that, in the long run, evil would be turned by God. into good.1

The third point in the moral theory of the world, the connection between moral worth and happiness, engaged all the subtlety of Chrysippus and his followers. To deny any connection between them would have been to contradict their ordinary views of the relation of means to ends. Besides, they were prepared to regard a portion of our outward ills as divine judgments. Still there were facts, which could not be reconciled with this view-the misfortunes of the virtuous, the good fortune of the vicious—and which required explanation. The task of explaining these facts appears to have involved the Stoics in considerable embarrassment, nor were their answers altogether satisfactory. But, in the

ibidem mala: nam cum bona malis contraria sint, utraque necessum est opposita inter se et quasi mutuo adverso quæque fulta nixu consistere: nullum adeo contrarium est sine contrario altero. Without injustice, cowardice, &c., we could not be aware of justice and valour. If there were no evil, φρόνησις as ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν would be impossible (Plut. C. Not. 16, 2).

1 Cleanthes, Hymn. 18 : ἀλλὰ σὺ καὶ τὰ περισσὰ ἐπίστασαι ἄρτια θεῖναι

καὶ κοσμεῖν τὰ ἄκοσμα, καὶ οὐ φίλα σοὶ φίλα ἐστίν·

ὧδε γὰρ εἰς ἓν ἅπαντα συνήρμοκαs ἐσθλὰ κακοῖσιν

ὥσθ' ἕνα γίγνεσθαι πάντων λόγον αἰὲν ἐόντα.

3 Plut. Sto. Rep. 35, 1: τὸν θεὸν κολάζειν φησὶ τὴν κακίαν καὶ

πολλὰ ποιεῖν ἐπὶ κολάσει τῶν που
νηρῶν . . . ποτὲ μὲν τὰ δύσχρηστα
συμβαίνειν φησὶ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς οὐχ
ὥσπερ τοῖς φαύλοις κολάσεως χάριν
ἀλλὰ κατ ̓ ἄλλην οἰκονομίαν ὥσπερ
ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν [τὰ κακὰ]
ἀπονέμεται κατὰ τὸν τοῦ Διὸς
λόγον ἤτοι ἐπὶ κολάσει ἢ κατ'
ἄλλην ἔχουσαν πως πρὸς τὰ ὅλα
οἰκονομίαν. Ιd. 15, 2: ταῦτά φησι
τοὺς θεοὺς ποιεῖν ὅπως τῶν πονηρῶν
κολαζομένων οἱ λοιποὶ παραδείγ
μασι τούτοις χρώμενοι ἧττον ἐπι-
χειρῶσι τοιοῦτόν τι ποιεῖν. At
the beginning of the chapter, the
ordinary views of divine punish-
ment had been treated with
ridicule.

* Thus Chrysippus (in Plut.
St. Rep. 37, 2) replies to the
question, How the misfortune of
the virtuous is to be explained,
by asking: πότερον ἀμελουμένων

CHAP.

VII.

(c) Contween virtue and happiness.

nection bes

CHAP.
VII.

spirit of their system, only one explanation was possible: no real evil could happen to the virtuous, no real good fortune could fall to the lot of the vicious. Apparent misfortune will therefore be regarded by the wise man partly as a natural consequence, partly as a wholesome exercise of his moral powers; everything that happens, when rightly considered, contributes to our good;2 nothing that is secured by moral turpitude is in itself desirable. With this view, it was possible to connect

4

a belief in divine punishment, by saying that what is an exercise of power to a good man is a real misfortune-and, consequently, a punishment to a bad man; but we are not informed whether the scattered notices in Chrysippus really bear out this meaning.

The whole investigation is one involving much doubt and inconsistency. Natural considerations frequently intertwine with considerations based on the adaptation of means to ends; the divine power is oftentimes treated as a will working towards a definite purpose, at one time arranging all things for the best with unlimited power, at another time according to an unchangeable law of nature;1 but all these inconsistences and defects belong to other moral theories of the world, quite as much as they belong to that of the Stoics.

• Philodem. περὶ θεῶν διαγωγῆς, col. 8: ἰδιωτικῶς ἅπαντος αὐτῷ [θεῷ] δύναμιν ἀναθέντες, ὅταν ὑπὸ τῶν ἐλέγχων πιέζωνται, τότε κατα

φεύγουσιν ἐπὶ τὸ διὰ τοῦτο φάσκειν
τὰ συναπτόμενα μὴ ποιεῖν, ὅτι οὐ
πάντα δύναται.

CHAP.

