have been different, or not, is irrelevant. But for this explanation, the Stoics would have been obliged to allow that virtue and vice are not in our power, and that, consequently, no responsibility attaches to them. When a man is once virtuous or vicious, he cannot be otherwise: the highest perfection, that of the Gods, is absolutely unchangeable.2 Chrysippus even endeavoured to show, not only that his whole theory of destiny was in harmony with the claims of morality and moral responsibility, but that it presupposed the existence of morality. The arrangement of the universe, he argued, involves the idea of law, and law involves the distinction between what is conventionally right and what is conventionally wrong, between what deserves praise and what deserves blame. Moreover, it is impossible to think of destiny without thinking of the world, or to think of the world λογικὰ, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἁμαρτήσεται, τὰ δὲ κατορθώσει. ταῦτα γὰρ τούτοις κατὰ φύσιν μὲν, ὄντων δὲ καὶ ἁμαρτημάτων καὶ κατορθωμά. των, καὶ τῶν τοιαύτων φύσεων καὶ ποιοτήτων μὴ ἀγνοουμένων, καὶ ἔπαινοι μὲν καὶ ψόγοι καὶ τιμαὶ καὶ κολάσεις. 1 Alex. c. 26. 2 Ibid. c. 32. • The arguments usual among the Stoics in after times may, with great probability, be referred to Chrysippus. * Ibid. c. 35 : λέγουσι γάρ· οὐκ ἔστι τοιαύτη μὲν ἡ εἱμαρμένη, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ πεπρωμένη· οὐδὲ ἔστι πεπρωμένη, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ αἶσα· οὐδὲ ἔστι μὲν αἶσα, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ νέμεσις· οὐκ ἔστι μὲν νέμεσις, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ νόμος· οὐδὲ ἔστι μὲν νόμος, οὐκ CHAP. VII. CHAP. VII. without thinking of the Gods, who are supremely good. Hence the idea of destiny involves also that of goodness, which again includes the contrast between virtue and vice, between what is praiseworthy and what is blameworthy. To this his opponents replied, that, if everything is determined by destiny, individual action is superfluous, since what has been once foreordained must happen, come what may. They were met by a distinction which Chrysippus made between two kinds of foreordination · one simple, the other composite; from which he argued that, as the consequences of human actions are simply results of those actions, those consequences are therefore quite as much foreordained as the actions themselves.2 From all these observations, it appears that the Alex. c. 37: A second argument ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς παλαίστρας is the following:-où návra μèv ἔστι καθ' εἱμαρμένην, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ ἀκώλυτος καὶ ἀπαρεμπόδιστος ἡ τοῦ κόσμου διοίκησις· οὐδὲ ἔστι μὲν τοῦτο, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ κόσμος· οὐδὲ ἔστι μὲν κόσμος, οὐκ εἰσὶ δὲ θεοί· εἰ δέ εἰσι θεοὶ, εἰσὶν ἀγαθοὶ οἱ θεοί· ἀλλ ̓ εἰ τοῦτο, ἔστιν ἀρετή· ἀλλ ̓ εἰ ἔστιν ἀρετὴ, ἔστι φρόνησις· ἀλλ ̓ εἰ τοῦτο ἔστιν ἡ ἐπιστήμη ποιητέων τε καὶ οὐ ποιητέων· ἀλλὰ ποιητέα μὲν ἔστι τὰ κατορθώματα, οὐ ποιητέα δὲ τὰ ἁμαρτήματα, κ.τ.λ. οὐκ ἄρα πάντα μὲν γίνεται καθ' εἱμαρμένην, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ γεραίρειν καὶ ἐπανορθοῦν. 