PART IV.

THE SCEPTICS-PYRRHO AND THE OLDER

ACADEMY.

СНАР. XXII.

A. Historical

CHAPTER XXII.

PYRRHO.

STOICISM and Epicureanism are alike in one respect : they commence the pursuit of happiness with definite dogmatic statements. The Sceptic Schools, howposition of ever, attempt to reach the same end by denying Scepticism. every dogmatic position. Varied as the paths may (1) Its re-. be, the end is in all cases the same; happiness is

lation to

cotemporary dogmatic systems.

made to consist in the exaltation of the mind above all external objects, in the withdrawal of man within his own thinking self. Moving in the same sphere as the cotemporary dogmatic systems, the post-Aristotelian Scepticism takes a practical view of the business of philosophy, and estimates the value of theoretical enquiries by their influence on the state and happiness of man. It moreover agrees with cotemporary systems in its ethical view of life; the object at which it aims is the same as that at which those systems aim-repose of mind, and

imperturbability. It differs, however, from them, none the less; for the Epicureans and Stoics make mental repose to depend on a knowledge of the world and its laws, whereas the Sceptics believe that it can only be obtained by despairing of all knowledge. Hence, with the former, morality depends on a positive conviction as to the highest Good; with the latter, morality consists in indifference to all that appears as Good to men. Important as this difference may be, it must not therefore be forgotten that Scepticism generally revolves in the same sphere as Stoicism and Epicureanism, and that in renouncing all claim to knowledge, and all interest in the external world, it is only pushing to extremes that withdrawal of man into himself which we have seen to be the common feature of these Schools. Not only therefore do these three lines of thought belong to the same epoch, but such is their internal connection, that they may be regarded as three branches springing from a common stock.

CHAP

XXII.

More than one point of a kindred nature was (2) Causes offered to Scepticism by early philosophy.

it.

The producing Megarian criticism and the Cynic teaching had taken up a position subversive of all connection of ideas, and of all knowledge. Then again Pyrrho had received from the School of Democritus an impulse to doubt. In particular the development of

1 Democritus had denied all truth to sensuous impressions. The same sceptical tone was held by Metrodorus (Aristocl. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 19, 5; Sext. Math.

vii. 88; Epiphan. Exp. Fid. 1088,
A), although he cannot be con-
sidered a full Sceptic. Scepticism
appears to have passed from him
to Pyrrho, by means of Anax-

СНАР. XXII.

the Platonic and Aristotelian speculations by those who were not able to follow them, had made men distrustful of all speculation, until they at last doubted the possibility of all knowledge. Not seldom do sceptical theories follow times of great philosophical originality. Still stronger was the impulse which emanated from the Stoic and Epicurean systems. Related as these systems are to Scepticism by their practical tone, it was natural that they should afford fresh fuel to Scepticism. At the same time the unsatisfactory groundwork upon which they were built, and the contrast between their statements regarding morality and nature promoted destructive criticism. If, according to the Stoics and Epicureans, the particular and the universal elements in the personal soul, the isolation of the individual as an independent atom, and his being

archus, and in combination with
it the Sceptical imperturbability.
This doctrine of imperturbability
being held by Epicurus, the pupil
of Nausiphanes, it might be sup-
posed that before Pyrrho a doc-
trine not unlike that of Pyrrho
had been developed in the School
of Democritus, from whom it was
borrowed by Epicurus. The con-
nection is, however, uncertain.
We have seen that the doubts of
Democritus only extended to
sense-impressions, not to intel-
lectual knowledge. The case of
Metrodorus was similar. His
sceptical expressions refer only
to the ordinary conditions of
human knowledge, that of ideas
derived from the senses; greater
dependence is, however, placed

on thought. We must therefore
take the statement ör áνTa
ἐστὶν ὁ ἄν τις νοήσαι subject to
this limitation. Anaxarchus is
said to have compared the world
to a stage-scene, which involves
no greater scepticism than the
similar expressions used by Plato
as to the phenomenal world.
However much, therefore, these
individuals may have contributed
to Pyrrhonism, a simple trans-
ference of Scepticism from Demo-
critus to Pyrrho is not to be
thought of. And as regards
imperturbability, Epicurus may
have borrowed the expression
from Pyrrho, whom, according to
Diog. ix. 64 and 69, he both knew
and esteemed.

merged in a pantheistic universe are contrasted with one another without being harmonised; among the Sceptics this contrast has given place to neutrality. Neither the Stoic nor the Epicurean theory can assert itself; neither the unconditional value of pleasure, nor yet the unconditional value of virtue; neither the truth of the senses nor the truth of rational knowledge; neither the Atomist's view of nature, nor the Pantheistic view as it found expression in Heraclitus, can be upheld. The only thing which remains amid universal uncertainty, is abstract personality content with itself, a personality forming at once the starting-point and the goal of the two contending systems.

The important back-influence of Stoicism and Epicureanism in producing Scepticism may be best gathered from the fact that Scepticism only attained a wide extension and a more comprehensive basis. after the appearance of those systems. Before that time its leading featnres had been indeed laid down by Pyrrho, but they had never been developed into a permanent School of Scepticism, nor given rise to an expanded theory of doubt.

CHAP.

XXII.

followers.

Pyrrho was a native of Elis, and may therefore (3) Purrho have early made the acquaintance of the Elean and and his Megarian criticism-that criticism in fact which was the precursor of subsequent Scepticism. But it can

1 Aristocl. in Eus. Pr. Ev. xiv. 18, 1; Diog. ix. 61. We are indebted almost exclusively to Diogenes for our information about Pyrrho. Besides Antigonus the

Carystian, Apollodorus, Alexan-
der, Polyhistor, Diocles, &c., are
the chief authorities for Dio-
genes.

CHAP XXII

hardly be true that Bryso was his instructor. To Anaxarchus, a follower of Democritus, he attached himself, accompanying that philosopher with Alexander's army as far as India. But he is, no doubt, less indebted to Anaxarchus for the sceptical than for the ethical parts of his teaching. At a later