand their own character, better than the People of any other country; and they ought to be the exclusive judges what plan of Government is best suited to their peculiar character and condition; and any interference by the People of any other country, to force upon them a form of Government which they do not, themselves, choose, is an act of tyranny and oppression. The whole project, then, is wrong in principle, and, therefore, ought not to meet our sanction.

Again, we are only in the course of experiment at home. Whether our plan is as perfect as it ought to be, is at this moment a subject of discussion over the way. We are endeavoring to improve it, and hope to render it so perfect that we will be pleased with it forever: yet, even we may change our minds upon that subject; and if we do, we will claim the right of changing our Government like.