VII.

CHAP.
VIII.

A. The

ral ideas

on nature.

CHAPTER VIII.

IRRATIONAL NATURE. THE ELEMENTS.

THE UNIVERSE.

TURNING now from the questions which have hitherto engaged our attention to natural science, in the stricter sense of the term, we must first make a few most gene- remarks as to the general conditions of all existence. About these conditions the Stoics hold little that is of a distinctive character. The matter or substance_ of which all things are made is corporeal. All that is corporeal is infinitely divisible, although it is never infinitely divided. But, at the same time, all things are exposed to the action of change, since one material is constantly going over into another.3 Herein the Stoics follow Aristotle, and, in contrast to the mechanical theory of nature, distinguish aqua, ignis ex aëre, ex igne aër

Diog. 135. Conf. Stob. Ecl.

i. 410.

2 In Diog. 150, there is no real difference between Apollodorus and Chrysippus. Stob. Ecl. i. 344; Plut. C. Not. 38, 3; Sext. Math. x. 142.

Plut. Plac. i. 9, 2: oi Σtwikol τρεπτὴν καὶ ἀλλοιωτὴν καὶ μεταβλητὴν καὶ ῥευστὴν ὅλην δι ̓ ὅλου Thy Any. Diog. 150. Sen. Nat. Qu. iii. 101, 3: Fiunt omnia ex omnibus, ex aqua aër, ex aëre

ex aqua terra fit, cur non aqua fiat e terra? . . . omnium elementorum in alternum recursus sunt. Epictet. in Stob. Floril. 108, 60. This is borrowed not only from Heraclitus, but also from Aristotle.

They only called the first kind κίνησις. Aristotle understood by Kivnois every form of change.

Never

change in quality from mere motion in space. They
enumerate several varieties of each kind.'
theless, they look upon motion in space as the
primary form of motion. Moreover, they include
action and suffering under the conception of
motion. The condition of all action is contact; 4
and since the motions of different objects in nature
are due to various causes, and have a variety of
characters, the various kinds of action must be dis-
tinguished which correspond to them.5 In all these
statements there is hardly a perceptible deviation
from Aristotle.

Of a more peculiar character are the views of the Stoics as to the intermingling of substances, to

1 Stob. Ecl. i. 404, gives definitions of Kivnois, or popà, and of porn, taken from Chrysippus and Apollodorus. Simpl. Categ. 110, B, distinguishes between μένειν, ἠρεμεῖν, ἡσυχάζειν, ἀκινητεῖν, but this is rather a matter of language. Simpl. Cat. 78, β, relates that the Stoics differed from the Peripatetics in explaining Motion as an incomplete energy, and discusses their assertion that Kiveîota is a wider, κινεῖν a narrower, idea.

2 Simpl. Phys. 310, b: oi dè ἀπὸ τῆς στυᾶς κατὰ πᾶσαν κίνησιν ČλEYOV VTEIVAL THY TOTIKHν, κατὰ μέγαλα διαστήματα ἢ κατὰ λόγῳ θεωρητὰ ὑφισταμένην.

3 Simpl. Categ. 78, 8: Plotinus and others introduce into the Aristotelian doctrine the Stoic view: τὸ κοινὸν τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν εἶναι τὰς κινήσεις.

dicts this statement. It had,
however, been already advanced
by Aristotle.

Simpl. 1. c. 78, 8: The Stoics
made the following diapopà ye-
νῶν: τὸ ἐξ αὐτῶν κινεῖσθαι, ὡς ἡ
μάχαιρα τὸ τέμνειν ἐκ τῆς οἰκείας
ἔχει κατασκευῆς — τὸ δι ̓ ἑαυτοῦ
ἐνεργεῖν τὴν κίνησιν, ὡς αἱ φύσεις
καὶ αἱ ἰατρικαὶ δυνάμεις τὴν ποίησιν
VжEруάČovтаι; for instance, the
seed, in developing into a plant

τὸ ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ ποιεῖν, οι ἀπὸ
ἰδίας ὁρμῆς ποιεῖν, one species of
which is rò anò λoyikĥs ópμñs——
τὸ κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνεργεῖν. It is, in
short, the application to a par-
ticular case of the distinction
which will be subsequently met
with of eis, pois, yuxh, and
ψυχή λογική. The celebrated
grammatical distinction of op¤à
and ὕπτια is connected with the
distinction between Toιey and

xáo xem. Conf. Simpl. p. 79, a,
$; Schol. 78, b, 17.

CHAP.

VIII.