2 Cic. De Fato, 12, 28; Diogenian. (in Eus. Pr. Ev. vi. 8, 16); Sen. Nat. Qu. ii. 37. Things which were determined by the co-operation of destiny alone Chrysippus called σvykabeluaрμένα (confatalia). The argument by which he was confuted went by the name of ἀργὸς λόγος (ignava ratio). Besides the apyòs λόγος, Plut. De Fato, c. 11, mentions the θερίζων and the λόγος παρὰ τὴν είμαρμένην as fallacies which could only be refuted on the ground of the freedom of the will. The last-named one, perhaps, turned on the idea ((Enomaus, in Eus. Pr. Ev. vi. 7, 12) that man might frustrate destiny if he neglected to do what was necessary to produce the results foreordained. According to Ammon. De Inter. 106, a, the BepiCwv was as follows:-Either you will reap or you will not reap: it is therefore incorrect to say, perhaps you will reap. Stoics never intended to allow man to hold a different position, in regard to destiny, from that held by other beings. All the actions of man-in fact, his destiny are decided by his connection with the universe: one individual only differs from another in that one acts on his own impulse, and agreeably with his own feelings, whereas another, under compulsion and against his will, conforms to the eternal law of the world.1 CHAP. VII. world. unity and Since everything in the world is produced by one C. Nature and the same divine power, the world, as regards of the its structure, is an organic whole, and perfect in respect of its properties. The unity of the world, (1) Its which was a doctrine distinguishing the Stoics from perfections. the Epicureans, followed as a corollary from the unity of the primary substance and of the primary force. It was further proved by the universal connection, or, as the Stoics called it, by the sympathy prevailing among all the parts of the world, and, in Sen. Ep. 107, 11: Ducunt volentem fata, nolentem trahunt. Hippolyt. Refut. Hær. i. 21: rò καθ' εἱμαρμένην είναι πάντη διεβεβαιώσαντο παραδείγματι χρησάμενοι τοιούτῳ, ὅτι ὥσπερ σχήματος ἐὰν ᾗ ἐξηρτημένος κύων, ἐὰν μὲν βούληται ἕπεσθαι, καὶ ἕλκεται καὶ ἕπεται ἑκὼν . . . ἐὰν δὲ μὴ βούληται ἕπεσθαι, πάντως ἀναγκασθήσεται, τὸ αὐτὸ δήπου καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων· καὶ μὴ βουλόμενοι γὰρ ἀκολουθεῖν ἀναγκασθήσονται πάν. τως εἰς τὸ πεπρωμένον εἰσελθεῖν. The same idea is expanded by M. Aurel, vi. 42: All must work for the whole, ἐκ περιουσίας δὲ καὶ ὁ μεμφόμενος καὶ ὁ ἀντιβαίνειν Teιрúμevos кal ȧvaipeîv тà yivó- 2 After all that has been said, CHAP. VII. particular, by the coincidence of the phenomena of earth and heaven.' It also followed, as a consequence, from their fundamental principles. But the Stoics made use of many arguments in support of the 1 Sext. Math. ix. 78: τῶν σωμάτων τὰ μέν ἐστιν ἡνωμένα, τὰ δὲ ἐκ συναπτομένων, τὰ δὲ ἐκ διεστώτων . ἐπεὶ οὖν καὶ ὁ κόσμος σῶμά ἐστιν, ἤτοι ἡνωμένον ἐστὶ σῶμα ἢ ἐκ συναπτομένων ἢ ἐκ διεστώτων· οὔτε δὲ ἐκ συναπτομένων οὔτε ἐκ διεστώτων, ὡς δείκνυμεν ἐκ τῶν περὶ αὐτὸν συμπαθειῶν· κατὰ γὰρ τὰς τῆς σελήνης αὐξήσεις καὶ φθίσεις πολλὰ τῶν τε ἐπιγείων ζῴων καὶ θαλασσίων φθίνει τε καὶ αὔξεται, ἀμπώτεις τε καὶ πλημμυρίδες περί τινα μέρη τῆς θαλάσσης γίνονται. In the same way, atmospheric changes coincide with the setting and rising of the stars: συμφανές, ὅτι ἡνωμένον τι σῶμα καθέστηκεν ὁ κόσμος, ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἐκ συναπτομένων ἢ διεστώτων οὐ συμπάσχει τὰ μέρη ἀλλήλοις. Diog. vii. 140: ἐν