CHAP. IX. C. Freedom and immortality. The effects of the Stoic principles appear unmistakeably in the above statements. They, however, pervade the whole body of the Stoical views on man.' From one point of view, the theory of necessity, and the denial of everlasting life after death, seem quite unintelligible in a system the moral tone of which is so high; but yet the connection of these theories with the Stoic ethics is very intimate. These theories commended themselves to the Stoics, as they have done in later times to Spinoza and diate dissolution of the soul after ether is also allotted to the are fed by the same elements as the stars. According to Chrysippus (in Eustath. on Ïl. xxiii. 65), they there assume the spherical shape of the stars. According to Tertull. De An. 54, Lucan. Phars. ix. 5, their place is under the moon. Zeno, in speaking of the islands of the blest (Lact. Inst. vii. 7, 20), probably only desired to enlist popular opinion in his own favour. The souls of the foolish and bad also last some time after death; only, as being weaker, they do not last until the end of the world (Ar. Did.; Theodoret. Cur. Gr. Affec. v. 23); and meantime, as it is distinctly asserted by Sen. Ep. 117, 6, Tertullian, and Lactantius, they are punished in the nether world. The peculiar objection mentioned by Seneca (Ep. 57, 5) as belonging to the Stoics-animam hominis magno pondere extriti permanere non posse et statim spargi, quia non fuerit illi exitus liber-was not required by their principles, as Seneca already observed. It belongs, in fact, only to individual members of that School. Schleiermacher, because they corresponded to their fundamental view of morality, according to which the individual can only be regarded as the instrument of reason in general, as a dependent portion of the collective universe. Moreover, since the Stoics admitted a future existence of limited, but yet indefinite, length-the same practical results followed from their belief as from the current belief in immortality. The statements of Seneca,' that this life is a prelude to a better; that the body is a lodging-house, from which the soul will return to its own home; his joy in looking forward to' the day which will rend the bonds of the body asunder, which he, in common with the early Christians, calls the birthday of eternal life; 2 his description of the peace of the eternity there awaiting us, of the freedom and bliss of the heavenly life, of the light of knowledge which will there be shed on all the secrets of nature; 3 his language 1 Conf. Baur, Seneca und Paulus in Hilgenfeld's Zeitschrift für wissensch. Theol. i. 2, 212. 2 Ep. 102, 22: Cum venerit dies ille, qui mixtum hoc divini humanique secernat, corpus hoc, ubi inveni, relinquam, ipse me Dis reddam ... per has mortalis vitæ moras illi meliori vitæ longiorique proluditur. As a child in its mother's womb, sic per hoc spatium, quod ab infantia patet in senectutem, in alium maturescimus partum. All we possess, and the body itself, is only the baggage, which we neither brought into the world, nor can carry away with us. Dies iste, $ Consol. ad Marc. 24, 3: ipse quidem æternus meliorisque nunc status est, despoliatus oneribus alienis et sibi relictus. The body is only a vessel, surrounding the soul in darkness: nititur illo, unde dimissus est; ibi illum æterna requies manet. CHAP. IX. CHAP. on the future recognition and happy society of souls made perfect; his seeing in death a great day of judgment, when sentence will be pronounced on every one; his making the thought of a future life the great stimulus to moral conduct here; 3 even the way in which he consoles himself for the destruction of the soul by the thought that it will live again in another form hereafter-all contain Ibid. 26, 7: Nos quoque felices animæ et æternæ sortitæ. Ibid. 19, 6: Excessit filius tuus terminos intra quos servitur: excepit illum magna et æterna pax. No fear or care, no desire, envy, or compassion disturbs him. Ibid. 26, 5. Consol. ad Polyb. 9, 3, 8: Nunc animus fratris mei velut ex diutino carcere emissus, tandem sui juris et arbitrii, gestit et rerum naturæ spectaculo fruitur . . . fruitur nunc aperto et libero cœlo . . . et nunc illic libere vagatur omniaque rerum naturæ bona cum summa voluntate perspicit. Ep. 79, 12: Tunc animus noster habebit, quod gratuletur sibi, cum emissus his tenebris . . . totum diem admiserit et cœlo redditus suo fuerit. Ep. 102, 28: Aliquando naturæ tibi arcana retegentur, discutietur ista caligo et lux undique clara percutiet. In Consol. ad Marc. 25, 1, Seneca describes how, the time of purification ended, the deceased one inter felices currit animas, and how his grandfather shows him the hall of heaven. Ibid. 26, 3. * Ep. 26, 4: Velut adpropinquet experimentum et ille laturus sententiam de omnibus annis meis dies. . . quo, remotis stro phis ac fucis, de me judicaturus sum. Conf. die hora decretoria, Ep. 102, 24. Ep. 102, 29: Hæc cogitatio (that of heaven and a future life) nihil sordidum animo subsidere sinit, nihil humile, ninil crudele. Deos rerum omnium esse testes ait: illis nos adprobari, illis in futurum parari jubet et æternitatem menti proponere. Ep. 36, 10: Mors. . . intermittit vitam, non eripit: veniet iterum qui nos in lucem reponat dies, quem multi recusarent, nisi oblitos reduceret. Sed postea diligentius docebo omnia, quæ videntur perire, mutari. quo animo debet rediturus exire. The souls cannot return, according to the Stoic teaching, until after the general conflagration; and that is on the supposition that the same persons will be found in the future world as in the present. As long as the latter lasts, the better souls continue to exist, and only the particles of the body are employed for fresh bodies. Accordingly, the passage just quoted, and also Ep. 71, 13, must refer to the physical side of death, or else to the return of personality after the conflagration of the world. nothing at variance with the Stoic teaching, however near they may approach to Platonic or even Christian modes of thought.' Seneca merely expanded the teaching of his School in one particular direction, in which it harmonises most closely with Platonism; and, of all the Stoics, Seneca was the most distinctly Platonic. Excepting the two points which have been discussed at an earlier time, and one other point relating to the origin of ideas and emotions, which will be considered subsequently, little is on record relating to the psychological views of the Stoics. Besides the definition of aloonois in Diog. 52, and the remark that impressions are made on the organs of sense, but that the seat of feeling is in the Яyeμoviкdv (Plut. Plac. iv. 23, 1), the following statements may be mentioned:-In the process of seeing, the δρατικὸν πνεῦμα, coming into the eyes from the YEμOVIKOV, gives a spherical form to the air before the eye, by virtue of its τονική κίνησις, and, by means of the sphere of air, comes in contact with things; and since by this process rays of light emanate from the eye, darkness must be visible. Diog. 158; Alex. Aph. De Anim. 149; Plut. Plac. iv. 15. The process of hearing is In CHAP. IX. P ETHICS. CHAPTER X. THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE STOIC ETHICS. ABSTRACT THEORY OF MORALITY. CHAP. WHATEVER attention the Stoics paid to the study of nature and to logic, nevertheless, as has been already remarked, the central place in their system was occupied by Ethics. Even nature, that most divine part of philosophy,' was only studied because the study of nature is an intellectual preparation for Ethics. In the domain of Ethics the true spirit of the Stoic system may therefore be expected to appear, and it may be anticipated that this subject will be treated by them with special care. Nor is this expectation a vain one; for ample materials exist, supplying data as to the Stoic doctrines on morality. Nevertheless, the way in which these materials were formally combined is only set forth in vague and contradictory statements. Moreover, the subject of morals appears to have been treated by the Stoics in such different ways, that it is hardly possible to obtain a complete survey of their |