δὲ τῷ κόσμῳ μηδὲν εἶναι κενὸν ἀλλ ̓ ἡνῶσθαι αὐτὸν, τοῦτο γὰρ ἀναγκάζειν τὴν τῶν οὐρανίων πρὸς τὰ ἐπίγεια σύμπνοιαν καὶ συντονίαν. Ibid. 143: ὅτι θ' εἷς ἐστι Ζήνων φησὶν ἐν τῷ περὶ τοῦ ὅλου καὶ Χρύσιππος καὶ ̓Απολλόδωρος καὶ Ποσει δώνιος. Alex. De Mixt. 142; Cic. N. D. ii. 7, 19; Epictet. Diss. i. 14, 2: οὐ δοκεῖ σοι, ἔφη, ἡνῶσθαι τὰ πάντα; Δοκεῖ, ἔφη· τί δέ; συμπαθεῖν τὰ ἐπίγεια τοῖς οὐρανίοις οὐ δοκεῖ σοι; Δοκεῖ, ἔφη. Cicero mentions the changes in animals and plants corresponding to the changes of seasons, the phases of the moon, and the greater or less nearness of the sun. Μ. Aurel. iv. 40. From all these 2 passages we gather what the question really was. It was not only whether other worlds were possible, besides the one which we know from observation, but whether the heavenly bodies visible were in any essential way connected with the earth, so as to form an organic whole (ζῷον). The Stoie conception of συμπάθεια was not used to denote the magic connection which it expresses in ordinary parlance, but the natural coincidence between phenomena belonging to the different parts of the world, the consensus, concentus, cognatio, conjunctio, or continuatio natura (Cic. N. D. iii. 11, 18; Divin. ii. 15, 34, 69, 142). In this sense, M. Aurel. ix. 9, observes that like is attracted by like; fire is attracted upwards, earth downwards; beasts and men seek out each other's society; even amongst the highest existences, the stars, there exists 2 Ένωσις ἐκ διεστηκότων, 2 συμπάθεια ἐν διεστῶσι. Even the last remark does not go beyond the conception of a natural connection; nevertheless, it paves the way for the later Neoplatonic idea of sympathy, as no longer a physical connection, but as an influence felt at a distance by virtue of a connection of soul. 3 M. Aurel. vi. 1: ἡ τῶν ὅλων οὐσία εὐπειθὴς καὶ εὐτρεπής· ὁ δὲ ταύτην διοικῶν λόγος οὐδεμίαν ἐν ἑαυτῷ αἰτίαν ἔχει τοῦ κακοποιεῖν· κακίαν γὰρ οὐκ ἔχει, οὐδέ τι κακῶς perfection of the world, appealing, after the example ποιεῖ, οὐδὲ βλάπτεταί τι ὑπ' ἐκείνου. πάντα δὲ κατ' ἐκεῖνον γίνεται καὶ περαίνεται. 1 Diog. 149: ταύτην δὲ [τὴν φύσιν] καὶ τοῦ συμφέροντος στοχάζεσθαι καὶ ἡδονῆς, ὡς δῆλον ἐκ τῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου δημιουργίας. ... 2 Plut. St. Rep. 21, 3: εἰπὼν [Χρύσιππος] ὅτι φιλοκαλεῖν . . τὴν φύσιν τῇ ποικιλίᾳ χείρουσαν εἰκός ἐστι, ταῦτα κατά λέξιν εἴρηκε· γένοιτο δ' ἂν μάλιστα τούτου ἔμφασις ἐπὶ τῆς κέρκου τοῦ ταώ. Conf. the Stoie in Cic. Fin. iii. 5, 18: Jam membrorum . . alia videntur propter eorum usum a natura esse donata . . . alia autem nullam ob utilitatem, quasi ad quendam ornatum, ut cauda pavoni, pluma versicolores columbis, viris mammæ atque barba. 3 M. Aurel. iii. 2 : It is there proved by examples, ὅτι καὶ τὰ ἐπιγινόμενα τοῖς φύσει γιγνομένοις ἔχει τι εὔχαρι καὶ ἐπαγωγὸν . σχεδὸν οὐδὲν οὐχὶ καὶ τῶν κατ' ἐπακολούθησιν συμβαινόντων ἡδεώς πως διασυνίστασθαι. • Cic. Acad. ii. 26, 85; Sen. Εp. 113, 16. The latter includes this variety of natural objects among the facts, which must fill us with admiration for the divine artifices. s Plut. Plac. i. 6, 2 : καλὸς δὲ ὁ κόσμος· δῆλον δ' ἐκ τοῦ σχήματος καὶ τοῦ χρώματος καὶ τοῦ μεγέθους καὶ τῆς περὶ τὸν κόσμον τῶν ἀστέρων ποικιλίας ; the world has the most perfect form, that of a globe, with a sky the most perfect in colour, &c. CHAP. VII. |